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ABSTRACT 
Protectionism; Applying Ethics Consistently focuses on the discrepancy between 
morality amongst human beings as opposed to morality with. regard to all other life forms. 
The introduction explains important terminology, terms, methods, and goals, The 
chapters that follow examine four prominent contemporary ethical theories that extend ethics 
to protect other life forms. Each chapter presents one of the four theories, immediately 
followed by a discussion of that theory. 
The first chapter discusses the work of Tom Regan, a philosopher who asserts that 
certain non-human animals hold rights, and that people are obligated to uphold corresponding 
duties to respect these rights.. The second chapter examines the work of the philosopher Peter 
Singer, who recommends protection for some non-human animals based on sentience and 
utilitarian principles, The third chapter is dedicated to the work of Andrew Linzey, a 
theologian, who indicates a Christian obligation of servitude toward non-human animals based 
on Jewish and Christian scripture, The fourth chapter presents and examines the work of Paul 
Taylor, a philosopher who offers a theory of environmental ethics based on the inherent worth 
of certain plants and animals. 
The fifth chapter has two sections. Section A expands on Linzey's work to 
demonstrate consistency across faith traditions. Without focusing on any one tradition, this 
section highlights protectionist qualities within the Vedic/Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist, islamic, 
and Indigenous religious traditions. Section B is an exercise in consistency in applied 
philosophy, which offers an. ethical theory, the Minimize Harm Maxim, This theory is not my 
personal theory, but merely results from philosophic consistency and impartiality in applied 
ethics, based on current Western ethics regarding human life. 
The conclusion restates the ethical dilemma-a discrepancy in our current ethical 
system-and reaffirms the need for continued, ' k losophical exploration.. of ethical theory and 
practice with regard to life, tov'arc a. m. ora>; ty that is less partial and more consistent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
My dissertation addresses an ethical discrepancy that lies between our moral 
requirements regarding human beings as opposed to our moral requirements with regard 
to all other living entities. The first four chapters present and discuss four ethical theories 
that propose an extension of ethics to include certain non-human animals. In Chapter Five 
I design a theory based on the consistent application of current Western ethical standards, 
extending ethics which we now reserve exclusively for human beings to cover all life 
forms. 
The first scholar I discuss is Tom Regan, who asserts animal rights. The second, 
Peter Singer, is a utilitarian who develops a theory around maximizing pleasure and 
minimize pain. Andrew Linzey, the third scholar, is a theologian who outlines an ethic of 
obligatory servitude to God's creation (including non-human animals) based on the 
Hebrew Bible and New Testament. The final philosopher, Paul Taylor, presents a theory 
of environmental ethics to protect wild organisms, based on the inherent worth of 
teleological entities. 
Chapter Five, informed by the strengths and weaknesses of the previous four 
theories, offers an exploration of future possibilities in applied ethics with regard to non- 
human animals. This chapter presents an ethical theory that is based on the philosophic 
principles of impartiality and consistency. The result, based on the consistent application 
of our highest ethical ideals, is a significantly expanded ethic. 
1. Terminology. 
a. protectionism: The term "animal rights" pertains to only a few relevant current 
ethical theories-those that propose "rights" for animals. (Of the four prominent scholars 
included in this dissertation, only Tom Regan's theory proposes animal rights. ) "Animal 
welfare" has come to refer to those who are concerned for animals, but who remain openly 
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humanocentric in outlook and aims. "Abolitionist" has an important, historic meaning, 
which ought not to be supplanted or marginalized. "Abolitionist" refers to advocates for 
the abolition of slavery in the United States prior to the Civil War. The term 
"liberationist" carries unfortunate connotations of violence, and is committed to other 
usage. In any event, "liberationist" refers to "liberating, " and is therefore not well suited 
for the broad spectrum of ethical issues that involve non-human animals, such as sport- 
killing, habitat destruction, and "owning" companion animals. 
For these reasons the term "protectionist" seems more appropriate than any of the 
above options. "Protectionist" will refer to anyone who strives to protect non-human life 
forms, whether via animal rights, utilitarianism, theology, or environmental activism, 
whether as a liberationist or a welfarist. "Protectionism" will also refer to any ideology or 
behaviour intended to protect non-human animals from human beings. Though this term 
has a place in economics, it is so infrequently used and sufficiently different from the usage 
I propose, that confusion is unlikely. 
While many protectionists may strive to protect human beings, including the 
unborn, the term protectionist will refer specifically to those people who strive to protect 
and aid non-human entities. Similarly, the work of environmental philosophers is 
protectionist . only 
in as much as it seeks specifically to protect the lives of non-human 
living entities (as opposed to those who seek to protect other animals for the sake of 
human benefit). 
b. non-human animals: Precise language is critical. While the precise use of 
words may sometimes be tiresome to the reader, it is important for clarity. 
Accepted Western definitions of "animal" include people. Because people are 
animals I use the term "non-human animals, " or "other animals, " refers to all species other 
than Homo Sapiens. 
People commonly refer to other animals as if we ourselves were not animals-but 
we are. Artificially distancing ourselves from other animals impedes our ability to assess 
our proper moral obligations toward these other animals. Morality is often understood as 
an extension of our sympathies from those we know well to others, whom we know only 
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partially (Telfer, Food 75-6). We generally want to be good to our families, and to our 
friends. By extension human ethics protect communities, nations, and to some extent (in 
some places) all people. For this reason, when considering ethical obligations to other 
animals, it is important to remember that as mammals we are closely related to other 
animals. 
Language can make it easier for us to forget our biological connection with other 
animals. Using language correctly-acknowledging that we are included in the scientific 
definition of what it is to be an animal-reminds us of these morally relevant similarities, 
and thereby helps us to assess our rightful moral relationship with other animals. 
2. Terms. 
a. moral considerability: Entities granted moral considerability have a certain 
moral standing (Orlans 16): "if an individual has the capacity for being morally 
considered, she warrants (deserves, merits) moral consideration" (Berstein 10). Moral 
considerability carries ethical obligations for moral agents (Birch 322); moral 
considerability distinguishes those that moral agents must treat with "minimum standards 
of acceptable behaviour" (Warren 13). 
Kenneth Goodpaster introduced the notion of moral considerability in 1978, in his 
article, "On Being Morally Considerable. " His work does not discuss moral behavior, but 
rather the requirements for Q, such that Q has moral standing. "On Being Morally 
Considerable" focuses on "the breadth of the moral enterprise, " assessing the nature of 
those entities to which we owe moral obligation (308-310). Goodpaster explores the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of Q that render Q worthy of moral consideration. 
"On Being Morally Considerable" describes several distinctions relevant to 
understanding moral considerability: 
" First, moral considerability is not dependent on, and does not imply moral 
rights. Moral rights are separate, narrower, and ancillary (311). 
" Second, the issue of moral considerability does not involve moral significance. 
To determine whether or not Q has moral standing is not to determine the 
weight of that moral standing. Adjudicating competing claims is also separate 
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and ancillary (311-312). 
" Goodpaster also distinguishes between ideal versus practical ethics. What we 
are accustomed to (normative ethics) and what we are able to accomplish 
(practical ethics) as opposed to what we can ideally conceptualize. He defines 
"regulative" moral considerability, whereby Q is morally considerable, but 
where Q's moral status is overlooked, or overridden, for practical reasons 
(313). 
Though moral considerability is foundational in ethics, the specific requirements for 
moral considerability remain unclear. In Regan's theory "subjects-of-a-life" are morally 
considerable; Singer's theory reserves this privilege for "sentient beings. " In Linzey's 
theory all of creation is morally considerable, while Taylor's theory offers moral 
considerability to all natural teleological entities. Most often philosophers list mental 
faculties as primary requirements for moral considerability, such as understanding, 
intending, suffering, consciousness, or having desires and preferences (Orlans 17). Yet 
there a more rudimentary requirement for moral considerability has been suggested: 
having interests (Rollin 35). 
Generally, Western ethics recognizes all human beings as morally considerable; no 
other animals are regarded as innately morally considerable (though some are protected as 
human "property, " or through special legal status such as "game" animals or "endangered 
species"). Human beings, whether brain-dead, comatose, new-born, or on the edge of 
death, are all thought to be morally considerable in current Western ethics. Citizens 
cannot treat them just any way they please. This is not true of non-human animals. For 
instance, whereas we are not allowed to kill other people for no good reason, we can kill a 
mouse because it is bothering us, a mole because it digs a hole in our yard, a raccoon in 
order to show off its tail, a cow so that we can eat its flesh, or innumerable other animals 
simply because we choose to do so. 
For most of my dissertation I scrutinize and contrast extant theories that involve 
moral considerability. In Chapter Six I demonstrate where logic, and the consistent 
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application of current Western ethics (regarding human beings) leads with regard to our 
treatment of other life forms. I do not posit my own theory of moral considerability, or of 
morally relevant criteria concerning moral considerability. The task that I undertake is the 
consistent application of current ideals regarding moral considerability amongst human 
beings to all creatures that are similar in morally relevant ways. 
b. morally relevant distinctions: A morally relevant distinction is a distinction that 
can be made between individuals or groups of individuals that has the potential to affect 
how that individual ought to be treated. Morally relevant distinctions are central in 
determining moral considerability: legitimate determinations of whether or not an 
individual is morally considerable are based on morally relevant distinctions. 
There is no conclusive list of morally relevant distinctions. However, there is a 
good deal of discussion on the matter. Goodpaster, in "On Being Morally Considerable, " 
notes that rationality is not a morally relevant criterion. He reaches this conclusion by 
noting that if rational thought were a morally relevant criterion, then children and those 
without full mental faculties would not qualify for moral considerability, an idea soundly 
rejected by current Western ethics (314). It is not permissible to treat non-rational human 
beings in any manner one chooses-a non-rational human being is morally considerable. 
This being the case, Singer comments, "If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does 
not entitle one human to use another for his own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit 
nonhumans for the same purpose? " (Animal 7). As Singer notes, philosophical 
consistency requires that rationality either be accepted as a morally relevant criterion 
between all human beings or rejected as a morally relevant criterion between human beings 
and all other animals. 
Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer focus on sentience, the ability to feel and suffer, 
as the fundamental morally relevant criterion for moral considerability. This criterion 
includes most animals along with human beings. Other animals share neurological and 
mental faculties associated with pain in human beings; they react to pain in ways similar to 
the reactions of human beings (vocalizing, contorted body movements, attempting to 
escape); and pain offers the same evolutionary benefits to all types of animals. Singer 
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concludes, "There is no good reason, scientific or philosophical, for denying that animals 
feel pain. If we do not doubt that other humans feel pain, we should not doubt that other 
animals do so too" (Animal 15). Due to physiological similarities, if sentience is morally 
relevant amongst human beings, consistency and impartiality require that sentience be 
acknowledged as morally relevant in other creatures. 
Goodpaster agrees with Bentham and Singer, but not completely. He notes that 
sentience is a sufficient condition for moral considerability, but not a necessary condition. 
Goodpaster explains: "sentience is an adaptive characteristic of living organisms that 
provides them with a better capacity to anticipate, and so avoid, threats to life" ("On 
Being" 316). He argues that the purpose of sentience is to protect life. Although some 
organisms are not sentient, they also have circumstances and conditions that are in their 
interest, such as conditions that allow for survival and reproduction ("On Being" 316- 
317). Goodpaster argues that these broader interests, beyond sentience, are also morally 
relevant because they can be thwarted or satisfied. He highlights the "connection between 
beneficence (or nonmaleficence) and morality, " and asserts that having something be in 
one's interest is the fundamental morally relevant distinction that determines moral 
considerability ("On Being" 316,322). 
Morally relevant criteria are critical to determining moral considerability, and the 
concurrent duties of moral agents. Sentience entails an interest not to be harmed, a 
morally relevant distinction between animals and plants, that carries certain moral 
obligations for moral agents. For instance, in light of sentience, thickness of skin-but not 
skin-color-is morally relevant. The swat of a puma would wound a zebra, but it would 
kill a Tasmanian rat kangaroo; a bushy coati will be less harmed by the sting of a nettle 
than a newborn cotton rat, while an arctic shrew will weather a brisk snowstorm better 
than a wallaby. Interests of sentient individuals vary according to physiology, but only in 
degree, not in kind. What is hurtful to a newborn, or a desert animal, will not necessarily 
be hurtful to a mature or Arctic animal. The duties of moral agents, for instance the duty 
not to cause needless suffering, vary according to morally relevant criterion. 
Other distinctions may seem greater, but are also only distinctions of degree. For 
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instance, one might suggest that mammals require air, but fish do not, and therefore one 
might deprive a fish of oxygen without causing unnecessary harm. Yet both a hognose 
skunk and a barracuda have an interest in breathing oxygen. The skunk's interest cannot 
be satisfied under water, while the fish must be under water in order to absorb oxygen. A 
morally relevant distinction cannot be made between these two animals on the basis of 
their interest in obtaining oxygen. Each can be suffocated, though in different ways, and 
each has an interest in not being suffocated. However, a morally relevant distinction must 
be made regarding how the interests of each are fulfilled. A skunk must not be kept 
underwater, while a fish must not be kept out of water, if both of their lives are to be 
preserved. In contrast, a saguaro cannot be said to have an interest in obtaining oxygen, 
and a morally relevant distinction can be made between hognose skunks and barracudas on 
the one hand, and saguaros on the other, with regard to access to oxygen, but not 
concerning water, an interest shared by skunks, barracudas, and saguaros. 
Morally relevant distinctions are based on interests such as an interest in obtaining 
oxygen and water. These constitute morally relevant distinctions because they ought to be 
taken into consideration for how mammals ought to be treated. Plants have a morally 
relevant shared interest in water, but not in obtaining oxygen-a morally relevant 
distinction that ought to affect the actions of moral agents. A moral agent can put a 
saguaro in a room with no oxygen without thwarting the interests of the plant, but the 
same cannot be done with a Tasmanian rat kangaroo. Whereas many animals, including 
barracudas and skunks, are harmed if denied oxygen (morally relevant similarity), other 
entities, such as saguaros, are not (morally relevant distinction). 
Human beings have sought to identify distinctions between themselves and other 
animals, none of which are morally relevant: ability to use language, rational thought, 
culture. While the absence of these qualities in all non-human animals is debatable, it is an 
accepted truth that each of these qualities is lacking in some human beings. Current 
Western ethics does not consider the absence of language, rationality, or culture morally 
relevant amongst human beings. Those who cannot speak are neither more nor less 
morally considerable than other human beings. People who are brain-damaged so that 
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they cannot engage in rational thought are not held to be less morally considerable than 
those who are extremely bright. If these distinctions have no moral bearing between 
human beings, why would they have moral bearing between species? Philosophic 
consistency indicates that these attributes ought not to be relevant between species if they 
are not relevant between humans. 
People have also noted distinctions between human beings and other animals that 
cannot be proven true or false, such as the absence of an immortal soul. Because this 
assertion cannot be proven or disproven (in human beings or in other animals), it is not a 
morally relevant criterion. 
As yet, human beings have failed to conclusively establish any morally relevant 
distinction between all human beings and all other animals. Where there is no morally 
relevant distinction, moral agents are obliged to treat like cases in a like manner. 
c. inherent value/intrinsic worth: (Value and worth are interchangeable, as are 
inherent and intrinsic. ) Inherent value lies within an entity. An entity that has inherent 
value is both the source and the locus of its own worth or value. Inherent value "must be 
either a property of an inherently valuable natural entity or be grounded in its actual 
properties, and it must be objective and independent of any valuing consciousness" 
(Callicott, "Intrinsic" 258). 
To propose inherent value is to posit that "value inheres in natural objects as an 
intrinsic characteristic, i. e., as part of the constitution of things" (Callicott, "Intrinsic" 
261). The critical distinction is that "humans may discover such values but do not generate 
them" (Lee 299). Whether biologically or spiritually based (as indicated by E. Wilson and 
Andrew Linzey respectively), inherent value implies that an entity is an end in itself, as 
opposed to a means to an end (inherent value as opposed to instrumental value) 
(Lockwood, "End" 266). "The heart of the concept of the intrinsic value of life is the 
claim that the value of an animal is not limited to an analysis of its usefulness to humans. 
The value of something that is a means to an end is an extrinsic value" (Orlans 202). 
Some protectionist philosophers determine that having interests is synonymous with 
inherent value: "A sentient being... has intrinsic value in that it experiences what happens 
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to it as good or bad for itself' (A. Taylor 251). Thus an entity with interests would be 
granted inherent value. 
Morally speaking, what is critical about inherent value is that inherent value entails 
moral considerability (Lockwood, "End" 269). In the above example, all entities with 
interests would qualify as morally considerable. Inherent value is thus one of many means 
of determining and asserting moral considerability. However, defining inherent value and 
delineating all those entities that have (and do not have) inherent value, is an extremely 
difficult task, and one best left to those in the field of meta-ethics. 
In contemporary Western society, human beings are generally all assumed to have 
inherent value. While no morally relevant distinction between all people and all other 
animals has been adequately established, Western ethics assumes that other animals lack 
inherent value. 
d. intuition: Intuition is the "direct perception of truth, fact, etc., independent of 
any reasoning process" (Webster's). In this dissertation the term refers to "moral 
intuition, " which does not involve "second sense, " a hunch, or any similar vague inner 
motivation. "Moral intuition" refers to those truths that most people in contemporary 
Western society agree on, after reflection. For instance, there is a common moral intuition 
that the parents of a child ought to base their actions on their child's best interests, even if 
the child's best interests are costly to others. There is no law that enforces this moral 
ideal, neither is there a generally understood moral rule with regard to this ethical ideal, 
such as the Biblical commandment regarding material greed: "Thou shalt not covet thy 
neighbor's ass. " Yet moral intuition is likely to lead most of us to conclude that parents 
ought to behave in such a way as to further the best interests of their children. Thus, 
moral intuition refers to this general moral sense of what one ought to do in a given time 
and place, in a certain situation. 
e. speciesism: Speciesism is the human tendency to make distinctions between 
species based solely on species, regardless of whether or not species entails morally 
relevant distinctions. One is speciesist when "moral obligations in respect of another 
creature are sensitive to the identity of its species; if its species is the same as yours, then 
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your obligations are greater than they are when -the species is different, " irrespective of 
morally relevant criteria (McGinn 95). Those who are speciesist tend to assume that the 
interests of human beings are always favoured over the interests of any other species 
(Orlans 19). 
Philosophically speaking, speciesism is considered an illegitimate means by which 
non-human animals are denied moral consideration simply because they are not human 
beings (Orlans 20). Speciesism is analogous with racism (to make moral distinctions 
between races based on race, a criterion that is not morally relevant), and sexism (to make 
moral distinctions based on gender, which is not a morally relevant distinction). One who 
is speciesist most often assumes that human beings "are entitled to treat members of other 
species in a way that would be considered improper treatment for members of our own 
species" (Thiele 173). Those who are speciesist are apt to ignore morally relevant criteria, 
such as pain or deprivation, and determine which entities are morally considerable based 
purely on species. Those who stand against speciesism assert that one cannot determine 
moral standing based solely on species membership. 
Richard Ryder, who coined the term, blamed entrenched speciesism for current 
indifference and cruelty toward non-human animals. 
Our society takes great pains to save human life, spending millions of dollars on elaborate medical 
care for everyone from premature babies to geriatrics. At the same time, we kill billions of animals 
and birds for the quite unnecessary purpose of flesh. If a dog is unwanted, it may be taken to a vet or 
the local pound to be destroyed; no one dreams of doing the same to unwanted humans. When a 
woman breaks her leg, the doctor will tell her not to worry because in a few weeks the leg will be as 
good as new again; when an animal fractures a bone, it is quite common to kill it in order to save the 
expense of medical treatment. (Singer, "Animals" 223) 
f. living entity: "Nature, " Aristotle observed, "proceeds little by little from things 
lifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to determine the exact line of 
demarcation" (Margulis 26). 
Life is not a "thing" in itself. The Russian scientist Vladimir Ivanovich Vemadsky 
referred to life as "living matter" thereby escaping "centuries of mystic clutter attached to 
the word `life; ' ... 
life is less a thing and more a happening, a process. " (Margulis 45) 
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"... even the simplest life form respond[s] to its surroundings to preserve and protect its 
form (Margulis 50). 
A living entity is an entity that is alive and strives to maintain its existence as the type of 
entity that it is. Entities that are alive, organisms, exhibit growth through metabolism, 
reproduce, and adapt to the environment via internal change. Animals, plants, fungus, 
protistans and monerans (bacteria, pathogens, and blue-green algae) are all living entities. 
Viruses do not fit the criteria; they do not self-maintain or metabolize. Viruses only "come 
to life" when they enter another living organism. "Smaller than cells, viruses lack 
sufficient genes and proteins to maintain themselves. The smallest cells, those of the 
tiniest bacteria, " are the smallest self-maintaining entities (Margulis 23-24). For the 
purposes of my work, cells will be considered entities capable of living, while viruses are 
not. 
3. Methods. 
a. consistency and logical extremes: Consistency is critical to the philosophic 
process: "to abandon consistency as a criterion of what one permits oneself to believe is 
to abandon the examined life, personally, and Western civilization, culturally" (Callicott, 
"Environment" 25). Consistency is an important aspect of rational thought, critical to the 
philosophic process if one wishes to reach sound answers to difficult questions. 
Consistency can lead to logical extremes. One function of philosophy is to 
examine how far a point of view might be taken if one is consistent. Not how far an idea 
might "reasonably" be taken, but how far a point of view might be carried as a matter of 
philosophical consistency. Exploring the extreme edges of an argument offers five worthy 
advantages: 
" we become more aware of extremes, which might help identify a middle- 
ground; 
" the fullest implications of a theory are exposed, which allows one to examine 
side-effects and side-issues that might be associated with a given response; 
" we are better able to identify at which point the application of a particular 
principle seems to become unreasonable, and why; 
" we are better able to determine how far we are willing to pursue a certain line 
of thought, and why we are unwilling to go any further; 
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" we are forced beyond blind spots and biases, to consider new and challenging 
ideas that might otherwise be overlooked. 
For all of these reasons, logical extremes are important for assessing philosophical 
theories. My theoretical speculations in applied philosophy, presented in Chapter Five, 
examine protectionist ethics specifically to discover where protectionism might ultimately 
lead if the ideas are consistently applied and carried to their logical conclusion across 
species. My intent is to consistently apply ethical principles regarding human life to all 
life. This method necessarily results in a point of view that seems extreme, but raises 
important questions about our current philosophical attitudes regarding ethics and the 
protection of living entities, including human entities. 
When ethics regarding the value of human life are extended to non-human entities, 
and visa versa, we might well feel that the conclusions are "absurd. " For instance, most of 
us would be indignant at the thought of a business that forcibly extracts and sells the milk 
of lactating human mothers, yet few human beings are bothered by this same business 
profiting on the nursing milk of cows. 
This remarkable discrepancy seems worthy of the attention of moral philosophers. 
Is our treatment of other animals an ethical blind spot maintained by ignorance and 
economic self-interest? Few people know what transpires in a testing laboratory or in the 
egg industry. Few people know that there is absolutely no need to eat flesh or drink the 
nursing-milk of other animals. But many of us feel that we have something to gain by 
experimenting on other animals or drinking their nursing milk. 
Human beings will go to remarkable extremes to maintain human life in almost all 
instances. In contrast, we harm and destroy millions of other living entities routinely for 
the sake of such non-essential human interests as testing household products and satisfying 
the culinary preferences of those who eat eggs, meat, and cheese. It is this inconsistency 
that offends my sense of justice and leads me to examine protectionist philosophy. 
Consequently, suffering and loss of life are not the main issues; consistency is the 
focus of my work. The reason for this requires explanation. Consider the adult life of a 
May Fly, which lasts for less than one day. An adult mayfly might only live a few hours if 
01% 
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eaten by a predator. Human beings are not any different, in the long run, from mayflies. 
We live a very short time, sometimes shorter than expected. We sometimes prosper, 
sometimes live a little longer than others, but we always die. Humans have a 
comparatively short life expectancy compared with a tortoise that might live 150 years. In 
this light, our little speck of time on earth might seem as tragic, irrelevant, or laughable as 
that of the May Fly. But this is all we have. Each entity lives for a short time, often 
suffers or dies prematurely, but in any event, always dies. For this reason, suffering and 
death in themselves do not attract my ethical concern, whereas the apparent inconsistency 
in our ethics does. 
Overall, life has tremendous value to the one possessing that life. Life matters 
tremendously to each entity that lives. In some cases a given life also matters to a select 
group of other entities, such as members of a family unit or pack. (This is particularly true 
of gregarious animals such as wolves or humans. ) Yet despite our great interest in living, 
we all die, and this state of affairs is not likely to change. 
Given this truth, is our ethic-an ethic that maintains human life, under normal 
conditions, even against all odds and at tremendous cost-appropriate? Is it rational to 
hold onto life with such tenacity, to keep a human body alive that is unable to breathe, eat, 
or drink by itself just because it is a human body? Is it reasonable to sustain human bodies 
under such conditions while simultaneously destroying other animals en masse, for 
culinary pleasures and our own hoped-for medical gain? Do either of these actions make 
sense in a world that swarms with Mayflies and humans? Consistency suggests that our 
reaction to our own death and our treatment of other life forms cannot both be 
appropriate moral responses. 
This is the motivating question behind my work. It is my intention in this 
dissertation to examine the discrepancy between our extensive moral obligations to human 
life, and our comparative moral indifference toward other life forms. Should life be 
maintained even against great odds at tremendous cost, or ought we to accept our 
inevitable and constant destruction more lightly-as we do the destruction of individuals 
from other species? I offer no definitive answer, only a clearer vision of this flagrant moral 
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inconsistency. 
My work in the fifth chapter is based on current Western ethics with regard to 
human life; I extend this extensive ethic concerning human life to its logical conclusion. 
Many are apt to feel that my dissertation reaches unexpected and remarkable conclusions. 
Yet most of us would accept these "radical" conclusions in cases concerning the lives of 
human animals. This inconsistency in our application of ethics appears indefensible (as 
Tom Regan and Peter Singer aptly demonstrate). Given that we have thus far established 
no morally relevant difference between all other animals and all human beings, 
consistency requires that we apply our current ethical standards for human life to other 
life forms. 
The burden of proof against what may seem to be an "extreme" conclusion lies 
with those who falter and fail in the consistent application of accepted moral standards. In 
the absence of morally relevant differences, these ethics must carry across species. If 
consistency is maintained, it is my thesis that conclusions that seem "absurd" are in fact 
moral imperatives. 
b. impartiality: Impartiality is critical to sound ethical theories, particularly to any 
assessment of ethical standing. Justice requires an impartial application of ethics. 
Impartiality is jeopardized if the individual implementing an ethical theory has a 
vested interest. For instance, if three people have a vested interest in an inheritance, and 
one of the three is the judge determining who ought to receive the inheritance, justice is at 
risk. Similarly, if the judge in a particular case is engaged to be married to the man who is 
on trial for theft, justice is at risk. 
As these examples reveal, vested interests, emotional attachment, and a close 
affinity make impartiality difficult to maintain. When human beings assess ethical rules 
between human beings and other animals, they generally have vested interests. Human 
beings always have a close affinity to those involved: we have a particular relationship 
with the human species over and against all other species, and a vested interest in our own 
lives and the lives of those we care about. It is not possible for us to move outside of this 
position of bias-it is inherent. If we are to exact justice, we must strive to be impartial in 
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spite of our vested interests and personal connections. 
Due to our inherent human bias, we must be wary of assessing other species, 
especially assessments that are used to elevate our own ethical standing while diminishing 
the moral status of other creatures. We must examine the means we use to reach these 
conclusions, and regard any decision that favours human beings as suspicious. 
There are many examples of our failure to fairly assess other animals. Humans 
concocted tests to assess the intelligence, ethical tendencies, and sensitivities of non- 
human animals, but all were necessarily created and administered from a human 
perspective. Our first attempt to teach chimpanzees to speak provides another apt 
example. Scientists concluded that chimps did not have linguistic ability, that they lacked 
the cognitive mechanisms necessary for all but the most basic forms of communication. 
They concluded that speech is the exclusive realm of human beings, a defining 
characteristic shared by no other animal, and an important element in establishing moral 
status. However, it was later discovered that chimps lack the physiology for verbal 
speech, but can communicate effectively-beyond basic communication-via sign 
language. We are now finding that other animals, such as whales, apes, and even vervet 
monkeys, have their own complex forms of communication (M. S. Dawkins 23-24, 
Warren 53). Most philosophers no longer consider language a necessary condition for 
moral considerability, but rather a form of humanocentrism (Orlans 150): "For a variety of 
economic, religious, or other ideological reasons, it has been important to many people to 
insist on an unbridgeable gulf between humans and animals, and language has seemed the 
most promising instrument for achieving this" (Dupre 331). 
Descartes is perhaps the best example of our inability to assess other animals. He 
concluded that non-human animals could neither think nor feel (Descartes 115). Human 
understanding of pain, intelligence, communication, thought, community, learning ability, 
and ethics are based on our narrow human perspective, gained from understanding these 
aspects as parts of our own lives. Yet we persist in judging other entities, and we 
invariably find ourselves to be the most "advanced, " and the most worthy of moral 
consideration. 
Why do we need to believe that we are radically different from other animals? 
Other animals exhibit adaptive behavior and have similar central nervous systems. They 
exhibit emotional responses and live in communities. 
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... any reason we 
have to doubt the existence of the minds of animals also gives us reason to doubt the 
existence of the minds of other humans. We are faced with a choice between attributing mental states 
to animals and solipsism or skepticism concerning other minds generally. As most of us are quite 
ready to accept that other human beings have minds, then we should accept that animals too have 
minds. 
The brains of all multicellular animals, including human beings, are made of the same matter. 
The fundamental characteristic of neurons and synapses are roughly the same. ... the 
brains of small 
whales, dolphins and porpoises are close in size to those of human beings, both absolutely and in 
relation to size of body. 
... the general truth that animal 
brains are anatomically similar to our own must be accepted. And 
this gives us reason for believing that the mental events that take place "within" them are in some 
degree similar to those which occur in our own brains. (Crisp, "Evolution" 310-312). 
Not even our minds can be considered fundamentally different from the minds of 
other animals. "We now know that these three attributes-complexity, thinking and 
minding about the world-are also present in other species. The conclusion that they, too, 
are consciously aware is therefore compelling" (M. S. Dawkins 177). We are not 
distinctly different from other animals in any morally relevant way. "A culture that 
recognizes its behavioral and emotional kinship with nonhuman animals is one that is likely 
to recognize its moral kinship as well" (Bekoff 360). 
Our past assumptions and assessments say more about "scientific advancement" 
than they do about the abilities of other creatures. Methods of assessment are far from 
trustworthy even amongst our own kind. How much can we know about the cognitive or 
emotional states of other people, let alone those of other animals? It is difficult to 
visualize how we might adequately assess the diverse abilities, tendencies, and interests of 
other creatures, especially psychological tendencies and mental abilities, across species. 
Our assessments of other creatures must be acknowledged as partial and entirely 
speculative. 
Assigning moral considerability, even amongst human beings, has not been 
unanimous over time. Romans "did not include in their moral community criminals, 
captives, foreigners, or nonhumans" (Marshal 80). Only recently have African Americans 
in the United States been granted the same rights as other human beings. For centuries 
women were denied the opportunity to hold public office or vote. In light of our inability 
to be impartial with regard to assessing what other human beings ought to be granted 
(particularly when the assessor has a vested interest) disparaging assessments of other 
animals ought to be met with considerable suspicion. 
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Given the inherent epistemological difficulties, and our tendency to be biased, we 
ought to avoid assumptions regarding the mental states or abilities of other creatures. 
Where assessments must be made regarding basic interests, we ought to assume that non- 
human living entities have the same basic interests as living human entities unless 
otherwise proven. For example, maintaining one's physical being and procreating. Even 
bacterium make more of themselves in order to maintain their existence; "... the simplest 
life form respond[s] to its surroundings to preserve and protect its form. " (Margulis 13, 
50) There are four reasons for this approach: 
" to avoid the inherent epistemological difficulties in assessing cognitive or 
emotional states external to ourselves 
" for the sake of consistency-this is the manner in which we approach other 
human beings 
" to avoid bias, which is commonplace in interspecies assessments 
" because shared biology indicates that basic interests amongst living entities are 
fundamentally the same. 
In light of these philosophical standards, in the absence of any established morally 
relevant distinction, the burden of proof lies with those who would argue otherwise. 
In spite of the inherent human bias in assessing other animals, and in spite of the 
conspicuous similarities between species, humans commonly assume, without regard to 
empirical evidence, that they are the only ethical animals. This assumption is not 
supported by evidence. 
A minimum view of ethics is that it is a system of behavioural norms that generate 
expectations of behaviour and punish deviance. Other animals appear to comply with 
social expectations, and to suffer social punishments for infringements. For instance, the 
seldom heralded vampire bat provides an example of "animal decision-making... what 
looks like a system of morality based on the principle of reciprocation of favours given in 
the past, coupled with sanctions against those that do not live up to their obligations" (M. 
S. Dawkins 57). Based on observations, the same might well be true of other primates, 
canines, equines, felines, insects, and perhaps many other non-human entities (Inside). 
(This possibility is explored, and examples offered, in Chapter One). 
In the likely event that ethical systems are not exclusively human, two interesting 
possibilities follow: 
" Ethics, including human ethics, might be genetically encoded. 
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" Human ethics is but one of many ethical systems throughout the animal world. 
If the former is true, then our much-touted ethical ways are merely biology in 
action. E. Wilson argues that what we recognize as "moral sentiments" might be better 
described as "moral instincts. " Wilson asserts that if we are to understand the "deep 
springs of ethical behavior, " we must consider the "development of moral sentiments as 
products of the interactions of genes and the environment" (64). If so our moral 
behaviour is merely a genetic predisposition resulting from natural selection, rather than a 
metaphysical truth to be discovered (58-59). Wilson asserts that ethics are "far more a 
product of autonomous evolution than has hitherto been conceded" (70). While perhaps 
not all that human ethics entail can be explained through a biological analysis, Wilson's 
perspective enhances our awareness that we are animals, not so very different from other 
animals. 
If Wilson is correct, then it is likely that other species are also genetically wired 
with an ethical code. If this is the case, then philosophers working in ethics have a much 
broader field to explore than was previously assumed. If other animals are in fact ethical 
agents in as much as we are, it would seem important to our ongoing ethical exploration 
and advancement that we attempt to move outside our narrow human vision of ethics to 
comprehend this larger ethical sphere. Like the judge with a vested interest, we cannot 
maintain impartiality, or adequately assess our own ethics, unless we are able to envisage 
morality from a broader viewpoint. 
Partiality has proven a dangerous stumbling block for human morality. Though 
just another type of creature, humans are very powerful, and often make decisions that 
affect other animals. In the Southern United States 200 years ago, Caucasians enforced an 
ethical code that held only Caucasians to be morally considerable. Such power does not 
demonstrate superiority-on the contrary. As we look back to the power and abuse that 
slavery entailed, we are ashamed of our moral shortcomings. Yet, at that time many 
people found it difficult to believe that African Americans were sensitive and intelligent, 
and suffered terribly from the treatment they received at the hands of Caucasians. 
Powerful slave-owners had everything to gain by envisaging slaves as lesser, as less 
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deserving, and as ethically irrelevant. The same is now true for human beings with regard 
to all other animals. 
If we are to fairly consider our ethical obligations with respect to other animals, we 
must strive to shift our vision beyond the narrow circle of personal vested interests. 
Currently, it looks as if we have labelled ourselves as the only ethical animals, while 
exemplifying an "ethic" that translates into "might makes right. " Ethical theories ought to 
consider the interests of all morally relevant entities, regardless of color, species, assumed 
aptitude, or gender. 
After discussing the works of Regan, Singer, Linzey, and Taylor, I attempt to 
present an impartial, consistent ethical theory that reaches across species barriers. In as 
much as I succeed, I present an ethic in which humans are equal members in a world of 
morally considerable living entities. In this ethic might does not make right, all living 
entities are equal, and the value of life does not change according to species, race, or 
gender. 
In the interests of upholding the important philosophic principle of impartiality, we 
ought to perpetually question "morally relevant difference" between humans and other 
animals, always yielding the benefit of the doubt on the side of sameness, honouring the 
fact that we are all animals, and striving for consistency and impartiality. Where no 
morally relevant distinction can be securely demonstrated, we must extend our ethical 
code to include other creatures. 
d. lifeboat scenarios: Philosophers sometimes use hypothetical "lifeboat" 
scenarios, built around unlikely ethical dilemmas designed to test the farthest reaches of a 
given theory (Norton, "Applied" 127). Specific philosophic cases are often developed to 
create a particular situation in which a certain dilemma must be confronted (Orlans 42). 
Lifeboat scenarios can help us: 
" move from theory to applied philosophy 
" find the logical extremes of a given theory 
" find weak points in a theory 
" discover inconsistencies in the application of a theory 
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" move away from entrenched points of view on standard issues 
" remind us that philosophy is a process of exploration 
" find reprieve from difficult or depressing real-life issues 
Lifeboat scenarios offer an opportunity to apply theories. While it is easy to say 
that life ought to be preserved whenever possible, it is a very different matter to decide 
what that means in the unlikely event of five individuals in the middle of an ocean on a life- 
boat that can only hold four. Such a situation pushes an idea, such as the sanctity of life, 
from theory to application. Does the sanctity of life require that all die to prevent one 
from being sacrificed, or does the sanctity of life require that one sailor be sacrificed for 
the benefit of the other four? 
Lifeboat scenarios exacerbate dilemmas yet restrict answers, forcing philosophers 
to make decisions regarding extreme situations. They not only force us to apply our 
ethical ideas, but they force us to apply our ideas to very extreme, and therefore difficult, 
situations. 
Tough cases help us to assess ethical theories. Extreme situations reveal weak 
points and inconsistencies that are not revealed in the situations for which these theories 
were designed. Philosophers can only design theories within the context of their own 
experience and understanding, but lifeboat scenarios can remove theories from this 
secluded context. In the process, weaknesses and inconsistencies are apt to surface. For 
instance, in the above example let us suppose a naked mole-rat, a mouse deer, a hyrax, a 
needle-clawed bushbaby, and a Homo Sapiens occupy the four-entity raft. Regardless of 
body size and weight, only four of the five can remain. If life is valuable-which Western 
ethics currently assumes to be the case for human beings-then all life is valuable, and one 
is faced with the task of determining on what grounds an individual might be tossed 
overboard, if any. In the process, inconsistencies, weak-points, and previously undetected 
difficulties surface. 
An important role of philosophic discourse is to challenge assumptions, to allow 
the human mind to expand and explore new concepts. Hypothetical situations remove us 
from direct contact with entrenched positions on real-life issues. Lifeboat scenarios help 
21 
us to examine new situations with a measure of distance, and offer philosophers the 
opportunity to explore new possibilities. When we examine hypothetical situations, created 
by pure imagination, there is less personal investment. While philosophers tend to 
understand the implications of each scenario, a lifeboat scenario can help us to see beyond 
long-held assumptions. 
Almost any ethical theory can be made to look ridiculous in a well-crafted lifeboat 
scenario. Lifeboat scenarios remind us that the implications of any given idea are usually 
well beyond what we anticipate. This humbling fact reminds us that the essence of 
philosophy lies in grappling with the conundrum. Ideally philosophy is not a mindless 
defense of one's point of view-philosophy is a process. 
Finally, the topic of ethics with regard to animals is heavy-laden with issues of 
extreme suffering and seemingly endless, unnecessary misery. Hypothetical situations 
allow us to step away from the horrors of these real-life situations. Absurd scenarios can 
offer a reprieve from real-life horrors, and sometimes add humor to an otherwise 
distressing topic. 
The downside of Lifeboat scenarios is that they have a tendency to trivialize all- 
too-real ethical problems, and to lead philosophers away from real-life dilemmas that stand 
in dire need of attention. Lifeboat scenarios have sometimes discredited philosophy and 
log jammed the process of finding reasonable solutions to complex current dilemmas. 
Lifeboat scenarios must not stand in the way of our ability to make decisions when 
faced with real-life problems. Just because we cannot conclusively decide whether to 
cause the last flea-bitten numbat or a host of pregnant two-toed sloths to sink or swim 
does not mean that we can have nothing legitimate to say about the ethics of destroying 
eight billion chickens and turkeys strictly for a culinary predilection. The role of lifeboat 
scenarios is important to the philosophic process, but limited. In the last analysis we must 
focus on specific issues, rather than general philosophical conundrums, to reach practical 
results (Sanders 30). Ultimately lifeboat scenarios must be set aside, and we must decide 
how to act in the face of real-life ethical dilemmas. 
e. idealism: The philosophy of ethics seeks ideals. Moral philosophy is based on 
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what we ought to do, not on what people actually do. 
It is unlikely that any normal adult human being has never lied; it is unlikely that 
one exists who has never been cruel. Yet ethical theories tend to indicate that we ought 
not to lie, and that we ought not to be cruel. Most ethical theories are utopian in nature- 
they seek to present the behaviours of people in an ideal world. 
Utopian visions are one method of questioning established ways and opinions (W. 
Nelson 10). They do not violate basic "laws" of nature-the "truths" as we experience 
them, yet utopian visions transcend the present social organization (Manuel 217). Utopias 
are rooted in a hoped-for reality, an improved vision of our existence, an inspirational 
glimpse of other possibilities (Patrick108-109), but their goal is concrete and meant for 
this world. 
My work falls into this category. In the pursuit of consistency, I present a 
protectionist ethical theory that most would consider utopian. Some argue that utopian 
ethical systems are useless because they are utopian, but many famous philosophers have 
proven otherwise. 
Those who note that utopias do not exist in the real world are correct. The word 
utopia has Greek roots that mean "no place" (W. Nelson 1). Yet by visualizing a perfect 
world we are able to envisage a potential reality. Potential realities can act as catalysts to 
instigate change. Consequently, utopian visions have proven to be powerful instruments 
of reform (Manuel 217). 
Utopian visions have had a tremendous impact on our world. Karl Marx offered 
an ideal vision-a utopian world-that had a direct, deliberate and powerful influence on 
human history (Berlin 1). For Marx, his utopian vision was more real than what others 
considered "fact" (Berlin 3), and his utopian ideals have formed the economic structure of 
several nations. 
Gandhi, another idealist whose vision influenced the history of nations, also saw his 
philosophic ideal as more than a dream. He created self-sufficient rural communities 
where he, and hundreds of others could live his utopian vision, embracing poverty and 
practicing non-violence (Wolpert 295). 
23 
Gandhi argued that living up to one's own ideals is essential. Any action that is 
less than the ideal threatens the entire process. He taught that, even if we visualize the 
type of world we might like to live in, we cannot always anticipate what might be entailed 
in achieving that ideal end. "... Gandhi saw that we were liable to be mistaken not only 
about what can be done but also about the importance, in relation to our general objective, 
of what we are trying to do. In other words, we seldom know how our immediate 
objectives are related to the world that we should like to create" (Horsburgh, Non- 
Violence 42). As a consequence, Gandhi taught that we must concentrate on means and 
not ends, that means become a seed for a particular end (Horsburgh, Non-Violence 42- 
43); "if one takes care of the means, the end will take care of itself' (Political 60). 
For Gandhi, the ideal was not to be achieved at the end, but in every action of 
every moment. If one acts with hostility, then a hostile environment is created; if one acts 
with compassion, then a compassionate environment is created. If we desire peace we 
must not use military force because a peaceful end cannot be achieved through violent 
means. Gandhi's vision includes every action as morally relevant. His idealistic 
philosophy has proven extremely important , not only to India, 
but to the civil rights 
movement in the United States. 
Plato offers another example of idealism. He presents an ideal state in his Republic 
in order to elucidate the concept of justice within the individual. His utopian vision sheds 
light on the abstract concept of justice (Boyd 5). In the process, Plato reaches conclusions 
that many would consider absurd, but he maintains consistency. Furthermore, Plato fully 
expected that his theory not only could be implemented, but that it ought to be. 
Thomas More also focuses on a community in order to explore an abstract idea. 
He uses his ideal vision to present an argument for enlightened rationality (W. Nelson 8). 
His book, Utopia, deals with a host of important social, political, and religious ideas 
(Cotterill xxxix). While it is generally assumed that More did not agree with everything he 
included in his utopian community (Cotterill xl), he maintained philosophic consistency in 
his vision, and used the extreme model that he created to playfully explore where ideas 
might lead (Lewis 69). 
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Philosophers have long offered ideas as inspiration. Their utopian visions did not 
exist in the real world, but their ideas have been extremely important to philosophy, to the 
unfolding of history, and ultimately in our daily lives. From Plato to Gandhi, idealistic 
visions have a long-standing place in ethics and have left an indelible mark on civilization. 
Science and mathematics also demonstrated the value of pure ideas-ideas that do 
not exist in the real world. Concepts as simple and fundamental as the perfect triangle do 
not exist in actuality-but the science of geometry is built around these perfect, non- 
existent forms. 
One of the most dramatic examples of the application of an idea that initially 
seemed to be purely hypothetical is the number "i" or "iota. " In mathematics, iota is the 
square root of minus one. Algebra does not admit of a negative square root-this is 
impossible because any number multiplied by itself is unflinchingly positive. Yet 
mathematicians invented this impossible number, and found many ways to use this 
concept. 
Many scholars now consider iota to be "the most remarkable formula in 
mathematics, " the "unification of algebra and geometry" (Feynman 22-10). Accepting iota 
as an idea, even though it was mathematically impossible, led to the development of a 
system called "complex numbers, " which has resulted in a plethora of innovations. Today 
"complex numbers" are critical to modern engineering and physics; both would collapse 
without "complex numbers" (Halley). 
Iota is used extensively in applied mathematics and physics. For instance, today, 
the description of waves (how they move and spread) can be accomplished with or 
without the help of complex numbers. However, the description using complex numbers is 
shorter, simpler and includes some of the most beautiful constructions in all of 
mathematics. More specifically, to study the movement of electricity between the 
elements in radios without complex numbers, one must engage in a difficult study of the 
ways in which waves are shifted and distorted. With complex numbers, the problem can be 
set up so that all the waves seem to disappear and everything looks (from the mathematical 
analysis) like a simple battery and a heater. "Complex analysis, the calculus of functions of 
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a complex variable, is used daily in the design-of-aeroplane wings and electronic circuits, in 
complicated statistical analyses, in quantum theory and in the making and breaking of top 
secret military codes" (Series 139). This new system of mathematics, born of a concept 
that could not possibly exist in real life, has simplified certain areas of mathematics so 
dramatically that current work in these fields of study would be threatened without 
"complex numbers. " 
Another apt example is the science of "fractals" which was born when 
mathematicians were attempting to create idealized numerical "monsters. " Previously, 
mathematics focused on sets and functions applicable to classical calculus. Irregular sets 
or functions "tended to be ignored as `pathological' and not worthy of study... In recent 
years this attitude has changed... Fractal geometry provides a framework for the study of 
such irregular sets" (Falconer xiii). As one might expect, creating "monsters" with 
numbers was once considered an extreme and purely theoretical area of mathematics, 
irrelevant to real life. It did not prove to be so. 
These "mathematical monsters" remained abstract curiosities until Mandelbrot 
discovered "fractals, " and a new science was born. "The ideas of fractal geometry can be 
traced to the late nineteenth century, when mathematicians created shapes-sets of 
points-that seemed to have no counterpart in nature... [Mandelbrot] argued that many of 
science's traditional mathematical models are ill-suited to natural forms and processes: in 
fact, that many of the `pathological' shapes mathematicians had discovered generations 
before are useful approximations of tree bark and lung tissue, clouds and galaxies" 
(Giffin). The `abstract' mathematics that descended from these "hypothetical monsters" 
has turned out to be more appropriate than any other form of mathematics for describing 
many natural shapes and processes (Giffin). "... many of the most active uses of fractals 
are in physics, where they have helped tackle some very old problems and also some 
altogether new and difficult ones" (Mandelbrot 134). 
Fractals describe things that previous branches of mathematics could not, such as 
the distribution of branches in trees and the distribution of plants on a landscape. "Cloud 
boundaries, mountain skylines, coastlines, forked lightning... ; these, and many other 
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natural objects have a form much better described in fractal terms than by the straight lines 
and smooth curves of classical geometry" (Falconer 265). The science of fractals is now 
one of the fastest growing areas of applied mathematics. Idealized numerical "monsters" 
have come to explain real-world situations. 
There is a documented link between pure theory and applied methods; only 
through exploring the limits of current boundaries can we find new answers to perplexing 
questions. "Very often what is introduced as an 'idealized abstraction' by one generation 
becomes an indispensable necessity for the next" (Halley). As demonstrated by such 
people as King, Gandhi, and Mandelbrot, working with pure ideas that seem to have no 
application in our present worldview can have tremendous practical value. 
Both in the sciences and in the humanities people as diverse as Mandelbrot and 
Marx have demonstrated that theoretical ideals are not frivolous contrivances, but 
important channels for invention and intellectual progress. If we do not push the 
conceptual limits of our understanding, whether in mathematics or ethics, we cannot hope 
to discover alternative ways of understanding the earth or our ethical obligations. 
f. applied philosophy: My dissertation does not delve into metaethics. My work 
explores the moral life-how we ought to live-from a utopian point of view. My work 
therefore falls into the category of applied philosophy. 
One might reasonably argue that the only legitimate purpose of philosophical 
debate on moral conundrums is toward applied philosophy. Applied ethics directs 
philosophical thought "away from abstract debates and toward resolutions of urgent and 
important public controversies" (Norton, "Applied" 131). Through applied philosophy 
"moral theory has made incalculable practical differences" through such noteworthy 
people as Gotama Buddha, Marx, and Gandhi (Rollin 64). The motivating factor behind 
my work is the many grievous, real-life problems surrounding our current treatment of 
non-human animals. It has been demonstrated that "argument can prepare the ground and 
plant the seeds that may grow into new moral viewpoints and show anomalies in one's 
ordinary perspective that ready us for the possibility of a new, revolutionary shift... " 
(Rollin 46). 
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This dissertation highlights current ethical inconsistencies in the hope that greater 
awareness might bring concrete change. It is because of my interest in applied philosophy, 
because of my hope for concrete change, that I examine philosophical theory, lifeboat 
scenarios, and utopian ideals. 
Analytic philosophy dominates academic discourse, but entire branches of 
philosophy have inclined toward applied philosophy. Most notably, those areas of 
philosophy that deal with urgent conundrums and those that seek practical results, have 
focused on applied philosophy. For instance, environmental philosophy has not been 
contented with pure analysis, and for this reason it has had considerable influence over the 
way we think about the world around us, and the way we treat the environment (Marietta 
3). For some, "environmental philosophy is environmental practice, " and the two are "as 
intertwined as the human and the natural" (Klaver 68,76). Many environmental 
philosophers also consider themselves activists (Marietta 6). 
While analytic philosophy tends to dominate in the classroom, applied philosophy 
has been fundamental to Western thought at least since the time of Socrates: 
Here is one picture of philosophy. It goes on in an ivory tower pursued by cloistered academics who 
endlessly dispute the contemporary equivalents of question like "how many angels can dance on the 
head of a pin? " It is far removed from the "real world, " even when philosophers spin theories about 
what is "real. " (In the real world, everyone knows what's real, without needing philosophers to 
inform or misinform them. ) Here is another picture of philosophy. Socrates is hauled into court and 
sentenced to death-not for anything he might have done, such as sell state secrets to the 
Lacedaimonians or assassinate Kleon-but for questioning religious ideas and moral ideals, thus 
bringing about the precipitous transformation of Athenian society. In the first picture, philosophy 
seems socially irrelevant. In the second it seems to be the most potent force of social change 
imaginable. (Callicott, "Environmental" 19) 
Plato's Republic was devoted to practical ethics (N. White 2). He believed that the 
ideal city he described was not just the best possibility but a real possibility (Grube xiii). 
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Plato believed that the fruits of philosophy could only be found in real life; he was 
"absolutely convinced that philosophy holds the key to human happiness and welfare" 
(Grube xi). Because he was convinced that only through practical philosophy could the 
evils of society be solved, Plato believed that philosophers ought to rule, or that rulers 
ought to become philosophers (Republic 473 c-d). Though his ideas failed him in practice, 
Plato believed his ideas could be beneficially applied to an actual situation, namely that of 
Sicily in 368 BCE. 
Like Socrates and Plato, Aristotle was concerned with applied philosophy. In 
Book I of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states his focus: "an investigation of social and 
political matters" (1094b). 
Rationality was extremely important to Aristotle-he believed that rationality set 
humans apart from all other animals, and made us uniquely human. But it was not just 
thinking rationally that mattered to Aristotle; humans had to act rationally. Reason was a 
guide to leading a "good" life. For Aristotle, it was "the very activity of living a good life 
that [was] in itself the end" (Ostwald xvii). 
Historically speaking, Western philosophy has been applied philosophy as far back 
as we can trace. Still today we cannot separate philosophy from the world of action. 
Philosophy is a "human product, " and each individual philosophizes with more than just 
reason. We use our will, feelings, "flesh and blood, " our "whole soul and... whole body" 
(Stern 6). Philosophy is only partly thought, it can result in concrete action that affects our 
lives and our world. 
Existentialism carried the idea that the whole person must be engaged in the task of 
applied philosophy. Existentialism taught that each individual is responsible for asserting 
her own destiny (Whal 22), which made philosophical questions "personal, urgent, and 
anguished" (Blackham 152). Existentialism teaches that philosophy is critical to each 
individual's life, and that existentialism ought to be used "in facing the decisions of our 
personal lives and the problem of our civilization" (Blackham 165). 
Kierkegaard referred to Existentialism as the "philosophy of existence" (Whal 1). 
He "insisted that philosophy should not be abstract, but based on personal experience, " the 
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basis of each individual's life (Roubiczek 55). Existential philosophy is connected with 
one's own life experience, is lived in an historical context, in a particular situation. 
Existential philosophy "is a way of life... capable of being lived" (Roubiczek 10). 
The existentialist, Marcel, taught that existence is "not a problem to be mastered... 
but a mystery to be lived and relived" (Blackham 152). Heidegger encouraged living a life 
of transcending, passing beyond, rising outwards "towards the world, towards the future, 
and towards other people" as the proper end toward which we are all directed (Whal 15). 
His moral theory requires a "resolute decision, " by which we assume responsibility for our 
own destiny (Whal 26-27). 
Jaspers and Sartre also taught that philosophy must move beyond ideas to concrete 
action. Sartre wrote, "Commit yourself! " (Heinemann 129), "there is no reality except in 
action, " and each of us is no more than the life we live (Odajnyk xi). Existentialism is a 
philosophy that means little or nothing if it is not applied philosophy. 
Marxism, measured by its "power of action" (Odajnyk 86), also offers a model of 
applied philosophy. Marx believed that the point of his philosophizing was no less than to 
change the world (Odajnyk 59). "The first commandment of Marxist morality consists in 
this: to participate with all strength in the struggle of the proletarian whose class 
assignment is identical with the liberation of all mankind" (Odajnyk 127). The philosophy 
of Karl Marx has been applied by millions of people, has had tremendous affect on the 
unfolding of history, and continues to determine political, economic, and social aspects of 
the world in which we live. 
Martin Luther King also engaged in applied philosophy. He taught that there was 
no morally relevant difference between African Americans and Caucasians, and that as a 
consequence they ought both to be covered by the same ethical system. This change was 
difficult to realize because it required. great financial sacrifices and tremendous lifestyle 
changes for those in power. But this more consistent application of ethical protection was 
accomplished in the real world, based on an extension of an ethical theory across races 
because they were similar in morally relevant ways: African slaves can suffer emotionally 
and physically from abuse and deprivation just as surely as Caucasians. Slowly but surely 
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we recognized that all people ought to be protected if Caucasians were protected, but this 
philosophical truth would have seemed comparatively irrelevant if it had not become 
applied philosophy . 
Western philosophy has had a significant element of applied philosophy, philosophy 
intended to affect how people behave in the world for at least 2300 years. The Ancient 
Greeks, existentialists, Marx, and King advocated applied philosophies that influenced the 
lives of many individuals, communities, and even nations. Recently, philosophical 
discourse on our relation to other animals and the environment has had a significant effect 
on the way we view the world around us (Marietta 10). 
While I present a utopian theory in Chapter Five, my dissertation is fundamentally 
one of applied philosophy, aimed at real-life issues and practical change. 
g. across disciplines: Applied philosophy is dependent on our "knowledge" 
because human "facts" are relevant to how we behave. Consequently, applied philosophy 
requires that we combine these "facts" with philosophical speculation in order to 
determine the best course of action. Applied philosophy asks: Given our understanding 
of the world around us, what ought we to do? 
Most modern philosophers agree that one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is. " 
However, there is considerable consensus that certain "facts" are critical to any 
determination of the best course of action. For instance, if biology indicates that spotted- 
tailed quolls are capable of suffering, and ethics indicates that causing others to suffer is 
morally abhorrent, then we ought not to cause spotted-tailed quolls to suffer. However, if 
science indicates that the spotted-tailed quoll is incapable of suffering, then this ethical 
teaching is irrelevant with regard to the spotted-tailed quoll. In this instance, the 
knowledge of biologists is critical to moral assessment. If chemists determine that our 
water is polluted, then moral philosophy asks what we ought to do with regard to this 
information. Similarly, the conditions and activities in laboratories and factory farms are 
morally relevant "facts. " 
Consider the moral dilemma entailed in patenting other animals. This issues 
involves genetic engineers, religious and secular values that have shaped our policies and 
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morality, biological understandings of pain and suffering, and the economic forces 
involved (Orlans 100). Experts and available information in each relevant field of study 
are critical to answering moral questions. My dissertation asks, given the current state of 
affairs with regard to animals in the Western world (a "fact"), what ought we to do? 
One need not be a specialist to apprehend the "facts" that are relevant to many 
moral decisions. For instance, if we know that an infant is cold, and that the parent is 
nearby, these facts lead most of us to the conclusion that the parent ought to warm the 
child. Similarly, if someone were stuck in quicksand, most people would agree that those 
nearby ought to free the one stuck. However, additional facts might alter our conclusion. 
For example, if the one stuck in the mud was not in danger of death, and was an escaped 
convict, perhaps one ought to leave the convict until authorities arrive. 
While facts cannot be depended on to lead us to clear ethical conclusions, we can 
and do reach ethical decisions based on certain assumed "facts. " Facts often constitute 
minor premises for ethical discourse while the philosophy of ethics supply the major 
premises. Both are important. 
Furthermore, in order for philosophical assertions of "ought" to be applicable, they 
must be informed by our larger understanding. If they are not aligned with how we 
perceive our world, our ethical assertions are irrelevant to the world in which we live, and 
irrelevant to each of us. In order to shape values and guide actions, applied ethics must be 
based on relevant information from other fields of study. Because general information and 
"facts" from other fields of study are important to ethical decisions, my dissertation 
involves several fields of study. 
Our worldview is developed partially by the fields of study we are introduced to in 
school. These schools of thought are, in turn, affected by our worldview, which is shaped 
by such things as education, upbringing, and cultural context. Worldviews are "an ever- 
changing complex of beliefs, values, feelings, desires, and expectations that affect the way 
a person sees the world and how that person feels about things in the world" (Marietta 8). 
They make us who we are-and determine how we behave. Worldviews "work behind the 
scenes, " subtly, bringing us to a certain point of view or attitude, even though most of us 
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are unaware of our particular worldview (Marietta 8). Moral norms depend on a 
"cognitive context, " or worldview, and our behaviour reflects this worldview (Callicott, 
"Environmental" 25). 
For instance, in Western societies "deeply entrenched traditions support the notion 
that animal welfare must bow to the best interests of humans" (Lauerman 49). Various 
factors have been critical in the development of this entrenched position, and these various 
factors must be examined if we are to reassess our ethical standards. Therefore, an 
examination of ethical conduct must not be done in a vacuum. 
In our culture, an examination of ethics and animals might need to consider 
information collected by zoologists, biologists, and sociologists. Each of these fields of 
study would be considered important to an exploration of protectionist philosophy because 
we must understand something of our biological and social nature, and that of other 
animals, if we are to assess ethical obligations with regard to people and other animals. If 
we have no information regarding other animals, we cannot determine whether or not they 
are sentient, or whether or not they mind if we eat their young for dinner. 
Each of the theories discussed depends on the expertise of other disciplines: social 
science, biology, religious studies, and environmental ethics. Regan and Taylor discuss 
rights, a discipline most commonly linked with the social sciences. Each philosopher 
discusses the biological nature of various living entities. Each theory discussed is linked 
with environmental philosophy. Regan states that the conditions for the ascription of 
rights in his theory are not necessary but merely sufficient conditions: his work opens the 
doors for more expansive theories that might include a plethora of living entities. Linzey's 
theological protectionist theory offers metaphysical backing for a wholly comprehensive 
environmental theory, where all of creation is treated with self-sacrificing service out of 
respect for the intentions of a divine creator. Taylor, an environmental philosopher, offers 
an overtly environmental theory. 
In examining our relationship with other animals, including our ethical obligations 
and the legal status of animals, we cannot reasonably ignore the importance of other 
disciplines, such as ethology and theology. While the biological links are readily apparent 
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in our science-oriented culture, links with religion are often more difficult to see, yet faith 
and scripture are critical to moral attitudes and practices-and have been for thousands of 
years. Our attitudes toward nature and other animals are deeply conditioned by beliefs 
about our nature and destiny-that is, by religion" (L. White 23). While many-modern 
Westerners may not ascribe to any particular religion, our culture and our beliefs are 
rooted in Christian history and practice; "religion arose on a foundation of ethics" (E. 
Wilson 65). An understanding of our deep-rooted religious beliefs, and of the religious 
influences imbedded in current laws and practices, is critical to any examination of our 
relations with the rest of "creation. " Understanding the moral influence of religion is 
central to assessing protectionist ethics. 
Applied philosophy cannot ignore the force of centuries of religious influence. For 
Christians or Jews, a protectionist examination of the Hebrew Bible and New Testament is 
especially important; scriptures are central to their determination of ethical obligations. 
For a practicing Christian, Jew, or Hindu, scriptures are often more important than any 
biological or philosophical inquiry or assertion. This is true for most people committed to 
faith-traditions. 
The historical effects of centuries of theology, how scripture and religious dogma 
continues to hold sway over societal beliefs and actions-even in secular societies- 
cannot be ignored by applied philosophy if we expect to fully understand current ethics. 
Religious traditions are an unavoidable part of our ethical systems, our worldviews, and 
our legal systems, whether or not we are religious. One who seeks an honest assessment 
of our ethical practices must be mindful of deep-rooted, historic beliefs based on 
traditional religious teachings. Consequently, one of the protectionist scholars I examine 
is a theologian. 
We determine "facts" about the world around us via such channels as mathematics, 
science, scripture, art, and our senses. All of these are important to apprehending the 
world around us, from which we derive our understanding of what we ought to do. 
However, these fields of study, and our senses, cannot determine what we ought to do. 
Mathematics, science, and our senses can only aid us in the philosophic process by offering 
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information for consideration. Applied philosophy is dependent on other fields of study 
for their particular expertise. 
i. casuistry: Casuistry is a method of moral discourse that reflects on actual 
problems in specific instances, examining problems in light of relevant accepted maxims 
and similar cases from the past, in--order to reach an informed moral judgment regarding 
that particular situation (Jonsen 1991). The word casuistry comes from the Latin casus, 
which means 'case. ' Casuistry is therefore the study of cases. 
Casuistry resolves moral problems in specific situations by applying general 
principles of ethics, religion, or moral philosophy to particular, concrete cases. It is often 
necessary to determine degree of guilt and responsibility by weighing all the circumstances 
of the case, especially motive and consent (Runes 46). In turn, that particular moral 
dilemma becomes part of the case history, the precedent, with which other moral 
judgments are made in similar cases in future situations. 
Casuistry is important to my work for three reasons: 
" casuistry focuses on particular circumstances in specific situations 
" casuistry is dependent on like cases being treated in a like manner 
" motive and consent are important moral considerations 
First, casuistry avoids the abstractions common in moral theories, and 
acknowledges the importance of the individual case in moral reasoning and practical 
application. "Casuists are skeptical of principles, rules, rights, and theory divorced from 
history, circumstance, and experience. One can make successful moral judgments... 
casuists say, only when one has an intimate understanding of particular situations and an 
appreciation of the record of similar situations" (Orlans 43). 
Second, casuistry assumes the principle of equality, whereby comparable instances 
are treated in a comparable manner, and the principle of universality, whereby a decision 
made in one instance will hold for all comparable cases (Buning 20). Casuists reason from 
one particular case to another that is similar in morally relevant ways. Certain cases set a 
precedent by which other similar cases will be judged in future instances. "The casuistic 
method is to start with cases whose moral features and conclusions have already been 
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decided, and then to compare the salient features in the paradigm case (that is, the case 
with morally settled dimensions) with the features of cases in need of a decision" (Orlans 
43). All things being equal, a case of theft ought to be treated like another case of theft. 
One who steals an ear of corn -ought to 
be treated the same. -as one who steals an eggplant, 
all things being equal. 
However, all other things are seldom equal, which leads to the third element of 
casuistry that is important to my work: motive and consent are critical. One common 
philosophical conundrum is the thief who steals to feed the starving. Let us assume that 
the one who steals the ear of corn does so simply because she does not want to pay for her 
food. In contrast, the one who steals the eggplant does so to feed her starving husband, 
who is too ill to fend for himself, and she is too poor to buy food. Casuistry acknowledges 
the morally relevant difference between a thief who steals out of indifference or for self- 
gain, and one who steals for a higher ideal-in the hope of preserving life. No one argues 
with the maxim, "stealing is immoral, " but casuistry acknowledges the importance of 
circumstances, motive, and intent in assessing morality. 
4. Goal. 
I caution readers to understand and remember my goal as they read my work: My 
dissertation is not a presentation of my own personal theory. My work addresses a 
flagrant moral discrepancy between what is morally permissible amongst people, and 
what is morally permissible between people and all other forms of life. 
In the first four chapters I analyze leading protectionist theories. I then use these 
theories as a springboard from which to launch: 
" an expanded spiritual vision that emphasizes consistency across religious 
traditions in protectionist morality. 
"a protectionist theory based on the consistent and impartial application of 
current Western morality amongst human beings, which therefore extends 
current Western morality intended solely for human beings to all non-human 
entities that have not been proven to be different in any morally relevant ways. 
The latter might easily be construed as my personal theory, but it simply represents 
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one possible method of removing the extreme moral discrepancy that exists between 
current Western ethics amongst humans as opposed to current Western ethics between 
humans and all other animals. 
After creating a theory that extends current Western ethics amongst human beings 
to all living things that are similar in morally relevant ways, I apply this moral theory to 
current ethical dilemmas and lifeboat scenarios, always with intent maintain consistency 
and impartiality. The consistent application of this ideal across species offers insights into 
the viability (or lack of viability) of this contemporary moral ideal. Thus, Chapter Five 
explores one way we might eliminate the current moral discrepancy that I highlight 
throughout my work. At the end of my dissertation other possible solutions are briefly 
presented and discussed. 
Please note that the theory I present is not my personal theory, but a consistent 
application of extant morality. My work merely maps out what this ethic would look like 
if applied consistently to all entities that have not been demonstrated to be distinct in any 
morally relevant way. 
Although my dissertation offers a critical analysis of the most well-known and 
well-respected protectionist theories available, ultimately I hope that my dissertation 
affirms the value of the contribution each of these scholars has made to our ongoing quest 
for a more consistent, compassionate morality. 
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I. TOM REGAN: ANIMAL RIGHTS 
A. Regan 's Right's View. 
Tom Regan proposes the "Rights View, " in which he asserts that certain animals 
have basic rights that ought not to be disregarded. He asserts that normal mammals aged 
one year or more have a welfare, which is necessary for all subjects-of-a-life that have 
equal inherent value. He outlines several well-respected philosophical guidelines for 
assessing moral theories, which he uses to test his Rights View: consistency, impartiality, 
and conformity with reflective intuitions (Case 190). 
Regan avoids speciesism in its most flagrant forms by identifying and discussing 
moral agents, moral patients, and subjects-of-a-life. Through these creative and well- 
thought-out distinctions Regan avoids typical speciesist divisions between "human beings" 
and "animals, " and discusses a range of morally relevant characteristics across species. 
1. Inherent Value. 
a. the cup itself: Regan bases animal rights on the inherent value of certain 
individuals. Inherent value is not based on experiences, aptitude, or any other acquired or 
innate characteristic. Regan uses the analogy of a cup to illustrate his point: like a cup 
filled with various items, the cup itself is what matters, not the contents. If an individual is 
of value, Regan postulates, she is of value in and of herself-she is both the source and the 
locus of inherent value. To have inherent value one need only be a cup (Case 236-7). 
Inherent value is not dependent on what others prefer, or on any particular qualities 
possessed. Inherent value cannot be earned or lost. 
Regan argues that if the contents-aptitude or experiences-are what offer value 
to an individual, that entity becomes a "mere receptacle" for those qualities. When 
humans are viewed as empty cups with valuable ingredients, such as "Virtues, " then those 
who are more gifted, or more active, have comparatively higher value. Regan denounces 
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this "perfectionist" approach (Case 233) because it runs against reflective intuition, one of 
his basic measures of assessing ideal moral judgments (Case 235-b). 
b. reflective intuition and perfectionist criterion: "Reflective intuition" requires 
that we apply an informed, critical eye to all intuitions. Perfectionism is fundamentally 
undesirable to our basic intuition. (Perfectionism is when one assigns various degrees of 
inherent value based on acquired or biological attributes of the individuals involved. 
Regan cites racism and sexism as examples of perfectionism in action. Regan writes that 
informed intuition leads one to reject valuing moral agents based on perfectionist attributes 
such as intelligence or earned income. ) Regan concludes that inherent value must be based 
on the cup itself (the individual), and not on the items inside the cup (aptitude, skin color, 
experience, length of toes, income, education, etc. ) 
c. equality of inherent value: Regan asserts that if individuals have inherent value, 
they all have it equally. Having rejected perfectionist criteria, all those who have inherent 
value must share this attribute equally. There can be no entity that is more or less 
inherently valuable than another. He argues that moral intuitions warn us that degrees of 
inherent value are perfectionist, and have led elitist attitudes such as those held by slave 
owners or members of the Ku Klux Klan. 
2. Welfare. 
Regan argues that certain individuals have a welfare: they fare well or ill 
depending on how their interests are benefited or harmed during the course of their lives. 
In the Rights View, all animals (normal mammals aged one year or more-including 
people) have a "welfare. " Regan agrees that humans have more numerous and varied 
possibilities than other animals, but 
[b]oth animals and humans have preference-and welfare-interests, some biological, some 
psychological, some social; both may be benefited or harmed and, if the latter, harmed either because 
of what they are made to experience (harms as inflictions) or because of what they are denied (harms 
as deprivations); both have lives that are characterized by pleasure or pain, satisfaction or frustration; 
and the overall tone or quality of the life of each, to a greater or lesser degree, is a function of the 
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harmonious satisfaction of those preferences that it is in the interests of each to have satisfied (Case 
119) 
a. psychophysical identity: Regan explains that animals with a welfare have a 
"psychophysical identity. " This means that normal mammals aged one year or older have 
desires, beliefs, and the ability to act; they have "preference autonomy" (Case 116) which 
entails wants, desires, and preferences which each strives to fulfil. 
b. Preference autonomy: Regan offers examples of preference autonomy in other 
animals. A dog will choose between different types of food, or between various activities, 
selecting the option that best satisfies her wants (Case 85). Dogs also avoid what they do 
not prefer. For instance, Regan would probably agree that a dog presented with both a 
rolled up newspaper used for punishment and a leash used for dog-walks, would most 
likely move away from the paper roll and toward the leash. The newspaper roll elicits 
dog-behaviour indicative of avoidance and displeasure, such as cowing or slinking away; 
the leash is greeted with enthusiasm displayed through tail wagging, prancing, and jumping 
up and down. The dog's actions demonstrate a preference for the leash and distaste for 
the rolled up paper. Predictably, the dog would rather go for a walk than be punished. 
She demonstrates her belief that the leash will satisfy her wants, whereas the newspaper 
will not. In either case the chosen option will elicit behaviour identifiable as either joy or 
unhappiness, satisfied wants or thwarted desires. Dogs indicate their preference, and 
thereby demonstrate "preference autonomy. " 
c. benefits and harms: In Regan's theory, welfare is determined by "benefits" and 
"harms. " In the above case the dog benefits by going for a walk if her biological, social, 
and psychological interests have been satisfied, and if her interests are genuinely good for 
her. (Obviously, if there is no safe place for the dog to walk, then going for a walk is not 
in her best interest. Other examples of interests that are not genuinely good for the 
individual are when a dog wants chocolate, or when a pony wants unlimited grass, which 
is usually deadly in the pony's case. ) Under Regan's definition, if most of the time a dog is 
given what she prefers, and if what she prefers is good for her, she is living well, and will 
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display behaviour indicative of pleasure and satisfaction. 
For an animal that has a welfare, Regan asserts: 
To live well is to have a life that is characterized by the harmonious satisfaction of one's desires, 
purposes, and the like, taking account of one's biological, social, and psychological interests. More 
generally, animals (including humans) live well relative to the degree to which (1) they pursue and 
obtain what they prefer, (2) they take satisfaction in pursuing and obtaining what they prefer, and (3) 
what they prefer and obtain is in their interests. (Case 117) 
As revealed above, harms can be either inflictions or deprivations (Case 94). The 
random, harsh use of the newspaper on a dog would most likely qualify as an infliction of 
harm, while repeatedly neglecting to walk the dog would be viewed as harm through 
deprivation. In either case the animal's welfare is diminished. 
3. Moral Agents and Moral Patients. 
Regan distinguishes between moral agents and moral patients. Moral agents are 
morally accountable for their actions, and so are "justly and fairly held accountable for 
their deeds" (Case 152). In contrast, moral patients lack the ability to understand or 
execute moral behaviour. Therefore moral patients cannot do right, nor can they do 
wrong (Case 152). A variety of animals including human infants and imbeciles fall into the 
moral-patient category. Regan assumes that "normal adult humans are moral agents" 
(Case 152). 
a. inherent value: Regan asserts that both moral patients and moral agents have 
inherent value. To grant inherent value only to moral agents would violate the basic 
philosophical principle of consistency and impartiality, which requires that like cases be 
treated in like manner (Case 190). Inherent value is granted to moral agents without 
regard for experiences or aptitudes, therefore it would be inconsistent and arbitrary to use 
the criteria of experience or aptitude in order to exclude moral patients: 
Since the inherent value of moral agents does not wax or wane depending on their comparative 
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happiness or their total of pleasures-over-pains, it would be arbitrary to maintain that moral patients 
have less inherent value than moral agents because they (i. e., moral patients) have less happy lives or 
because their total of pleasures-over-pains is less than that of moral agents-even if this were true... 
Morality will not tolerate the use of double standards when cases are relevantly similar. If we 
postulate inherent value in the case of moral agents and recognize the need to view their possession of 
it as being equal, then we will . 
be rationally obliged to do the same in the case of moral. patients. A11 
who have inherent value thus have it equally, whether they be moral agents or moral patients. All 
animals are equal, when the notions of `animal' and `equality' are properly understood, `animal' 
referring to all (terrestrial, at least) moral agents and patients, and `equality' referring to their equal 
possession of inherent value. inherent value is thus a categorical concept. One either has it, or one does not... Moreover, all those who have it, have it equally. Case 240) 
b. welfare: Both moral patients and moral agents have a welfare. Both fare 
poorly or well depending on the fulfilment of interests-their welfare is harmed and 
benefited during the course of their lives. Moral patients, like moral agents, have a welfare 
that can be harmed in similar ways. Because they can be harmed in similar ways, 
impartiality and consistency require that both moral agents and moral patients be protected 
if either one is to be protected (Case 189). 
Regan finds that welfare reveals an important similarity between non-human 
animals and humans, between moral patients and moral agents-a similarity that is critical 
to understanding each (Case 84). In Regan's view elements that constitute a good human 
life "over and above considerations of basic biological needs, " have a counterpart for other 
animals (Case 90). Although Regan states that the opportunities for satisfaction are more 
varied and numerous for human beings, other animals can be harmed in relevantly similar 
ways, and the welfare of other animals carries important moral implications. Regan 
concludes that it is wrong for humans to do to another animal "what he or she does not 
want done, " and the immorality of such an act is not lessened "if our victims are non- 
rational, or not morally autonomous. What difference does it really make whether or not 
they have or could have a principled objection to our behaviour? If they have no will in 
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the matter I do not violate their will, but I clearly violate their wishes" (Animals 77). 
c. moral considerability: Even if individuals cannot rationally articulate distaste 
for what is done to them, even if they cannot make moral decisions, an entity with a 
welfare ought to be accepted as morally considerable. Regan asserts that we ought to 
consider how a given action will impact all mammals that have a welfare-not just human 
beings ("Nature" 9). If we are to be consistent, all beings with a welfare ought to be taken 
into account if we are to consider any beings with a welfare. To do otherwise is to go 
against basic guidelines for moral theories; to do otherwise is to be inconsistent and 
partial. "We have a prima facie direct duty not to harm any relevantly similar individual 
who can be harmed" (Case 193-4). Morality requires that we assess the loss of each 
individual equitably if we are to honour "equal inherent value and the equal prima facie 
right not to be harmed" of all subjects-of-a-life (Case 325). In the course of making 
decisions that might affect welfare, we must consider all entities that have a welfare and 
therefore might be a affected. 
In the Rights View both moral patients and moral agents have a welfare and both 
therefore have equal inherent value (Case 239). But how might we determine which 
individuals do not have inherent value? 
While both moral agents and moral patients have life, " Regan sees problems with this 
criterion: how can we have duties to "individual blades of grass, potatoes, or cancer 
cells... lawns, potato fields, or cancerous tumors? " (Case 241-242). Regan asserts that 
beings with inherent value must share some "relevant similarity between them that makes 
attributing inherent value to them intelligible and non-arbitrary" (Case 241). This criterion 
must not vary between individuals, "since that would allow their inherent value to vary 
accordingly" (Case 241). 
4. Subject-of-a-life. 
Regan postulates "subject-of-a-life" as the relevant similarity that grants an 
individual equal inherent value: 
To be the subject-of-a-life is to be an individual whose life is characterized by... beliefs and desires; 
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perception. memory. and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together 
with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference-and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in 
pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time. and an individual welfare in 
the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility 
for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests. Those who 
satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of value-inherent value- 
and are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles. Case 243) 
Regan admits that there may be many who do not fit the subject-of-a-life criterion 
who ought to be acknowledged as having inherent value (such as new-born and severely 
retarded humans), and that these exclusions run against our reflective intuitions. 
Consequently, he poses "subject-of-a-life" merely as a sufficient condition for equal 
inherent value, not as a necessary condition (Case 246). 
Regan limits his scope of ethical protection to "normal mammalian animals, aged 
one year or more" (Case 190), all of which he asserts are subjects-of-a-life. (When he 
refers to "animals, " this is the category to which he refers. ) He justifies this particular 
division not because creatures that fall outside this category are logically excluded from 
having rights, but because he finds that the rights of those within this category can be 
clearly justified-based-on definable, -morally relevant traits. 
5. Harm Principle. 
Based on equal inherent value for all subjects-of-a-life, Regan derives the "harm 
principle" (Case 262-263). The "harm principle" requires that we treat subjects-of-a-life 
in ways that show respect for their inherent value. Regan's "harm principle" states that 
individuals who have equal, inherent value also. have .a welfare and are 
due the prima facie 
right not to be harmed (Case 186-7). Regan's "harm principle" demands that a subject-of- 
a-life never be treated merely as a means to an end. Moral agents have a duty to treat 
subjects-of-a-life justly, and to assist them if their inherent value is not respected (Case 
249). 
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The harm principle, a principle that sets forth a prima facie direct duty not to harm either moral 
agents or patients, can be derived from the respect principle... when we note that (1) those 
individuals who satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion are individuals who are intelligibly and non- 
arbitrarily viewed as meriting respect because they are intelligibly and non-arbitrarily viewed as 
possessing inherent value, and that (2) as subjects-of-a-life, all have an experiential welfare. Prima 
facie, therefore, we fail to show respect for these individuals when we do anything that harms them. 
(Case 264-5) 
a. Subjects-of-a-life: In Regan's Rights View, subjects-of-a-life hold the prima 
facie right to not be harmed; this right carries a duty for human moral agents. Normal 
mammals aged one year or more are subjects-of-a-life and therefore have the moral 
right-or valid claim-to be treated with respect. The right of a subject-of-a-life not to be 
harmed is universal, which is to say that it is held by all "relevantly similar individuals" 
(Case 327) and can only be overridden by appeal to a valid moral principle. Regan's 
"respect principle " grants equal respect to all those who have equal inherent value and 
thereby avoids arbitrary or inconsistent determinants of value. Regan's thoughts might be 
summarized as follows: Subjects-of-a-life can be harmed, and are therefore due inherent 
respect, which requires that they not be treated as means to an end Moral agents have a 
corresponding direct duty to respect the unacquired moral right not to be harmed held by 
all subjects-of-a-life, and to aid subjects-of-a-life whose basic right to respectful 
treatment is violated (Case 249). 
b. death: Because deprivation constitutes harm, bringing about an untimely death 
is a tremendous harm in the Rights View. Death "forecloses all possibilities of finding 
satisfaction" (Case 100). Even a painless, purposeful death is a loss, and thereby a great 
harm to the deceased, if it is untimely. Death may be brought to another without 
constituting harm only if 
" euthanized animals are killed by the least painful means available; 
" they are killed in the true belief that death is in their interests; and 
" they are killed out of concern for them and for what is in their interests (Case 
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1 19). 
6. Overriding Rights. 
Regan identifies and makes ethical decisions regarding three instances in which a 
subject-of-a-life's prima facie, unacquired right not to be harmed may be overridden 
a. miniride: The "miniride principle" (from "minimize overriding principle") 
asserts that the rights of the few may be overridden for the rights of the many, all things 
being equal. 
For instance, if one miner is trapped in a shaft, and will be killed if explosives are 
used to free fifty other miners (who are also trapped), the one ought to be killed if only by 
killing the one will the fifty be saved. The miniride principle indicates that we ought to act 
to save fifty miners at the expense of one. Morality requires that we override a minimum 
of rights (Case 307): it is better to override only one individual's right not to be harmed 
than to override the same rights for fifty people. 
b. worse-off The "worse-off principle" allows the rights of the many to be 
overridden for the rights of the few if "the harm faced by the few would make them 
worse-off than any of the many" (Case 328). 
If one choice of action will destroy an individual's life while a second choice will 
simply make another person uncomfortable, then the first person's life should be spared 
and the second allowed-or even caused-to suffer. Similarly, if one thousand people 
would be caused to suffer by saving a single individual, then it is the best option to cause 
more-even one thousand-to suffer lesser harms than to severely harm one individual 
(Case 308-9). 
What if one had to choose between creating an explosion that would kill a single 
miner and rescue fifty, or slowly digging the trapped people out over the course of a 
week-even though they would be without food during this time? Regan's Rights View 
seems to indicate that the fifty ought to suffer the harm of hunger for one week in the hope 
that one might avoid the harm of death. Hunger is a lesser harm for each of the fifty than 
death is to the individual in the adjacent shaft. 
c. loss of innocence: Regan adds a further mitigating principle for the prima facie 
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right not to be harmed: "those who forge, as well as those who perpetuate injustice are 
not on the same moral footing as their innocent victims" (Case 323). Retributive action is 
permissible. One who has sacrificed their "innocence" has simultaneously lost their equal 
right not to be harmed. 
Regan extrapolates from the example of the fifty people trapped in the shaft to 
illustrate loss of innocence. If the fifty people had forced the single individual into the 
shaft "because they believed they might reap some benefits from his forced labor, " 
the fifty have lost their claim to be protected by the application of the miniride principle, assuming all 
involved face prima facie comparable harm. Or, again, if the lone miner happened to be an orphaned, 
unloved, retarded slave, while the fifty were highly intelligent, loved, and respected slave-owners, the 
fifty would have no valid claim to the protection afforded by the worse-off principle, despite the 
greater prima facie harm death would be for each of them when compared to the harm death would be 
for the enslaved miner. (Case 323) 
Regan explains his allowance for loss of innocence: without an exemption for 
those who have acted immorally, the miniride and "the worse-off principle would allow the 
rights of those who perpetuate injustice to override the rights of their victims, " but 
"reflective intuition tells us that no account of justice and individual rights that allows this 
can be sound" (Case 323). 
Summary 
The Rights View asserts that normal mammals aged one year or more are subjects- 
of-a-life that have a welfare, which indicates equal inherent value. Regan asserts that all 
subjects-of-a-life have the right not to be harmed, based on the respect principle, which 
respects those individuals that can be harmed and their preference not to be harmed. 
Impartiality requires that all subjects-of-a-life, regardless of species, be granted the right to 
be protected from harm, except in extenuating circumstances. 
Regan's Rights View is detailed and far-reaching. He provides thorough, solid 
ground on which to base animal rights, and he includes detailed criteria to offer guidance 
in diverse situations. Regan's Rights View remains the most comprehensive philosophical 
protectionist argument based on rights. 
B. Discussion. 
Regan's methods and some important terms require further investigation, as well as 
some possible undesirable consequences of the Right's View. 
1. Methods. 
a. moral intuition: Regan includes moral intuition amongst his tools of 
philosophic reasoning. Moral intuition is not to be confused with intuition in its more 
general usage. Moral intuition is not a hunch, or vague inner feeling. Moral intuition in 
the philosophical sense refers to those principles taken to be universal moral truths, such as 
"do not steal. " 
Regan uses a very qualified intuition, but intuition remains subjective. 
if appeal to intuition is to be a test for the truth... of a proposed moral principle, then it 
is a test such that two mutually contradictory proposed moral principles could each pass 
it. 
... 
It's the test that is shown insufficient by this possibility... once we allow-that 
people of good will and judgment can both be wrong, we have admitted that appeals to 
good will aren't enough, if what we are looking for is the truth. (Narveson, "On a Case" 
34) 
Whereas Regan indicates that certain actions are consistent with his moral intuition 
(for instance, "special considerations, " as discussed in the final section of this chapter), 
those same acts are consistent with my moral intuition. If we are seeking one conclusive 
determination, moral intuition is inadequate to the task, then moral intuition fails us. 
Moral intuition has helped human beings support a status quo that today seems 
highly immoral. For instance, it was once the common moral intuition that the man ought 
to be the head of the house, the one obliged to make important decisions for the entire 
family, while the woman ought to comply with and accommodate the husband's decisions. 
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Common moral intuition once held (and for many people still holds) that people of other 
faiths ought to be systematically brought into the Christian fold. While moral intuition in 
India once indicated that caste ought to be respected and protected, the Western world 
was shocked by this human categorization. Although much of the Western world feels 
that women ought to cover their breasts in public, many African peoples do not. Moral 
intuitions are not always dependable, and they are subject to change. 
... the radical subordination of certain 
human interests (those of `natural slaves') seemed 
intuitively innocent and natural to Aristotle, and, as J. S. Mill noted in The Subjection 
of Women, it is a standard mark of a deeply held prejudice that it seems perfectly 
natural to the one who holds it. There is always the danger of accepting only those 
principles which are compatible with our prejudices. (VanDeVeer, "Interspecific" 77f) 
Where animal issues are concerned, the moral compass has scarcely moved. It is a 
common moral intuition that, "even if the choice were between a thousand animal lives or 
one human life, most people would not doubt that it is right to save the human" (Singer, 
"Animals" 222). Regan's common moral intuition seems to lead him to a conclusion that 
many protectionists would reject. 
Intuition is not a dependable moral indicator because it is not objective. We cannot 
hope to find reliable moral guidance through our subjective intuitions (McGinn 94). 
Intuition is at best tenuous, at worst dangerous, as a moral compass. 
b. defining terms: Regan's Rights View requires, as a sufficient condition for 
equal inherent value, that one be a "normal" mammal aged one year or more. Regan does 
not discuss or define his use of "normal. " 
Are animals with schizophrenia, transvestites, and those who have had cosmetic 
surgery to remove wrinkles, shorten tails, or make ears more pointed normal or abnormal? 
If one is missing their left nostril, can they be considered a normal adult? What if they are 
missing memory or lacking in compassion? There are myriad of levels of intelligence, 
psychosis, memory loss, and deformity that must be categorized to determine which 
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creatures qualify as "normal. " 
The concept of "harm " is also important to Regan's work. In the Rights View, 
levels of harm are determined by the thwarting of one's opportunities for satisfaction. The 
greater the opportunity for satisfaction for such things as desires and preferences, the 
greater the harm through loss of life. Opportunities for satisfaction indicate the amount of 
harm entailed in death, and life and death decisions are based on these levels of harm. 
Regan discusses aspects of harm thoroughly, but understanding "harm" in Regan's 
work is complicated by his use of the term. He submits that he has no objection to any 
"use" of animals that does not "harm" them. He adds that it. is "not only the pain and 
suffering that matters-though they certainly matter-but it is the harm done to the 
animals, including the diminished welfare opportunities they endure... and their untimely 
death" (Case 388). Is it possible to "use" another entity and do no harm? Regan seems to 
indicate that this is possible, though he offersno examples. 
Essentially, this becomes a question of whether or not other entities ought to be 
used as means to an end, or whether they ought only to be viewed as ends in and of 
themselves. It seems inconsistent with Regan's respect principle, based on the inherent 
value of subjects-of-a-life, to use them as means-even if we could do so without harm. 
2. Central Concepts. 
a. opportunities for satisfaction: Regan's application of opportunities for 
satisfaction seems to be based on nothing more than species, entails epistemological 
problems, and seems misguided in its focus on possible (rather than likely, or actual) 
opportunities for satisfaction. Additionally, Regan's assessment of opportunities for 
satisfaction seems perfectionist. 
Regan asserts that the harm brought through death is a function of foreclosed 
"opportunities for satisfaction" (Case 324). He determines the level of harm "based on 
assessing the losses each individual faces and assessing these losses equitably" (Case 325). 
In the Rights View, levels of harm through death are determined by opportunities 
for satisfaction. Thus, opportunities for satisfaction indicate which creatures ought to live, 
and which must die. But Regan's assumptions regarding opportunities for satisfaction are 
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based solely on species and are epistemologically problematic. 
Regan assumes that a certain quality, a certain level of opportunities for 
satisfaction, are inherent in normal, adult human He but absent in all other species. He 
states that, "sources of satisfaction available to most humans are at once more numerous 
and varied than those available to animals" (Case 119). This distinction appears to be 
made solely on the basis of species. Regan offers no justification for this assumption, nor 
does he explain what these numerous, exclusively human sources of satisfaction might be. 
Hinging protectionist theories on an assessment of mental states and physical 
conditions-intelligence, psychological harm, stress, satisfactions available-is common in 
protectionist theories. However, this assumption raises complicated epistemological 
concerns. 
Regan offers this assumption and reaches the following conclusion: "All on board 
have equal inherent value and an equal prima facie right not to be harmed. Now, the harm 
that death is, is a function of the opportunities for satisfaction it forecloses, and no 
reasonable person would deny that the death of any of the four humans would be a greater 
prima facie loss, and thus a greater prima facie harm, than would be true in the case of the 
dog" Case 324). While Regan does not directly state that all normal adult humans have 
greater opportunities for satisfaction than all normal adult dogs, his conclusion reveals this 
assumption. Regan concludes that it is right to preserve normal adult human life at the 
expense of normal adult dog life. "To save the dog and to throw any one of the humans 
overboard would be to give to the dog more than is his due. It would be to count the 
lesser harm done to the dog as equal to or greater than the greater harm that would be 
done to any of the humans if one of them was cast overboard" (Case 324). 
Because Regan assumes that a certain subject-of-a-life has fewer opportunities for 
satisfaction based solely on species, Regan seems to assume that any normal adult dog will 
suffer less harm through death than will be suffered by any normal adult human. He 
forfeits the dog's right to life in preference for the four humans, and he would do the same 
to 4000 dogs to save the same four humans. In the Rights View, a normal, adult dog will 
always be sacrificed rather than a normal adult human being. 
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There are epistemological difficulties entailed in comparing opportunities for 
comparing satisfaction. We cannot hibernate, enjoy the. savory taste of well-rotted carrion, 
or dash up tree-trunks. How much opportunity for satisfaction do these represent? We 
cannot burrow through a decomposing log or participate in the mating rituals of the blue- 
footed boobie. How can we weigh these possible sources of satisfaction against eating 
popcorn at the theater, finding the perfect shoe at a reasonable price, or participating in 
human mating rituals? Even though we can swim, does swimming offer human beings as 
much satisfaction as it offers an otter, a polar bear, or a dolphin? 
It is common in the West to assume that "... the prospects of satisfaction are 
qualitatively and quantitatively greater for human beings than for animals" (VanDeVeer, 
"Interspecific" 70-71). Regan, like most protectionists, believes that there is something 
about the human condition that makes our lives more valuable. 
Value is the "relative worth, or importance" and also as "the worth of something in 
terms of the amount of other things for which it can be exchanged" (Webster's). Regan 
does not speak of value, but he values the lives of normal adult humans more highly than 
those of normal, adult dogs because he is willing to exchange the lives of dogs for the lives 
of humans. He bases this enhanced life-value of adult human life on opportunities for 
satisfaction. If Regan is going to draw conclusions regarding right to life based on the 
special nature of certain human opportunities for satisfaction, he needs to define and 
explain these special opportunities in relation to those of other subjects-of-a-life. How 
will he do this? If there are four humans and a dog on a boat that can hold only four, 
Regan concludes that "no reasonable person would suppose that the dog has a `right to 
life' that is equal to the humans' or that the animal should be given an equal chance in the 
lottery for survival" (Case 285-286). More specifically, he assumes that normal human 
opportunities for satisfaction offer us an enhanced right to life. 
How might Regan determine the amount of. harm constituted by the loss of a 
particular opportunity for satisfaction for a certain species? What is the unit for measuring 
"harm" through loss of opportunities for satisfaction? Is it possible to obtain a full 
inventory of all species' psychology of satisfaction for all possible activities, and then 
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compare them with every other species in order to determine which subject-of-a-life is first 
to walk the plank? Regan fails to explain how we might calculate losses and harm, how 
we might measure opportunities for satisfaction, or how we will assess which subjects-of- 
life ought to be allowed to die-or even caused to die-based on these figures. 
In spite of the epistemological difficulties entailed, interspecies comparisons that 
elevate human beings are an old habit, even in philosophy. John Stuart Mill makes a 
similar assertion, and runs into similar difficulties. 
Mill distinguishes between higher and lower pleasures, between quality as well as 
quantity of pleasure, and assumes that "higher" pleasures are preferable. In his assessment 
human beings have these "higher" pleasures, while other animals do not. Human pleasures 
are elevated based on Mill's assertion that humans understand the "lower" pleasures and 
choose the higher pleasures, while all other animals are unable to assess or choose between 
the different types (McCloskey, John 66). 
In his famous work, Utilitarianism, Mill writes, "... some kinds of pleasure are 
more desirable and more valuable than others" (15), and humans are capable of more 
desirable pleasures. He asserts that people can rise above "base" pleasures, which we 
share with other creatures, but other species are limited to the lowest form of pleasures. 
He concludes, "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be 
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied" (18). 
How might one assess the mental, emotional, or psychological state of a satisfied 
swine? Why do people who have known both "higher" and "lower" pleasures, as defined 
by Mill, sometimes chose the latter? "Few who have successfully organized their lives for 
the maximum satisfaction of the lower pleasures express regret at having done so, whereas 
intellectuals... do commonly express doubts about the pleasure aspects of their styles of 
life" (McCloskey, John 68). In Utilitarianism, Mill answers these challenges by leveling an 
ad hominem attack against anyone who does not conform to his theory by attributing 
human preference for "animalian" pleasures to an "infirmity of character" (19), or lack of 
cultivation of higher faculties (20). 
Like Regan, Mill takes account of the pleasures and pains of other animals, but not 
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on an equal basis. In Utilitarianism, Mill advocated that we seek, the greatest happiness 
"secured to all mankind; and not to these alone, but so far as the nature of things admits, 
to the whole sentient creation" (22). Even the "base" pleasures of non-human animals are 
"part of the general happiness" that ought to be considered (McCloskey, John 60,68)- 
but they are a lesser consideration. Also like Regan, Mill does not find his way around the 
epistemological problems entailed in his assumption that other animals are incapable of 
"higher" pleasures. Yet he and Regan, both conclude that the satisfactions/pleasures of 
non-humans count for less than those of humans. Neither offers a verifiable standard for 
measuring pleasure or harms-in fact, neither philosopher offers any standard of 
measurement whatsoever. Like Mill, Regan offers only an ad hominem attack against 
those "unreasonable" people who might dissent from his point of view. 
The epistemological problems inherent in Regan's use of opportunities for 
satisfaction put him in a precarious position in relation to utilitarian protectionist theories. 
He accuses utilitarian philosophers of ignoring inherent value, and of trading off on the 
value of life (based on pleasures and pains), without presenting any viable system of 
measurement. Regan asserts that utilitarian protectionism is a theory without adequate 
attention to practicability because the method of measurement is a mere concept without 
any definable means. But Regan's Rights View fails to offer any method of measurement 
that might be replicated in a common, real-life scenario. How do pain, suffering, untimely 
death, diminished welfare-how do harms and "opportunities for satisfaction" -play out 
in the buying and selling of wool socks in New Zealand? How would Regan use his theory 
to make an objective determination in a practical situation? 
Leaving epistemological problems aside, Regan's focus on opportunities for 
satisfaction seems misguided. Of what relevance are prospects for satisfaction? Of what 
value are prospects if they are almost never realized? Is it not more important which 
species is most apt to actualize satisfactions when the opportunity arises? How would 
Regan calculate an opportunity for satisfaction that has a one-in-a-million chance of being 
realized? 
Cats, dogs, and horses enjoying a variety of satisfactions. While human beings 
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work throughout most of each day in the hope of gaining some uncertain satisfaction for 
the future, other animals perpetually realize a variety of opportunities for satisfaction that 
most Western human beings routinely forego. As far as we know, only humans willingly 
work many hours at tasks they despise, perpetually delaying the simple satisfactions in 
hopes of possible future pleasures. Are not actualized satisfactions worth more than 
hypothetical opportunities for satisfaction? 
Again, epistemological difficulties aside, the Rights View risks perfectionism, 
which Regan decisively denounces. Perfectionism in ethical theories allows for acquired 
or biological traits to determine whether or not an entity is protected, and to what degree. 
Perfectionism focuses on certain traits, largely beyond our control, such as gender, skin 
color, or religion. Perfectionism offers elite status to a specific type of individual based on 
these morally irrelevant, largely pre-determined characteristics. Regan denounces 
perfectionism because basing protection on acquired or biological traits allows for routine, 
systematic oppression (Case 18). Regan argues that education, athletic ability, and 
musical talent should not determine one's value. He finds perfectionism, and the 
systematic oppression of certain individuals reprehensible-against our reflective intuition. 
He defends his work as non-perfectionist: 
... 
lifeboat and other prevention cases, including those discussed earlier, are not decided by appeal to 
perfectionist principles, according to the rights view. They are decided by appeal to principles that 
acknowledge and respect the equality of the individuals involved, both their equal inherent value (no 
one individual's losses are to be outweighed by summing the losses of any group of individuals) and 
their equal prima facie right not to be harmed (no one individual's lesser harm can count for more 
than another's greater harm). This is not perfectionism. (Case 325) 
Yet Regan assumes, without explanation, that normal adult humans have a 
particular quality, in this case a certain level of opportunities for satisfaction, that is absent 
in all other normal adult mammals. Humans can solve crossword puzzles, play the oboe, 
or systematically learn to identify mushrooms. As far as we know, only human beings can 
55 
enjoy these opportunities for satisfaction. But Regan does not reveal how he weighs such 
possible "opportunities for satisfaction; " it would seem difficult for him to avoid using 
qualities held by individuals (i. e. the contents rather than the cup). Regan asserts that 
enhanced opportunities for satisfaction (a quality held only by human beings, over which 
animals have little or no control) concurrently indicates greater harm through loss of life. 
Regan concludes that enhanced opportunities for satisfaction offer humans the privilege to 
live at the expense of non-human individuals. Although Regan insists that his concept of 
inherent value is non-perfectionist, his concept of opportunities for satisfaction seems 
dependent on attributes such as intelligence and health-perfectionist attributes. 
The potential for routine, systematic exploitation in Regan's Rights View is 
alarming. One who is well educated, young, healthy, and considered beautiful in the 
context of their culture will have more numerous and varied opportunities for satisfaction 
than a poor, sickly, ill-formed individual. Are not the opportunities for satisfaction greater 
for you or me than for a beggar on the filthy streets of Bangladesh? Ought we to 
determine who lives, and who dies, based on these enhanced or reduced opportunities for 
satisfaction? Regan makes life and death decisions based on opportunities for satisfaction, 
which seem to rest on nothing more than species membership. In this sense Regan's 
Rights View offers elite status to a specific type of individual based on an in-born 
characteristic. Therefore, Regan's Rights View is perfectionist. 
Regan's perfectionist inclinations could have dire consequences. At one point in 
his work Regan writes that if dogs did have greater opportunities for satisfaction than 
human beings, it would not "be wrong to cast a million humans overboard to save a canine 
survivor, if the harm death would be for the humans was, in each case, less than the harm 
death would be for the dog" ("Dog" 57). Whether human or dog, as many individuals can 
be pushed overboard as are necessary to maintain the lives of those who have the greatest 
opportunities for satisfaction. In this way, Regan asserts, the least harm is incurred. 
Regan offers no details about the human sailors, but asserts that normal adult 
human opportunities for satisfaction are inherently more valuable than are those of a 
normal adult canine. What if the dog in Regan's life-raft is a young, healthy, adult that 
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happens to be a seeing eye dog, a rescue dog, a herding dog, a police dog, and a much 
loved family pet, while-the humans are lonely, inactive, bored, normal adult human beings? 
Is it not possible that the death of the pup might be a greater prima facie loss of 
opportunities for satisfaction than the death of any-or all-of the humans? The pup is 
apt to increase the opportunities for satisfaction amongst all that come to know her. Does 
Regan consider net opportunities for satisfaction, including satisfactions that the pup might 
offer others? What if the humans were perfectly normal adult geriatric convicts-rapists 
and murderers-while the canine was a rare Arctic fox pregnant with eight pups? Do 
problematic humans decrease net opportunities for satisfaction? Are geriatric convicts 
"normal"? Is a rare mammal "normal"? Uncertainties abound. 
But, in Regan's view, dogs simply do not have greater opportunities for 
satisfaction. Regan assumes that normal adult humans have greater opportunities for 
satisfaction than normal adults of every other species. (He does grant that abnormal 
human beings fall into the same category as other species, or perhaps even into a less 
protected category. ) Regan's assessment has interesting implications: 
if we allow (what is certainly debatable) that we can in principle compare the harm that death is to a 
[normal adult] whale with the harm death is to a [normal adult] human, what then follows if we 
discover, contrary to expectation, that whales generally live richer, more satisfying lives than humans 
do? On Regan's view we should sacrifice, if it comes to a choice, any number of [normal adult] 
human beings rather than one [normal adult] whale possessing superior faculties; indeed we should 
wipe out the entire human species rather than one superior whale. (If you can't imagine superior 
whales, try substituting a suitable space alien. ) (A Taylor 259) 
This hypothetical whale-scenario allows us to examine Regan's conclusion more 
carefully. If we value our own particular mindset/available opportunities (you name it), 
criterion that allows certain subjects-of-a-life to live at the expense of others, it would 
seem contradictory to assert that all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value. 
Peter Singer notes that Regan's theory fails to protect the equal inherent value of 
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all subjects-of-a-life, and instead allows for systematic exploitation: 
Suppose, for instance, that a new and fatal virus affects both dogs and humans. Scientists believe 
that the only way to save the lives of any of those affected is to carry out experiments on some of 
them. The subjects of the experiments will die, but the knowledge gained will mean that others 
affected by the disease will live. In this situation the dogs and humans are in equal peril and the peril 
is not the result of coercion. If Regan thinks a dog should be thrown out of the lifeboat so that the 
humans in it can be saved, he cannot consistently deny that we should experiment on a diseased dog 
to save diseased humans. 
That is not all, since Regan says that in these cases numbers do not count, and a million dogs 
should be thrown overboard in order to save a single human being, he would have to say that it would 
be better to perform the experiment on a million dogs than to perform it on a single human. ("Dog" 
57) 
(It does seem that Singer's analogy is flawed in two significant ways. First, Regan 
has created a scenario where chucking one-or a million-entities overboard will save 
lives. A certain number of individuals must go overboard, and those that remain will be 
able to stay afloat. Singer's scenario entails experimentation, which is necessarily based on 
assumptions and the hope, or "belief, " that lives will be saved. Second, in Regan's 
scenario each lifeboat entity is equally in jeopardy of drowning if all stay aboard. Diseases 
do not cause death with the certainty of over-filled lifeboats. Neither do experiments offer 
salvation with the same certainty offered by fewer passengers on an overfilled lifeboat. 
For these reasons, Singer's analogy is weak. ) 
Despite the problems in Singer's analogy, he highlights the danger of systematic 
oppression in Regan's perfectionist use of opportunities for satisfaction. The lifeboat 
scenario Regan portrays could only occur if one assumes that a particular species of 
normal adult animal is inherently "the first to go, " or "the last to go, " as Regan has done. 
Regan denies his own assertion of equal inherent value, and his own denunciation of 
perfectionism, with his assumption that normal adult human beings have greater 
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opportunities for satisfaction, and suffer more harm through death, than normal adult 
dogs. 
In other instances Regan clearly avoids perfectionist criteria. He offers a scenario 
where four preeminent scientists, capable of offering enormous health benefits to 
humanity, have a degenerative brain disease. The fifth lifeboat passenger "delivers 
Twinkles to retail stores in Brooklyn" (Case 386). Regan unequivocally concludes that it 
is not acceptable in the Rights View to use the Twinkie deliverer for experimentation in 
the hope of saving the four scientists. He adds, 
just as perfectionism is not an equitable basis for assessing the justice of practices involving humans, 
so it is an unacceptable basis for assessing the justice of practices involving animals... Implicit 
allegiance to perfectionism... would tempt one to sanction the harmful use of animals in research, 
their "lesser" value being "sacrificed' for the "greater" value of humanity. Grounded in the 
recognition of the equal inherent value of all those who have inherent value, the rights view denies 
that a distinction between lesser and greater would be made where the perfectionist defense of the use 
of animals in research requires it. Case 387) 
Here Regan indicates that intelligence has nothing to do with opportunities for 
satisfaction. Why does Regan protect Twinkie-sellers but not dogs? Regan admits that 
not all humans have the same opportunities for satisfaction, but he offers no tools or 
standards with which to quantify or qualify these factors between individuals. Maybe 
scientists do have greater opportunities for satisfaction... or maybe a dog does. 
If we could conclusively determine that some entities or species have greater 
opportunities for satisfaction than others have, what relevance might this have to a rights 
theory intended to protect the basic rights of all subjects-of-a-life? Regan asserts that all 
"moral agents are viewed as equal in inherent value, if any have such value; " therefore any 
criterion for "how some may be justly treated applies to all" (Case 239). 
Based on Regan's assertion of equal inherent value, and corresponding equal 
treatment, it is reasonable to assume that either a dog has the same right to life as a human 
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being, or it has none at all (A. Taylor 257). Regan's theory indicates that the dog does 
have as much right to survive on the life-boat as any of the human beings; all subjects-of-a- 
life have equal inherent value in the Rights View. It must be so, or Regan contradicts his 
own assertion, yet in practice the dog is not granted an equal opportunity to survive on an 
overcrowded lifeboat. 
Rights theories are ineffective when they allow that 
circumstances may arise in which a right may be overridden. Typically, this will be the case when 
there are conflicting rights in a situation. The possibility exists that the rights of non-human animals 
may be acknowledged in theory, but overridden in practice by human moral agents when they judge 
that the circumstances warrant it. Since, as moral patients, animals are not in a position to contest 
these judgments, and since it is human moral agents who will stand to gain from them, the theory 
might end up not giving much protection in practice! (Benton 86). 
As evidenced by Regan's lifeboat scenario, the Rights View offers preferential 
treatment to animals assumed to have greater opportunities for satisfaction. When life and 
death are at stake, it is the dog that goes overboard to drown. 
The dog's fate seems to hinge on assumed levels of self-consciousness. Regan 
"attributes inherent value to creatures possessing a degree of self-consciousness" over and 
above what would be necessary for mere sentience (A. Taylor 251). While he only intends 
these as a sufficient condition, his lifeboat scenario reveals that Regan hinges basic rights, 
such as the equal right to life, on mental/emotional states. 
If life and death decisions hinge on human assessments of harm through loss of 
opportunities for satisfaction, based on mental states, humans are apt to grant themselves 
the first and longest chance to live, as Regan has done. When lives must be lost, if the 
lives of all other animals are sacrificed before any normal adult human lives, as indicated 
by Regan, the Rights View is not much different from the status quo. What is the point of 
offering other species a right to life that can be snatched away whenever their existence 
infringes on our own, more highly valued lives? 
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Though Regan asserts equal inherent value for all subjects-of-a-life, the Rights 
View does not give the life of a dog the same value as the life of a human being. Regan 
could just as well have hypothesized, without need of supporting evidence or verifiable 
standards of measurement, that all men have greater opportunities for satisfaction than 
women simply because men are the dominant gender in our culture. He could then justify 
chucking women out of lifeboats to save the lives of men. However, he could not do so 
while maintaining that women have equal inherent value. 
A rights theory that bases protection on indeterminate mental factors is incapable 
of protecting the fundamental rights of any individual. 
b. moral agency: Regan assumes that only human beings can be moral agents, but 
this assumption is based on an unsupported assertion of free will. His distinction also 
seems to be based purely on species, without morally relevant distinction, and contrary to 
evidence. 
Regan defines moral agents as "individuals who have a variety of sophisticated 
abilities, including in particular the ability to bring impartial moral principles to bear on the 
determination of what, all considered, morally ought to be done and, having made this 
determination, to freely chose or fail to choose to act as morality, as they conceive it, 
requires" (Case 151). Regan asserts that non-human animals cannot be moral agents 
(Case 295). 
Morality consists of standards of behaviour (Orlans 7). To behave morally is to 
conform to the rules of a particular group (Webster's). Such moral obligations are often 
called duties. Regan asserts that other animals (moral patients), "have no duties... Only 
moral agents can have duties" (Case 285). 
According to Regan's definition, a moral agent must have a free will and impartial 
moral principles. Therefore, he assumes human beings have "free choice" to apply or not 
to apply "impartial" moral principles. Regan does not defend these assertions. 
It appears that Regan sidesteps the possibility of determinism in order to define 
human beings as moral agents. Yet this possibility is an important consideration. Without 
free will there is no element of choice in our actions. Determinism reduces morality to 
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mere biology: we behave as we are programmed to behave. Regan's notion of human 
beings as moral agents is dependent on an assumption of free will. 
If Regan asserts free will amongst human animals, he must either demonstrate that 
this is an exclusive human attribute, or he must also assume that other animals have free 
will. To do otherwise is to be partial and inconsistent. He notes that the burden of proof 
lies with those who assert that other animals do not have qualities which we ascribe to 
ourselves, unless there is an obvious reason why humans ought to be placed in a special 
category (Case 34-37). There appears to be no obvious reason. In fact, evolution might 
indicate otherwise. "Any animal able to use mental abilities to choose between alternative 
forms of behavior is likely to be advantaged in the evolutionary process. It would be odd, 
Darwin suggested, if only humans had achieved any measure of this massive evolutionary 
advantage" (Orlans 12). 
Notions of free will have frequently come under philosophic attack. It is possible 
that "our belief that we can act morally is a delusion produced by our evolutionary history" 
(J. Wilson 199). What if our will is no more or less free than that of any other animals? 
In this case we do not qualify as moral agents. In the absence of evidence, Regan asserts 
that we must assume other animals to be like ourselves, yet Regan does not explain why he 
assumes that only human beings have free will. Regan's assertion of moral agency solely 
for human beings is based on an unsupported assumption of free will held exclusively by 
human beings. 
Regan's assertion also seems contrary to empirical evidence. There is ample 
evidence that other animals do have a sense of morality-that they can and do choose to 
conform or break the rules of their communities. Studies on non-human primates and 
canines indicate that humans are not the only animals that make moral choices. 
Rosemary Rodd, quoting the ethologist Frans de Waal, indicates that chimpanzees 
have a sense of morality.: 
Some descriptions of their behavior do suggest that they feel consciously indignant at cheating 
acts: 
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"... The two basic rules are one good turn deserves another and 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth'. 11 
"The rules are not always obeyed and flagrant disobedience may be punished. ... reciprocity 
among chimpanzees is governed by the same sense of moral rightness and justice as it is among 
humans. " (Alexander 206) 
Chimpanzees demonstrate "a rudimentary sense of fair play" and are "rational 
beings" whose behaviour suggests "social-contract ethics of rational self-interest" 
(Alexander 206). In this sense they seem very like ourselves. 
Rhesus monkeys also appear to behave morally-to choose to act in ways that 
demonstrate a social conscience. Studies have shown that "a majority of rhesus monkeys 
will consistently suffer hunger rather than secure food at the expense of electroshock to a 
conspecific" (Rachels, Created 150). If human beings made this same choice, observers 
would conclude that the subjects had made a moral decision, and that they had behaved 
morally. (Interestingly, experiments that ask humans to inflict pain on conspecifics have 
not always shown Homo Sapiens to be such an exemplary, moral animal as the rhesus 
monkey. ) 
Biologists have also observed canines administering punishments to pack members 
that deviate from expected codes of behaviour (Alexander 206). If there are expected 
codes of behaviour, as there appear to be, this indicates that these animals are expected to 
behave in a certain way-that they are responsible for their actions and can be punished if 
they do not comply. Mary Midgley discusses morality amongst wolves: 
Recently, ethologists have taken the trouble to watch wolves systematically, between meal-tines, 
and have found them to be, by human standards, paragons of steadiness and good conduct. They pair 
for life, they are faithful and affectionate spouses and parents, they show great loyalty to their pack 
and great courage and persistence in the face of difficulties, they carefully respect one another's 
territories, keep their dens clean, and seldom kill anything that they do not need for dinner. If they 
fight with another wolf, the encounter normally ends with a submission. They have an inhibition on 
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killing the suppliant and about attacking females and cubs. They have also, like all social animals, a 
fairly elaborate etiquette, including subtly varied ceremonies of greeting and reassurance, by which 
friendship is strengthened, co-operation achieved, and the wheels of social life generally oiled. Our 
knowledge of this behavior is not based upon the romantic impressions of casual travellers; it rests on 
long and careful investigations by trained zoologists, backed up by miles of film, graphs, maps, 
population surveys, droppings analysis, and all the rest of the contemporary toolbag. Moreover, these 
surveys have often been undertaken by authorities who were initially rather hostile to the wolf and 
inclined to hope that it could be blamed for various troubles... east 25-26) 
Social expectations carry duties. Where there are punishments for unacceptable 
behaviour, there are also codes of expected behaviour. The social lives of wolves and 
chimpanzees indicate that members have duties and can be punished for failing to fulfil 
expectations. This empirical evidence indicates that wolves and chimpanzees are moral 
agents. Observations of canine pack behaviour have led biologists to hypothesize that 
moral systems arise: 
" when outside threats encourage group cohesion, 
" when such threats might be most appropriately combated by complex internal 
social organization, and 
" when certain members of a group can take action to make others modify 
behaviour (Alexander 80). 
Not only non-human primates and canines fit this description: "Many animals live 
in social groups and behave in ways appropriate to preserving those societies" (Rodman 
7). It would seem unusual for codes of conduct-duties-to occur only in human 
societies, and not amongst other gregarious animals that combat outside threats as a 
group. Even musk ox unite against outside aggressors, and ought to be acknowledged as 
likely to have a moral system. 
Not only is it extremely likely that other animals have moral codes, but they have 
been observed exhibiting moral excellence. For human beings, for at last 2000 years, 
altruistic behaviour has been recognized as moral excellence. The "highest level of 
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morality is reached when persons extend their sympathies beyond their own group and 
indeed beyond their own species to all sentient creatures" (Orlans 14). 
Interspecies altruism is evident in other animals (Clark, Animals 53). The people 
of ancient Crete recorded dolphins that assisted drowning humans. In 1996, in Chicago's 
Brookfield Zoo, an eight-year-old gorilla named Binti rescued a three-year-old human 
being that fell into her cage. She carried the boy to a door where humans could retrieve 
and attend to him. Her own seventeen-month-old baby, Koola, clutched her back 
throughout the incident (Associated). Cats and dogs, cats and mice, and cats and birds 
have proven to be amicable living companions when the need to hunt is eliminated. The 
gorilla Koko, who was taught sign language, had a feline friend that was killed by a car. 
Koko signed with great emotion when shown pictures of her cat-friend three years after 
the cat's death, still indicating regrets at the loss of her feline companion (Orlans 148). 
It is unlikely that only human beings, amongst the many social animals, act as 
moral agents. Social order amongst animals appears to be maintained through ethical 
codes, which imply expected conduct, or duties. Groups in other species also seem to 
maintain social control amongst members-rules of conduct and expected behaviour. 
Regan does not discuss whether a lioness might have duties to her cub, a stallion to his 
herd, or whether a seeing-eye dog has duties to her mistress. It appears that we have 
failed to recognize any form of morality outside our own. Maybe what Regan (and may 
others) mean to say is that other animals cannot, and do not, participate in human 
morality. Generally speaking other animals do not conform to our moral codes. While 
other animals do not follow our legal and social codes, neither do we participate in the 
pack-morality of Arctic wolves or the herd-morality of African elephants. 
Morality appears to be species-specific rather than exclusively human. Non- 
human animals have no human duties or human moral obligations, but they appear to have 
moral obligations within their own social context. Regan's exclusion of non-human 
animals from the category of moral agent, without discussion, is inconsistent with 
empirical evidence, and with his own assertion that the burden of proof lies with anyone 
who indicates that other animals do not share the qualities which we ascribe to ourselves 
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(Case 34-37). 
c. inherent value: Regan uses an analogy to explain the basis on which he 
ascribes inherent value, but the analogy seems inadequate. It is unclear whether or not 
inherent value can be adequately defended. 
Through the analogy of a cup and its contents Regan accuses utilitarian 
protectionists of valuing the ingredients inside the cup without acknowledging the value of 
the cup itself. Regan writes that utilitarians view individuals as "mere receptacles... of 
positive value (pleasure) or negative value (pain), " such that the individuals themselves 
"have no value of their own; what has value is what they contain (i. e. what they 
experience)" (Case 205). Regan accuses utilitarian theories of robbing individuals of 
inherent value because "welfare is something that can be taken into account and then 
traded off against other values... Regan [will] have none of this utilitarian calculating" 
(Rachels, Created 217): 
The cup (the individual) does "contain" (experience) things that are valuable (e. g., pleasures), but the 
value of the cup (individual) is not the same as any one or any sum of the valuable things the cup 
contains. Individual moral agents themselves have a distinctive kind of value, according to the 
postulate of inherent value, but not according to the receptacle view to which utilitarians are 
committed It's the cup, not just what goes into it, that is valuable. (Case 236) 
The strength of any analogy is based on the closeness of the parallel between the 
two ideas. Regan's cup-analogy seems inadequate in six ways: ,. 
"A cup is easily separated from its contents. 
" The greatest effect the contents can have on a cup would be a change of 
temperature or the addition of surface substances. 
" Cups are indifferent to what goes inside them. 
In contrast, individuals 
" Cannot be separated from their vast and varied experiences, from "Virtues, " or 
from emotions. 
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" Our contents affect us and become, to some extent, who we are. We become 
electricians or computer-hacks dependent on what is "inside the cup. " 
" While it is easy to imagine a cup without anything inside, it is difficult to 
imagine an individual without their experiences or aptitudes. 
In the case of individuals, one might legitimately wonder if there is a difference 
between "cup" and "contents: " 
If I have a bottle of wine in my hand, I can pour the wine out of the bottle, but there is no way in 
which I can separate the valuable experiences of pigs from the pigs themselves. We cannot even 
make sense of the idea of an experience-whether of pleasure, or preference satisfaction, or anything 
else floating around detached from all sentient creatures. 
... 
it is not easy to see how the individuals and the valued experiences are to be separated. 
(Singer, "Animal" 8,12) 
Regan defines subject-of-a-life according to certain attributes. He therefore 
ascribes inherent value based on possessing particular attributes, such as psychophysical 
identity. Can Regan consistently require specific attributes, such as desires, beliefs, and 
the ability to act as a requirement for inherent value, and then claim that inherent value is 
based on "the cup itself'? What are these "cups" -apart from desires, beliefs, and the 
ability to act? What are they apart from experiences, emotions, aptitudes, or propensities? 
In the absence of a definition of what these "cups" are, devoid of all experiences and 
aptitudes, what is the meaning of inherent value? 
The uncertainties of Regan's cup analogy call into question his notion of inherent 
value. Can the notion of inherent value be defended? In light of Regan's criterion for a 
subject-of-a-life, which includes attributes, and his insistence that inherent value is based 
on "the cup itself, ", his cup-analogy cannot hold water. 
Regan does not adequately define "the cup" which he claims holds inherent value. 
But there are other ways to defend inherent value, as a logical locus and proper end for the 
value an entity places in things outside itself, or as arising in relation to other entities. The 
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concept is far from clear, yet central to Regan's Rights View. 
The difficulties entailed in proposing inherent value will re-surface (as inherent 
worth) in Chapter Four. 
d. subject-of-a-life: Those mammals granted "subject-of-a-life" status are 
simultaneously granted equal inherent value. Those who are granted equal inherent value 
are thereby granted the right not to be harmed: "... because all moral agents are viewed as 
equal in inherent value... what applies to how some may be justly treated applies to all" 
(Case 239). The determinants for subject-of-a-life are therefore extremely important. 
Regan's subject-of-a-life category includes all beings that 
have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an 
emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the 
ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psycho physical identity over time, and 
an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically 
independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone 
else's interest. (Case 243) 
Regan's delineation of subject-of-a-life seems unsatisfactory on three counts: 
" it seems unclear why Regan has included this particular set of criteria 
" Regan's criteria seem to be perfectionist 
" Regan's criteria for subject-of-a-life can be reduced to welfare, the same basis 
used by utilitarian philosophers. 
First, it would be reasonable to assume that there is a reason why each of these 
seven criteria have been included-that each is morally relevant and indispensable to 
Regan's list of qualifications. However, this does not seem to be the case. 
Why has Regan included memory? Is memory integral to an entity if that entity is 
to be granted moral considerability? If an individual is unable to remember anything at all, 
does she lose her subject-of-a-life status?. Do senile old people loose their right not to be 
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harmed? If so, why? If not, why is memory included? If one remembers everything, but is 
paralyzed and cannot initiate actions based on my desires and goals, does such a one lose 
subject-of-a-life status? How is this quality morally relevant to subject-of-a-life status? 
Why is it necessary for one to be granted equal inherent value? Does it make sense to 
revoke a subject-of-a-life's equal inherent value if she becomes paralyzed or looses her 
memory? Regan's reasons for selecting specific criterion, and the importance of each, 
remains unclear. 
Second, Regan's description for subject-of-a-life also raises questions regarding 
the inherent value of individuals-the "cups" who qualify for subject-of-a-life. Regan 
asserts that inherent value is based on "the cup itself. " Only those who are granted 
subject-of-a-life status qualify for inherent value. Consequently, in order for Regan to 
maintain his non-perfectionist ideal for all those granted inherent value, the qualification 
for a subject-of-a-life must also be non-perfectionist. Concurrently, if the qualifications for 
subject-of-a-life are perfectionist, then the qualifications for inherent value are also 
perfectionist, since one must be a subject-of-a-life in order to be granted inherent value. 
Yet this is not the case. Regan clearly delineates both physical and psychological 
requirements for subjects-of-a-life. For one to be a subject-of-a-life one must have 
something in the cup. Regan's subject-of-a-life criteria contradict his insistence that 
inherent value is based on "the cup itself. " 
Third, my examination of Regan's seven criteria for a subject-of-a-life leads me to 
believe that to be a subject-of-a-life is synonymous with having a welfare. Regan asserts 
that "mammalian animals have a welfare" (82). He describes in detail what welfare 
consists of having a psychophysical identity over time (116); autonomy (84); interests, 
both preference and welfare (87); desires and goals (89); psychological and social needs, 
including an emotional life (90); and the ability to be harmed directly or through 
deprivation (94), or to gain satisfaction (93). If each of the seven items on Regan's 
subject-of-a-life list is checked against qualities Regan considers to be critical for having a 
welfare, each is present: 
" beliefs and desires: Regan writes, "to have desires involves having beliefs" 
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(Case 92), and while beliefs are not explicitly included in the list of qualities necessary 
to have a welfare, desire is. If having desires involves having beliefs, then where 
Regan asserts that there are desires, he simultaneously asserts the existence of beliefs. 
Beliefs and desires are therefore integral to being a subject-of-a-life and to having a 
welfare. 
" perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future: 
Goals are part of Regan's list of requirements for having a welfare. Because goals 
entail a vision of one's own future, an individual with goals must also have a sense of 
the future, particularly a sense of one's own future. Regan asserts that to have beliefs 
entails both perception and memory (Case 80-1), and beliefs are part of the 
requirement for having a welfare. Therefore perception, memory, and a sense of one's 
own future are requirements for one who has a welfare. 
" an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain: Regan writes 
that welfare entails psychological and social needs including an emotional life (Case 
90) and the ability to be harmed directly or through deprivation (Case 94). Direct 
harm is through inflictions, which involves pain as is evidenced by Regan's statement 
that inflictions are "acute or chronic physical or psychological suffering... Suffering 
involves prolonged pain of considerable intensity" (Case 94). To have a welfare is not 
only to be sentient, but also to be able to suffer various types of pain, such as physical 
and psychological. 
Regan's definition of welfare includes living well, which means that one has a 
positive welfare. One who has a positive welfare will "take satisfaction in pursuing 
and obtaining what they prefer" (Case 117). The American Heritage Dictionary 
defines "satisfaction, " as the "pleasure derived from gratification. " To take satisfaction 
in something is to derive pleasure from it, and so the notion of taking pleasure is 
integral to Regan's definition of welfare. Therefore having an emotional life, complete 
with pleasure and pain, is entailed in having a welfare. 
" preference- and welfare-interests: both receive direct reference amongst 
Regan's requirements for having a welfare (Case 87). 
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" ability to initiate action in pursuit of desires and goals: Autonomy is on 
Regan's list of necessary qualities for having a welfare, and he writes that "individuals 
are autonomous if they have preferences and have the ability to initiate action with a 
view to satisfying them" Case 85). Autonomy is "the capacity for self-determination, 
involving choice among clearly envisaged alternatives" (Haworth 104). "Autonomy 
matters because of what it enables us to make of our lives" (Frey, "Autonomy 52). 
Individuals that have a welfare are autonomous, and are therefore able to initiate action 
in pursuit of desires and goals. The ability to initiate action in pursuit of desires and 
goals is therefore entailed in having a welfare. 
" psychophysical identity over time: Psychophysical identity over time receives 
direct reference amongst Regan's requirements for having a welfare (Case 116). 
" individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for 
them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of 
their being the object of anyone else's interest: Because it is unacceptable to use a 
word to define itself, "welfare" does not receive direct reference in Regan's definition 
of what it means to have a welfare. All other qualities are part of what is necessary for 
one to have a welfare, since that is what Regan seeks to define. Obviously, having a 
welfare is entailed in Regan's definition of what it is to have a welfare. 
Regan has included each of the seven qualities necessary for a subject-of-a-life in 
his description of those qualities necessary for having a welfare. It therefore appears that 
subjects-of-a-life are defined by having a welfare: they are able to be benefited or harmed, 
and therefore they fare well or ill during the course of a lifetime (-Case 82). The criterion 
for being a subject-of-a-life are entailed in having a welfare, therefore to be a subject-of- 
a-life is to have a welfare. 
Regan adds to this equation autonomy and interests-a "psychophysical identity 
over time" Q Case 116). These qualities define the agent that can be benefited or harmed. 
Without a psychophysical identity, harms and benefits have no agent on which to act, or 
place to dwell. This, then is "the cup itself. " If this is the case, the qualifications for 
subject-of-a-life that Regan offers are perfectionist-they are not the cup itself. These 
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"attributes" are just that-attributes that are contained in the entity, the "cup. " 
In addition, Regan's subject-of-a-life-a mammal, aged one year or more, with a 
psychophysical identity that can be benefited or harmed-can be reduced to welfare, and 
welfare can be reduced to benefits and harms. This looks very much like a utilitarian 
equation. 
Rather than emphasize benefits and harms (as utilitarians do under similar terms 
"pleasures" and "pains"), the Rights View focuses on a psychophysical identity (the 
individual, or cup) which must contain the ability to have experiences to be harmed and 
benefited. This ability (contents of the cup) qualifies an entity for inherent value, which in 
turn obligates moral agents to avoid harming that entity's welfare. Regan's theory looks 
very much like a utilitarian equation where one's experiences, and how those experiences 
affect one's welfare, determine one's moral considerability. 
e. rights: Those with rights have "a claim to something and against someone" 
(Feinberg, Rig is 159). Rights are a "justified claim or entitlement" often validated by 
moral principles and rules (Orlans 28). Most Westerners willingly accept the existence of 
human rights, but rights seem ephemeral, subjective, and human-centered. 
Few are inclined to think that other animals have rights: a claim to something 
against human beings. Many argue that animals are simply not the kinds of beings that can 
have rights due to the very nature of what rights are. "It is one thing to say that it is 
wrong to treat animals cruelly, quite another to say that animals have rights" 
(Passmore 116-117). 
The concept of rights may not be applicable to non-human animals: "... if we fail to 
treat someone in a way that he/she has a right to be treated, that person not only has a 
right to demand that he/she be given the treatment, but to complain if it is not 
forthcoming" (Kushner 147). Those that cannot defend their rights therefore are not 
eligible for rights. In short, "one can have rights only against those capable of 
acknowledging them" (Clark, "Rights" 172). Non-human animals cannot have rights 
because they are incapable of defending their rights. Any obligations we have toward 
other animals are either owed to the owners of the animals, or are offered merely as self- 
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imposed obligations (Orlans 29). 
If this is the case, neither children nor primitive peoples qualify to bear rights. But 
before we concern ourselves with extending rights to more entities, perhaps we should 
focus on whether or not any rights of any kind have any validity. An extension of rights 
"presupposes that human beings have moral rights, ... a powerful case can 
be brought 
against the truth of this presupposition" (Frey, "What" 106). To many people rights seem 
"synthetic and unconvincing-whether applied in the human case or otherwise" (Ryder, 
Animal 328): "Not all philosophers are confident that moral rights even exist; some are 
suspicious of the concept and wonder exactly what it means... " (Rachels, Created 207). 
Rights have not conclusively been shown to be grounded on anything more ultimate than 
our own conception of what rights are. They are not tangible, and such concepts are "not 
demonstrably justifiable" (Feinberg, Social 94). 
Rights have been dangerously subjective, "given and denied by humans, in some 
kind of collective fashion... [I]f all humans were to decide that dogs, or rhesus monkeys, 
or laboratory rats have rights equally with humans they would indeed then have such 
rights... " (Alexander 156-157). What is the value of a claim that seems to have no 
grounding beyond human contrivance? Are Regan's subject-of-a-life criteria just another 
subjective list for a subjective group of rights-holders? 
Regan's Rights View is dependent on the existence of human rights, though 
"rights" are ephemeral, arbitrary, and to some scholars "just human invention" (Ryder, 
"Painism" 197). If human rights stand on shaky ground, is there any point in proposing 
animal rights? 
Yet philosophic skepticism regarding the existence of rights is a decidedly small 
and isolated phenomenon. Most people in Western cultures accept the existence of rights, 
most notably their own. To refer to "rights" is to call to mind something that most of us 
feel strongly about. In Western countries "the language of rights resonates powerfully in 
the public mind" (A. Taylor 251). 
If we accept human rights-as we generally do in the Western world-animal 
rights are a legitimate proposition. If one is to accept the existence of human rights, it is 
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difficult to maintain consistency and grant rights to all human beings while excluding all 
other animals. The burden of proof lies with those who would assert that all other animals 
are different in some morally relevant way, and consequently have no rights. In the 
absence of a morally relevant distinction, consistency requires that we accept non-human 
animal rights if we accept human rights. 
However, rights seem inadequate as a basis for protectionist philosophy because 
the concept of rights is defined by what we as human beings are. Rights have been 
defined according to human-centered criterion, and though Regan successfully applies 
these human-centered criteria to normal mammals aged one year or more, the criteria 
remain human-centered. Only a handful of select entities, ones that share particular 
human-like tendencies, are able to qualify. 
Human-based criteria by which we measure animals, such as self-consciousness or 
sentience, are inadequate. Due to this human bias, our long-standing assessment of which 
entities ought to be granted rights ought to be reconsidered. 
3. Undesirable Consequences. 
a. innocent threats: Regan defines "innocent threats" as dangerous moral patients. 
He defines moral patients as inherently innocent. A small child flinging poisonous darts 
randomly into a crowd is an innocent threat. 
When an innocent threat endangers others, it may be necessary to harm the 
innocent to prevent them from endangering or destroying others. Regan uses the example 
of a rabid dog and rabid fox, indicating that in either case one might "harm" dangerous 
animals in order to nullify a threat Case 296,353). 
Regan writes, if rabid foxes have "bitten some children and are known to be in the 
neighboring woods... and if the circumstances of their lives assure future attacks if 
nothing is done, then the Rights View sanctions nullifying the threat posed by these 
animals" (Case 353). Regan does not explain "nullify, " but historically speaking the fox 
will be killed. My assessment of Regan's treatment of innocent threats is therefore based 
on the assumption that "nullify, " as he uses the term, includes killing innocent threats. If 
this is the case, Regan's ethics allow innocent threats to be eliminated for our own 
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protection (Case 353). 
While the basic principle (allowing self-defense against innocent threats) seems 
reasonable, Regan fails to define the borders. Without limitations on what constitutes a 
"legitimate" threat, and in the absence of limits on the measures one may take in the name 
of self-defense, Regan's innocent threat clause could have undesirable consequences. 
For example, moose roam backyards, city streets, and recreational areas in 
Anchorage, Alaska. Every year moose stomp people to death in fenced yards, on ski- 
trails, or even on the main university campus. Circumstances dictate that future human 
encounters with moose will occur, and that some such encounters will result in death. On 
this basis Regan eliminates rabid foxes. He could also sanction killing moose in 
Anchorage because they constitute an "innocent threat. " 
Similarly, grizzly bears sometimes attack and kill hikers on trails around 
Anchorage. The only way to prevent such incidents is to eliminate bear. In most of the 
world, that is exactly what people have done, whether by design or chance. Bears and 
moose around Anchorage might also be eliminated under Regan's innocent-threats clause. 
If we extrapolate from Regan's rabid fox example, taking this idea to its logical 
extreme, all moose and bear might justifiably be killed as innocent threats. The farther 
back into the wild country human beings venture, the more likely that people will 
encounter "dangerous" animals, and the more likely that human lives will be lost. In 
Regan's Rights View, it is legitimate to "nullify" such innocent threats. Ultimately, all 
dangerous wild animals might be eradicated, including rattlesnakes, polar bear, black 
widow spiders, cougar and many, many more in order to nullify these innocent threats. 
If we are to be impartial, and to maintain consistency, as the Western philosophic 
tradition indicates, Regan's allowance for innocent threats might also endanger people. 
Though Regan's use of innocent threats deals with situations where moral patients harm 
moral agents, he offers no indication that the same would not be true in the opposite 
situation. Humans-more than any other animal-pose a danger to other entities, and we 
are often ignorant of the damage we do. 
It is often assumed that if one harms through ignorance, they are innocent. If 
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ignorance renders one "innocent, " then people who are ignorant of the suffering they 
cause to other animals are "innocent. " For instance, if a hunter kills a deer for recreation, 
she poses an "innocent" threat. Reason indicates that if a hunter were aware of the 
suffering caused, she would not kill deer, unless mentally disturbed. The fact remains that 
recreational killers needlessly endanger and kill thousands of animals every year-though if 
asked, they will indicate that they are unaware of the harm they cause-they imagine that 
they do their victims a favour! Hunters generally indicate that they are unaware that eating 
meat is entirely unnecessary, or that hunting causes unnecessary suffering. Do we have a 
right-are we morally obliged-to defend the hunted from these dangerous human killers? 
This may seem outrageous, but only because it is not a familiar concept. If the 
"innocent threats" clause can be used to destroy a rabid fox that might bite out of fear or 
for self-defense, on what grounds can we deny the use of the innocent threats clause 
against humans who might kill other innocents? Recreational hunters do not even act out 
of fear, self-defense, hunger, or to protect offspring. The vast majority of Western hunters 
kill for recreation-because it is fun. Do hunters kill for pleasure because they are cruel, 
because they do not know that such killing is completely unnecessary, or because they do 
not know that they cause great danger and harm to other subjects-of-a-life? The first 
reason seems the least likely, and the other two possibilities reveal the innocence of the 
killer's deed. To eliminate other species when they pose an innocent threat, but not 
humans, when they pose an innocent threat to other species, is inconsistent. 
b. loss of innocence: Regan asserts that one who has lost their innocence by 
behaving unjustly has forfeited their equal inherent value (Case 323). While those who 
have lost their innocence must still be treated with respect, and are still due just treatment, 
the injustices that some have had to bear grant them privileges above those who perpetrate 
injustice. 
Regan's lifeboat holds four humans and one dog vying for space. How might loss 
of innocence affect the outcome with regard to these hapless floaters? 
Regan accuses those who buy and consume flesh of being immoral-of sacrificing 
their innocence. He states, "those who support current animal agriculture by purchasing 
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meat have a moral obligation to stop doing so" (Case 394). We might also reasonably 
assume that Regan would make a similar assertion about all unnecessary exploitation of 
other animals. Therefore, to test for loss of innocence, each of the four humans will be 
scrutinized to determine whether or not they have been wearing or eating body parts of 
other animals. Flesh-eaters and leather/fur-wearers jeopardize their otherwise equal right 
not to be harmed. Loss of innocence for the four human beings is almost certain. If the 
humans on the lifeboat have been eating bits of bodies from innocent moral patients, each 
of whom share equal inherent value and the equal right not to be harmed, the dog is the 
least likely to be thrown overboard. 
Furthermore, Regan asserts that non-human animals are always innocent moral 
patients. Consequently, dogs-and every other non-human animal-cannot jeopardize 
their chance for a spot on the lifeboat. While humans will almost surely be guilty of 
treating other animals as if they did not have equal inherent value-thereby forfeiting their 
place on the raft-all other passengers are incapable of forfeiting their rights because they 
are inherently innocent. 
In any and all scenarios humans are likely to have jeopardized their innocence in 
relation to-and with regard to-other animals, while other animals remain inherently 
innocent. Contrary to Regan's conclusion, if members of the lifeboat are chucked 
overboard one by one, first eliminating those who have sacrificed their innocence-the 
sairvivor must be the dog. 
c. obligation to defend: Regan states that moral agents have an obligation to 
defend a subject-of-a-life when a subject-of-a-life's equal right not to be harmed is 
violated. He writes that the onus of justification for any harm done is always on the one 
who brings about that harm. Unless or until we are shown how such harm is justified, we 
are rationally entitled to believe, and morally required to act, against such an action. 
Regan asserts that those who violate the rights of others are liable to sanction, and we all 
ought to participate in this process. Though Regan does not discuss where this duty 
begins or ends, or the difficulty of determining exactly when such rights are violated, two 
things are clear: 
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A slave-trader does not do what is right by supplying his client with a promised slave, and he has no 
valid moral duty to do so, despite his promising... promises made in the name of the perpetuation of 
this institution are morally null and void. The same is true regarding society's "contract" with 
science and the supposed duty of scientists to carry out their end of the agreement by harming some 
animals so that others, both humans and animals, might benefit. This "contract" has no moral 
validity, according to the Rights View, because it fails to treat lab animals with the respect they are 
due. That science that routinely harms animals in pursuit of its goals is morally corrupt, because 
unjust at its core, something that no appeal to the "contract" between society and science can alter. 
(Case 390) 
Regan's obligation to defend seems clear on two counts: 
" every moral agent ought to work to liberate animals, and 
" moral agents are justified in breaching accepted moral laws in the process of 
liberating other animals from unjust practices. 
According to Regan a moral agent is obligated to break contracts and ignore laws in 
order to fight against the meat industry, or to thwart the use of animals in science. Regan 
also indicates that people are justified in forcing change on those who harm others: "If 
Heather violates the rights of those she cooks and eats when she cooks and eats them, then 
she has no grounds to complain that we violate her rights by stopping her" (Case 334). It 
is no violation of Heather's rights if moral agents act to prevent her from eating meat. 
Regan is unclear where these moral obligations begin, end, or how far they might 
carry one along the path of civil disobedience. Consequently, the possibilities are 
somewhat daunting. Are we obligated to unchain our neighbour's dog? Must we 
forcefully liberate battery hens... or free-range hens? Does morality require us to engage 
in guerrilla-tactics to set loose laboratory and zoo animals? Beyond major lifestyle 
changes, is political activism enough, or must we step in on behalf of every cow and hen, 
every rat and monkey, every dolphin and kangaroo, every cat and budgie whose rights are 
currently violated? 
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Perhaps Regan accepts all of these obligations. If he does not, he risks 
inconsistency. If he does, he invites chaos. 
d. special considerations: Regan asserts that "the moral bonds between family 
members and friends [are] a special consideration that justifiably can override the 
otherwise binding application of the miniride and worse-off principles" (Case 316). 
Through these "special considerations, " Regan justifies protecting a familiar and preferred 
human at the greater expense of a stranger simply because "it is those closest to us whom 
we stand to help or harm most, and they, us" (Case 316). Regan argues that "the 
relationships between friends and loved ones are special" (Case 317) and therefore 
impartiality cannot be expected-impartiality is not preferred. Without this special 
considerations clause, Regan writes, one would be expected to "spare the stranger at the 
expense of our loved one. And that is counterintuitive" (Case 315). 
Yet Regan's special consideration clause seems to feed into the hand of self- 
interest: 
... love relations are relations of self-interest, 
though deep ones. It is important to you that you choose 
that man or that woman, as friend, lover, spouse; that you are the parent of that child; and so for 
many other such cases... -you care for them more. If moral relations are generated essentially by 
rational agents promoting their own well-considered, long-run interests, these cases make sense. 
(Narveson, "On a Case" 36) 
Special considerations clauses have frequently been used, in just such a self- 
interested manner, to defend racism, sexism, and speciesism. Natural feelings between 
family members, and between human beings, are stronger than between strangers or 
between species (Orlans 20). If we allow special considerations, human beings are apt to 
be granted special considerations over and above other animals (Rollins 43), and perhaps 
certain powerful individuals will gain special moral status over other human beings: 
If it is permissible to have special regard for family or neighbours. why not one's fellow species- 
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members? The problem with this way of thinking is that there are lots of groups to which one 
naturally belongs, and these group-memberships are not always (if they are ever) morally significant. 
The progression from family to neighbour to species passes through other boundaries on the way- 
through the boundary of race, for example. (Rachels, Created 184) 
How will Regan define "friend" and "family" in order to prevent racists and bigots 
from seeking advantages for those nearest and dearest? It does not logically follow that 
natural feelings, just because we have them, ought to be the basis of moral obligation. 
Regan's special interests clause can be used to legitimize any and all special interests: 
speciesism, racism, and sexism. 
It must be noted that Regan specifically protects basic rights from being toppled 
for "special considerations. " While no subject-of-a-life can be denied a right to life, based 
on Regan's special considerations clause, they can be denied access to goods or 
opportunities due to their personal relations. Consequently, Regan's special interest clause 
threatens the impartial application of the Rights View. 
Regan seems to include this protective clause to prevent unsavory possibilities such 
as fathers neglecting their children to help more needy street-urchins, or soldiers at war 
who might abandon comrades to help wounded fighters across the lines. Regan states that 
such actions are counterintuitive because they deny fundamental bonds. 
His point is worth considering. It is important to remember that philosophers most 
often seek ideals, even if these ideals are considered extreme. The utopian visions of 
philosophers have had a tremendous impact on our present world. To explore Regan's 
special considerations clause, it seems useful to visualize a utopian world with no special 
considerations. 
In a completely egalitarian world each of us would deal with everyone else in the 
same manner. We would impartially help whomever was in the most danger. In times of 
crises we would make decisions via "moral triage, " helping those most in need rather than 
tending our loved-ones first and foremost. Yes, fathers would leave their children to help 
other children who were more needy. And soldiers would cross the lines to help more 
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seriously wounded on the other side. Whoever was most in need would gain aid 
regardless of gender, race, family membership, or species. Such a utopian state of affairs 
would end the very possibility of war and famine. This vision seems neither 
counterintuitive nor negative, but utopian and idyllic. 
Conclusion 
Regan's theory is mammoth in scale and groundbreaking in philosophical 
achievement. The particulars of the Rights View, especially as revealed in his lifeboat 
scenario, are sometimes inconsistent with his overall intent. Regan's lifeboat scenarios 
reveal areas that need more deliberation, but the extremes of lifeboat scenarios do not 
harm the solid core of Regan's work: the Rights View effectively exposes the moral 
inconsistency of offering rights exclusively to humans while denying it to all other animals. 
If one is willing to accept human rights, in the absence of a morally relevant distinction 
between certain other mammals and human beings, Regan convincingly argues for a 
broader category of rights-holders. The Rights View remains the most systematic and 
comprehensive animal rights theory to date. 
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H. PETER SINGER: UTILITARIAN PROTECTIONISM 
A. Singer's Theory on Sentience. 
Peter Singer's protectionist philosophy has been one of the most controversial 
philosophical topics of recent decades. His simple utilitarian theory is grounded on equal 
consideration of interests and sentience. 
1. Utilitarianism. 
"At least since Epicurus in the fourth century BC, philosophers have suggested that 
all creatures seek pleasure and avoid pain" (Ryder, Animal 324). Utilitarian moral theories 
assert that the morality of an action is determined by the consequences. One ought to act 
in such away as to bring about the greatest utility: to produce the greatest good, 
happiness, benefit, and pleasure (Bentham 1-5). "In its classical form, utilitarianism 
maintains that we ought always to act so as to promote the greatest good for the greatest 
number" (Facione 15). 
Egalitarian utilitarian theories assert that when assessing the greatest good for the 
greatest number, each individual carries no more weight than any other; each individual 
counts for one and no one counts for more than one (Regan, Animal 152). The interests 
of any one individual are no more or less important than the interests of any other. 
Singer asserts that we are all naturally concerned for our own personal welfare: 
we wish to maximize our happiness and minimize our suffering. But, Singer writes, 
feelings of self-interest ought not to guide moral actions; self-interest ought to be 
subordinate to reason (Practical 69). We are called upon to "assess the moral claims of 
those affected by our actions independently of our feelings for them" (Singer, Practical 
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67). He indicates that rational thought and universalizing self-interest lead naturally to 
utilitarianism. Through this process, our self-interested actions become group-oriented, 
and achieving the greatest good for the greatest number becomes the basis of ethical 
actions. 
2. Sentience. 
In Singer's theory we ought to behave in such a way as to bring about the best 
consequences, on balance, for all. Any being that can suffer will almost always have an 
interest in not suffering. In order to bring about the greatest utility, the best 
consequences for all concerned, we must take interests into account. 
Singer's utilitarian scales do not weigh one individual against another, they weigh 
suffering and need-interests. Singer asserts that the ability to suffer is essential to having 
interests (Practical 50). Interests stem from one's ability to suffer. A piece of coal cannot 
have interests because it cannot suffer. An armadillo, on the other hand, has a central 
nervous system and can suffer. Singer focuses moral considerability specifically on entities 
that have a central nervous system (Singer, "Animals" 244). He indicates that we ought to 
seek the best consequences for all sentient beings, for all entities able to suffer, for all 
creatures that have a central nervous system. A functioning central nervous system 
indicates that an entity can suffer. If we are to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, all 
sentient creatures must be taken into consideration (Singer, Practical 12): 
Singer's work follows that of the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who is 
often quoted by protectionists: "The question is not, Can they reason? nor Cant they talk? 
but, Can they suffer? " (Regan, Animal 153). Bentham argued that because other animals 
have the capacity to feel pain, they ought to be morally considerable (Orlan 22). While we 
cannot, with legitimate reason, discount interests based on hair-color, IQ, or length of 
toes, we need not be concerned with those who have no interests. Any being that is able 
to suffer will have interests. Interests are a morally relevant criterion that is not racist, 
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sexist, or speciesist. Singer concludes, "If a being suffers, there can be no moral 
justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration" (Practical 50). 
a. equal consideration of interests: Singer does not demand equal treatment for 
all sentient creatures, only equal consideration of interests. "How bad a pain is depends on 
how intense it is and how long it lasts, but pains of the same intensity and duration are 
equally bad, whether felt by humans or animals" (Practical 54). Equal consideration of 
interests functions as a scale that weighs interests impartially. Equal consideration of 
interests requires us to `weigh up interests, considered simply as interests and not as my 
interests, or the interests of Australians, or of whites. "True scales favor the side where the 
interest is stronger or where several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of 
similar interests; but they take no account of whose interests they are weighing" (Singer, 
Practical 19). 
Equal consideration of interests provides a basic principle of equality in Singer's 
theory (Singer, Practical 19). Equal consideration of interests is "beyond personal or 
sectional points of view and take[s] into account the interests of all those affected. " 
From this point of view race is irrelevant to the consideration of interests; for all that counts are the 
interests themselves. To give less consideration to a specified amount of pain because that pain was 
experienced by a black would be to make an arbitrary distinction. Why pick on race? Why not on 
whether a person was born in a leap year? Or whether there is more than one vowel in her surname? 
All these characteristics are equally irrelevant to the undesirability of pain from the universal point of 
view. (Singer, Practical 19-20) 
All sentient creatures have an interest in avoiding pain, and this interest is as 
morally considerable in other sentient species as it is amongst human beings. To disregard 
sentience-interests of those that don't happen to belong to our species, according to 
Singer, is no more rational than to ignore the sentience-interests of other races, age- 
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groups, or religions. Drawing the line of what constitutes a legitimate interest not to be 
harmed between Homo Sapiens and other animals is arbitrary and speciesist. "Pain and 
suffering are bad and should be prevented or minimized, irrespective of the race, sex, or 
species of the being that suffers" (Practical 54). 
The principle of equal consideration of interests ignores both species and aptitude. 
Equal consideration of interests "implies that our concern for others ought not to depend 
on what they are like, or what abilities they possess" (Regan, Animal 155). 
... the 
fact that some people are not members of our race does not entitle us to exploit them, and 
similarly the fact that some people are less intelligent than others does not mean that their interests 
may be disregarded. ... the 
fact that beings are not members of our species does not entitle us to 
exploit them, and similarly the fact that other animals are less intelligent than we are does not mean 
that their interests may be disregarded. (Practical 49) 
Singer bases his theory only on the equality of consideration of interests. He 
accepts that no two individuals are equal in other ways. Races, genders, and age groups 
show different aptitudes-as do species: "equality is a basic ethical principle, not an 
assertion of fact" (Practical 18). 
We should make it quite clear that the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral 
capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact. Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion 
of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability 
between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to satisfying their 
needs and interests. The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged 
actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat humans. (Singer, "All" 
152) 
Singer asserts that there are no morally relevant differences between races, 
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genders, or species where suffering is concerned. This is not to say that there are no 
morally relevant differences between one species and another, only that species itself does 
not qualify as a morally relevant difference where suffering is concerned. 
It is acceptable for one to make moral decisions based on species-in fact we must 
do so. For instance, a young shrew stranded on a street-comer in New York City, and a 
young boy stranded on the same corner, have very different needs, which result in different 
moral duties. Equal treatment would indicate that the Good Samaritan take both to a 
distant meadow and turn them loose. Alternatively, equal treatment would require one to 
search out, identify, and return the lost youth to their parents. In either case only one 
would benefit from such well-intentioned efforts. A lost youth in New York requires 
different actions for different species if one is to bring about the best consequences for 
each. 
Such different needs are not only true between species, but between individuals of 
the same species. Men have special interests-such as regular check-ups for prostate 
cancer. Young people need different nutrition than older people. Burrows do not need to 
be guaranteed employment, owls do not need to be offered the right to a fair trial, nor do 
comatose patients need assurance of an adequate exercise pen. Not all distinctions based 
solely on species are morally suspect (Clark, "Humans" 180). Most of us, if we were 
trying to find just one parent for a tiny orphaned child, would choose a female Homo 
Sapiens. Such a choice is based on considerations of both species and sex, but it is not 
morally reprehensible. Genders, age groups, races, and species, all have different interests 
and different needs. Absolute equality is neither appropriate not desirable. Some moral 
distinctions are legitimate (based on morally relevant criterion) even though they are based 
purely on gender or species, while other moral distinctions based purely on species are not 
based on morally relevant reasons, and are therefore not legitimate. 
"There are important differences between humans and other animals, " and between 
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all species, "and these differences must give rise to some differences" in our obligations 
(Regan, Animal 150). Needs vary, therefore interests vary, and necessary actions vary 
accordingly. "The basic principle of equality... is equality of consideration and equal 
consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment" (Regan, Animal 150). 
Absolute equality is neither necessary nor appropriate. Singer's utilitarian theory only 
requires equal consideration of interests. 
If we are to impartially and equally consider interests of all sentient beings, to 
maximize aggregate pleasure and minimize aggregate pain, then we ought to be willing to 
experiment on a severely and irreversibly brain-damaged person (who has no living 
relatives) in the place of dogs or monkeys. Singer concludes that people "show bias in 
favor of their own species whenever they carry out an experiment on non-human animals 
for purposes that they would not think justified them in using human beings at an equal or 
lower level of sentience, awareness, sensitivity, and so on" (Singer, Practical 59). Equal 
consideration of interests requires us to consider levels of sentience and concurrent 
interests when making ethical decision, rather than focus on species. 
3. Mental Capacity. 
Singer's theory considers mental capacities as relevant to one's interests. He 
asserts that certain mental abilities sometimes influences one's capacity for suffering. He 
notes that entities with self-awareness that can foresee misery will have mental anxiety in 
addition to physical suffering. For example, Singer might argue that a woman who knows 
she is dying, and will leave unfinished engineering plans-over which she has labored for 
decades-will most likely experience anxiety over her unfinished work in addition to any 
suffering she might experience from her slow demise. Singer would assert that a 
porcupine cannot share these scholarly concerns. Both the engineer and the porcupine 
would experience the physical pain of disease and dying, but Singer asserts that the woman 
suffers the additional psychological anxiety of unfinished labors. 
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Self-awareness affects levels of suffering, but it does not always enhance suffering. 
Sometimes an understanding of what transpires can decrease misery (Singer, Practical 3). 
For instance, Singer would most likely agree that an injured weasel, taken from the side of 
the road for medical care, would have greater stress than a human being would have under 
similar conditions. A medical unit helps to alleviate the fears of suffering people, but a 
human rescue team does not carry the same comforting message to a weasel. In this 
instance the entity with a greater self-awareness would suffer less. 
In Singer's view certain mental capacities (such as the ability to experience terror, 
dread, and self-awareness) offer morally relevant distinctions with regard to suffering and 
equal consideration of interests. However, he notes, this does not mean that those with 
higher mental capabilities have a greater claim to moral consideration. As in the case of 
the weasel, it works both ways. Nor can we assume that all human beings would be 
equally protected if this were the case: human infants and some mentally defective people 
do not possess higher mental capabilities than non-human animals. Infants and some 
mentally defective people do not possess self-awareness, although the chimpanzee 
Washoe, the first chimp to learn American Sign Language, demonstrated self-awareness. 
When shown her reflection in a mirror, and asked, "who is that? " Washoe replied, "Me, 
Washoe" (Singer, Practical 94). Because the criterion of self-awareness runs across 
species, it is not species-specific, and it is therefore not speciesist. If certain mental 
abilities, such as self-awareness, are morally relevant criteria for ethical protection, then 
Singer asserts that we must accept that some humans fall outside this protected category, 
while individuals from other species qualify, and must be offered due protection. 
4. Death and Killing. 
Singer asserts that the ethics involved in killing another entity are "much more 
complicated" than the morality of inflicting suffering (Singer, Animal 228). For Singer, 
pain is pain, but the harm of death is relative to the entity that is killed and the methods 
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used. As a utilitarian, Singer asserts that taking certain lives quickly and painlessly neither 
harms nor helps those killed, and such killing is therefore not morally reprehensible: 
A rejection of speciesism does not imply that all lives are of equal worth. At is not arbitrary to 
hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable of abstract thought, of planning for the future, of 
complex acts of communication, and so on, is more valuable than the life of a being without these 
capacities. To see the difference between the issues of inflicting pain and taking life, consider how we 
would choose within our own species. If we had to choose to save the life of a normal human being or 
an intellectually disabled human being, we would probably choose to save the life of a normal human 
being; but if we had to choose between preventing pain in the normal human being or the 
intellectually disabled one-imagine that both have received painful but superficial injuries, and we 
only have enough painkiller for one of them-it is not nearly so clear how we ought to choose. The 
same is true when we consider other species. The evil of pain is, in itself, unaffected by the other 
characteristics of the being who feels the pain; the value of life is affected by these other 
characteristics. (Animal 20-21) 
Singer holds that the life of a "self-aware being" is of greater "value" than the life 
of a creature that does not hold this quality. While both may suffer equally from any given 
pain, a self-aware being suffers more through death. He is quick to add that this is not a 
speciesist division-severely brain-damaged human beings are not self-aware, while some 
non-human primates are. 
Summary 
In summary, Singer is a utilitarian who bases his ethics on interests, which arise 
from sentience. He rejects actual equality and proposes equal consideration of interests. 
Singer's states that speciesist criteria are morally irrelevant where pain and suffering are 
concerned. He asserts that like interests ought o be treated in a like manner. He argues 
that all sentient creatures have an interest in avoiding harm. He offers an ethical theory 
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that weighs pleasures against pains to maximize happiness and minimize suffering for the 
greatest number of sentient creatures. 
Singer's work effectively highlights the moral blindness of accepted current ethics, 
which ignores the morally relevant criterion of sentience. Peter Singer's protectionist 
theory has had a tremendous impact on current discussion amongst philosophers and on 
the ever-growing protectionist movement. 
B. Discussion. 
Utilitarianism, based on pleasures and pains, is the root of the simplicity that has 
made Singer's work popular, but utilitarianism entails difficult philosophic problems. 
Examining two common objections to Singer's work reveals that these complaints are 
unfounded. Serious. problems do arise in Singer's utilitarian theory, including 
practicability, expendability, and Singer's use of mental factors in his utilitarian equation. 
1. Common Concerns. 
a. asserting new boundaries: Singer's theory rejects common, species-based 
ethical distinctions, but he admits that replacement guidelines are difficult to offer. Where 
does sentience begin? Which beings will be considered self-aware? If we manage to 
include every human being under our ethical canopy-including one born without any 
brain at all-are interests the final criteria? 
To such quandaries Singer offers no answer. Instead, he notes that we are keeping 
brain-dead humans alive on expensive hospital machines while denying freedom of 
movement, adequate nutrition, mother's care, and life itself to otherwise healthy, sentient 
non-human creatures. He concludes that the pressing question is not where to draw a new 
line but how to begin the process of uprooting extant speciesist attitudes and actions. 
Drawing new lines will be a relevant concern at some point in the future-but it is not 
relevant in light of today's flagrantly speciesist practices. On this point Singer seems 
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correct. 
b. devaluing human life: Singer's critics accuse him of choosing to sacrifice 
mentally deficient, helpless human infants to the cause of science, rather than fully sentient, 
functional "laboratory" animals. But Singer states plainly: "... the aim of my argument is 
to elevate the status of animals rather than to lower the status of any humans... I would 
like our conviction that it would be wrong to treat mentally defective humans in this way 
to be transferred to non-human animals at similar levels of self-consciousness and with 
similar capacities for suffering" (Practical 68). 
Those who object that Singer's work devalues human life misrepresent his plainly 
stated intent and the probable effect of any utilitarian theory based on sentience. Singer 
does not wish to increase but to decrease suffering. "In the end, Singer is in favor of 
increasing protections for vulnerable animals and humans" (Orlans 24). Furthermore, he 
stresses the importance of mental capacities, which adds yet more protection to the vast 
majority of human beings. Singer's theory not only helps to protect human beings, it 
favours them. Consequently, those who object to Singer's work on the grounds that it 
devalues human life are actually objecting to the fact that Singer's work values the lives of 
other animals. Singer cannot rightly be accused of devaluing human life. 
2. Problems Associated with Utilitarianism. 
a. practicability: Some philosophers favour utilitarianism for its theoretical 
simplicity. "The great strength of pure utilitarianism... is its unity, its capacity to 
adjudicate non-arbitrarily between all competing moral claims" (Lockwood, "Singer" 158). 
Utilitarianism is simple in theory, but extremely complicated in practice. 
Singer fails to demonstrate the means by which his theory might be implemented. 
Singer does not conclusively determine the best consequences, based on his utilitarian 
assessment of all relevant pleasures and pains, in an actual situation. Applying Singer's 
simple utilitarian equation to any given instance is by no means simple. 
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For instance, a shift from flesh-based farming industries to vegetable-based 
industries would, in one way or another, impact almost every extant individual, especially 
those directly involved in the free-market economy. Is it possible to weigh flesh-eating 
pleasures against deaths, and the suffering of other animals? If we consider factors such as 
loss of income where might we reasonably end our assessment? Would we consider the 
incomes of those who supply knives to slaughterhouses? Steelworkers? Those who make 
knife-sharpeners? Hog-feeders? Grain producers? Those who provide electricity to 
meat-shops? Dam-builders and maintenance crews who supply cows and pigs with 
millions of gallons of water? Those who sell transport trucks? Gas stations and road- 
workers? Those who might take pleasure, or suffer great pains, in watching truckloads of 
sheep pass by on the freeway? The husbands and children of each? 
Perhaps one could address the central equation first, leaving other pleasures and 
pains (such as those of job loss) as secondary. To assess the utility of dietary choice we 
need only calculate the amount of pleasure gained by eating meat that would not occur if 
we were to eat only vegetable dishes (Gruzalski 260). If this is the case, the core equation 
is simple: meat diet versus vegetable diet. 
Singer focuses on the primary question, the differences in pleasure between eating 
flesh and eating vegetables. His utilitarian equation asks only whether flesh or a non-flesh 
diet yields better consequences. This approach makes sense because if no one prefers to 
eat meat, it is pointless to perpetuate the meat industry purely for the financial needs of 
those currently involved in this line of work. If the scales tip toward flesh-eating, we 
might next ask what sort of farms would be ethically preferable. If the scales tip toward 
eating only vegetables, we might ask what method of disbanding farms might offer the best 
consequences. After the primary issue is resolved a new utilitarian equation emerges for 
consideration. Through this process Singer' theory adds to our understanding of the most 
important considerations in a given issue, and those that might be considered secondary. 
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Singer elaborates on his utilitarian calculations, and concludes that this simple 
equation yields no utilitarian gain for flesh-eaters ("Utilitarianism" 333). Considerable 
evidence indicates that there is no health gain, non-flesh-eaters argue that there is no 
culinary gain, therefore, on what grounds would one justify the torment and death of 
millions of animals for a food-choice that offers no benefits whatsoever? 
Using this simplified approach, where only the most central issues are considered, 
Singer offers the following considerations as gains entailed in a vegetarian diet: 
" an end to the excessive suffering of food-industry animals 
" no culinary sacrifice 
" increase in grain available to feed hungry populations 
" health benefits 
" environmental benefits ("Utilitarianism" 332-4). 
Singer admits that a vegetarian diet will involve financial losses for those who gain 
from the flesh-industry, but he notes that this is a one-time loss, and therefore easily 
outweighed by long-term considerations. "Compare the indefinite prolongation of animal 
suffering with the once-only cost of a transition, and I think that as long as we give the 
interests of animals equal consideration with similar human interests, the answer is clear" 
("Utilitarianism" 334). Unfortunately, what seems clear to Singer appears to be unclear to 
the majority. It is unclear how to proceed if those weighing relevant factors disagree on 
the comparative weight that each ought to receive. 
Focusing on the primary question-flesh-diet versus non-flesh-diet-avoids a 
critical point: the "food-animal" industry already exists. Any dietary change will impact 
many lives for the better or for the worse. These harms and benefits cannot fairly be 
removed from an equation intent on finding the utility of dietary choice. If the equation 
had been worked out before the advent of agra-business, Singer could reasonably focus 
only on dietary matters, in which case it might have been clear that the farm industry ought 
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never to begin. However, this mammoth business exists and cannot be eliminated without 
hardship. Singer cannot ignore these hardships in his utilitarian equation if he seeks the 
best possible outcome for all those effected. 
Utilitarian equations are instrumental in assessing who will experience the greatest 
impact from certain actions. However, these benefits are mitigated by a lack of 
dependable tools for measuring pleasures and pains. How might Singer measure the 
pleasures of a flesh-based diet against those of a non-flesh diet? 
Meat-eaters tend to assume that the pleasures of flesh-eating are irreplaceable. 
Who can argue with their personal statements of culinary preference? Maybe a vegetarian 
diet is lacking in pleasure, though few vegetarians are apt to agree. Only those who are 
willing to go without meat for a prolonged period of time will be able to comment on a 
vegetable-based diet, and their opinions are apt to be biased. Hard-core flesh-eaters, who 
believe giving up meat is a tremendous culinary loss, are not apt to give up meat long 
enough to comment on the differences. An economist is likely to argue that money makes 
the world go around, while a minister is more apt to assert that this function is filled by 
faith, religion, and ultimately God. Similarly, flesh-eaters and vegetarians tend to view 
dietary choice through a personal lens. How can subjective opinions be weighed on the 
scales of utility? There is no unit of value for pleasure and pain, yet "there must be 
principles which determine how these reasons for and against are to be weighed... " 
(Sprigge, "Metaphysics" 137). Even if we could gather all the necessary information from 
all affected parties, how would we compare pains and pleasures. There is no unit of 
measurement. 
How might Singer weigh physical or mental pains and premature death of a veal 
calf against loss of livelihood and thwarted culinary pleasures? Moral intuition might 
suggest to most of us that loss of liberty and life will always outweigh any downward shift 
in finances or loss of culinary pleasure, but Singer does not accept moral intuition as a 
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legitimate philosophical guideline ("Utilitarianism" 9,327). Nor is Singer's moral intuition 
the common sentiment in Western societies. Without a defined unit of measure, Singer's 
conclusions are similar to moral intuitions-entirely subjective. "Given the difficulty of 
measuring pain and pleasure in any objective fashion... it is impossible to convince a 
skeptic that the premise of the Utilitarian argument-that the overall pain caused by eating 
meat is greater than the pleasure-is in fact true" (Telfer 73). 
Yet the issue of flesh-eating is straight forward compared to most protectionist 
issues. How do pain, suffering, loss of life, and thwarted opportunities of a tusked 
elephant (or walrus) weigh against the shoe-string survival of assorted Africans (or 
Inuits)? We must weigh the lives of those killed against these five different livelihoods: 
" Killers that kill the animals and sell the tusks to smugglers 
" Smugglers that smuggle the ivory out of the country and sell to artists 
" Artists who carve an elephant (or a walrus) and sells to a dealer 
" Dealers who sell to a shopkeeper 
" Shopkeepers that sells to consumers 
How can we conduct a utilitarian calculation with regard to the ivory trade? How would 
the equation change if the ivory supplier would perish without the income? What if the 
tusks were cut off of a live elephant? Finally, what if the de-tusked elephant was then 
killed by a bull-elephant because it had no tusks to defend itself? How might scales of 
utility accommodate these myriad possibilities? How does one weigh the pains of an 
elephant (or walrus) against the pleasures of those who depend on the ivory industry for 
their welfare, along with the pains of those who fight for the lives of these animals, or 
against those who enjoy-or hate-ivory products? 
Concepts are not as straightforward or complete as mathematical equations. We 
cannot feel the pains of others, nor their pleasures. Even if we could, how are they to be 
compared, one with another? Such a feat requires super-human knowledge. "Only God 
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can aggregate the pains and pleasures of others and only then if he or she can actually feel 
them" (Ryder, "Painism" 203). In the absence of god-like knowledge, Singer's theory is 
difficult to use in practical situations. 
While the complications of utilitarian equations, and the lack of a defined unit of 
measure, make Singer's theory difficult to employ conclusively in any given situation, that 
is not to say that weighing harms and benefits has no practical value. Singer's work 
follows a long-standing moral inclination to weigh harms and benefits. Once a system is 
established for this purpose, as is the case in Western legal systems, weighing harms and 
benefits is more manageable. For instance, the most notable distinction between murder 
and attempted murder is one of harm done. The criminal is no less wrong in action for 
having failed in her attempt to kill, yet the crime is categorized separately, and tends to 
carry a lesser punishment. Perhaps Singer's theory could also reach such a state of 
institutionalized categorization with regard to harms and benefits, in which case it might 
one day be more viable in actual cases than it is currently. 
b. expendability of life: Tom Regan criticizes Singer's theory for failing to 
respect the value of life. Singer asserts that utilitarianism maintains the value of individual 
lives: 
... utilitarians and others who are prepared to harm individuals... will view those they are harming, 
along with those they are benefiting, as equally possessing inherent value. They differ with Regan 
only in that they prefer to maximize benefits to individuals, rather than to restrict such benefits by 
requirement that no individual may be harmed... 
The principle of equal consideration of interests, which is the foundation of utilitarianism as well 
as of many other ethical views, fully satisfies the demand that we recognize the inherent value of 
subjects-of-a-life. (Singer, "Animal" 11,13) 
Despite this claim, Singer's utilitarian theory offers no basis for the "value" of life. 
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His theory weighs pleasures and pains to determine which action will bring about the best 
consequences for all effected. If Singer's theory requires that the life of an ibis hang in the 
balance while we determine which actions will bring about the best consequences for all 
those effected, what is the "value" of that ibis' life? 
Singer might argue that the best outcome for the ibis is as relevant as the best 
outcome to all other individuals. In that her interests are given equal consideration, the 
ibis is granted inherent value-but not absolute inherent value. Absolute value protects 
the lives of individuals first and foremost, all things being equal. Singer's theory does not 
offer inherent value to any individual. 
But Singer's theory is based on a more general "value" for life. In his theory lives 
are valued, but only in relative proportion to all other entities. Each sentient entity is 
viewed as a member of a larger group, where tradeoffs for the greater good of the group 
are permissible-even desirable. Singer's theory acknowledges the "value" of sentient 
entities by basing his theory on reducing pain. Why would one wish to increase happiness 
or reduce suffering if individuals have no value? Singer's theory does not overtly ascribe 
inherent value to any one entity, yet by seeking the best consequences for all those 
affected, his theory actualizes a fundamental "value" for all effected. Each individual in 
the equation is de facto granted a measure of inherent value because their interests are 
considered. 
Yet individuals are expendable in Singer's work; aspects of Singer's theory fail to 
protect the lives of sentient individuals. 
Ethics in the United States focus on individual rights. Individual consciousness is 
of extreme moral relevance and "it is wrong to aggregate across individual sentients" 
(Ryder, Animal 326). Singer's theory does not focus on individual rights. His work 
trades one individual off against another. 
In Singer's utilitarian theory "killing a self-conscious being would be justified if this 
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brought about the optimal aggregate balance of pleasure over pain for those affected" 
(Regan, Case 210). (Technically, Singer's theory is based on the outcome that brings the 
best consequences for all those affected, but Singer agrees that the aggregate balance of 
pleasures over pains is one and the same. ) "For utilitarians the proper end-the greatest 
good for the greatest number-reduces all beings into resources for attaining this ideal. It 
is for this reason that [utilitarians] believe individuals can be appropriately sacrificed for 
the greater good" (diZerega 31). 
For Singer there are situations in which using other lives as a means to an end 
might be justified. For instance, Singer accepts "aggregative trade-offs, " whereby "a 
painful experiment upon an unwilling subject (whether non-human or human) is justified 
by its beneficial consequences" (Ryder, Animal 325). "I do not believe that it could never 
be justifiable to experiment on a brain-damaged human. If it really were possible to save 
several lives by an experiment that would take just one life, and there were no other way 
those lives could be saved, it would be right to do the experiment" (Animal 85). 
Singer's theory does not value the individual per se. Singer's protectionist theory 
trades off the lives of some individuals for the possible benefit of others (Regan, "Dog" 
56). 
. 
Each individual lives or dies according to their utility. If their death brings greater 
utility to more individuals, then their individual life ought to be sacrificed to the greater 
good. 
Singer's utilitarian expedience highlights the epistemological difficulties that plague 
utilitarian calculations. glow many infants can be sacrificed for the benefit of how many 
others? How much agony is justified by what quantity of benefit? How certain must [one] 
be of the success of the experiment in advance? " (Ryder, Animal 326). How can we 
answer these questions if we do not know the interests of each species-of each entity- 
and if we have no unit of measurement? Singer fails to address these complicated 
uncertainties (Benton 9). 
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Singer's tendency to trade lives off, one against another, is epitomized in his 
"replaceability" argument. In order to maximize utility, Singer asserts that certain 
individuals ought to be replaced by entities that are better able, or more likely, to satisfy 
interests. Such replacements maximize satisfaction of interests. Utilitarian expedience 
allows for the killing of comparatively less happy or less successful individuals in order to 
maximize satisfaction of interests. 
Perhaps the "replaceability" argument even requires such deaths. Dale Jamieson 
offers an example consisting of two parents, who plan to have only a certain number of 
children, and who have one exceptionally miserable child. He asks, would not their 
chances of bringing more happiness into the world be higher if they were to eliminate the 
misery-child, and conceived another in its place? If one entity can be replaced with 
another that is happier, is not a moral utilitarian compelled to sacrifice the less-happy for 
the sake of the happier (Jamieson, "Killing" 142-145)? Given the anxiety such a system 
would bring to parents, perhaps not, but if one were allowed to eliminate unhappy children 
if they so chose, perhaps so. 
Singer's ethic not only allows the killing of individuals for the benefit of the 
majority, but requires such an act. Michael Lockwood offers an example of how the 
"replaceability" argument might facilitate the birth of a company that he calls 
'Disposapup. " This hypothetical company breeds pups to provide pets for families. 
"Disposapup" also takes dogs back and disposes of them, by putting them painlessly to 
death, if the family wishes to go on vacation, or if their pup has grown beyond the cute 
and cuddly stage, and the family has lost interest. If the family wants another dog 
"Disposapup" can give them a fresh start with a cute and cuddly puppy whenever they so 
choose ("Singer" 168). Because Singer focuses on pleasure, rather than the individual, his 
theory leads to some alarming possibilities. 
But utilitarianism is not solely to blame for the carnage. At least some of these 
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surprising possibilities stem from theoretical errors in Singer's work. 
In "Killing Humans and Killing Animals" Singer examines two utilitarian outlooks. 
The "total view" indicates that ethical actions will always "increase the total surplus of 
pleasure over pain, irrespective of whether this is done by increasing the pleasure of 
existing beings, or increasing the number of beings who exist" (147). In contrast, the 
"prior existence view" considers the pleasure and pains only of those beings that already 
exist (Singer, "Killing" 148). 
Singer opts for the "total view" because he notices an inconsistency in the "prior 
existence view. " For Singer it makes perfect sense not to base a decision to have children 
on a utilitarian commitment to increase the amount of pleasure in the world. Therefore, 
the "prior existence" theory is consistent with our moral intuition. Reason suggests to 
Singer that the opposite ought also to be true, but Singer notes a disconcerting asymmetry: 
"if the pleasure a possible child will experience is not a reason for bringing it into the 
world, why is the pain a possible child will experience a reason against bringing it into the 
world? " ("Killing" 148). Singer discounts the "prior-existence" view based on this 
suspicious asymmetry, and opts for the "total" view. 
The asymmetry seems to result from Singer's wording of the question, rather than 
from inherent problems in the "prior existence view. " In his discussion of the total view, 
Singer assumes that any given life generally counts as a "pleasant life, " unless otherwise 
described: 
... 
it does not seem wrong for the government of an underpopulated country to encourage its people to 
have more children so that the population will rise by, say, one million. Yet of this million, we can be 
sure that at least one will be thoroughly miserable. If it is not wrong to create the million, but would 
be wrong to create the single miserable being, the obvious explanation is that there is value in the 
creation of the 999,999-or however many it will be-whose lives are happy. ("Killing" 150) 
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Singer assumes that all lives-except the (minuscule) quantity who are undeniably 
miserable, are correctly counted as "happy, " and therefore rightly brought into the world 
toward a net utilitarian gain. Singer assesses existence as an undisputed positive/pleasure. 
Is not the myriad experience of life more complicated than Singer's assumption indicates? 
It seems more reasonable to assign a neutral or mixed value, since He is many-faceted. 
If we rewrite the conundrum, eliminating Singer's assessment of life as an 
automatic (and it would seem exclusive) pleasure, the question looks very different: if the 
pleasure and pain a normal child is apt to experience is not a reason for bringing it into the 
world, why is the certain increased pain of a defective child a reason against bringing it 
into the world? The question no longer appears asymmetrical or perplexing. A not-yet- 
conceived entity is necessarily an unknown, but will most likely find a mixture of both 
pleasure and pain throughout life. Some beings, born with diseases or mental defects, 
experience increased suffering from medical treatments, torment of peers, exclusion from 
activities, or the uncertainty of their futures. Concurrently, the anguish of parents, 
extended family, and friends is heightened by the birth of a child that is not physically or 
mentally average. 
If the anticipated mix of pleasure and pain is altered so that increased pain is 
expected, one might reasonably choose not to parent. This is not to say that there is no 
pleasure in the life of one born outside the physical norm, only that it is reasonable to 
assume that the pain ratio will be higher in the birth of a defective child-for the child, the 
parents, and for all involved. 
Singer's assessment of life as an exclusive "pleasure" leads him to reject the "prior 
existence" view in favour of the "total" view, which in turn leads Singer to accept the 
"replaceability argument. " The "replaceability argument" asserts the utilitarian expedience 
of killing of an animal (human or otherwise) that has no conception of itself as a being in 
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the future, provided such individuals lead pleasant lives, are killed painlessly, and are 
replaced by beings of equally pleasant lives. Singer notes that this view seems 
counterintuitive (especially since children and severely retarded individuals fall into this 
same category). If Singer had not erroneously misconstrued life as exclusively "pleasure, " 
he would not have rejected the "prior existence" view based on an asymmetry created by 
his erroneous assumption. In this case Singer probably would have opted for the "prior- 
existence" view, thereby avoiding the counterintuitive conclusions of the "replaceability 
argument" highlighted by Jamieson and Lockwood. 
Michael Fox attacks the expendability of certain individuals due to Singer's focus 
on sentience. He notes that a being with no sensation has no interests, and such 
individuals need not be treated with any consideration in Singer's theory. Michael Fox 
brings to light 
... 
[a] rare but thoroughly documented condition called "congenital universal indifference (or 
insensitivity) to pain, " which is characterized by complete absence, throughout life, of any pain- 
sensing capability. But if the capacity to experience pain is missing, any rights predicated on it must 
vanish as well. In addition, completely anesthetized, hypnotized, or deeply comatose human beings 
lack the capacity in question and hence, too, any corresponding rights. ("Animal" 110) 
Fox misrepresents Singer's utilitarian theory as a theory base on rights, and he 
neglects to consider the more complex aspects of Singer's theory, such as mental 
suffering, and the suffering of relatives and friends-all of which Singer takes into 
account. However, Fox's point holds true for beings that have no sensation, when no one 
else experiences the effects, and so long as there is no mental anguish involved. However 
unlikely, Fox brings up a point worth considering-even if one does not suffer, is not an 
interest in living of some relevance? 
This question can be explored via Singer's views on painless death. Singer seems 
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uncertain about a hard-core utilitarian approach to painless death. Sometimes his work 
reveals a more live-and-let-live philosophy: "If fish are capable of enjoying their lives, as I 
believe they are, we do better when we let them continue to live than when we needlessly 
end their lives... " (In Defense 9). This statement hints at a measure of value in the lives of 
other beings-whether or not they feel pain, whether or not their continued existence 
bring about the greatest aggregate of pleasure. 
But Singer's live and let live sentiment is noticeably absent from his more classical 
utilitarian philosophy. His theory does not prohibit killing, so long as it is done painlessly 
(VanDeVeer, "Interspecific" 56). "When animals lead pleasant lives, are killed painlessly, 
their deaths do not cause suffering to other animals, and the killing of one animal makes 
possible its replacement by another who would not otherwise have lived-the killing of 
non-self-conscious animals may not be wrong. " In short, "the wrongness of killing 
amounts to no more than the reduction of pleasure it involves" (Practical 104). If the 
extant pleasure is not reduced, no wrong is done. 
This conclusion is based on the assumption that sentient beings have no interest in 
staying alive (VanDeVeer, "Interspecific" 160). Singer does not overtly express or defend 
this assumption, yet all living entities are "psychologically oriented to escape death and to 
pursue the goals appropriate to their kind-which tells against the idea that it is normally 
acceptable for us painlessly to kill healthy sentient beings lacking a high degree of self- 
awareness" (A. Taylor 252). Is the thwarting of an animal's interest in survival, as 
indicated by the behaviour of almost all (if not all) living things, a harm? On what grounds 
can thwarted interest not constitute a valid harm in Singer's utilitarian equation? Singer 
offers no explanation. 
If a painless death is possible and ethical, there is nothing to stop the demise of 
unloved and unwanted individuals. In the eyes of some, "there are good reasons not to 
judge deficient human life either of equal value to normal, adult human life or, in extreme 
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cases, even of much value at all" (Frey, "Autonomy" 58). Many individuals (human and 
non-human) might be eliminated for the aggregate benefit of all. The painless death of 
these individuals, deaths that cause no suffering to anyone, maximize happiness and are 
therefore preferred. 
Not only do some individuals fail to add to the aggregate happiness, but they may 
be a significant detriment to Singer's utilitarian goal. Singer fails to consider situations in 
which the death of an individual would bring great pleasure to others. If a man beats his 
wife, cat, kids, and dog; if he steals from his relatives, threatens coworkers, goes hunting 
every weekend, and eats his neighbors (he lives between a hog-farm and a cattle ranch), 
would not his elimination be preferable for all sentient beings effected? Singer 
theoretically calculates the best outcome for all sentient entities, and he will need to 
consider under what circumstances annoying or dangerous individuals are rightly 
eliminated. When does an individual cause so much pain and suffering to others that the 
utilitarian scales vote against their existence? Perhaps Singer's utilitarian equation 
indicates that flesh-eaters, fur-wearers, hunters, and other ruthless exploiters of sentient 
beings ought to be eliminated. 
However, any answer must take into account the effect of killing on the one who 
kills. On this count Singer's equation seems incomplete. He assumes (in his 
"replaceability" argument) that here is no net loss if the pleasures subtracted on account of 
death are added back into the equation by a new birth. In this view killing is acceptable so 
long as a given death is painless, the individual is replaced, and no other animals are 
effected (through loss of a mate, offspring, or a member of their social group). Singer 
asserts that if these conditions are met there is no reason to oppose killing. He writes 
rather glibly, "an infant who is `allowed to die' ends up just as dead as one who is killed" 
(In Defense 8). 
But Singer has left out two important factors: the effects of killing on the one who 
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makes the kill, and on the society in which that killer lives. Moral responsiveness is 
generally considered both strong and natural in human beings, and violence inherently 
disturbing (Ryder, Animal 320). Studies indicate that violence and cruelty "undermine our 
moral responsiveness to humans" (Auxter 224). We do not "call someone `inhuman' 
because that person is stupid, but because he or she lacks certain fundamental emotional 
responses" (Clark, "Human" 173). Most people would view cruelty and indifference to 
life as classically "inhuman. " 
Singer might argue that killing leads to no ill effects if one feels that they are doing 
the right thing-that killing is what they ought to do under the circumstances, and 
behaving justly guards against ill effects. Such an assertion ignores evidence from war- 
veterans, those who work on animals in laboratories, and slaughterhouse workers. 
Evidence indicates that killing-even rubber-stamped, institutionalized killing-has a 
negative effect on those who carry out the deed (Eisnitz). 
An employee at Biosearch Laboratories is reported to have said, "Once you've 
been here a few days, you lose respect for all living things" (Orlans 132). Educators in 
human and veterinary medicine repeatedly ask why students arrive "sensitive, concerned, 
idealistic, morally aware, and suffused with a desire to promote health and alleviate illness 
and suffering, yet emerge four years later cynical, hardened, brutalized, and rigid, their 
ideals and enthusiasm forgotten" (Rollin 110). Statistics from slaughterhouse employees 
reveal a similar "hardening" toward moral sensibilities, but to a more extreme degree. 
They are commonly in and out of prison, batter family members, and are known for their 
ability and willingness to wield weapons against any possible aggressor-including 
humans. Gail Eisnitz conducted an extensive survey of slaughterhouse workers. All of 
her subjects admitted to excessive, unnecessary cruelty toward the animals they 
perpetually kill. A fairly typical interviewee reported: 
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The worst thing, worse than the physical danger, is the emotional toll. If you work in that stick 
pit for any period of time [killing pigs]. you develop an attitude that lets you kill things but doesn't let 
you care. You may look a hog in the eye that's walking around down in the blood pit with you and 
think, God, that really isn't a bad-looking animal. You may want to pet it. Pigs down on the kill 
floor have come up and nuzzled me like a puppy. Two minutes later I had to kill them-beat them to 
death with a pipe. I can't care... 
Every sticker [slaughterhouse killer] I know carries a gun, and every one of them would shoot 
you. Most stickers I know have been arrested for assault. A lot of them have problems with alcohol. 
They have to drink, they have no other way of dealing with killing life, kicking animals all day long. 
If you stop to think about it, you're killing several thousand beings a day. (Eisnitz 87) 
Though the killing is considered "legitimate, " "necessary, " and generally condoned 
by society, slaughterhouse workers seem to be affected-violently and negatively-by the 
deaths they cause. In turn, the societies they live in suffer the effects. 
Eisnitz's work also reveals what seems to be an unavoidable moral numbness and 
indifference that results from institutionalized killing. Slaughterhouse owners are 
notoriously indifferent to their employees. For instance, it is not uncommon for workers 
to be injured, including those crushed by cattle, burned by chemicals, stabbed by poking 
knives, or who have lost limbs and body parts in machinery. Workers are sometimes not 
even trained to use the machines they are required to operate. Eisnitz discovered that, 
"with nearly thirty-six injuries or illnesses for every one hundred workers, meat packing is 
the most dangerous industry in the United States" (Eisnitz 271). She concluded that the 
effects of long-term involvement in slaughterhouse killing results in "a system that places 
nearly as little value on human life as it does on animal life" (Eisnitz 273). Gail Eisnitz's 
study indicates that the negative impact of killing is intense and extensive. 
For centuries philosophers have assumed that cruelty toward animals begets cruelty 
toward people (Hoff 63-64). Kant wrote: 
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If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he does not fail in his 
duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is inhuman and damages in himself that 
humanity which it is his duty to show towards mankind If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he 
must practice kindness toward animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his 
treatment of men. (Broadie 381) 
It has long been assumed that wanton cruelty and killing, "even where one is sure 
the creature feels no pain, may encourage habits of cruelty. Thus one should prevent 
one's children from crushing snails, not for the snails' sakes, but to make sure they don't 
get the idea of doing the same with baby chicks" (Forrester 117). 
Current research supports this historic assumption. Evidence suggests that a lack 
of respect for any living being is associated with a lack of respect for all living beings. In 
1983 a study linked animal abuse to child abuse, revealing that "88% of the families in 
which physical abuse took place also had animals that were abused" (DeViney, 311). Since 
then an ever-increasing body of evidence has clearly linked violence toward other animals 
and violence toward humans. 
A recent study, Cruelty to Animals and Interpersonal Violence offers an extensive 
collection of diverse materials linking cruelty toward non-human animals with child abuse, 
violence against women, and violent-often lethal-antisocial behaviour. The following 
quote is from an article that was first published in 1992 in the Canadian Veterinary 
Journal: 
Research also found compelling evidence confirming intuitions that cruelty to animals, when 
perpetrated by children, might be a predictor of future antisocial behavior. Research documented: ... a 
triad of symptoms, closely associating cruelty to animals, physical abuse by one or both parents, and 
violence toward people... 
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Spectacular anecdotal incidents among serial killers enhanced this research. Mass murderer 
Theodore Bundy claimed he had spent his early years with a grandfather who assaulted people and 
tormented animals: circumstantial evidence linked him to animal's graves. Albert DeSalvo, the 
"Boston Strangler, " in his youth shot arrows into dogs and cats trapped in orange crates... Carroll 
Edward Cole, executed in 1985 for five of the 35 murders of which he was accused, said his first act 
of violence as a child was to strangle a puppy. James Huberty, who killed 21 at a McDonald's 
restaurant in San Ysidro, California, had been accused of shooting his neighbor's dog with an airgun. 
Earl Shriner... sexually mutilating a seven-year-old boy in Tacoma, Washington, had a juvenile 
history of stringing up cats, sticking firecrackers up the anuses of dogs, and slaughtering chickens. In 
1975, neighbors photographed the skulls of animals impaled in the yard of Jeffrey Dahmer. 
imprisoned this year for dismembering of 17 men in Milwaukee. None of these early incidents were 
reported to authorities. (Arkow 409-410) 
Singer's utilitarian equation fails to calculate these possible dire consequences. 
Though we humans are proud of our brain-power, most would agree that 
intelligence does not, and cannot, make us truly human. The word "human" looks very 
much like the word "humane. " What most people would consider classically "human" is 
more illusive, and more likely to be damaged by acts of wanton cruelty and destruction of 
life. To accept institutionalized cruelty, even for the sake of aggregate happiness, threatens 
something more fundamental than aggregate pleasure: "people who cannot be trusted 
with animals often cannot be trusted with human beings either; a child who enjoys 
torturing small animals had better not be left alone with the baby" (Warren 51). 
A baby that cannot live, and is left in peace to die, will be just as dead as one 
overtly killed, but the emotional and social indications and consequences are worlds apart. 
Singer's utilitarian expedience with the lives of individuals indicates that he has failed to 
account for this in his utilitarian equation. 
3. Mental Capacity. 
Singer asserts that "some features of certain beings... make their lives more 
ý.. ý. ý ... ýýt ý.. -r-ý5--.. ý-_ý. _ -ý. ý- _. . _ýf: 
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valuable than those of other beings: " a self-aware being, capable of abstract thought, of 
planning for the future, of complex acts of communication, and so on, is more valuable 
than the life of a being without these capacities (Animal 19-20). 
Singer asserts that the criterion for deciding ethical actions is the outcome which 
brings the best consequences for all sentient beings affected. Singer writes, "... to take the 
life of a being who has been hoping, planning, and working for some future goal is to 
deprive that being of the fulfillment of all those efforts; to take the life of a being with a 
mental capacity below the level needed to grasp that one is a being with a future-much 
less make plans for the future-cannot involve this particular kind of loss" (Animal 21). 
Singer indicates that preference and the ability to plan are not the sole determinants 
of whether or not one ought to live. Consistent with his utilitarian philosophy, Singer 
writes that it is always better to let a creature capable of enjoyment live out their life 
undisturbed (Singer, In Defense 9). However, he concludes that the death of a person 
who has been "hoping, planning, and working for some future goal" is a greater loss than 
the death of an individual who is unaware of having a future (Animal 21). 
It is common for human beings to believe that there is something more tragic in 
their death because we assume that "... unity and continuity hardly have application to the 
lives of lower animals at all, which means... that there is here an entire spectrum of worth, 
on which their lives do not even figure" (Lockwood, "Singer" 167). We assume that 
because people plan for the future, 
... 
[a] premature death can, as it were, make nonsense of much of what has gone before. Earlier 
actions, preparations, planning, whose entire purpose and rationale lay in their being directed towards 
some future goal, become, in the face of an untimely death, retrospectively pointless-bridges, so to 
speak, that terminate in mid-air, roads that lead nowhere. The lives of other animals tend, in 
contrast, to be mere meanderings anyway... (Lockwood, "Singer" 167) 
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Singer's theory determines which sentient creatures ought to live, while others die, 
based on aspects of mental ability. His assumptions regarding mental capacity, and the 
importance of mental capacity are common in Western Culture, yet clouded with 
epistemological difficulties. 
a. utilitarian calculations: On the basis of assumptions regarding mental factors, 
philosophers such as Singer accept painless death: "If we painlessly end [a cat's] life while 
it is actually sleeping thus ensuring that not even a short-term desire, for food say, is, in 
consequence, denied satisfaction, it is difficult to see that we are thereby acting contrary to 
any preference, on the creature's part" (Lockwood, "Singer" 159). 
First Singer's utilitarian calculation does not consider any loss for a thwarted 
interest in survival. Living entities do have an interest in survival (A. Taylor 252). Singer's 
theory is grounded on maximizing interests and diminishing suffering, and some measure 
of suffering must be entailed in the thwarting of the basic biological desire to avoid death. 
For this reason Singer's assessment seems contrary to his own goal of maximizing 
happiness. 
Mental awareness is irrelevant to the basic desire not to die and the loss of pleasure 
entailed in an untimely death. If Peabody loses her wallet on the way to church, her money 
is lost whether or not she is aware of any loss, and her pleasures are diminished whether or 
not she is consciously aware that they are diminished. Similarly, most stray cats probably 
know nothing beyond hunger and homelessness; they are most likely unaware of all that 
might be lacking in their lives. Feral cats probably do not dream of soft chairs or dishes 
perpetually filled with crunchy nibblets. Still much is lacking in the lives of stray felines, 
and their happiness is decreased by deprivation. None of us can prefer a situation that is 
completely outside our experience-but few would deign to argue that the interests of 
starving or homeless people, who know no other life, are not thwarted by absence of food 
and shelter. Singer's utilitarian theory is based on actions that will bring the best 
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consequences for all those affected whether or not the effected individuals are aware of 
what those outcomes or consequences might be. On these grounds, Singer must reject 
painless death, and let sleeping cats He. 
Second, Singer asserts that having a plan for the future will make a particular life 
more "valuable, " but he does not indicate whether or not any and every plan will suffice. 
Are some plans more valuable than other plans? If a cat sits outside the door, then dashes 
for the food dish when the door is opened, would we deny that the cat was planning to 
come in and eat? Is this plan less valuable or important to a utilitarian equation than my 
plan to go out to dinner tonight? Will the plan to become an artist yield more or less 
utilitarian benefit than the plan to become a military general? Will either one of these offer 
as much utility-value as a "plan" to do absolutely nothing? 
b. epistemological problems: Singer's utilitarian calculation is based on how 
other entities think and feel. Offering conclusive information with regard to the feelings or 
thoughts of others meets with challenging epistemological difficulties. 
By including mental factors in his utilitarian equation, Singer runs into the same 
epistemological problems faced by Regan. Singer writes: In general it does seem that the 
more highly developed the conscious life of a being, the greater the degree of self- 
awareness and rationality, the more one would prefer that kind of life (Singer, Practical 
90). Why? How can we know? Perhaps it "seems" so to Singer, but he denies the moral 
validity of intuition ("Utilitarianism" 9,327). How might Singer determine which 
creatures are able to have plans, hopes, and actions based on their personal assessment of 
their own future? How did Singer determine that the ability to prefer one's own existence 
over non-existence is a "pleasure" in the utilitarian equation? "A reflexive being has a kind 
of interest in life that an unreflective being lacks, but it is not clear exactly why this should 
give the reflexive being any greater claim on life, or make life more valuable or important. 
Why should mental complexity count for anything? " (E. Johnson, "Life" 130). And if it 
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should count for something, what are the units of measurement with which we will 
compare lives? 
Though he offers no way to assess his criterion, Singer stakes the value of the lives 
of sentient beings on mental and physical aspects of other creatures: 
taking the life of a person will normally be worse than taking the life of some other being, since a 
being which cannot see itself as an entity with a future cannot have a preference about its own future 
existence. This is not to deny that such a being might struggle against a situation in which its life is 
in danger, as a fish struggles to get free of a barbed hook in its mouth; but this indicates no more than 
a preference for the cessation of a state of affairs that is perceived as painful or threatening. Struggle 
against danger and pain does not suggest that the fish is capable of preferring its own future existence 
to non-existence. (Practical 81) 
On what grounds does Singer assert that the fish does not prefer continued 
existence? Ascertaining consciousness is like "attempting to pin down shadows" (Ryder, 
"Painism" 200). How can we know what another entity prefers? If we assume the absence 
of certain mental states, such as a will to continue living, we are obligated to include 
human babies in this assumption. On what grounds would we assume that human babies 
have these "higher" mental characteristics (Lockwood, "Singer" 157)? 
Like Singer, many people assume that fish feel little or no pain, and lack much in 
mental states. But fish have a complex nervous system. Evidence indicates that fish are 
"sensitive to pain, have memory and are capable of learning, and are conscious, or aware 
of, their existence" (Dionys de Leeuw 378). Fish have been conditioned to swim in a 
particular direction through electroshock (Rollin 31). While most people assume that fish 
are not self-aware, the biologist A. Dionys de Leeuw who worked extensively in sport 
fisheries management, has documented that "fish have all the relevant characteristics 
attributable to those animals requiring humane treatment from society generally" (373f, 
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389). The only characteristic that seems necessary for moral consideration that fish lack is 
cuddly cuteness. He asserts that fishing is morally outrageous because "the point of 
angling is to intentionally inflict pain, fear, and suffering on fish in a manner that prolongs 
and aggravates these conditions by first hooking them, then playing with them until they 
are exhausted, and finally establishing complete control over them by landing them" (389). 
Singer indicates that fish are outside moral protection, but he offers no indication that he 
has studied fish. The life and death decisions he makes seem to be based on his own 
unfounded assumptions. 
Mental abilities are notoriously difficult to assess. Even levels of sentience are 
difficult to determine. How can we be sure whether or not a centipede can suffer? If it 
does suffer, how might we compare its suffering in a particular instance with the suffering 
of a rare and mysterious aye-aye in a similar instance? Some people believe that there are 
"great differences between animals in respect of their capacity to experience pain" 
(McCloskey, "Moral" 66). How can we know what any creature, outside of ourselves, 
feels? 
Singer's assessment of mental states and levels of physical pain are subjective 
assumptions. We cannot know a baby's consciousness any more than we can know that of 
a fish or a kudu. "How can sufficient be known about the consciousness of other animals 
to form a moral judgment on these matters? " (Sprigge, "Metaphysics" 135). 
Singer bases his utilitarian theory on sentience and mental factors, yet he does not 
demonstrate how either of these might be ascertained for all relevant species. Even if we 
could be sure of what other creatures feel, on what grounds have we determined that 
sentience is more important than other interests, such as the interest in being mobile, or in 
facing toward the sunlight? There is good reason to be suspicious of sentience as a 
qualification for consideration of interests: 
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If it would seem arbitrary... to find one species claiming a monopoly of intrinsic value by virtue of its 
allegedly exclusive possession of reason, free will, soul, or some other occult quality, would it not 
seem almost as arbitrary to find that same species claiming a monopoly of intrinsic value for itself and 
those species most resembling it (e. g. in type of nervous system and behavior) by virtue of their 
common and allegedly exclusive possession of sentience? (L. Johnson 233) 
How can we know what a fruit-bat thinks or feels? How can we judge that a fruit 
bat is of less "value" -brings less desirable consequences for all those affected-than a 
busy human mind full of "rational, " critical, analytical, thoughts and schemes? We cannot 
know if oysters are conscious, and our uncertainty is "no reason to despise their 
consciousness as in itself of less value to them than our own is to us" ("Life" 132). 
What moral weight does such complexity carry? I incline to the view that each mind can be 
valuable to itself. There need be nothing intrinsically wrong with the mentalities of those who are 
"mad, " "retarded, " or "childish. " That they are not what I want for myself does nothing to show that 
they are not valuable to those beings. Shouldn't every mind have a voice, even if I cannot hear it? (E. 
Johnson, "Life" 131). 
Children are beloved because of their mental simplicity. If we are willing to 
acknowledge that these various states of consciousness are beautiful, we must reassess our 
denigration of other animals based on their mental capacity (E. Johnson, "Life" 131). 
Perhaps it is consciousness itself that is of value, not any particular kind of consciousness. 
(Jamieson, "Killing" 145). But since we are unable to determine which animals might 
have, or might not have consciousness, we will be obliged to offer the benefit of the doubt. 
Singer assesses mental capacity and indicates a different "value" based on his 
assessment. Assigning greater or lesser value to individual lives is anathema to 
protectionist theories. Singer's theory demonstrates that "... once it is admitted that certain 
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forms of life are inherently more valuable than others (valuable to whom, incidentally, if 
not to humans? ), then it has already been conceded that the allegedly `more valuable' 
beings have a greater claim to life, pleasure, and freedom from suffering than those lacking 
the capacities in question" (Fox 113). Any such delineation has repercussions beyond the 
individuals directly involved. Any "tempting basis for making interspecifrc discrimination 
entails possibly counter-intuitive results with regard to intraspecific discriminations" 
(VanDeVeer, "Interspecific" 74). 
Any theory that becomes enmeshed in considerations of mental aspects of other 
beings-whether their levels of pain or their mental abilities-will inevitably become 
embroiled in a discussion about which we have insufficient information. Singer admits that 
it is mere "imaginative reconstruction" to assess what the life of another being might be 
like (Practical 90). 
c. faulty conclusion: Singer's assumption regarding the importance of mental 
ability is bolstered by a conclusion that does not seem tenable. 
Singer's analogy forces readers to choose between saving a normal human being or 
an intellectually disabled human being. Singer concludes that we will probably choose to 
save the life of a normal human being, and he offers this as evidence to indicate that the 
way we value individual lives is influenced by the mental attributes of the individuals 
involved (Animal 20-21). Singer thereby concludes that the loss of certain lives (those 
with more complex brains) is a greater utilitarian loss (greater reduction of pleasure and 
increase in misery) for all those effected, than the loss of other lives (those with lesser 
mental complexity). 
First, it appears Singer has incorrectly identified the reason for our probable 
choice. If we consider a situation where we must choose between two perfectly normal 
people, one with a mental capacity at the same level as Singer's "intellectually disabled" 
individual and one of above average intelligence, the choice is no longer clear. 
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Singer's example fails to demonstrate a human preference for self-aware beings, 
capable of abstract thought, that can plan for the future and engage in complex acts of 
communication. His example seems to highlight our preference for saving the lives of 
those who are not disabled, a preference for non-damaged beings, rather than a preference 
for higher mental ability. 
Second, Singer's demonstration of common preference indicates nothing of utility. 
Singer fails to make a logical connection between the common human value placed on 
those that are not disabled, and maximizing pleasure for all those concerned. How does 
intelligence compute in terms of maximizing aggregate happiness? 
Third, Singer asserts that the majority of people are likely to indicate that they 
ascribe a lesser value to individuals who have lower intelligence. A young gorilla named 
Lana scored 85 on a standard IQ test, higher than some humans (Rollin 23). Would 
Singer assert that most people would choose to save the life of Lana before the life of an 
adult human being that scored below 85? If so, Singer's conclusion does not match up 
with our actual choices; if not, Singer contradicts himself. 
Finally, nowhere does Singer assert that choosing more intelligent beings over 
lesser intelligent beings is what we ought to do. Yet Singer implies that such a choice is 
indicative of what is proper and acceptable-of what is ethical. He offers no evidence that 
such a choice is ethically preferable, only that it might suit the intuitions of the majority. 
At best, his example asserts a common preference, but not a moral preference. 
d. cultural perspective: Singer assumes that, all things being equal, the lives of 
those assumed to have hopes and plans for the future, which constitute an additional loss 
of pleasure if thwarted, are assigned more value. It is common to assume that there is 
something more tragic in the death of a human, and more valuable in human lives, due to 
our mental capacity. 
It is questionable whether or not a higher mental level is associated with increased 
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happiness. Such a connection has not been demonstrated by Singer, and is by no means 
inevitable (Ryder, Animal 327). Perhaps it would be more reasonable for Singer's scales- 
of-utility to register a greater loss to the death of one who has no self-awareness and no 
future plans. 
We assume that "much of what is bad about dying is anticipation of greater 
suffering and fear of what may lie beyond the grave (of which personal extinction may be 
the most terrifying), and regrets about unrealized goals... Consequently, death for animals 
is, on the whole, less of an evil than for humans" (Forrester 124-125). Yet, a "planless" 
being is living in-the-moment, without the stress of concern for tomorrow. One who plans 
for the future is apt to experience less joy in each moment, and is more apt to experience 
anxiety-not only about death, but about life. One who lives in the moment will avoid 
ongoing stress and tension worrying about tomorrow. Consequently, the He of one who 
is less self-conscious will hold less emotional and mental pain and misery. 
This assessment of the value of higher mental states is well-supported in Eastern 
philosophy. Eastern thought favours simplicity-giving up all endeavors-as the shortest 
route to peace and happiness. Singer's assertion, which favours an individual with self- 
awareness and plans for the future, would fall on deaf ears in the Taoist world. 
Tao "denotes simplicity, spontaneity, tranquillity, weakness, and most important of 
all, non-action (wu-wei). " Non-action requires people to allow nature to take its course 
(Chan 136). The Tao-Te Ching instructs people to "attain complete vacuity, / Maintain 
steadfast quietude" (147); Taoists "Manifest plainness, / Embrace simplicity... " (149). Lao 
Tzu is attributed with saying, "I alone am inert, showing no sign (of desires), / Like an 
infant that has not yet smiled... " (150), and "I know the advantage of taking no action" 
(161). Chuang Tzu, second only to Lao Tzu as a Taoist authority, taught that "the 
ultimate man has no self, the spiritual person has no accomplishment, and the sage has no 
name" (hair, Wandering 5-6). 
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In the Taoist tradition Singer's prized attributes-self-awareness, planning, and 
aspiring to many deeds-are discouraged. Simplicity of thought and action is the ultimate 
way of being, and the way of the worthy sage. Taoists value a life that does not look to 
tomorrow, but lives in the moment, above one that is crowded with plans for the future. 
Schools of Buddhism have a philosophy very like that of the Taoist tradition. The 
Ch'an (Zen) Buddhist master I-Hsuan (also from China) instructed his followers: "In 
Buddhism no effort is necessary. All one has to do is to do nothing, except to move his 
bowels, urinate, put on his clothing, eat his meals, and lie down if he is tired. The stupid 
will laugh at him, but the wise one will understand. An ancient person said, `One who 
makes effort externally is surely a fool"' (Chan 446). 
Singer's assumption that the human mind grants enhanced experiences and special 
moral status is broadly accepted in the West, but his assertion would not go unchallenged 
in the East. Eastern wisdom indicates that an individual with plans and hopes offers the 
least utility for all concerned. If one wishes to maximize happiness, one must abandon 
such conniving. Singer's assessment lies within the framework of a narrow, 
contemporary, Western, Protestant ethic. 
e. speciesist criterion: Singer writes, "it would not necessarily be speciesist to 
rank the value of different lives in some hierarchical ordering" (Practical 90). And he 
insists that his theory is not speciesist: 
... 
because it does not make a discrimination on the basis of species, but rather on the basis of 
characteristics that can arguably be said to be morally relevant. Its nonspeciesist nature is apparent 
from the fact that in accordance with this position the life of a member of another species could 
certainly be more valuable than the life of a grossly retarded member of our own species. ("Fable" 
121) 
True, making such assessments in not necessarily speciesist, but if one happens to 
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value the particular attributes of their own species (mental capacity) above the most 
noticeable aspects of all other species, they fail to be impartial. Only non-normal adult 
human beings fall outside Singer's protected category. The moral "value" of all other 
entities hinges on treasured human qualities, such as self-awareness, which is difficult to 
ascertain in other species. In this way Singer's theory favours human attributes. He 
argues that these attributes enhance the aggregate happiness, but he fails to consider other 
characteristics that might also enhance the aggregate happiness, but which human beings 
do not have. He draws conclusions without the benefit of concrete methods of measuring 
mental states and levels of sentience. 
The danger of Singer's approach is easy to expose. What if Singer argued that 
having an opposing thumb made one physically more adept, and therefore more valuable? 
He could assert that this is not a speciesist criterion because not all humans have opposing 
thumbs. (Some thumbs are missing either at birth or through accidents. ) What if Singer 
argued that testosterone makes one stronger, and therefore enhances one's pleasure in He, 
and simultaneously enhances one's weight in a utilitarian equation? He could assert that 
his view is not sexist because some women have levels of testosterone that are higher than 
those of some males. 
In either case, such arguments cloud the issue-opposing thumbs are a peculiarly 
human trait; high levels of testosterone are a peculiarly male characteristic. Thumbs and 
testosterone offer certain advantages (especially if you wish to engage in war), but so do 
the attributes of other animals and women. Similarly, the mental propensities of human 
beings offer certain advantages, but so do the mental attributes of other animals. A long, 
strong tail or trunk offers advantages that we cannot enjoy, although monkeys and 
elephants can and do enjoy these advantages. Singer has chosen a peculiarly human 
mental capacity to include in his assessment of the value of life. His choice is no less 
arbitrary than that of testosterone. The only real difference seems to be that one is sexist 
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and the other is speciesist. 
Singer's utilitarian theory is based on maximizing happiness. Toward this end he 
offers special consideration for entities with particular mental abilities. Singer fails to 
consider the importance of other attributes with regard to his utilitarian assessment. For 
instance, Singer does not consider the importance of characteristics such as most 
nurturing, best swimmer, or gentlest-none of which are the special and exclusive realm of 
human beings in relation to other species, but all of which might maximize pleasure. 
Instead, Singer favours certain mental abilities-mental abilities in which humans 
seem to specialize-and he hinges increased life-value on these attributes. Yet the human 
brain is part and parcel of many questionable tendencies, such as unceasing material 
acquisition and gruesome meditated violence: "having started with man as the uniquely 
rational animal, we come finally face to face with man as the only animal who 
systematically slaughters his own kind. ... 
humans are especially dangerous" (Rodman 17). 
If one looks more closely at the human animal, there is ample reason to favour non-human 
attributes. . 
Conclusion 
Peter Singer's utilitarian sentience-based theory conclusively demonstrates that 
"there is no consistent way to draw nonarbitrary moral lines based solely on species 
differences" between humans and all other animals (Orlan 24). His work entails 
epistemological difficulties, and may not adequately protect each individual, yet Singer's 
theory is popular because most people recognize that "animal pain and suffering... are 
factors of which account is to be taken in our moral deliberations" (McCloskey, "Moral" 
24). : Si nger's simple theory has helped bring protectionist philosophy-particularly 
speciesism-to the forefront of classrooms, into philosophical journals,. and to audiences 
all over the Western world. 
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III. ANDREW LINZEY: THEOLOGICAL PROTECTIONISM 
Andrew Linzey has been, and remains, the dominant voice for a theological 
justification of protectionism. Linzey rejects the traditional Christian view that God has 
granted people the right to use other animals for their own ends. Linzey asserts that 
exploitation of other animals violates God's will, as expressed in the Bible, and that God 
intended people to offer self-sacrificing service to other animals. 
A brief history of the church with regard to protectionist ideals, including Aristotle, 
Aquinas, theologians, and saints, provides a context for Linzey's work. Linzey's work 
discusses biblical teachings regarding creation and the covenant, and biblical challenges to 
his thesis, including animal sacrifice, dominion, and the eating of flesh. Finally, Linzey 
examines the New Testament, focusing on the life of Christ, the fall and salvation, and 
hierarchy. Based on his examination of the Bible, Linzey asserts a Generosity Paradigm, 
which requires Christians to exhibit self-sacrificing service toward all of creation. 
A. Historical Survey. 
Historically, the weight of the Christian church has been anti-protectionist. 
Animals have most often been viewed as chattel for our purposes, slaves to our needs, 
offerings for sacrifice: unclean, irrational, anti-God, and bereft of souls (Linzey, After 3- 
11). Centuries later, many are dismayed that Christians continue to be "largely or wholly 
instrumentalist in their understanding of animals" (Linzey After 10-11). 
The thirteenth century theologian, Thomas Aquinas, maintained tremendous 
influence over Christianity for seven centuries. He believed that non-human animals were 
put on earth for human purposes. Most contemporary church doctrines accept the 
teachings of Aquinas, yet his teachings stem from pre-Christian sources, namely Aristotle. 
Aristotle taught that all of nature is a hierarchy where creatures with less reasoning 
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ability exist for the sake of those with more (Aristotle, Nicomachean 1: 7,8: 12). As a 
result, he believed that those incapable of moral deliberation had less responsibility and 
fewer privileges (Clark, "Rights" 184). He taught that a more rational mind was part of a 
more complete and perfect individual. `The imperfect are made for the perfect, ' and non- 
human animals exist for the sake of human beings (Aristotle, Politics I. 5-8). "Plants exist 
for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man, domestic animals for his use 
and food, wild ones for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various 
tools. Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has 
made all animals for the sake of man" (Aristotle, Politics 16). Aristotle used animals for 
his purposes, keeping a large museum of `specimens' from other species, which were 
"drawn, dissected, described, and classified" (Thomson 20-21). The Greek tradition, so 
much a part of Christianity, saw nature as one great resource for the use of human beings. 
We have inherited this "general philosophic indifference toward the natural environment" 
and toward other animals (Hart 13). 
Aquinas pulled Aristotle's ideas into Christian Theology (Linzey, After 6). He 
mimicked Aristotle's point of view, but ascribed these ideas to the Almighty. 
There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such that 
the imperfect are for the perfect... things like plants... are all alike for animals and all animals are 
for man. Wherefore it is not unlawful if men use the plants for the good of animals, and animals for 
the good of man, as the philosopher [Aristotle] states (Politics I, 3). 
Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that animals use plants. and men 
use animals, for food, and this cannot be done unless these be deprived of life, wherefore it is lawful 
both to take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for the use of men. In fact this 
is in keeping with the commandment of God Himself (Genesis i, 29,30 and Genesis ix, 3). (Aquinas, 
ll.. II Q64, art. 1. ) 
Aquinas concludes: "considered in themselves animals have no reason and no 
rights, and humans no responsibility to them" (Linzey, Animal 15). Aquinas taught that 
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animals have no moral status except through human interest-as human property (Linzey, 
Animal 13), a point of view that has only just begun to be challenged. 
Aquinas supported his Aristotelian view by asserting that 
" animals lack rationality 
" animals are designed for humans by their very nature 
" animals are made for humans by divine providence 
" animals lack immortal souls 
He concluded, "Hereby is refuted the error of those who said it is sinful for a man 
to kill dumb animals: for by divine providence they are intended for man's use in the 
natural order. Hence it is no wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in 
any other way whatever" (Regan, Animal 58-9). Yet "the argument by which Aristotle 
linked rationality and immortality has been regarded as fallacious by most philosophers, 
and his claim that only humans are capable of rationality is equally dubious. Thus, today's 
standard Christian belief that only humans have immortal souls is, at least in part, based on 
the unsound arguments of a non-Christian philosopher" (Singer, "Animals" 227). Aquinas' 
Aristotelian point of view is not theologically defensible, as Limey's work demonstrates. 
The only objection early Christian thinkers raised with regard to cruelty to animals 
was that it might lead to cruelty toward other humans (Schochet 274). The views of 
Aquinas, based on Aristotle, laid a foundation for current Christian attitudes toward other 
animals that culminated in Descartes. Descartes, a seventeenth century Christian, asserted, 
that animals could not feel pain because they have no minds and no consciousness, as 
evidenced by their lack of language (Descartes 116-117). Descartes carried on the ancient 
tradition of emphasizing rationality, but he carried the importance of rationality to new 
heights. In his mind irrational non-human animals were mere automata-completely 
"other" by virtue of lacking rationality. Descartes' assertion launched a more vigorous 
tendency to view other animals as separate and beneath human beings. 
Descartes' assertions had dreadful consequences for animals in the Western world, 
especially in the hands of science (Regan, All 5). In the course of time, his idea that 
rationality is the root of respect for life has bolstered much prejudice between human 
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beings-white men assumed themselves to be the crowning achievement in rational 
thought, while women and other races are considered inferior (Attfield 17). 
Descartes' dualistic vision is in many ways unsatisfactory, both philosophically and 
religiously. Religiously speaking, Christ was born both of the Virgin Mary and of Spirit. 
Though Mary has never represented reason, intellect, or wisdom, she was highly regarded 
by all Christians until the Protestant reformation. Mary continues to have great power and 
prestige in the Catholic Church. Philosophically, Descartes' focus on rationality is equally 
unsatisfactory, for rationality is recognized as morally irrelevant with regard to respect for 
life. If this were not the case, irrational human beings would be expendable. Although 
Descartes' dualistic vision is unsatisfactory, many human beings continue to emphasize the 
importance of rational thought with regard to respect for human life. Descartes' extreme 
dualistic teaching has been used to justify human dominion and exploitation for centuries. 
In the aftermath of Descartes' influence, the theologian Humphrey Primatt offered 
the first theological argument for extending justice to other animals. Primatt, a 
predecessor of Singer's sentience-based theory, asserted that pain is pain, regardless of 
who feels the pain. He viewed nature as proof of the goodness of God, and offered a 
theological, sentience-based argument for the protection of other creatures (Linzey, 
Animal 15-16). He asserted that those who were cruel acted as atheists; justice requires us 
not to cause pain to God's creation (Linzey, After 10). 
Primatt was the first Christian scholar to defend other animals, but hagiographies 
offer ample proof that the lives of Saints have always offered a model of protectionism 
(Linzey, After 70). Hagiographies reveal that those closest to God are also close to God's 
myriad creatures. 
St. Francis of Assisi is the most famous protectionist saint. For Saint Francis God 
was present in all creatures (Hughes 315). "He asked for captive animals, and cared for 
or released them. If wild animals were given to him, he treated them gently and let them 
go. Often they sensed his friendship so strongly that they stayed near him instead of 
fleeing" (Hughes 317). " Francis saw God expressed in the morphological variety of 
creation; he valued every species and was drawn into wonder and prayer by individual 
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creatures" (Hughes 316). He insisted that his followers exemplify compassion for all 
creatures, and it was his deepest hope that kindness might come from all people toward 
the created world. 
The compassionate attitude of St. Francis was neither unique nor new. Christian 
protectionism had precedents in early and medieval Christian ideas about nature, and was 
supported by Biblical passages (Hughes 313). Many saints rejected the classic separation 
between human and nature (Polk 185); benevolence toward all living creatures was 
relatively common in the lives of saints. Hagiographies demonstrate that saints, known for 
their proximity to the God and the Christian ideal, were generally compassionate and 
tender toward all entities. 
Hagiographies frequently explain a special relationship between saints and other 
animals. Sometimes non-human animals assisted saints, such as the wild ass that helped 
Abbot Helenus. At other times animals were helped by saints-especially against the 
cruelties of humans-such as when St. Godric harbored the hunted stag. Stories of the 
lives of saints also credit animals for having a special spiritual understanding that humans 
lack, as in the story of Saint Columba's white horse (Waddell). Many saints, such as St. 
Jerome, St. Guthlac of Croyland, and St. Godric lived with wild animals that protected 
them; animals were their closest companions. Saint Kieran of Saighir "lived with a wild 
boar, a fox, a badger, a wolf and a deer" (Vischer 26). 
Saints demonstrate "a reversal of the relationship of fear and enmity between 
humans and animals that appertains after the Fall and the Flood" (Linzey, After 100). For 
those closest to God, the fragile nature of non-human animals, and their complete 
subjugation to the ever-growing power of human beings, lends those with Godly love to 
feel a Christian attitude of charity and protective tenderness (Polk 185). What we can 
learn from these "countless saintly examples is that to have a relationship with God the 
Creator can also mean having as a consequence trusting friendships with God's other 
creatures" (Limey, After 101). 
The connection between spiritual leaders and non-human animals runs through the 
Divine. "If animals are spiritual beings-in the sense of being creatures with their own 
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relationship to the Creator-then it must follow that in our encounter with them we 
apprehend-to some degree-the Creator or at least the workings of the Creator" 
(Linzey, After 58). The monk Thomas a Kempis, who wrote one of the most influential 
works of Christian literature, wrote, "If your heart were right, then every creature would 
be a mirror of life and a book of holy doctrine. There is no creature so small and mean 
that it does not put forth the goodness of God" (69). It was common for saints to see 
creation as a "reflection of God's mysterious love" an understanding of which allowed one 
to "come closer to the Creator" (Linzey, After 71). One of the greatest Catholic mystics, 
St. John of the Cross, noted that animals "are all clothed with marvelous natural beauty, 
derived from and communicated by that infinite supernatural beauty of the image of God" 
(Linzey, After 79). 
Although benevolence and compassion toward all creatures has been central to the 
lives of many exemplary Christians, Christians have ignored this message. Instead, 
Christians have defended notions of human dominion and exploitation, including central 
figures such as Pope Pius IX and reformers such as Calvin and Luther (Linzey, After 7, 
10). In spite of the overwhelmingly exploitative attitude of Christians toward creation, 
there have always been voices to offer a religious understanding that does not admit of 
human supremacy. Such is the voice of Andrew Linzey. 
B. Linzey's Generosity Paradigm. 
Linzey reveals theological support for the inclusion of non-human animals in 
Christian morality beginning with two broad topics, creation and the covenant. 
1. Creation. 
Genesis One reports that the elements of creation were made first, then vegetables, 
and finally (on the sixth day) animals, including man and woman: 
And God said, `Let the earth bring forth living creatures according to their kinds: cattle and 
creeping things and beasts of the earth according to their kinds. ' And it was so. And God made the 
beasts of the earth according to their kinds and the cattle according to their kinds, and everything that 
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creeps upon the ground according to its kind And God saw that it was good. Then God said, `Let us 
make man in our image, after our likeness. "' (Gen. 1: 24-26) 
a. shared origins: Linzey notes two important details concerning biblical creation: 
" We are next to all other animals in the creation hierarchy and therefore must 
not assume we are radically different, above, or in a separate sphere. 
" Because creation originated with the creator, Christians are obligated to treat 
God's loving bounty with respect. 
Linzey notes that Genesis One posits "circles of greater or lesser intimacy with 
God. But what is often overlooked is that animals belong to the innermost circle of 
intimacy... land animals and humans are created together on the sixth day" (Linzey, 
Animal 34). Our shared origins indicate that "eve cannot logically claim our own value 
before the Creator without acknowledging the value of other creatures as well" (Linzey, 
After 13). "To affirm creation as God's work is to understand oneself as a creature" 
(Linzey, After 12). Linzey asserts that "the common creatureliness of all creatures" is the 
strongest message of Genesis One (Linzey, After 18). 
Linzey asserts that this creation doctrine has moral ramifications: "animals do not 
need to justify themselves before God, for their existence is their justification. All 
creatures glorify God, especially the plants and animals, for they are simply blessed in 
being what they are" (Linzey, After 72). Linzey argues that non-human animals, because 
they are created by God, "must... have moral worth in themselves" ("Animal' 90). 
"Concern for animals, for all the aspects of the created world, is essential not because 
these things are pleasing to us humans... but because they originate with the creator" 
(Linzey, "Liberation" 512). 
Archbishop of Canterbury (Robert Runcie, 1988), announced that the Christian 
"concept of God forbids the idea of a cheap creation, of a throw-away universe in which 
everything is expendable save human existence. The whole universe is a work of love. 
The value, the worth of natural things is not found in Man's view of himself but in the 
goodness of God who made all things good and precious in his sight" (Linzey After 13). 
127 
This world, and all of life, is "the object of God's sustaining and providential love" 
(Linzey, After 80). "... every creature is a blessed creature or it is no creature at all... We 
must view creation from God's own perspective and not our own. All creatures are 
precious because they originate with God, just like human beings. 
b. idolatry and humanism: Linzey warns that if people hold themselves up as the 
yardstick against which other beings are to be assessed-which we have done for 
centuries-then we are idolaters. The worth of every creature does not lie in whether it is 
beautiful (to us) or whether it serves or sustains our life and happiness... Only God, and 
not man, is the measure of all things" (Linzey, "Liberation" 513). Human beings who look 
to Homo Sapiens as the measure from which one might pass judgment on the worth of 
other creatures are idolatrous because their religious ideal is human, not divine. Such a 
vision deifies people by regarding the interests of human beings as the sole, main, or even 
exclusive concern of God the Creator" (Linzey, After 118). 
Creation is a hierarchy, but if we fail to acknowledge God above and before our 
judgments and ourselves, then we fail to focus our devotion on God, and we become 
idolatrous. "While it cannot be doubted that humans hold a high place in creation, " it does 
not follow that people can single-handedly determine how to treat creation based on what 
we prefer (Linzey, "Animals" 33). In the Christian faith God alone is the measure of all, 
not human beings. If Christians "neglect the place and significance of other creatures in 
God's good creation, Christian theology fundamentally weakens itself, and its claim to 
be... God centered" (Linzey, After 119). 
Our current focus on ourselves is an affirmation of humanism, where humans are 
the measure of all things. Both idolatry and humanism are inimical to Christian teachings. 
"The welfare of humanity has become the dominant ideology of our age... belief in God 
might require us to modify or qualify the demands made for human welfare... " (Linzey, 
After 121). Linzey asserts that we cannot justify everything that we do simply because we 
believe it to be in our best interests. He encourages Christians to see the "Creator's 
interest in the rest of creation, the intrinsic value of each creature in God's sight, " and 
acknowledge "the justice and mercy of God which extends to all works of creation" 
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(Linzey, After 120). This view rejects humanism and puts God back at the centre. For 
"God has created a world of millions of species that are for the most part utterly otiose 
and irrelevant to us" (Linzey After 122). We are not the centre of the created universe, 
and all things were not created for our purposes. 
The Jewish and Christian traditions are united in their conviction that the world of living creatures 
exists because God loves them, and sustains them, and rejoices in them. But if we do not sense this 
divine rejoicing throughout creation it is perhaps not surprising that we live mean, narrow, self- 
centered, essentially exploitative lives. 
The central point is that celebration involves the recognition of worth, of value, outside ourselves. 
Human beings are not he sum total of all value. (Linzey, After 12) 
Contemporary idolatry and humanism demonstrate arrogance and wanton pride. 
Both assume that human beings are the centre and measure of all. Christians, following 
Aristotle's lead, have based morality on this over-inflated attitude of human self- 
importance. Through our "simple-minded humanistic utilitarianism, " we have smugly 
assumed that "what is good for us, must be right with God" (Linzey, After 124). Our 
"spiritually infantile" attitude, after centuries of entrenchment and growth, allows us to use 
"sentient creatures simply as walking `spare parts' for human beings, " to patent them as 
"financial returns" on human ingenuity (Linzey, After 125). 
Linzey rejects Aristotle's humanocentric influence over doctrine, and challenges Christians 
to put God back in the centre of their lives. The Bible teaches that the created world 
faithfully reflects the design of a loving and generous creator-a world that can exist, and 
can only continue to exist, through God's attentive care: "The Lord is good to all, and his 
compassion is over all that he has made" (Ps. 145: 9). God's loving beneficence is 
expressed in creation. "God enjoys creatures. God rejoices, as the psalmist says, in `the 
works of his hand"' (Linzey, After 104). If we treat our world with loving care, we 
acknowledge creation as priceless; we express a theological understanding of reverence for 
God's works. Faithful Christians ought to remember that creation is not ours, but God's, 
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and "Ave must never destroy without serious justification and without acknowledging that 
all life belongs not to us but to God" (Linzey, After 105). 
2. Covenant. 
Linzey notes that the biblical covenant is between God and all of creation. 
Scripture regarding this divine covenant is no less than redundant in its emphasis on God's 
agreement made with all creatures: 
Then God said to Noah and to his sons with him, "Behold, I establish my covenant with you and 
your descendants after you, and with every living creature that is with you, the birds, the cattle, and 
every beast of the earth with you, as many as came out of the ark. ... never again shall there be a flood 
to destroy the earth. " And God said. "This is the sign of the covenant which I make between me and 
you and every living creature that is with you, for all future generations: I set my bow in the cloud... 
I will remember my covenant which is between me and you and every living creature of all flesh; and 
the waters shall never again become a flood to destroy all flesh. ... 
I will look upon it and remember 
the everlasting covenant between God and every living creature of all flesh that is upon the earth. " 
God said to Noah, "This is the sign of the covenant which I have established between me and all flesh 
that is upon the earth. "' (Gen. 9: 8-17) 
Five times this biblical passage asserts that God's covenant includes "every living 
creature; " indicating that this inclusion is of particular importance. It is not written that 
the covenant was made between God and people about the rest of creation. Rather, 
scripture informs us that God established the covenant with all created life. For the 
purposes of God's covenant, "humankind and animal-kind are so integrally related they 
cannot really be separated" (Linzey, After 22). 
Other passages in the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) support Linzey's emphasis on 
a shared covenant. For instance, animals (including humans) are protected from work on 
the Sabbath. Neither human slaves nor burrows are to be burdened (Myers 897). Hebrew 
law teaches the faithful to "refrain from causing distress to any of God's creatures. " The 
Hebrew Bible demands moral inclusion of animals in passages such as Proverbs 12: 10, "A 
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righteous man has regard for the life of his beast, but the mercy of the wicked is cruel, " 
and Deuteronomy 25: 4, "You shall not muzzle an ox when it treads out the grain. "These 
ancient regulations, virtually forgotten, bespeak an eloquent awareness of the status of 
animals as ends in themselves" (Rollin 52). Ample evidence indicates that Jewish and 
Christian exploitation of non-human animals is contrary to biblical teaching, and that only 
the compassionate can be considered righteous (Linzey, After 23-4). 
The protectionist tendencies of the Hebrew Bible have not gone unnoticed. 
Rabbinical exegesis specifically calls attention to 
" God's over-arching, providential care; 
" the need for humans to emulate such care in their dealings with animals; 
" Sabbath regulations concerning animals; and 
" the underlying scriptural principle of compassion. (Linzey, After 24) 
Jewish sacred writings offer a wealth of teachings that denounce exploitative 
attitudes toward creation. These writings support God's covenant as between the divine 
and all of creation. The God that created them protects all creatures of the earth. 
3. Challenges. 
The Bible also presents challenges to protectionism. Linzey discusses three 
stumbling blocks: animal sacrifice, the consumption of flesh, and notions of dominion. 
a. animal sacrifice: Animal sacrifice in biblical times was viewed differently from 
what we think of today. Furthermore, there is evidence that attitudes toward sacrifice 
were changing, and that such rituals were controversial in Biblical times. 
The Judeo-Christian God sometimes appears a rather arbitrary and bloodthirsty 
deity in the Hebrew Bible: After God brought the flood to destroy creation, Noah and his 
family offer animal sacrifices, and "the Lord smelled the pleasing odor" (Gen. 8: 21). First 
God creates sentient creatures, then the Divine brings destructive forces down on what has 
been created, and finally the Almighty seems pleased by the spilling of blood and the 
cooking of flesh as a religious sacrifice. After ordering Noah to protect and preserve each 
created animal by taking them on the ark, God delights in their sacrificial blood. This 
passage is as powerful in its brevity and clarity as it is in its implications. How are 
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protectionists to make sense of these apparent contradictions? 
Passages such as these raise fundamental concerns regarding the value of life, 
including human life: "God created all the animals, not just humans... one might think that 
to kill any animal is to destroy God's property, and thus to `play God. ' Just like 
euthanasia" (Singer, "Animals" 229). What are we to make of Abraham's willingness to 
sacrifice Isaac, the destruction of life in the flood, and the blood of Christ on the cross? 
What are Christian moral obligations with regard to life and death? What are our moral 
obligations in light of honouring God's creation and sacrificing one another to the divine? 
Linzey approaches the issue of animal sacrifice from five different angles. First, he 
cites three scholars (Mascall, Masure, and Yerkes) to elucidate the ancient implications of 
this practice. In biblical times this blood-ritual was not viewed as the destruction of 
animals for human ends, but rather as offering completion, the returning of animals back to 
their Maker (Linzey, Animal 104). Animal sacrifice is yet another acknowledgment of the 
inclusion of all animals in God's munificence. Sacrifice returned entities to the creator, 
and was a "confirmation of their existence beyond death" (Linzey, After 5). 
Human sacrifice was no different, and in this light there is no reason why Isaac 
ought not to be sacrificed... except out of compassion for the family. Indeed, God shows 
compassion for Abraham, and allows a ram to be sacrificed in Isaac's place. (Presumably 
the ram did not have close family ties. ) Biblical death is not viewed as anathema, but as 
completion, shared by non-humans and humans alike. 
Second, while many biblical objections to animal sacrifice were directed against 
cults of the time, these objections also seem to be against the spilling of blood for religious 
purposes (Linzey, Animals 105). Death per se does not seem to be an issue, but killing as 
a religious ritual was an issue, which makes sense in the context of death as a completion. 
Linzey cites a biblical passage in the Prophets in which the Lord speaks: "What to 
me is the multitude of your sacrifices? I have had enough of burnt offerings of rams and 
the fat of fed beasts; I do not delight in the blood of bulls or of lambs, or of he-goats" (Isa. 
1: 11). The voice of God denounces animal sacrifice. 
Third, Linzey cites scriptures that speak out against animal sacrifice because blood- 
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rituals detract from more important spiritual actions. The Bible indicates that, rather than 
kill for God, people ought to live for one another. Instead of killing the fatted lamb, tend 
the downtrodden; rather than cover your hands with blood, fill your hearts with directive 
compassion. "When you spread forth your hands I will hide my eyes from you; even 
though you make many prayers, I will not listen; your hands are full of blood. Wash 
yourselves; make ourselves clean; remove the evil of your doings from before my eyes; 
cease to do evil, learn to do good; seek justice, correct oppression; defend the fatherless, 
plead for the widow" (Isa. 1: 15-17). The Divine does not prefer that we spend our time 
sacrificing animals when there are many more worthy deeds that require our attention. 
Fourth, Linzey notes that God's all-inclusive ownership makes animal sacrifice 
pointless. He refers to biblical passages where God reminds the faithful that all of 
creation is God's-God's from inception. Why would we offer to the Almighty what is 
already God's? "I will accept no bull from your house, nor he-goat from your folds. For 
every beast of the forest is mine, the cattle on a thousand hills. 1 know all the birds of the 
air, and all that moves in this field is mine" (Ps. 50: 9-11). Something is decidedly askew 
when one member of creation offers up another member of creation to the.. Creator. 
Linzey culminates his discussion of animal sacrifice with reference to the New 
Testament, highlighting the Christian rejection of animal sacrifice. Those who follow 
Christ "believe that the sacrificial tradition has reached its ultimate point and climax in the 
sacrifice of Christ... through him, and not through the sacrifices of animals... we are able 
to find ourselves in our Father's presence" (Linzey, Animal 105). Christians look to Christ 
as the eternal, ultimate sacrifice that annuls and makes reprehensible all other forms of 
sacrifice. For Christians, the New Testament completes and fulfills the Hebrew Bible, and 
the coming of Christ abrogated animal sacrifice. 
b. dominion: The 'Dominion Thesis" is "... human chauvinism, according to which 
items outside the privileged human class have zero intrinsic value, ... earth and all its non- 
human contents exist or are available for man's benefit and to serve his interests... " 
(Routley 56). Those who accept the Dominion Thesis believe that "man is entitled to 
manipulate the world and its systems as he wants, that is, in his interests" (Routley S6). 
. 
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"With this worldview, [we] see with arrogant eyes" a world in which everything is 
organized in reference to our own interests (Curtin, "Making" 66). 
The belief that humans have dominion over the rest of creation reaches back to the 
teachings of Aristotle, and has become deeply entrenched in contemporary Judaism and 
Christianity. Western religions have made a bad name for themselves amongst 
protectionists, especially environmentalists, by accepting-insisting on-exploitative 
dominion. Christians who accept the "dominion thesis" believe that "animal life is of little 
or no value-for why else would God have given humans dominion over the other animals 
and told us that we may kill them for food? " (Singer, "Animals" 230). 
Most theologians who have sought an environmentally sound theology within the 
Christian tradition have rejected traditional notions of dominion (Nash 95). Linzey rejects 
traditional notions of Christian dominion, but accepts human dominion as ordained by 
God. He interprets Christian dominion as a responsibility; protective rather than 
exploitative. Biblical commentary with regard to the divinely ordained diet supports 
Linzey's assertion. 
c. flesh-eating. Linzey asserts that a fleshless diet, as presented in Judeo-Christian 
scripture, is the most thoroughly supported of all protectionist claims, and he notes that 
dominion was granted to vegetarian overlords (Animals 126): 
God blessed them, and God said to them, "be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue 
it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing 
that moves upon the earth. " And God said, "Behold, I have given you every plant yielding seed which 
is upon the face of the earth, and every tree with seed in its fruit; you shall have them for food. And 
to every beast of the earth, and to every bird of the air, and to everything that creeps on the earth, 
everything that has the breath of life, I have given every green plant for food. " And it was so. And 
God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good. (Gen. 1: 28-31) 
This passage holds the original, divinely ordained diet for human beings (Buttrick 
1: 486), and it is "altogether a vegetarian food supply" (Allen 1: 132). According to 
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Hebrew scripture, even animals that we know as carnivores originally ate only vegetable 
matter. Consistent with God's original plan, "Judaism has invariably held vegetarianism to 
be the ideal God-given diet for human beings" (Linzey, After 57). Christianity has not. 
The point of Genesis 1: 29 "is not what man may eat, but rather that he may not eat 
flesh. " This scripture echoes back to "a primitive golden age when men were at peace 
with the beasts" (Buttrick 1: 486). Genesis One envisages an ideal world, created by an 
ideal God, in which "overlordship does not include the right to kill animals for food" 
(Allen 1: 132). "Man is thus to be a vegetarian" (Buttrick 1: 486). 
After placing vegetarian humans in charge of a vegetarian creation, God is pleased 
and notes that his creation is "very good" (Gen. 1: 31). Then God places people in the 
peaceful garden to "till and keep" what had been created (Gen. 2: 15). The dominion 
offered by God was not exploitative or humanocentric. "Dominion" has been twisted to 
"comply with preconceived ideas and established practice" (Linzey, After 18). "[H]erb- 
eating dominion is hardly a license for tyranny" (Animal 126). 
The traditional Dominion Theory justifies ancient human practices, "including the 
killing of animals for food-a practice that was, no doubt, in existence long before Genesis 
was written" (Singer, "Animals" 231). Rather than bend our ways to comply with God's 
intent, Christians have custom-tailored the meaning of "dominion" to allow for selfish 
acquisition and brutal dominance. 
Genesis informs us that people were "set over the world to look after it, to care for 
it, as God would do" (Linzey, After 19). Linzey reminds Christians of this original world 
of peace and harmony, "free from violence, predation, strife and cruelty, " about which 
God comments that it is "very good, " and rests on the seventh day with all of creation 
(Linzey, After 20). In God's ideal world "dominion" was a labour of love. 
How did the creatures of God come to eat one another? The answer shows up 
later in Genesis. First God observes changes on the peaceful earth that had been created: 
"Now the earth was corrupt in God's sight, and the earth was filled with violence. And 
God saw the earth, and behold, it was corrupt; for all flesh had corrupted their way upon 
the earth. And God said to Noah, `I have determined to make an end of all flesh; for the 
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earth is filled with violence through them; behold, I will destroy them with the earth"' 
(Gen. 6: 11-13). 
But God does not destroy all of creation. After causing a great flood, the Divine 
offers a rainbow as a promise to the survivors (all creatures) that such destruction will 
never be brought upon them again. At this point God grants Flesh-eating in despair at the 
sinful nature of human-kind. The Almighty looked upon the earth, at the corruption and 
violence creation had wrought, at the damage of the flood, and God seems to accept the 
demise of the original peaceable kingdom. 
Linzey notes that allowing flesh-eating is a divine gesture of reconciliation and 
acceptance of creaturely shortcomings. God grants that humans might eat the bodies of 
other creatures, but this new diet is a concession given after great upheaval-it is not what 
God intended or preferred (Linzey, Animal 127). In marked contrast to the original 
dietary announcements, the tone is threatening and divisive: "The fear of you and the 
dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every bird of the air, upon 
everything that creeps on the ground and all the fish of the sea; into your hand they are 
delivered. Every moving thing that lives shall be food for you; and as I gave you the green 
plants, I give you everything" (Gen. 9: 2-4). Eating flesh is not presented as ideal, or even 
good; it is merely tolerated. Linzey reminds Christians that eating flesh was a concession 
granted to humans when they proved incapable of doing any better (Animal 127). 
Immediately after God accepts flesh-eating, God sought to restrict human 
carnivorous inclinations. The nature of these restrictions reminds us that God is not happy 
about the new order of violence and exploitation (Limey, Animal 27). Genesis 9: 4-5 
informs flesh-eaters that they are accountable to the Creator for any animals killed. God 
granted flesh-eating to sinful humans but the Divine adds, "you shall not eat flesh with its 
life, that is its blood. For your lifeblood will surely require a reckoning; of every beast I 
will require it and of man" (Gen. 9: 4-5). "Life is everywhere and always God's peculiar 
possession, " and through such added restrictions God's "law is universalized and made a 
law of all life-human and animal" (Allen 1: 155). We are accountable for what we kill. 
The peaceable kingdom, a vegetarian world, remains the divine ideal (Linzey, Animal 
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129). 
Other biblical scholars agree with Limey's assessment. When people were granted 
the right to eat meat "it marked the end of the golden age... in which men lived in 
harmony with the beasts" (Buttrick 1: 549). With the flowering of violence, the world is 
no longer the peaceable kingdom created by God. Meat eating was never God's ideal- 
preying on one another was not God's original idea of how we ought to live. The 
dominion God originally intended did not include flesh-eating. 
3. Life of Christ. 
Jewish ideas with regard to non-human animals have been foundational to 
Christianity and Western culture (Linzey, After 17). Judaism has been more important to 
Christian faith and practice than the non-religious teachings of Aristotle. Yet, in contrast 
with the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament offers little explicit information about how 
humans ought to behave toward other animals. 
There is relatively little about animals in the New Testament. They are referred to incidentally in 
descriptions of everyday life and appear in parables and figures of speech, but they are never the 
express topic of any passage... The Old Testament point of view on animals was taken as valid in 
Judaism at the time of Jesus, and in the New Testament is considered as self-evident. (Vischer 15). 
Linzey admits that the silence of the New Testament on protectionist matters poses 
difficulties. He discusses the life of Christ as the most important indicator of an ideal 
Christian lifestyle. 
Little mention is made of animals in the New Testament. And when they are 
mentioned, comments sometimes seem flagrantly non-protectionist, such as the incident 
with the swine of Gerasene (Mark 5: 11-14). Linzey notes that even with regard to a 
vegetarian lifestyle the New Testament is problematic-Christ ate fish. While it is not 
expressly stated, it is generally assumed that Jesus also ate lamb at the Passover meal 
(Linzey, Animal 132). (Many assume so without question, though the contents of the 
Passover meal are not described. ) 
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In the absence of concrete protectionist statements, and in light of a few decidedly 
non-protectionist incidents in Christ's life, Linzey turns to more general assessment of 
New Testament teachings (Linzey, After 63). Linzey asserts that, while the New 
Testament is noticeably quiet with regard to animals, and in spite of a few explicit set- 
backs, the overall life of Christ calls Christians to a protectionist lifestyle. 
Linzey asserts that the particular details, such as the eating of fish and the incident 
with the swine of Gerasene, are not as important as the more general statement entailed in 
the life of Christ (Animals 135). For instance, it is not important that Christ was a Middle- 
Eastern man in a Hebrew culture. If this were important, how could a Bantu woman born 
in 1989 find any commonalty with Christ or Christianity? How could she live as Christ 
lived-speak his language, eat the same foods, wear Christ-like clothing, or feel any part 
of the life that Christ lived as a Middle-Eastern man two thousand years ago? Linzey 
asserts that the particulars are irrelevant. 
Christianity relies little on specific commandments, much on the effects of character. Instead of 
explicitly and ineffectively condemning slavery, it modified the characters of Christians in such a way 
that they eventually saw slavery to be incompatible with their religious principles. Similarly, 
although the Bible does not abound in specific injunctions against cruelty to animals, the devout and 
intelligent practice of biblical religion created a state of mind out of which the modem movement for 
the legal prohibition of cruelty to animals grew up. (M. Hume 3) 
Linzey indicates that the overall example offered by Christ during his lifetime is 
that of a protectionist. Jesus repeatedly exemplified self-sacrifice and service to "the least 
of these" (Mat. 25: 40). New Testament scripture reveals Jesus as concerned for the 
downtrodden (Linzey, Animal 135). He ministered to prostitutes, praised old women, and 
healed lepers. Though he was God-great and perfect by nature-he lived a life devoted 
to weak and imperfect beings. Christ was born in a particular place and time, but His 
overall message speaks of compassion and service to the lowly. It is this strong and 
consistent message, Linzey asserts, that ought to guide Christians. 
138 
a. Generosity Paradigm: Using the model of Christ as a compassionate, self- 
giving moral exemplar, Linzey asserts the "Generosity Paradigm" (Animal 30-33). 
To establish his point, Linzey first notes that each aspect of creation has fallen. 
Under the care of a just and loving God, how can anything included in the fall be exempt 
from salvation? "Nature too was cursed by Adam's fall, so too we must expect a 
transformation of all creation" (Linzey, After 82). "The Old Testament looked upon sin as 
the cause of the disharmony that existed in the natural order... Nature, therefore, was 
destined to share in the redemption of God's people" (Allen 5: 232). "For if God is the 
Creator of all creatures, it must follow that God cares for them all" (Linzey, After 71). 
Linzey supports his point with scriptural backing. In the writing of Paul to the 
Romans, God intends future glory to be shared by all of creation (Animal 71): 
I consider the suffering of this present time not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed 
to us. For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God; for the creation 
was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the will of him who subjected it in hope; because 
the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the 
children of God. We know that the whole creation has been groaning in travail together until now; 
and not only the creation, but we ourselves... (Rom. 8: 18-23) 
Linzey also cites Colossians and Ephesians, each of which remind us that all of 
creation shares both the promise and the curse, and that all of creation is united in Christ 
(Animal 70): 
... 
for in him all things were decreed, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible... He is before 
all things, and in him all things hold together. He is the head of the body, the church; he is the 
beginning, the first-born from the dead, that in everything he might be preeminent. For in him all the 
fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself all things. whether on 
earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross. (Col. 1: 16-20) 
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Ephesians states that nothing on earth is apart from God. "For he has made known 
to us in all wisdom and insight the mystery of his will, according to his purpose which he 
set forth in Christ as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite all things in him, things in 
heaven and things on earth" (Eph. 1: 9-10). These passages state that all of creation is 
contained in Christ and reconciled through Christ. 
Christ as redeemer includes every mouse and every mussel. All animals are 
morally considerable because they are creatures of God. Through these passages from 
Colossians, Ephesians, and Romans, Linzey establishes that all of creation has eternal 
significance. 
Suffering is part of life, and central to scripture. The Israelite nation, defeated and 
displaced, is a model of ongoing suffering. In the Christian tradition suffering is central to 
the life of Christ, epitomized in Christ's betrayal and death on the cross. Linzey asserts 
that a good and loving God must remain morally responsible for and invested in every 
sentient being. To create sentient animals and then turn away from the cries of their 
suffering is not consistent with the Christian concept of a just and loving God (Linzey, 
Animal 98-100). God cares about all aspects of creation; nothing that has lived and 
suffered will be omitted by a just and good God. Linzey asserts that, in as much as Christ 
is present in all love and life here on earth, the divine is also present in suffering (Linzey, 
Animal 48-52). Christians must expand their "understanding of the justice of God... 
which extends to the smallest part of creation" (Linzey, After 127). "If God is pre- 
eminently present in the suffering of the vulnerable, the undefended, the unprotected and 
the innocent, God's suffering presence is to be located... in the suffering of all the 
vulnerable, undefended, unprotected and innocent in this world, including animals" 
(Limey, After 129). 
Because scripture reveals these religious truths, Christians are obligated to help 
make God's loving embrace manifest in this world. "The hope of living without violence 
is, after all, at the heart of the gospel" (Linzey, After 106). By working for peace with 
other animals in our daily lives, "eve cooperate with God's Spirit in the work of wholeness 
and renewal" (Linzey, After 109). "If we love nothing, we suffer little, if at all" (Linzey, 
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After 102). As God was born and died for mortal, earthling creations, Christians are to 
engage in costly, loving condescension toward creation. 
As Christ's life was devoted to the eternal salvation of earthly beings, Linzey 
asserts that Christians are to devote their lives to the earthly salvation of other animals. "If 
man's superior capacities confer on him a privileged position, privilege does not exempt 
him from responsibility: `A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast (Prov. 12: 10)"' 
(M. Hume 6-7). Unless we transform our lives in this manner we fail to acknowledge the 
"moral reality of being in covenant with other living creatures. Until all violence is 
overcome by love, not just for the human species, but for all sentient beings, creation 
remains unfinished and incomplete" (Linzey, After 76). This is Linzey's understanding of 
the obligations of human dominion: self-sacrifice for the sake of other sentient creatures. 
b. hierarchy: Linzey does not assert that such generous self-sacrifice is shared 
equally by all of creation. Linzey reminds readers that God brought about creation in a 
particular order, and he asserts that God created a morally considerable difference between 
inanimate objects and sentient creatures (Linzey, Animal 4). 
Linzey justifies these divisions via Jewish rabbinical teaching on capacity for injury. 
Jewish rabbis have long upheld a principle "which prohibits the causing of unnecessary 
suffering to any living being" (Linzey, After 11). Inanimate objects;. such as stones, are 
incapable of being injured, while "slugs, snails, and earthworms, "fill a "gray-area" which 
in no way permits of "gratuitous slaughter" (Linzey, Animal 74). 
Consequently, Linzey maintains the traditional view of hierarchy, in which people 
hold a special position amidst creation-we were given dominion. But he repeatedly and 
adamantly rejects the traditional view of dominion, where animals are of less importance 
(Animals 103). Linzeyasserts that the divine affirmation of humans does not constitute a 
divine denial of all other created 'beings. He states that humans hold a special place 
amidst creation as servants of God. In acknowledgment of this special role, Jews and 
Christians (and Muslims) ought to show reverence for each detail of creation: believers 
show reverence for God through respect for creation-which is God's alone (Linzey, 
Animal 96-7). 
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Linzey notes that his views maintain traditional (and much lamented) paternalism. 
However, he argues that the gospels make no appeal to equality; paternalism is as biblical. 
as the fall: "obligation is always and everywhere on the `higher' to sacrifice for the 
`lower; ' for the strong, powerful and rich to give to those who are vulnerable, poor or 
powerless. In this respect it is the sheer vulnerability of animals, and correspondingly our 
absolute power over them, which strengthens and compels the response of moral 
generosity" (Linzey, Animal 32). 
It is in this context that we hold dominion. "The steward's duties arise from her or 
his special relationship to the creator and the rest of creation" (Gunn, "Traditional" 152- 
3). Humans have a special position, and with it comes tremendous responsibility. 
We need a conception of ourselves in the universe not as the master species but as the servant 
species: as the one being given responsibility for the whole and for the good of the whole. We must 
move from the idea that the animals were given to us and made for us, to the idea that we were made 
for creation, to serve it and ensure its continuance. This actually is little more than the theology of 
Genesis chapter two. The garden is made beautiful and abounds with life; humans are created 
specifically to `take care of it' (Gen. 2: 15). (Limey, "Arrogance" 69) 
c. salvation through protectionism: Linzey asserts that we can find our own way 
to God, and to our own salvation, through actualizing the generosity paradigm in our daily 
lives. If we acknowledge the suffering of innocents-and work to relieve that suffering- 
we can come closer to God's creation, and to God. St. Catherine of Siena wrote, those 
who are devoted to God love all of God's creatures "so deeply" because "they realize how 
deeply Christ loves them, " and to love what is loved by God because it is loved by God, is 
the essence of a Christian heart (Linzey, After 74). For Linzey, "sensitivity to animals may 
well be a test of our theology. For to know the Word made flesh- requires that we honor 
all flesh" (Linzey, After 103). In this way, Linzey writes; we will- find redemption by 
entering into the suffering of non-human animals, and sfiärftig some of-what Christ suffered 
on our account. 
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Summary 
Linzey offers biblical support to assert his Generosity Paradigm: 
" all beings share in the suffering of life on earth, 
" God's covenant includes all creatures, 
" all entities share unity in Christ, 
" redemption is shared by all, and 
" all creatures are of God. 
From these scriptural notions Linzey derives his Generosity Paradigm, which 
insists on a loving relationship with God's creation, where the higher sacrifices for the 
lower. The creation hierarchy is not to be interpreted as a justification for exploitation, but 
as a call to the unique human ability to serve. "If our power over animals confers upon us 
any rights, there is only one: the right to serve" (Linzey, Animal 38). 
Linzey combines traditional Western hierarchy with an obligation for Christ-like 
compassion and munificence toward all creatures. He reveals a peace-loving Hebrew God 
that created a vegetarian world with humans as caretakers. Linzey examines Hebrew 
scripture and the New Testament, and demonstrates that the original creation offered 
humans a "dominion" that required a self-sacrificing life of service to God's bountiful 
creation. In Linzey's interpretation, humans have been "commissioned to liberate God's 
creation" through Christ-like self-sacrifice (Linzey, Animal 71). When we accept these 
religious obligations we participate in the suffering of Christ, and all creation, follow a 
path that leads to God and our own redemption. 
Linzey's theological protectionism is unparalleled. Linzey calls Christians away 
from the contemporary, self-centered approach to life and the world around us, and insists 
that redemption lies in humble subservience to God's travailing creation, as exemplified by 
Christ two thousand years ago. 
C. Discussion. 
Linzey's work entails several more general issues that must be examined before 
moving on to several larger issues: Linzey's analysis of scripture, and theoretical 
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considerations in his assertion of hierarchy. 
1. General Issues. 
a. theological assumptions: Linzey's thesis rests on unsupported theological 
assumptions. Linzey assumes the existence of a divine power, the authority of the Bible, 
that God is just and loving, and that certain consequences follow from these truths-such 
as God caring for sentient creation. While these assumptions are essential to a theological 
protectionist theory, they remain nothing more than assumptions. 
Yet often what we see and understand is beyond our comprehension, and precludes 
facile religious explanations. Much misery that we encounter in our lives-from AIDS to 
SIDS-simply cannot be explained or understood theologically. 
Theists generally accept that the greatness and wonder of the Divine Mystery does 
not admit of human understanding: "The Lord will... do his deed-strange is his deed! 
And to work his work-alien is his work! " God is understood to be beyond human 
comprehension. "From time immemorial, out of the unconsoled grief of the human heart, " 
people have wondered why, at the hands of a God of love, there is so much sorrow, 
suffering, and adversity (Buttrick 5: 320). For a small human animal, "It is difficult to 
trace God's ways in the world" (Marcus 233). 
Where divine matters are concerned, we are forced to accept our own ignorance. 
People cannot know if our human understanding of compassion and justice is consistent 
with that of the divine. Nor can we know how these supposed attributes of God are 
manifest in creation. Yet theologians such as Linzey purport to understand something of 
God's ways. 
While it is true that Linzey cannot know whether or not God is concerned about 
the hunger of a tiny pygmy jerboa, or the destruction of a long-tailed pangolin's home, 
Linzey's approach is reasonable. In our contemporary world of religious pluralism, a God 
whose ways are completely mysterious will have few followers. Human beings have 
always expected a measure of accountability from God, our prayers and offerings will be 
turned toward another deity if we do not ever feel that they are received. The divine must 
be somewhat predictable within our human limits of understanding. Westerners today are 
144 
aware of many religions from which they might choose (in as much as one might choose a 
religion). A tradition that does not make sense within the context of our human 
understanding is more apt be replaced. 
Given the spiritual crisis that has spread across Western nations in the last forty 
years, and the surprising number of converts to Buddhism in particular, this is not an 
altogether hypothetical situation. We have only our own understanding by which to assess 
the mechanisms of the divine, however limited our abilities may be. If the creator God has 
given us reason and compassion, then this God must assume that we will use these 
attributes. Our understanding of God needs to be consistent with our sense of compassion 
and justice, or we cannot consider the divine force compassionate or just. We have no 
other means by which to assess the divine; we must base our theology on our own 
understanding, as Linzey does. 
Linzey does not defend many of his assumptions regarding the nature of God, but 
his assertions seem reasonable, even unavoidable. Most people of Western faiths expect 
the same qualities that Linzey expects-compassion and investment in creation-from the 
divine. Few Westerners have extended this expectation to non-human animals, but 
compassion remains an important human value. It is not surprising that Buddhism, a faith 
well-known for emphasizing compassion toward all beings, has received the lions-share of 
Christian converts in the last forty years. 
b. detracting from human love: Some religious conservatives insist that love is 
misplaced when directed toward non-humans. This is the most common objection to 
 , i, 
protectionism amongst Christians. 
Linzey's response to this objection is that one kind of love is not a replacement for 
another, and neither does love fror öther animals reduce ones ability to love people. Any 
"understanding of God's love"wh c'h~limit's our care and affection for other creatures is 
spiritually impoverished" (Linzey, Afher '131). He argues that "... sensitivity to suffering is 
a sign of grace and also a litmus At` of our fidelity to the passionate Creator God. ... any 
theology which desensitizes'uStd si Bring cannot properly be a theology centered on the 
divine vindication of innoceeit"suf Bring. ':. of the crucified Christ" (Linzey, After 132). 
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Linzey's response is well-supported by the hagiographies of saints (discussed 
earlier in this chapter). Compassion has not been shown to be a limited resource, but it 
has been associated with some of the greatest spiritual exemplars the world has known, 
from Gandhi and Mother Theresa to Saint Francis of Assisi. 
c. authorship: Many books of the New Testament are attributed to Paul. In 
contrast, the first four gospels are written about the life of Jesus. It is important to 
distinguish these sources because the life of Jesus is central to Christian teachings, more so 
than the words of Paul. Linzey's Generosity Paradigm is based on the life and teachings of 
Jesus, not on the works of Paul. 
Paul was not raised as a Christian. He was a Jew highly influenced by Greco- 
Roman thought. Paul's attitudes show Stoic influence, particularly in his assertions that 
value flows only from God. For instance, Paul's writing teaches that the value of anything 
earthly comes only through humans because of our relationship with God (L. Johnson 18). 
The writings of Paul are permeated with non-Christian influences. 
There is no illusion of saintliness or perfection in Paul's early life. He was 
excessively cruel before he became a Christian (Acts 7 and 8), and though he was 
changing, he was far from the model offered by Christ (Status 6). Paul himself noted his 
imperfections (Phil. 3: 12). These factors must be taken into account when assessing 
scripture. 
With regard to non-human animals, Paul was a townsman who had little interest in 
animals, or farm-life. In his writing he only used elements of the non-human world as 
allegories (M. Hume, Status 6). He did not have the saintly inclinations of Saint Francis of 
Assisi, and it is difficult to find any overly protectionist teachings in his works. 
While Christians cannot disregard Paul's biblical contributions, neither ought we to 
draw conclusions from his works that run against such broadly accepted Christian ideals as 
love, compassion, and equality-exemplified by Christ. Paul's works must be 
acknowledged as less important than the life and teachings of Christ in the Gospels. 
Linzey's Generosity Paradigm is based on some of the most fundamental teachings 
of Jesus: compassion, self-sacrificing love, and attentiotk to the needy. While much of the 
New Testament is human-centered, Linzey's assessment of the teachings of Jesus are 
sound, and these teachings are the heart of Christian scripture. 
2. Interpretation of Scripture. 
a. Genesis: Linzey's interpretation of the original diet prescribed in Genesis is 
central to his thesis, but his treatment of these passages, and his interpretation, seems 
incomplete on three counts: 
" Linzey's analysis of the diet prescribed by god 
" God's reaction to what has been created 
" God's prescription of "every green plant" for food 
Linzey's analysis of the diet prescribed by God falls short of the truth. Genesis 
One instructs people to eat "every plant yielding seed... and every tree with seed in its 
fruit, " and to all other animals God grants "every plant for food. " This passage not only 
indicates that we were not to eat flesh, but also that God did not intend us to partake of 
dairy or poultry products. God's original plan was that all creatures be vegans; no 
creature was to partake of any animal products. 
This is an important distinction. Few who understand current Western dairy and 
poultry practices, are aware of the mother-child relationship, and are concerned about 
ethics, continue to eat cheese and eggs or drink milk. If God intended hens to be treated 
as they are treated in our society, then God is not compassionate. But if God is 
compassionate, then these industries are against God's will. 
Scripture indicates that God was aware of the cruelty that might follow from eating 
eggs and drinking milk. God added specific restrictions on the eating of eggs and dairy in 
light of the special bond between mother and offspring (Ex. 34: 26 and Deut 22: 6). Linzey 
refers to these passages, but he fails to elucidate their importance. 
Jewish law prohibits killing a parent and offspring on the same day, and one must 
not sacrifice an infant that is less than eight days old-thus allowing the mother to suckle 
her young. The modern dairy industry snatches a calf from its mother on the day that it is 
born; hens never even see their chicks hatch. This religious law, if honoured, would 
prevent the maternal deprivation intrinsic in the egg and dairy industries (Linzey, After 30- 
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31). 
Maimonides (1135-1204), an extremely influential Jewish theologian, taught that 
the injunction not to "seethe a kid in its mother's milk" (Ex. 34: 26) protects against acts 
that harden the human heart (Linzey, After 47). While Deuteronomy allows the taking of 
young from a nest, with the restriction that one must not take both mother and young 
(22: 6), Maimonides interpreted this restriction as a divine limitation on the pain that is 
permissible for humans to inflict on other creatures. He taught that this passage is the 
minimum requirement, and that people ought to leave both the young and the mother. 
Maimonides intended that the mother "not be pained by seeing that the young are taken 
away" (Linzey, After 46-7). Today these passages do nothing for cattle or hens, but they 
are the basis for the Jewish distinction between dairy meals and flesh meals (Eerdmans 
719). 
Historically, the Jewish tradition has held a fleshless diet in high esteem, as noted 
by Linzey, but the Jewish tradition has also acknowledged and praised the enhanced 
compassion of a vegan diet, as originally ordained in Genesis One. 
Second, Linzey clearly documents a fleshless diet as the biblical ideal. Nowhere, 
either in the Hebrew Bible or the New Testament is flesh-eating put forth as a preferred 
diet. The eating of other creatures is merely permitted as a concession to human 
depravity. God's reaction to his original vegan world, as compared to his reaction to a 
flesh-eating population, is worthy of note for any individual who is interested in pleasing 
God. 
When God's original plan of a peaceful, vegan world is enacted in Genesis One, 
God comments, "it was very good" (Gen. 1: 31). Herein we see a reaction to the 
"completely perfect character of what has been created, without flaw, without pain, all in 
its ordained order; but there is also the pleasure and the delight of the divine viewer" 
(Allen 1: 132): God saw that a peaceful creation was "very good. " 
For religious environmental protectionists, "... the intrinsic worth of species comes 
from Genesis: `And God saw all that God had made, and behold, kol wv-and it was 
good. ' In the original Hebrew, `good' is singular, showing us that God views life in all its 
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diversity as a fundamental unity" (Saperstein 14), a unity that did not admit of exploitation 
between species. 
God does not offer the same positive outlook once a flesh-eating world has been 
accepted. The divine response to flesh-eating is one of limits and restrictions. Nowhere 
does scripture indicate that God said or thought, "it is very good. " 
Linzey neglects to mention the divine reaction to the original vegan world, and the 
comparative reaction to a world of flesh-eaters, indicates that God is not pleased that we 
kill other animals and eat their bodies. Christians ought not to ignore what God prefers, or 
settles for second best. God desires that creation be vegan. 
Third, Linzey's presents God's original world as a vegetarian world, where every 
green plant was offered as permissible food, but he does not discuss how we are to 
account for poisonous plants in a world where God offered " every green plant" (Gen. 
1: 30). This concern can be answered in two ways. 
First, one might argue that poisonous plants are part of the prickliness that 
vegetation assumed after the fall. The Bible informs that God introduced undesirable and 
unpleasant vegetal changes as a result of the fall, such as thorns and thistles. These plants 
were introduced as a punishment because Adam and Eve ate of the forbidden fruit (Gen. 
3: 18). 
Alternatively, it might be argued that poisonous plants are compatible with God's 
original plan because God did not indicate that every creature should or could eat every 
plant. It would be reasonable (biologically speaking, it is essential) that plants be 
somewhat species-specific. In this way each species might fill a niche, avoid debilitating 
competition, and prevent overuse of vegetation. 
b. swine of Gerasene: Limey mentions such sticky matters as the swine of 
Gerasene (Mark 5, Mat 8, Luke 8), and readily admits that such perplexing scriptures 
suggest no easy explanation-and he offers none. It seems that there are at least partial 
explanations that might be offered for this difficult passage. 
The story of the Swine of Gerasene is not a moral lesson about how we ought to 
treat swine, nor is it a commentary on the value of creation. This is a story confirming the 
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miraculous powers of Jesus. A possessed man is extremely powerful, and apparently 
problematic to a community due to indwelling spirits. Jesus restores the man to a normal 
condition, and the people of the community witness the effects of the powers of Jesus. 
This is the essence of the story that involves the swine of Gerasene. The swine are simply 
a medium through which Jesus allows the spirits to depart, on the request of the spirits. 
As a result, many pigs perish. While this does nothing to enhance the value of non-human 
creation, this is clearly not the intent of the story. 
It is informative to compare the story of the swine of Gerasene to Biblical 
teachings regarding the role and status of women, especially in the works of Paul. For 
most of us, the injunction to "Let a woman learn in silence with all submissiveness" (1 Tim 
2: 11) does not affect contemporary interpersonal relations, based on the equality of 
individuals. There are a fair number of biblical passages that affirm a woman's subordinate 
role. While these passages must be taken seriously, they do not generally pose 
insurmountable barriers for women who wish to be active in church. Teachings about 
women are specifically intended to maintain social roles that were accepted in Biblical 
times, yet we recognize that these teachings are not the essence of the Bible, and that the 
overall message of the Bible encourages each person to be spiritually involved. 
Consequently, women do not maintain silence in churches, though their voices breach 
Biblical commands. If we are able to accept the essence of the message without 
maintaining seemingly irrelevant particulars in the case of women, why would we allow a 
parable about the healing and restorative powers of Jesus, influence our attitudes and 
actions toward pigs? 
The overall lesson of Christ is one of compassion and inclusion. Western churches 
tend to recognize this with regard to explicit comments on the role of women, the same 
ought to hold true for incidental incidents with regard to other animals. One must find the 
essence of scripture, and not be sidetracked by the particulars. 
c. Acts 10: 9-16: Linzey briefly mentions that Acts 10: 9-16 is damaging to the 
case for a non-flesh diet (Limey, After 4). But these passages are not damaging unless 
one gets tangled up with the particulars, and misses the essence of these lines. Standard 
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biblical interpretation for Acts 10: 9-16 conflicts with Linzey's assessment. 
Acts 10: 9-16 describes a vision Peter had while he was in a trance. Peter saw "all 
kinds of animals and reptiles and birds of the air. And there came a voice to him, `Rise, 
Peter; kill and eat. ' But Peter said, `No, Lord; for I have never eaten anything that is 
common or unclean. ' And the voice came to him again a second time, `What God has 
cleansed, you must not call common"' (Acts 10: 11-15). 
Peter refused to eat the creatures "because in such a collection of creatures, many 
were unclean and taboo for a Jew" (Allen 10: 67). Leviticus 11 reveals specific food laws 
which Jews traditionally upheld. These passages are detailed and lengthy. For instance, 
the Israelites are not to eat pigs, rabbits, shellfish, camels, vultures, geckos, weasels, or 
bats, while locust, katydids, and grasshoppers are permissible (Lev. 11: 4-30). The 
defining characteristics of permissible and forbidden foods are carefully written down, and 
Jews have long-established dietary habits, based on interpretation of these passages. 
Peter's dream is an abrogation of those tedious dietary laws: all that God has accepted for 
consumption must not be called unfit. 
Restrictive eating habits were anathema to the newly-formed Christian tradition. 
The "priestly dietary laws, adapted by the Jews after the Exile, contributed tremendously 
to the exclusive nature of the Jewish religion" (Allen 10: 67). Exclusivity harmed unity, 
and Christianity was to be a religion for all people. Christianity, based on a personal 
relationship with God, had no need for food restrictions and rituals. The importance of 
Peter's dream lies in God's denouncing restrictive eating habits that set people apart from 
one another. 
Peter's vision abrogates prevalent Jewish belief that "eating pagan food was an 
abomination, but to dine in the house of a pagan was much worse" (Allen 10: 67). These 
passages in Acts are part of a transition central to Christianity, a transition from the 
meticulous mechanisms of Jewish law to faith in Christ. Through Peter's dream Jewish 
food laws were "abrogated explicitly as they had been implicitly in Jesus' teaching [Mark 
7: 14]" (Guthrie 985). 
These passages in Acts do have tremendous significance, but not with regard to a 
.. 1: 
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flesh-based diet. Acts 10: 9-16 warns "against the tendency to separate things and call 
some of them sacred and some secular... The true division is between... that which is 
centered upon God and that which is not" (Buttrick 9: 136-7). 
Peter's vision serves as an injunction to end a practice that created barriers 
between people, and to re-focus religious practice on Christ's teachings of love. In the 
process of annulling Jewish food laws, Acts 10 indicates that it is acceptable to eat flesh. 
This is consistent with Genesis 9, and with Linzey's assessment of Genesis: he 
acknowledges that flesh-eating is allowed, but not preferred. Acts 10: 9-16 in no way 
indicates that meat-eating is preferred. The point of Peter's dream is to remove diet-based 
barriers between people, and has nothing to do with encouraging a carnivorous diet, 
especially when viewed in conjunction with Romans 14. 
d. Romans 14: 13-21: 
... 
decide never to put a stumbling block or hindrance in the way of a brother... If your brother is being 
injured by what you eat, you are no longer walking in love. Do not let what you eat cause the ruin of 
one for whom Christ died... for the kingdom of God is not food and drink but righteousness and 
peace and joy in the Holy Spirit; he who thus serves Christ is acceptable to God and approved by men. 
Let us then pursue what makes for peace and for mutual up-building. Do not, for the sake of food, 
destroy the work of God. Everything is indeed clean, but it is wrong for any one to make others fall 
by what he eats; it is right not to eat meat or drink wine or do anything that makes your brother 
stumble. (Rom. 14: 13-21) 
Divergent points of view have too often become catalysts for division and 
stumbling blocks to faith, both of which scripture clearly and strongly warn against. If a 
flesh-based diet is a point of contention, and might turn people away from Christ, Romans 
14 instructs Christians to stop eating flesh. 
Flesh-eating was a point of contention in early Christian communities, and between 
early Christians and Jews. The Essenes were vegetarians, and Jews followed meticulous 
dietary laws. Dietary differences were defining characteristics, important to membership 
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and group identity. 
While Acts 10 asserts that no food is unclean, Romans 14 reminds Christians that it 
is their responsibility to spread the word of God, to augment the community of Christ, and 
that dietary choice may limit their effectiveness. Christians ought to avoid any food-such 
as flesh and wine-if these items turn people away from the Christian community. 
Romans 14 reminds Christians that they ought not to avoid lifestyles that detract from 
their Christian message. As with Peter's dream, flesh-eating serves as an example to make 
a more general point. 
Romans 14 remains relevant for today's Christian communities; diet continues to 
be defining and controversial. Christians, and those who might otherwise choose to be 
Christians, are being turned away by current Christian attitudes and behaviours toward 
animals. Today's carnivorous Christian congregations, fattened on the flesh of factory- 
farmed calves and the eggs of battery-hens (soon-to-be chicken soup), turn the stomachs 
of many protectionists. 
Flesh-eating remains a divisive issue. Romans 14 instructs the faithful to abandon 
the eating of flesh for the sake of those who will be turned away from by a Christian 
congregation that is red in tooth and fork. This teaching is as relevant today as it was two 
thousand years ago. 
e. 1 John 4: 8 and 16: Linzey emphasizes overarching importance of love in 
Christianity, but he does not offer specific teachings to support his assertion. Neither does 
he link specific teachings on Christian love to his protectionist message. 
God is represented in the New Testament as love itself. 1 John 4: 8 and 16 state 
simply: "God is love. " Love is "not merely an attribute of God but defines his nature, 
though in a practical rather than philosophic sense... God's nature is not exhausted by the 
quality of love, but love governs all its aspects and expressions" (Buttrick 12: 280). 
Almost all Christians agree that love is "the paramount scripture... essential to the 
Christian way of life" (Allen 12: 214). Christians are called upon to "love by choice, love 
motivated by the will and implemented by action and conduct. " Christian love is 
particularly precious because it stems from the munificence of God's love (Allen 12: 214). 
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Love is central to the Christian life. 
Christ's love--God as love-demands a life of compassion and caring for others. 
Linzey notes that Christ modeled a life of costly, life-giving love. "In the light of Jesus, 
Christian loving can only properly be defined in terms of that kind of loving which costs us 
something" (Linzey, After 102). Living a life of Christ-like love is difficult, and requires 
sacrifice, but this is the life that is consistent with biblical teachings of love and compassion 
that are central to Christian morality. 
While Linzey fails to mention 1 John, he exposes Christ's example of loving self- 
sacrifice, and the original peaceable (vegan) kingdom planned by God (Gen. 1). He 
concludes that Christians must understand current violence against other animals as 
antithetical to God's will. His assertion seems well-supported. Violence toward other 
animals, intensified and aggrandized by modern methods of factory farming and science, 
must be immeasurably worse than the simple violence of Noah's time. Yet even the 
violence of Noah's day led the Almighty to make an end of all that had been created. 
f. Isaiah 11: 6-9. " Linzey reveals God's original plan as a world of peace and non- 
violence, and he discusses how this world was lost. But Linzey fails to note that the 
peaceful lifestyle God originally planned is to be restored. 
The ideal Christian world, a "state of peace and well-being" will eventually follow, 
"symbolized by the idyllic picture of powerful animals and poisonous reptiles in 
harmonious companionship with domesticated animals and truly spiritual human children" 
(Buttrick 5: 249): 
The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, 
and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, 
and the calf and the lion and the falling together, 
and a little child shall lead them. 
The cow and the bear shall feed; 
their young shall lie down together; 
and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. 
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The sucking child shall lay over the hole of the asp, 
and the weaned child shall put his hand on the adders den. 
They shall not hurt or destroy 
in all my holy mountain; 
for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord 
as the waters cover the sea. (Isa. 11: 6-9) 
Isaiah tells us that "complete harmony and peace... [will] prevail with the coming 
of the messianic age... The righteous rule of the messianic king will result in the 
restoration of harmony to the natural order... men and animals [will] live together in a 
paradise-like relationship, and no living creature [will] hurt or destroy another" (Allen 5: 
232). There will be "reconciliation in the world of nature, and the ancient enmity between 
man and beast shall be done away" (Buttrick 5: 249-50). Isaiah "clearly reveals an 
expectation that God will bring all bloodshed in creation to an end. God is aware of the 
suffering of animals [even] among their own kind. Their death is not simply pointless and 
forgotten" (Vischer 10). Nor is this violent condition chronic. These teachings offer a 
vision that expresses "reconciliation, concord, and trust" (Guthrie 598). 
The fulfillment of this idyllic vision will happen-and can happen-through the 
"work of all who believe in Jesus Christ and his kingdom" (Buttrick 5: 250-1). Christians 
are not to wait passively for God's kingdom, but are called to realize this ideal in their 
daily lives, for this peace is the actualization of "the knowledge of the Lord" (Guthrie 
598). 
Many Christians today dismiss the peaceable kingdom as a fairy tale, but they 
forget what their scripture indicates, that "with God all things are possible" (Mat. 19: 26). 
Psalms and Proverbs reveal a biblical vision where all of nature is spiritually united, where 
we are one species amongst many adoring creatures of God. As Linzey notes, God 
created all, all share in the fall, and all will share in redemption. Psalm 148 exclaims: 
"Praise him, sun and moon, / Praise him, all you shining stars! / Praise him, you highest 
heavens, / and you waters above the heavens!... / Mountains and all hills, / fruit trees and 
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all cedars! / Beasts and all cattle, / creeping things and flying birds!... / Praise the Lord! " 
In the biblical worldview, we are not the only entities that have a relationship with God. 
In the Bible, "all creatures, humans and animals, praise God. All creation is a single hymn 
of praise in which humans, animals and nature as a whole praise God with one voice" 
(Vischer 5). 
This peaceful biblical vision, where all creatures are united in their devotion to a 
Christ-like peaceful existence, is central to Christianity. At Christmas time each year, 
Christians erect images depicting Christ as a newborn babe, lying in a barnyard feed-bin 
(manger), with animals all around. (And the faithful are all very glad that they did not eat 
him! ) This idyllic vision, and the promise of its return, calls Christians to action. For "the 
reign of Christ already produces this kind of transformation in the sphere of human 
character, and will ultimately change the whole creation" (Guthrie 598). Christians, 
according to scripture, are to actively seek to realize the peaceable kingdom here on earth 
throughout their lives. 
The oft spoken "Our Father" perpetually reminds Christian of this duty: "Thy 
kingdom come. / Thy will be done, On earth as it is in heaven" (Mat. 6: 10). What God 
ordained is to be realized on earth with our active participation. Christians are to 
participate in the "final triumph of God's will" (Allen 8: 115). The "Our Father" 
"acknowledges a personal and social obligation" for each Christian, to work toward this 
idyllic end (Buttrick 7: 312): 
A Christian's prime purpose in life ought to be to do God's will. More specifically, 
our duty is to help to reestablish God's peaceable kingdom on earth-the world God 
intended-as revealed in the original vegan world designed and created by the Almighty, 
in the peaceful kingdom described in Isaiah, and hoped for here on earth in the "Our 
Father" prayer. In Christ-like fashion, out of love for and as a duty to God, Christians are 
to devote their lives to the restoration of God's peaceable kingdom. 
3. Theoretical Considerations. 
a. hierarchy: Any mention of hierarchy smacks of historic Christianity's rather 
transparent attempt to offer humans a special category amidst creation. Hierarchy is the 
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foundation for the traditional concept of dominion based on the assumption of human 
preeminence. Theists have reasoned "that God exists; that He has the right to decide 
which of His creatures shall live or die; that He has the right to delegate this right to 
others; and that He did delegate this right to human beings" (Singer, "Animals" 231). The 
effects of hierarchy have been deadly for non-human animals. 
Similarly, Linzey assumes that humans have a special place over and against the 
rest of creation. However, Linzey's assumption is that humans have special 
responsibilities rather than exclusive privileges. His assertion appears to be untenable for 
two reasons (discussed simultaneously): 
" There is no reason to assume that what is created last is most important. 
" There are two divergent creation stories in the Bible that cannot both be 
reconciled with Linzey's assertion of a hierarchy. 
Linzey only acknowledges the creation story in Genesis One. In this version God 
creates day and night, then atmosphere and water on the first and second day. The third 
day brings dry land and vegetation followed by the stars and planets on the fourth day. On 
the fifth day God creates sea creatures and birds, and on the sixth day all the beasts of the 
earth, culminating in the creation of man and then woman (Gen. 1: 1-30). 
Based on the Genesis One creation story, the hierarchy (in ascending order) would 
be: time, basic earthly elements, inanimate matter and vegetation, heavenly bodies, 
creatures of sea and sky, and finally all other animals (including people). 
The creation story of Genesis Two, however, begins with mists, followed by the 
creation of man, then vegetation. Rivers and minerals are then mentioned before the 
creation of animals. The final act of creation is woman: 
In the day that the Lord God made the earth... a mist went up from the earth and watered the 
whole face of the ground-then the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into 
his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being. And the Lord God planted a garden in 
Eden, in the east; and there he put the man whom he had formed. And out of the ground the Lord 
God made to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food... 
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Then the Lord God said, "It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper fit 
for him. " So out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field and every bird of the 
air... but for man there was not found a helper fit for him. So the Lord God... took one of his ribs... 
and the rib... he made into a woman and brought her to the man. (Gen. 2: 4-23) 
The ascending order of creation presented in Genesis Two is: basic earthly 
elements, man, vegetation, more complex inanimate matter, other animals, woman. 
How are we to understand and enact a hierarchy where vegetation is between man 
and other animals? How might we determine whether the first act of creation, or the last 
(or even third, for that matter) is at the top of the hierarchy? How will our humanocentric, 
patriarchal Christian societies assimilate the Genesis Two hierarchy, where either woman 
or the basic elements of earthly matter are put forth as the apex of God's creation? ? How 
might these two creation stories be reconciled? 
Linzey does not discuss these issues. Neither does he explain why he believes the 
Genesis One creation is more important than Genesis Two, or why he assumes that 
creation was enacted in ascending order. 
The hierarchy Linzey asserts offers primary importance to human beings. If he is 
to maintain this assertion, he ought to discuss aspects of the Bible which specifically 
demote human beings. The Bible teaches that "certain areas of God's creation are outside 
human control" and beyond our acceptable and proper realms (Vischer 9). For instance, in 
the Book of Job God challenges us to recognize that we do not rule over all places and all 
creatures: 
" "The wild ass and wild ox would scorn to bear human burdens or feed at the 
human manger and that the great creatures of land and sea were not made to serve as 
our pets or playthings" (Goodman 11). 
" The divine gave the wild ass a home in the steppes and salt land to be free from 
the despicable sounds of humans in their busy settlements, where drivers shout at 
laboring burrows (Job 39: 5-8). 
" God caused it to "rain on a land where no man is, on the desert in which there 
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is no man; to satisfy the waste and desolate land, and to make the ground put forth 
grass" (Job 38: 26-27). 
" God asks the presumptuous human: "Where were you when I laid the 
foundations of the earth? Tell me if you have understanding" (Job 38: 4). 
These passages indicate that God did not create a humanocentric world; we do not 
stand over and above the rest of creation. God attends to every creature's needs. The 
Bible indicates that much of nature is purposefully outside the domain of human beings, 
even beyond our understanding. The world is not designed according to human plans and 
schemes. 
Interestingly, Linzey does mention that Christian notions of hierarchy are not part 
of the Biblical Hebrew tradition; they are Greek in nature. He notes that, "... influenced by 
Aristotelian philosophy, Hebrew monarchy becomes created hierarchy. Traditionally, 
Christians interpret Genesis in terms of the Aristotelian pattern, which sees nature as a 
hierarchical system in which it is assumed... that the male is superior to the female, the 
female to the slave, and the slave to the beasts... " (Animal 18). If hierarchy is not 
Hebrew, then this interpretation is misplaced in the context of Hebrew scripture. This 
assertion is supported by the fact that there are two, divergent creation stories in Genesis. 
b. all things equally precious: Linzey's assumption of a biblical hierarchy seems 
untenable. If the Christian hierarchy is dismantled, but the central thesis of Linzey's 
Generosity Paradigm kept intact, we are left with a very interesting theological assertion: 
all of creation is inherently valuable and equally valuable. 
Linzey's generosity paradigm has far-reaching implications, much more far- 
reaching than Linzey seems to notice: his work offers a comprehensive environmental 
ethic. If we accept Linzey's theological basis for protectionism, but reject his untenable 
assertion of hierarchy, then all of creation ought to be approached with self-sacrificing 
love. If all of creation is united in God, and if Christ is taken as moral exemplar of self- 
sacrificing service toward the weaker-always the higher (God) sacrificing for the lower 
(creation)-then Christians must be led to respect all of creation as never before. 
Linzey's assertion of self-sacrificing service, extended toward all of creation, has a 
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historic precedent and does not run contrary to Biblical teaching. As early as 1954 the 
Theologian Joseph Sittler asserted that "all things" were included in God's saving grace, 
even atoms. He taught followers of Christ to tend the earth, and to tend life on the earth, 
as "a matter of obeying Christ" because God intended that nature be included in our moral 
sphere, and ultimately in redemption (Nash 99). "Six times before our appearance in the 
story of creation, God declared life to be good" (Saperstein 14). Humans are just one 
small part of the beauty of creation; "nothing was made by God for man to spoil or 
destroy" (Locke 2.31). Humans were put in God's good garden to "till and keep" what 
had been created, not to ravage and exploit. "The world is not ours, and... we do not rule 
it" (Buttrick 7: 312). 
Humans were put in a position of stewardship by the divine. "The steward's duties 
arise from [a] special relationship to the creator and the rest of creation... " (Gunn, 
"Traditional" 152-3). To be a steward follows from being a Christian, and the 
"... deliberate (or careless) extermination of species, the poisoning of lakes, rivers, and air, 
the destruction of soil fertility and the land stability seem quite incompatible with a 
recognition of our stewardship over God's creation" ("Gunn, Traditional" 152). God 
created the earth, and was pleased with what had been created, Christians therefore "have 
an obligation to respect [the earth's] inhabitants and its processes, to avoid harming or 
destroying them, to live simply, to limit the exercise of our considerable powers, to learn 
to practice and enjoy harmless activities rather than the consumption of the products of 
modem technology" (Gunn, "Traditional" 153). Because God has "entrusted the care of 
the non-human world to humans, and has given us the power to control it and the ability to 
make moral choices, " we are obligated to live simply (Gunn, "Traditional" 152). 
Accepting our role as stewards of the earth would transform current practices. If 
Christians accepted other animals as creatures of God, adopted a sense of responsibility 
for nature, and acknowledged the "intrinsic value of non-human life, places, natural 
features, and ecosystems, " they would "promote policies of preservation, population 
control, low entropy life styles, use of renewable resources rather than nonrenewable ones, 
and considerably reduce exploitation of other animals" (Gunn, "Traditional" 153). All of 
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these ideas are part of the biblical tradition, but currently have little or no part in the 
traditional Christian lifestyle. 
The story of Noah and the Ark (Genesis 6-9) answers modern ethical questions such as these: 
Isn't saving people more important than saving species? The story answers this by telling us that the 
people who were saved were the ones who worked to save the species. Isn't saving species too costly? 
This is answered by Noah's expenditure of immense resources and time to implement a rescue plan in 
a society that laughed at his foolishness. His saving work was not completed until the animals were 
reinstated into their natural habitat. " (DeWitt 8) 
The Bible indicates that Linzey's Generosity Paradigm, which offers self-sacrificing 
service to all of God's creation, is the proper Christian life. "As one cannot praise 
Rembrandt sincerely while trampling his paintings, so one cannot praise God sincerely 
while trampling His works" (DeWitt 8). Linzey's Generosity Paradigm, devoid of 
hierarchy, insists that all aspects of God's creation receive the self-sacrificing service of 
Christendom. 
There are some difficulties with this conclusion. First, there is one major difference 
between Linzey's Generosity Paradigm and other theories of environmental philosophy 
(Linzey, Animal 95-97): Linzey's ethic does not focus on the inherent value of nature, but 
rather on our duty to God. "For the Christian, the duty of the steward is to carry out the 
plan of the absent ruler. The duty not to mistreat animals is owed to the absent ruler, not 
to the animals" (Gunn, "Traditional" 151). While Linzey's theory is capable of protecting 
the environment from the current plundering of Homo Sapiens, this protection is only 
provided for the sake of God, not for the sake of the land, seas, plants, or animals. 
While this is a significant difference, a theistic approach to protectionism offers the 
same result-protection. Furthermore, it offers a refreshing alternative to theories that 
place human beings at the centre of the universe. Many environmental philosophers 
preserve forests and species with an eye to future human interests. This seems patently 
selfish; a God-centered vision is at least one step removed from this common, overtly 
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selfish environmental focus. There is something to be said for moving ones focus from 
self-interest to something more ultimate. Perhaps, "without a truly spiritual understanding 
of our relationship with the rest of life on Earth, both the Environmental Movement and 
the Animal Welfare Movement are... condemned to irrelevance" (Porritt 15). While it is 
uncommon for environmentalists to be theologically based, there is considerable merit in 
Linzey's approach. 
Second, if we extend Linzey's Generosity Paradigm to all of creation, we are faced 
with the monumental task of discovering what it means to offer self-sacrificing service to 
all of creation. Not only is this a monumental task, but it also requires an understanding 
of what each entity might require. How do we best service a cockroach while also 
servicing our human neighbors? How do we feed the lion without sacrificing the lamb? 
Self-sacrificing service, when translated into action, seems somewhat impossible. 
However, as Paul encouraged his Christian followers, if we focus on the spirit of the 
teaching rather than the letter of the law, Linzey's Generosity Paradigm does not seem 
impossible to apply to all of creation. The spirit of the teachings of Jesus is the spirit of 
love. If we demonstrate compassion, consideration, and genuine concern for the lives of 
other creatures, our actions demonstrate self-sacrificing love. Ecological destruction has 
generally been born of indifference and greed. While it is less clear what the best action 
might be in any one situation, perhaps "the most basic ecological experience is that of an 
audacious generosity, of daring to love all the suffering, perishing creation" (Kohak 170). 
If one acts with compassion toward all of creation, then a stray cat will be fed, 
while a wilting plant will be watered, and a stone along the path will be left in place-lest 
the many things that live around and under the stone be disturbed. Each entity requires a 
different act of self-sacrificing service to God's bountiful creation. Linzey asserts that 
Christians ought to approach all of creation with an attitude of service and self-sacrifice, 
asking not what can be gained from each small part of creation, but what we might best do 
to serve God's ends through the existence of that entity. His theological vision does not 
require equal treatment for a piece of granite and a platypus, only equal respect for each of 
these aspects of the divine splendor. In the absence of hierarchy, the Christian vision 
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might be extended so that the whole universe is acknowledged as having divine 
significance, and Christianity might truly become all-inclusive (Buttrick 9: 139). 
Linzey's hierarchy is untenable. With the toppling of this hierarchy, his theory 
becomes a comprehensive environmental ethic, whereby Christians are called upon to live 
their lives so as to offer self-sacrificing service to all that God has created-every cow and 
skunk, every beetle and thistle, each drop of every ocean. 
Conclusion 
Linzey's work offers much to challenge historic-and contemporary-Christian 
assumptions of how we ought to live amidst the wealth and beauty of God's earth. While 
one can always find passages in the Hebrew Bible or New Testament to support abuse and 
misuse of animals, Linzey successfully demonstrates that the overall message of scripture 
(as well as many specific passages), supports a protectionist ethic. Linzey highlights the 
overall message of love and self-sacrificing service exemplified in the life of Christ to 
assert a Christian obligation to treat all of creation with compassion and respect. 
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IV. PAUL TAYLOR: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
Paul Taylor is not as well known as Linzey, Singer, or Regan. Taylor is 
specifically interested in environmental ethics. His principal work, Respect for Nature, 
outlines an ethical theory to protect the interests of wild entities. Taylor's work presents 
an interesting direction for future protectionist philosophy. 
Taylor's work is developed from a foundation that must be clarified before 
presenting his theory of Respect for Nature. 
A. Taylor's Foundation. 
1. Individual versus Species. 
Unlike most environmental ethicists, Taylor emphasizes the individual rather than 
the ecosystem. Taylor writes, "... to harm several such beings is not merely to bring about a 
certain amount of intrinsic disvalue in the world... It is to commit a number of violations 
of duty, corresponding to the number of creatures harmed" (Respect 284). Taylor insists 
that individuals are the only value of a species: 
... unless 
individuals have a good of their own that deserves the moral consideration of agents, no 
account of the organic system of nature-as-a-whole can explain why moral agents have a duty to 
preserve its good. Even if it is the case that the entire realm of life on Earth is itself a quasi-organism, 
why should the well-being of that entity count ethically? (Respect 119) 
2. Natural and Non-natural. 
a. natural: Taylor's ethical theory protects the "natural" world, including "the 
entire set of natural ecosystems on our planet, along with the populations of animals and 
plants that make up the biotic communities of those ecosystems" (Respect 3). A natural 
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ecosystem is "any collection of ecologically interrelated living things that, without human 
intrusion or control, maintain their existence as species-populations over time, each 
population occupying its own environmental niche and each shaped by the evolutionary 
processes of genetic variation and natural selection" (P. Taylor, Respect 3). 
Whilst focusing on the protection of "wild" or "natural" teleological entities, 
Taylor admits that no definitive line can be drawn between natural and unnatural entities or 
ecosystems. His theory includes living things with which we have tampered but which 
now exist without human intervention (Res ect 4), such as endangered "wild" animals that 
have been captive bred. 
b. bioculture: Taylor distinguishes between environmental ethics and the ethics of 
bioculture. Environmental ethics concentrate on "... the moral relations that hold between 
humans and the natural world. The ethical principles governing those relations determine 
our duties, obligations, and responsibilities with regard to the Earth's natural environment 
and all the animals and plants that inhabit it" (P. Taylor, Respect 3). 
By contrast, the ethics of bioculture involve moral guidelines for our treatment of 
plants and animals that are under human control and that are the result of human 
manipulation. Biocultural ethics target entities that have been created, regulated, and 
exploited for human ends. Taylor acknowledges that these entities have a good of their 
own, just like the plants and animals of natural ecosystems (Respect 53-55), but these 
beings he outside the scope of Taylor's theory of environmental ethics. 
3. Moral Considerability. 
a. inherent worth: Where Regan uses the term "inherent value, " Taylor prefers 
"inherent worth. " (Taylor notes inherent value is synonymous with inherent worth. ) He 
ascribes inherent worth to "entities that have a good of their own" (Res a 75) and "can 
be made better or worse off by the way humans treat them" (Respect 56). 
Taylor writes that inherent worth: 
9 is deserving of moral concern and consideration, 
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" requires that all moral agents have a prima facie duty to promote or preserve 
the entity's good as an end in itself-for the sake of that entity's good (Respect 
75). 
b. teleology: Taylor's theory offers inherent worth to wild teleological entities. 
He includes "any wild creature just in virtue of its being a member of a biotic community 
of a natural ecosystem" (Respect 79). Such teleological beings are not to be treated as a 
means to an end, but as an end in themselves with a value independent of any utility 
recognized by human beings (Respect 57). While "animals may not actually be valued by 
humans as highly as other humans... this does not mean that animals do not have the same 
inherent value as humans" ("Inherent" 17). 
c. equal moral consideration: Each entity that has inherent worth has a "good of 
their own. " Having a good of one's own makes one worthy of moral consideration. Moral 
consideration entails a duty for moral agents (Respect 75). Entities that have inherent 
worth are all equally deserving of moral consideration (P. Taylor, Respect 79). 
4. Moral Agents and Moral Patients. 
Taylor also distinguishes between moral agents and moral patients. As with 
Regan's definition, moral agents are morally accountable for their actions, and may be held 
accountable. Moral patients are not morally accountable and cannot do right, nor can they 
do wrong. Also like Regan, Taylor includes most humans as moral agents, and all other 
animals (and some humans), as moral patients-though he admits he cannot be certain 
whether or not other animals might be moral agents (Respect 14). Taylor's definition of a 
moral agent includes: 
... the ability to 
form judgments about right and wrong; the ability to engage in moral deliberation, that 
is to consider and weigh moral reasons for and against various courses of conduct open to choice; the 
ability to make decisions on the basis of those reasons; the ability to exercise the necessary resolve and 
willpower to carry out those decisions; and the capacity to hold oneself answerable to others for 
failing to carry them out. (Respgc t 14) 
5. Rights. 
a. legal rights: Taylor notes that non-human entities have legal rights in the 
Western world. He defines legal rights as entitlements established by law. He cites the 
Endangered Species Act, and laws that prohibit recreational killing of deer in certain 
places at certain times, as proof that both plants and animals have legal rights (Respect 
223). 
b. moral rights: Taylor avoids assertions of moral rights to non-human animals. 
Taylor argues that moral rights, in contrast to legal rights, can only be ascribed to 
"persons. " For Taylor, a "person" is an entity that has interests and purposes, preferences 
and plans, a sense of personal identity over time, and makes autonomous choices or 
valuations (Respect 33-36). Taylor does not accept non-humans as "persons. " 
Moral rights, according to Taylor, require that one be a member of a community of 
moral agents, have self-respect, be able to exercise or enjoy rights, and also to hold others 
to account (Respect 246,251). Bearers of moral rights "are acknowledged to have 
supreme authority over those conditions of their lives which are essential to preserving 
their personhood" ("Inherent" 26). Only "persons" have moral rights. 
"Persons" are autonomous, rational beings who choose their own value-system and 
direct their own lives on the basis of that value-system (P. Taylor, Respect 36). Taylor 
does not recognize non-human animals as "persons" or as bearers of moral rights. 
c. human rights: Taylor describes human rights as rooted in "human ethics based 
on respect for persons. " Human rights are central to the structure and functioning of 
societies (Respect 234). "The principle of respect for persons is built into the very 
structure of the moral community and serves as the ultimate ground of the rules of duty 
within the domain of human ethics... respect for persons serves as the foundation for 
universal human rights" (P. Taylor, Respect 39). 
Taylor indicates that human rights belong "to all persons in virtue of their 
personhood... Thus they are universal (belonging to every person) and equal (the same for 
all persons)" ("Inherent" 25). He writes, basic human rights 
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... consist 
in a set of guaranteed opportunities and permissions which make it possible for one to 
(choose to) maintain oneself as a living organism and to seek those ends of interest that make up the 
central values of one's self-determined conception of a meaningful life. Thus our basic rights set 
boundaries of inviolability, as it were, around the core of our existence. ("Inherent" 25) 
Taylor lists several human rights: 
" The right to subsistence and security, including the "physical necessities of 
biological survival, " the right not to be killed, and the right of physical safety (Respect 
235). 
" The right to liberty, which entails "freedom from positive external constraints 
upon the pursuit of one's permissible interests" (Respect 237). Permissible means 
those interests that do not infringe on the rights of others, or break a valid moral rule, 
including "the right to take effective steps to realize the goals we have set for 
ourselves, without hindrances or obstacles placed in our way by others; " we are "at 
liberty to pursue our good as we see fit, " but not necessarily to have our good realized 
(Respect 237-9). 
" The right to autonomy, including the right to self-determination, which allows 
individuals to lead lives of their own, "based on goals they set for themselves and 
values they have chosen for themselves... they are accordingly self-directed and self- 
governed beings" (Respect 239). 
Taylor asserts that human rights maintain the integrity of persons: "... we must 
conceive of rights as protecting those conditions essential to the rights-holder's existence 
as the kind of being it is... Whatever conditions are essential to making it possible for 
such an entity to realize its welfare are those to which it has a moral right" ("Inherent" 27). 
Human ethics recognize each person as the "center of autonomous choice, living 
(or potentially capable of living) a way of life according to his or her own value-system, " 
and obligated to all other moral agents according to rules of ethics (Respect 37). 
This autonomy necessarily involves limits. Self-respect rather than self-interest 
form the basis of human rights. Consequently, `where the preservation of the whole 
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system of rights is at stake, it is understood that our rights can justifiably be overridden, 
with or without our consent" ("Inherent" 25-26). 
Taylor explains that moral rights become laws because "rational and autonomous 
persons" unanimously adopt ethical rules when these rules "give equal weight to every 
person's value-system and at the same time make it possible for each to pursue the 
realization of his or her own value-system in ways compatible with everyone else's similar 
pursuit" (Respect 3 8). 
d. a parallel theory: Taylor asserts that the language of moral rights cannot be 
used for animals and plants because this would imply that other living beings have rights in 
the same manner as humans, which they do not. He adds that moral rights (such as human 
rights) are not necessary for the protection of non-human entities; that his theory of 
environmental ethics offers non persons the same securities that human rights offer 
persons (Respect 254). 
Taylor's theory of environmental ethics parallels human ethics. He distinguishes 
two categories of ethical conduct: that of human ethics, and that of environmental ethics. 
The former grounded in respect for persons, the later in respect for nature (Respect 26). 
Just as respect for persons is made manifest in human rights, "rules of duty governing our 
treatment of the natural world and its inhabitants are forms of conduct in which the 
attitude of respect for nature is manifested" ("Ethics" 203). Taylor asserts that there is no 
reason for other animals to have moral rights if we adopt his environmental ethic of 
Respect for Nature. 
6. Principles and Standards. 
Taylor explains the principles and standards to which both human and environmental 
ethics might be held. Such rules must be: 
" general in form 
" universally applicable to all moral agents 
" intended to be applied disinterestedly 
" advocated as normative principles for all moral agents 
0 considered to override all nonmoral norms. (Respect 27) 
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Taylor rejects moral intuition on the grounds that it impedes the process of seeking 
ethical truths (Respect 23). 
B. Taylor's Respect for Nature. 
Taylor's theory of environmental ethics consists of a belief-system, attitude, and 
system or set of rules. Taylor includes four rules and five principles that offer guidance for 
the practical application of each rule. The "belief-system supports and makes intelligible 
the adopting of the attitude, and the rules and standards give concrete expression to that 
attitude in practical life" (Respect 44). 
1. Belief System-The Biocentric Outlook. 
a. interdependence: "Each animal and plant in the natural world pursues its own 
good in its own way and therefore is similar, in that respect, to a human" (P. Taylor, "In 
Defense" 237). A biocentric outlook allows individuals to view themselves as members of 
the "Earth's Community of Life, " dependent for existence on the "biological system of 
nature" (P. Taylor, Respect 44). 
One who holds a biocentric outlook will recognize people as part of the earth's 
vast interdependent community wherein each organism exists on the same terms as each 
other living organism (P. Taylor, Respect 99). "The biocentric outlook recognizes a 
natural world where each species, including humans, is an integral, interdependent 
element, and the welfare of each living thing is "determined not only by the physical 
conditions of its environment but also by its relations to other living things" (P. Taylor, 
Respect 100). 
In Taylor's theory, ecological interdependence is a condition of both human and 
non-human existence. The unending "reality and universality of this condition throughout 
the whole realm of life on Earth, " unites "humans and non-humans in a single system of 
relationships, " the realization of which forms a basic component of the biocentric outlook 
(P. Taylor, "In Defense" 239). 
Taylor introduces the complicated idea of teleology in the process of emphasizing 
the interconnected nature of life on earth. Teleology entails both internal functioning and 
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external activities constantly working to maintain an organism's existence (Respect 121). 
The biocentric outlook recognizes each organism-creatures and vegetation-as a unique 
goal-oriented being "pursuing its own good in its own unique way. [Each] living thing is 
conceived as a unified system of organized activity, the constant tendency of which is to 
preserve its existence by protecting and promoting its well-being" (Respect 45). 
Teleological entities have "interests" because they have a good that can be 
thwarted. "We have each a good of our own, and each of us, human and non-human alike, 
can be helped or hindered in the realization of that good" (P. Taylor, "In Defense" 238). 
Like ourselves, other organisms are teleological centers of life. The constant tendency of their 
behavior and internal processes is patterned around the realization of their good. Although the 
content of our good and the means by which we pursue it may be vastly different from theirs, the 
teleological order exemplified both in our lives and in theirs signifies a fundamental reality common 
to all of us. (P. Taylor, Respect 157) 
The biocentric outlook does not describe what any particular entity's good might 
entail. Some-insects in particular-may sacrifice their individual lives for a group, 
indicating diverse methods by which entities "realize their own biological potentialities" 
("In Defense" 238). Each teleological entity "is carrying out its biological functions 
according to the laws of its species-specific nature" ("Ethics" 210). 
b. equality: Individuals who hold Taylor's biocentric outlook will not place 
humans either at the centre or at the top of the natural order. "The moral commitment 
which is associated with [the biocentric] outlook is a disposition to ascribe to wild animals 
and plants the same inherent worth which we attribute to our fellow humans, and so 
regard them as deserving of equal consideration with ourselves" (P. Taylor, "In Defense" 
240). Humans are one type of entity amongst many, pursuing our good just as other 
organisms do. The good of both plants and animals requires that their "ecological 
equilibrium must not be destroyed. The same holds true of the well-being of humans" 
("Ethics" 209). "The biocentric outlook entails species-impartiality, " from which point of 
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view all living beings are judged to be equally worthy of moral concern and consideration 
(Respect 46). Taylor's vision "requires humans to treat other creatures in such a way that 
there is no bias in favor of humans just because they are human" (P. Taylor, "In Defense" 
241). To "accept the [biocentric] outlook is to understand the place of humans in the 
domain of life on Earth as one of fundamental equality with other members... an equality 
that extends to all forms of life in our planet's natural ecosystems" (P. Taylor, "In 
Defense" 240). The biocentric outlook holds that it is never acceptable to destroy any 
being "merely on the grounds that it would benefit human beings" (Regan, "Nature" 32). 
c. insider's perspective: Taylor's biocentric outlook looks to a future where we 
see all other beings from the reference point of that other being-that entity's shared 
interest in "survival, health, and well-being" (Respect 124). This outlook offers "the most 
complete realization, cognitively and imaginatively, of what it is to be that particular 
individual; " the biocentric outlook allows us to "let the reality of another's life enter the 
world of our own consciousness" (Respect 128). 
Taylor admits that his "biocentric outlook" cannot be proven either true or false, 
but adds, "beliefs that make up the content of the biocentric outlook are scientifically 
established" ("In Defense" 240), and "firmly rooted in the findings of the physical and 
biological sciences" (Respect 160). No worldview can be conclusively demonstrated as 
true or false, but each stands or falls based on well-established criteria: 
comprehensiveness, coherence and internal consistency, freedom from obscurity and 
semantic vacuity, and consistency with known empirical truths. Taylor holds the 
biocentric outlook up to this light and concludes that this world-view is acceptable to 
rational individuals based on compliance with these criterion (Respect 158-161). 
2. Attitude-Respect for Nature. 
Taylor indicates that virtues are important because attitudes critical to 
environmental ethics are rooted in human character (Respect 199). Such virtues as 
conscientiousness, integrity, courage, perseverance, benevolence, sympathy, impartiality, 
trustworthiness, and fairness are virtues held by Taylor's ethical individual. An individual 
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with these virtues will accept environmental ethics in the same way that most people 
accept human ethics-as a fundamental and formative aspect of life. 
Taylor's biocentric belief-system "underlies, supports, and makes intelligible" the 
attitude of respect for nature, the ultimate moral attitude required to uphold environmental 
ethics (Respect 167). Respect for nature, in Taylor's theory, is "the most fundamental kind 
of moral commitment that one can make, " a moral commitment that serves as a ground for 
rationally motivated decisions and actions, as well as emotive responses, but is grounded 
on no more fundamental concept (Respect 90). 
One who holds an attitude of respect for nature will not harm or interfere with the 
world around them. They will honour "the natural status of wild living things, " and strive 
to preserve "their existence as part of the order of nature" (P. Taylor, Respect 81). Those 
who respect nature will use reason to determine which actions are based on personal 
respect for nature, and they will strive for policies and practices that preserve natural 
ecosystems. One who holds an attitude of respect for nature will also be emotionally 
engaged so as to feel pleased or displeased according to whether or not events uphold or 
damage the earth's natural ecosystems (P. Taylor, Respect 81-83). 
As in Kant's ethical theory, Taylor asserts that actions must be motivated by 
ethical obligations, not personal affection. Actions that maintain natural ecosystems do 
not express respect for nature unless they are motivated by a respect for the inherent 
worth of living organisms. Furthermore, actions that express respect for nature, must be 
done "as a matter of moral principle" (P. Taylor, Respect 85). Moral imperatives guide 
individuals who respect nature to pursue an ethical action in a disinterested fashion (P. 
Taylor, Respect 92). Intentions matter. 
... people show genuine respect 
for nature only when they act or decline to act out of consideration and 
concern for the good of wild living things... To express in practical life one's respect for nature, one's 
intentions and aims must be directed toward not interfering with or harming animals and plants in 
natural ecosystems and to preserving their wild status for their sake. Having those aims and 
intentions as one's ultimate ends is essential to having true respect for nature. (R ect 84-85) 
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3. Four Rules and Moral Triage. 
The rules that guide a moral agent who accepts the biocentric outlook, and who 
bases actions on an attitude of respect for nature, are four in number: 
a. nonmaleficence: Nonmaleficence is an injunction not to harm "any entity in 
the natural environment that has a good of its own, " that we refrain from killing organisms 
and "from any action that would be seriously detrimental to the good of an organism, 
species-population, or life community" (P. Taylor, Respect 172). Nonmaleficence 
prohibits moral agents from actions that are destructive or harmful to natural organisms or 
their habitats. 
b. noninterference: Noninterference requires that moral agents refrain from 
"placing restrictions on the freedom of individual organisms" and from meddling in the 
natural lives of ecosystems and biotic communities, or in the lives of individual organisms 
(P. Taylor, Respect 173). No matter how good intentions might be, noninterference 
requires that we maintain a laissez-faire policy, allowing wild creatures to live out their 
natural lives freely, in their natural environment. Noninterference demands the complete 
absence of human intervention, even actions intended to preserve the life of an organism 
(Respect 173-175). If we fail to practice noninterference, 
... we 
intrude into the domain of the natural world and terminate an organism's existence as a wild 
creature. It does not matter that our treatment of them may improve their strength, promote their 
growth, and increase their chances for a long, healthy life. By destroying their status as wild animals 
or plants, our interference in their lives amounts to an absolute negation of their natural freedom. (P. 
Taylor, Respect 175) 
We are called upon to refrain from manipulation, control, modification, or 
management of natural ecosystems. "Respect for nature means that we acknowledge the 
sufficiency of the natural world to sustain its own proper order throughout the whole 
domain of life" (P. Taylor, Respect 177). 
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c. fidelity: Fidelity forbids gaining an entity's trust only to deceive them and gain 
advantage for immoral reasons. We are required to maintain the integrity of our actions so 
that another animal's expectations of our behaviour are fulfilled. 
Taylor targets hunting, trapping, and fishing as particularly deceitful. Such actions 
treat other animals as a means to human ends, and are the antithesis of respect for nature 
(Respect 184). 
d. restitutive justice: Restitutive justice requires moral agents to make restitution 
to moral subjects whenever an agent has wronged a subject. Moral subjects are wronged 
whenever one of the three previously mentioned rules are transgressed (nonmaleficence, 
noninterference, and fidelity). Moral agents who demonstrate respect for nature will hold 
themselves accountable for actions that wrong a moral subject. Restitution is intended to 
restore the balance of justice that existed between moral agent and subject (P. Taylor, 
Respect 186). The rule of restitution requires moral agents to interfere with natural 
ecosystems in order to mend individuals or ecosystems that moral agents have damaged. 
Even when moral agents could not have avoided the harm done to wild organisms, 
"an act of restitutive justice is called for in recognition of the inherent worth of what has 
been destroyed" (P. Taylor, Respect 189). It is not surprising that Taylor asserts that all 
of us who live in modem, industrialized societies owe "restitutive justice to the natural 
world and its wild inhabitants" (P. Taylor, Respect 191). 
Taylor highlights methods of restitutive justice: "... setting aside wilderness areas, 
protecting endangered and threatened species, restoring the quality of an environment that 
has been degraded, and aiding plants and animals to return to a healthy state when they 
have been weakened or injured by human causes" (Respect 198). If organisms have been 
killed it is not possible to restore moral equilibrium, but Taylor insists restitution still ought 
to be offered to living members of the same species. If an entire ecosystem has been 
destroyed, similar lands in other locations might be set aside for permanent protection, or 
cleaned of pollutants so that similar ecosystems might exist more easily (Respect 188, 
190). 
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e. moral triage prioritizing the four rules: Having outlined four basic rules that 
guide the ethical conduct of those who demonstrate an attitude of respect for nature, 
Taylor offers examples of how these rules are to be prioritized. 
The duty of nonmaleficence has primary place, and must never be superseded 
Noninterference, on the other hand, can be outweighed by either the fidelity rule or 
restitutive justice, provided that "great good is brought about and no creature is 
permanently harmed by the permitted interference" (P. Taylor, Respect 197). 
Taylor uses the example of putting up a fence to maintain fidelity. If the woodland 
is a place where animals have come to dwell, and have learned to feel safe, then a fence 
that prevents feral children and other marauding humans from upsetting woodland 
residents, is a legitimate solution. Such a fence might prevent other animals from traveling 
outside the barrier, but would be an overall benefit to those within. This fence is 
legitimate because it maintains fidelity established between the human who has bought the 
land and the animals that dwell therein (P. Taylor, Respect 195). As this example shows, 
one who respects nature may interfere with wild organisms in order to maintain fidelity in 
a way that will bring about an overall greater good. 
Similarly, fidelity can be overruled for restitutive justice if a significant good is 
gained and little harm done. Taylor offers the example of cleaning up after an oil-spill: 
"To clean the oil from their feathers the birds must be caught, and this often involves 
breaking a trust they place in us to leave them alone... [An] attempt to help them justifies 
the momentary acts of infidelity that cannot be avoided" (Respect 197). 
Next Taylor postulates cases of competing interests between humans and other 
organisms, and explains how his four ethical rules resolve "moral dilemmas that arise when 
human rights and values conflict with the good of non-humans" (Respect 256). Conflicts 
between life forms are an inevitable result of sharing the earth with other living things. 
"Every society... interferes with and makes use of some parts of the natural world" (P. 
Taylor, Respect 257). It is in this section, while explaining how conflicts of interest are to 
be resolved, that Taylor reveals how human rights and respect for nature interact. 
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Taylor reiterates: when one has respect for nature it is "morally irrelevant... that 
wild animals and plants, unlike human persons, are not bearers of moral rights" (P. Taylor, 
Respect 262). Human rights are only relevant within the membership of a moral 
community. Our rights hold no sway in our interactions with the larger world. 
Intraspecies interactions are informed and guided by the biocentric outlook and the 
attitude of respect for nature. Inherent worth possessed by every being that has a good of 
its own, requires that each entity receive equal concern and consideration alongside 
humans (P. Taylor, Respect 260-262). Taylor reasserts his conviction that humans do not 
automatically take precedence over the good of other organisms (Respect 152). 
4. Five Principles. 
Taylor introduces five principles to represent five morally relevant considerations. 
The application of these five principles reveals how Taylor's four ethical rules (stated 
above) are enacted in situations of conflict between humans and wild life (Respect 263): 
a. self-defense: Taylor's self-defense principle balances against nonmaleficence, 
allowing moral agents to protect themselves against dangerous organisms. We are morally 
obligated to avoid the need to use self defense (P. Taylor, Respect 268). When conflict 
cannot be avoided, self-defense is permissible, even to the point of killing. Humans are not 
obliged to sacrifice their own lives for other forms of life ("In Defense" 243). Taylor 
defines a harmful or dangerous organism as "one whose activities threaten the life or basic 
health" of moral agents (Respect 265). Self-defense allows moral agents to protect 
themselves against moral subjects, even if other organisms will be destroyed along with 
those that threaten our lives or safety (P. Taylor, Respect 266). 
In the process of presenting his rule of self-defense, Taylor makes two assertions: 
Self-defense is species-blind and personhood is worthy of preservation "The fact that 
(most) humans are moral agents and (most) non-humans are not is a contingent truth 
which the principle does not take to be morally relevant" (P. Taylor, Respect 266). Taylor 
cautions that the principle of self-defense does not indicate that moral agents have greater 
inherent worth than moral subjects. The principle of self-defense merely acknowledges 
that personhood is fundamentally worthy of preservation (Respect 268). We have a right 
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to defend our lives against other organisms (just as human ethics allow moral agents to 
defend themselves against violent people without indicating that such humans have a lesser 
inherent worth) (Respect 267). 
Only this first principle applies to conflicts that are life threatening to moral agents 
(Respect 269). 
b. proportionality: Proportionality (and the next principle, that of minimum 
wrong), apply to cases that involve basic interests of moral subjects and nonbasic interest 
of persons. 
Taylor defines nonbasic interests as interests that promote the good of an entity, 
and basic interests are those interests necessary for an organism to maintain their existence 
as the type of being that they are. 
When "morally legitimate, " humans have a right to have basic interests fulfilled 
because they hold moral rights. Humans are not considered morally legitimate in Taylor's 
theory if they pursue nonbasic human interests that are "intrinsically incompatible with the 
attitude of respect for nature" (Respect 272-275). Taylor asserts that such actions negate 
the inherent worth of wild things and are therefore not permissible (though such actions 
are perfectly acceptable within the narrow framework of human ethics). 
The principle of proportionality covers morally abhorrent activities such as the 
ivory and fur trade, collecting butterflies or wildflowers, selling exotic animals, and 
recreational killing (such as hunting and fishing when flesh is not necessary for survival). 
Because these actions sacrifice the basic interests of other entities for nonbasic human 
interests, these activities fail to demonstrate respect for nature, and they fall outside of 
Taylor's description of acceptable moral behaviour. The principle of proportionality 
allows that when there is "a conflict between human values and the good of (harmless) 
wild animals and plants, greater weight is to be given to basic than to nonbasic interests, 
no matter what species, human or other, the competing claims arise from" (P. Taylor, 
Respect 278). 
c. minimum wrong: The minimum wrong principle also applies to conflicts of 
interest that involve nonbasic human interests and basic interests of moral subjects. 
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However, in this case the conflicts are compatible with respect for nature (i. e. they do not 
demonstrate an exploitative attitude that fails to honour the inherent worth of moral 
subjects). Although damaging to other beings, certain actions are permitted because they 
involve valuable human ends. In such cases gains outweigh undesirable consequences, 
"even when such weight is assigned by one who has full respect for nature" (P. Taylor, 
Respect 277). 
Taylor offers examples: creating a park or building a dam, constructing an airport 
or art museum. He remarks that "whether people who have true respect for nature would 
give up the activities involved in these situations depends on the value they place on the 
various interests being furthered, " and on any possibilities for less damaging alternatives 
(Respect 277). 
The construction of "buildings, highways, airports, and harbors, " represent 
nonbasic interests, yet these are all necessary to "high-level civilization based on 
advancement of scientific and humanistic knowledge" complete with an "aesthetically rich 
culture" (Respect 289). These activities cause harm to ecosystems, but are central to 
humans as the type of creatures that they are. 
The principle of minimum wrong allows that "rational, informed, and autonomous 
persons who hold the attitude of respect for nature, " and who feel it is important to engage 
in certain activities that harm wild animals and plants, may do so (P. Taylor, Respect 282). 
However, all such actions must involve "fewer wrongs (violations of duties) than any 
alternative" (P. Taylor, Respect 283). The actions must also be valued in and of 
themselves. Alternatively, they must be directed toward a work of art, natural wonder, 
historical monument, or aspect of nature that is supremely valued by "rational and 
enlightened" persons for aesthetic, historical, or cultural, reasons, or as "a matter of 
personal sentiment, wonder, or admiration" (P. Taylor, Respect 282,74). 
Minimum wrong requires us to regulate human development, consumption, and 
expansion. We are expected to recycle, and clean up fouled areas. We must use 
appropriate energy-efficient, clean technologies, and we must limit and control damage 
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with environmental legislation. These restrictions minimize wrongs done to non-humans in 
natural ecosystems for the benefit of humans (P. Taylor, Respect 283). 
Taylor's minimum wrong principle also applies to instances where humans kill 
other entities directly for nonbasic needs. For instance, when we take organisms for art, 
research, or education, and when we use pesticides or herbicides. Minimum harm allows 
for this type of destruction, but requires that these acts be carefully scrutinized, and that 
damages be minimized (P. Taylor, Respect 290-291). 
d. distributive justice: Distributive justice provides for the "just distribution of 
interest-fulfillment" when the interests of both parties are basic, and when the moral 
patient poses no threat to the moral agent. The purpose of distributive justice is to "make 
it possible for wild animals and plants to carry on their natural existence side by side with 
human cultures" (P. Taylor, Respect 293). Taylor offers two examples: hunting wild 
animals for food where extreme environmental conditions permit of no other food source 
(as in the Arctic or at high altitudes) and culling wild animals in environments where 
conditions do not allow one to live from horticulture or animal husbandry. 
Generally speaking, Taylor explains, we must kill to live. All entities have inherent 
worth, so it is no less wrong to kill a plant than an animal (Respect 293-295). While the 
suffering of animals is a moral concern, if animals are raised and killed humanely, only 
increased land-use offers a cogent argument in favour of vegetarianism. "We can greatly 
reduce the amount of cultivated land needed for human food production by changing from 
meat-eating culture to a vegetarian culture... Vegetarians, in short, use much less of the 
Earth's surface to sustain themselves than do meat-eaters. And the less humans use for 
themselves the more there is for other species" (Respect 296). 
Distributive justice requires that we consider carefully whether or not there is any 
way to avoid eating wild animals. When eating other creatures cannot be avoided, we are 
obligated to eat those that are plentiful, and to hunt and kill them as humanely as possible 
(Respect 294). 
Taylor presents four means of distributive justice: 
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" permanent habitat allocation: habitat set aside permanently, where non- 
human entities can live free from human interference; 
" common conservation: sharing resources fairly with non-human entities that 
depend for their existence on the same limited resources; 
" environmental integration: integrating wild organisms into non-natural 
environments-such as golf courses and city parks-by taking specific measures to 
make these environments safe and habitable; and 
" rotation: completely removing ourselves either temporarily or permanently 
from environments, when possible, such as by closing and restoring mines, research 
and specimen points, temporary buildings, emergency water-sources, or seasonal 
claming marshes (Respect 302). 
Each of these measures allows wild entities to recover and find reprieve from 
admissible human interference. 
e. restitutive justice: Restitutive justice acknowledges that although "fair shares 
are equal shares... this ideal is never wholly realizable" (P. Taylor, Respect 304). Though 
the principles of distributive justice and minimum wrong help balance the scales, harms are 
still incurred by non-humans because of humans. Therefore, restitution is due as an 
attempt to restore the balance of justice. 
Taylor explains that "whenever we cause harm to animals and plants in the pursuit 
of our human values, some recognition must be given to the fact that our treatment of 
them is prima facie wrong" (Respect 286). "The greater the harm done, the greater the 
compensation required, " and Taylor suggests that restitution focus on "whole ecosystems 
and their biotic communities" (Respect 305), in order to maximize benefits offered to the 
greatest number of individuals. "We can, as it were, return the favor they do us by doing 
something for their sake" (Res ect 306). 
Summary 
Taylor summarizes his theory of environmental ethics as "a matter of fairness to 
wild animals and plants... [aimed at] a fundamental harmony between nature and human 
civilization" (Respect 305). He admits that his theory requires a "profound moral 
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reorientation" (Respect 313) that must begin with "an inner change in our moral beliefs 
and commitments" (Respect 312). 
Taylor's theory requires "sensitivity and awareness" yet demonstrates that respect 
for life "is not vacuous, in that it does provide a ceteris paribus encouragement in the 
direction of nutritional, scientific, and medical practices of a genuinely life-respecting sort" 
(Goodpaster, "On Being" 324). His theory offers insightful and challenging possibilities for 
protectionism, and offers a much more comprehensive ethical system than any normative 
ethic can begin to support. It is perhaps for these reasons that Respect for Nature has 
almost "come to define the perspective of biocentric individualism" (Sterba 191). 
B. Discussion. 
Taylor makes some controversial assumptions and seems to have some theoretical 
problems in his theory. Most importantly, Taylor's work seems harmed by a tendency 
toward humanocentrism, most flagrantly in his acceptance of human rights, while rejecting 
rights for all other entities. 
1. Controversial Assumptions. 
a. species versus individuals: The vast majority of environmental philosophers are 
holistic; they argue that ethics ought to focus on the species rather than the individual. 
Others, such as Taylor, assert that the individual has preeminence. 
Holistic protectionists argue that, even if we believe we will gain significantly by its 
demise, we ought to preserve every species because each species "has moral significance in 
its own right" (L. Johnson 169). Individuals are expendable, but species are not. "The 
good of a species or the good of an ecosystem or the good of the whole biotic community 
can trump the good of individual living beings" (Sterba 200-201). The importance of any 
one organism is dependent on the larger group (Agar 402). 
Those who ascribe to the species approach assert that individuals ought to be 
sacrificed for the good of the whole: exotics ought to be eliminated to protect local 
species, grazers killed to protect rare plants-even human beings that threaten endangered 
species might be better eliminated (Hettinger 5). Holistic philosophers argue that anyone 
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who focuses on the individual neglects the interests of the larger group, or community, by 
protecting such harmful individuals (L. Johnson 238). 
Holistic protectionists also argue that biological sciences indicate that it is more 
consistent with nature to favour species; natural selection seems careless with individuals 
(Rolston 22). In fact, the death of individuals is necessary to the healthy maintenance of 
the whole: 
The death of individuals, often violently by predation, is necessary both for the health of species 
and the viability of ecosystems. Zebras have, presumably, an interest in survival, but the future of the 
veldt depends, partly, on the regular killing of zebras by lions and hyenas. To understand the sense in 
which it is good that predators kill their prey, it is necessary to abandon the individualistic frame of 
reference and adopt a holistic approach... Indeed, where major predators have been exterminated... it 
may even be a duty of humans to assume the role of major predator. [Where] browsing mammals... 
have been introduced, the culling or even extermination of these species is essential to the survival of 
native forests and other vulnerable habitat. (Gunn, "Traditional" 149) 
Those who favour protecting species argue that the predator/prey relationship 
supports their point of view. Prey species depend on predators for the maintenance of 
healthy populations at sustainable numbers, yet being eaten is not in any individual 's 
interest (L. Johnson 163). "When a wolf kills a deer, the deer clearly suffers loss. From 
the point of view of the deer population and of the ecosystem, however, such a loss is 
actually a positive value" (Scoville 120). Because of this predator/prey relationship, 
holistic philosophers note that preserving individuals per se is misguided because this 
method cannot "serve to protect the ongoing integrity of nature" (Gunn, "Traditional" 
149). 
However, this holistic argument seems flawed. It seems that Zebras and deer do 
have an interest in predators-each has a personal interest in some other zebra or deer 
being eaten. Inter-species competition indicates that individuals have an interest in the 
demise of other members within their own species. Thus deer and zebra do have an 
i 
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interest in having predators kill others of their kind. In fact, individual members of a 
species continue to compete with one another even when extinction looms large on the 
horizon (Williams 53). This indicates that preserving individuals is exactly what the 
mechanisms of nature indicate. 
If we accept that individuals have an interest in predators, perhaps we are obligated 
to reintroduce predators wherever they have been eliminated, for the benefit of the prey. 
(Hunters cannot replace other predators, because they do not select out the weakest 
members of a given population. ) 
The holistic approach is most often backed by human self-interest in biodiversity 
(Norton 162). Humans protect biological diversity for our sake, not for the sake of the 
individuals involved. We take delight in marveling at the great elephants; we do not want 
to lose the possible medicinal value of the chestnut weevil-we attach great importance to 
biodiversity for the maintenance and evolution of all life-ours included. Human interest 
in biodiversity remains self-centered. The holistic approach allows for a "collector's 
instinct, " preserving a few of this, and a few of that, simply because these creatures please 
us or seem important to our welfare (Naverson, "Animal" 162). 
In contrast, moral individualists believe that 
what matters is the individual characteristics of organisms, and not the classes to which they are 
assigned The heart of moral individualism is an equal concern for the welfare of all beings, with 
distinctions made among them only when there are relevant differences that justify differences in 
treatment. (Rachels, Created 222) 
Those who focus moral attention on the individual argue that an ethical theory 
failing to protect the many vulnerable components of our ecosystem is inadequate 
(Callicott, "Intrinsic" 161). They assert that emphasizing the whole abrogates the value of 
the parts, particularly the value of individuals, whether human or animal (Midgley, "A 
Problem" 62). 
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Those who favour the holistic approach counter that individualists might allow 
entire species to be lost while they are laboring to save a few individuals (L. Johnson 235), 
but it seems unlikely that an entire species could be lost if one strives to save each 
individual. To save each individual is in fact to save the species. It is possible that the 
individualist's approach might lose an entire species if members of a species are allowed to 
perish in order to free them from ongoing suffering and exploitation (E. Johnson, "Animal" 
267). For instance, this might be considered a humane solution to the thousands of 
poultry and pigs, rabbits and rats, maintained for human exploitation in the food and 
medical industries. Aside from this instance it is difficult to see how saving individuals 
within populations will allow for the extinction of that species. 
In fact caring for individuals is likely to favour rare species. Killing a member of a 
rare species (or allowing it to die) adds, proportionally, greater stress to the remaining 
members. For instance, the difficulty of finding a mate in a dwindling species is 
significantly enhanced when one member is lost. Consider a rare bird, the black stilt: 
Because pied stilts are plentiful, killing five does not have a real impact on the ability of the 
remaining individuals to mate successfully. By contrast, killing five black stilts has a serious impact 
on the chances of other stilts to breed. Further, a small reduction in the ability of current stilts to 
produce offspring translates into a much greater reduction in the chances that their offspring will 
produce offspring. (Agar 413-414). 
Concern for individuals will result in more care for individuals from a rare species, 
when the choice must be made, because of the heightened impact of one loss on remaining 
members. In such instances, favouring individuals also favours rare species. 
An individualist might well agree with an holistic protectionist regarding the 
removal of an introduced species, but they are apt to disagree on methods. The 
individualist is more apt to advocate relocating "problem" species. This response assumes 
the importance of individuals, yet works for the benefit of both individuals and species. 
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Effective moral philosophy is based on consistency; the individualist's approach is 
consistent with Western ethics with regard to human life. If our ethic were holistic, we 
would not maintain individuals with hereditary disorders such as hemophilia within our 
breeding population. Are we prepared to carry a holistic ethic into our own ranks? If not, 
how do we justify this approach with regard to other species? 
Distinctions between species and individuals are sometimes hazy. Control over the 
fate of populations "brings with it some responsibility for the welfare of the individuals of 
which they are comprised" (Kirkwood 140). While the whole may be greater than the sum 
of its parts, it is also true that "the well-being of species, more often than not, follows 
when justice is secured for individual members of the species" (Thero 101). 
Taylor focuses his ethical theory on the individual, but his views seem inconsistent. 
For instance, he argues that it is a greater wrong to kill a rare wildflower than to kill a 
human in an act of self-defense ("In Defense" 242-243). As an individualist, Taylor is 
inconsistent if he notes "rarity. " How can an individual be rare? The notion of 
"endangered, " or "rare, " is a function of being part of a whole, and makes no sense 
otherwise. Taylor also suggests that, if we are to eat the bodies of other animals, we 
ought to eat animals that are "plentiful" (Respect 294). Again, individuals cannot be 
plentiful; only members of a species can be numerous. Perhaps most blatantly, Taylor 
writes that his principle of restitutive justice ought to focus on "the soundness and health 
of whole ecosystems and their biotic communities" (Respect 305)-not individuals. The 
blurred lines between the holistic and individualistic approaches to protectionism are 
apparent in Taylor's work. 
These inconsistencies aside, Taylor asserts that individuals are the morally 
significant unit. Consequently, his theory offers a bridge that might welcome a closer 
partnership between individualists (such as those who fight for animal rights) and those 
who are holistic (who generally are environmentalists). 
b. teleology: Taylor writes, "all organisms, whether conscious or not, are 
teleological centers of life because each is a unified, coherently ordered system of goal- 
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oriented activities that has a constant tendency to protect and maintain the organism's 
existence" (Respect 122). 
In Taylor's theory the basis of inherent value is teleology-an organisms self- 
maintaining nature. Biological beings "have a variety of needs, " and survival depends on 
how well a being copes with its environment (Broom 90). Teleology guides us to fulfil 
our needs, to succeed at the daunting task of survival (Williams 136). "Everything that is 
alive at this moment has meticulously covered all the bases, and is the result of ancestors 
who displayed brilliant artifices to reproduce against nearly impossible odds" (Sagoff 15). 
Taylor asserts that, because organisms "grow, respond to stimuli, reproduce, resist 
dying, assimilate, and use materials from their environment" in order to survive, we ought 
to respect their efforts, and their lives (Scoville 121). Each living thing "battles 
innumerable enemies to maintain its existence... The battle itself seems noble, " and the 
unique capacities of each teleological being justify "the ascription of inherent worth to life 
in general" ("Inherent" 259-260). 
The myriad living things are "equal, in that they are successfully adapted creatures 
able to survive in their environment" (Gunn, "Traditional" 151). Taylor writes, we are 
called upon to regard "every entity which has a good of its own as possessing inherent 
worth-the same inherent worth, since none is superior to another" (Respect 155). 
Teleological entities pursue the realization of their interests, and Taylor asserts that to 
harm the good of a teleological entity thwarts interests, and denies inherent worth (P. 
Taylor, Respect 71-72). 
The difficulty Taylor faces is to define exactly what teleology is, and apply this 
definition without absurdity. Taylor must somehow limit inherent worth to biological 
objects, so that his theory is able to separate "a barnacle's good from that of a radium 
atom" (Agar 399). Yet teleology has a long history of vague and overarching application. 
Philosophers have discussed teleology for at least two millennia. Aristotle wrote, 
"... each of the parts of the body, like every other instrument, is for the sake of some 
purpose, viz. some action, it is evident that the body as a whole must exist for the sake of 
some complex action" (Williams 41). David Hume commented that biological 
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"mechanisms, " and "even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an 
accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The 
curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it 
much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance" (Williams 33). 
Since the general observations of philosophers such as Aristotle and Hume, entire 
books have been written on the subject of teleology, yet the concept remains indistinct. 
Teleology defines instances as diverse as the function of organs and the behaviour of 
species (Mayr 38). Characteristic language of teleology includes function, purpose, goal, 
and behaviours that are intended to "bring about" a certain end (Mayr 39). Teleology is a 
"commonly recognized but loosely delineated trait of biological organisms" often used to 
"distinguish living from inanimate things, " and most easily identified as "the apparently 
purposive character of living organisms" (Nagel 276). 
Definitions indicate that the essence of goal and function ascriptions-the essence 
of teleology-is survival. "The only thing that anything in nature is designed to 
accomplish is its own success" (Williams 156). Teleological entities strive to persist 
genetically. In this sense entities are not complete wholes, but rather places "where 
various processes operate" (Williams 116). 
Teleology is based on purpose. As discussed in other chapters, knowing the 
minds or meanings of actions for other creatures-or even for ourselves-is extremely 
difficult, if possible. 
For instance, consider the two main types of teleological statements: goal 
ascriptions and function ascriptions. Goal ascriptions state some outcome or goal toward 
which certain activities or mechanisms of an organism are directed, " such as a woodpecker 
pecking to find grubs (Nagel 277). Function ascriptions call attention to "some of the 
effects of a given item or of its activities in an organism, " such as the function of teeth is to 
chew food (Nagel 277). Our dog tears the skin off tennis balls. Is this best described as a 
function or an ascription behaviour? How might I determine if this behaviour is indicative 
of a teleological entity? 
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Perhaps Taylor could base his ascriptions of teleological function on empirical 
evidence: complex systems of biological entities have evolved with a specific purpose for 
that entity (Agar 400). For instance, it seems evident that the wool of a sheep has evolved 
to keep sheep warm (not to bolster the profits of wool producers). Similarly, deer muscles 
have most likely evolved for mobility (not for the teeth of flesh-eaters). Natural selection 
has resulted in the wool of sheep, the muscles of deer, and the blubber of whales because 
these attributes enhance fitness for survival. A radium atom appears to have no 
comparable complex system of adaptive evolution. (One could argue that the muscles of 
dear are intended to feed carnivores, either by divine intent or by natural selection- 
biology favoured predators that ate flesh in areas where deer were numerous. But this 
would be more difficult to establish and defend as an explanation for the existence of 
muscles in deer. ) 
However, focusing on evolution might thwart Taylor's purpose. Perhaps natural 
selection merely rewards successful combinations of genes, without regard to individuals. 
In this case the evolutionary process of individual entities, or species, does not qualify as 
teleological. Each entity survives because it happens to be the result of successful 
combinations of genes (Mayr 43). "If genes are the targets of selection, then the 
preservation of genes is the most fundamental function or purpose of natural things and an 
ethic grounded in the maintenance of biological... interests must be focused on genes 
rather than on individual organisms" (Agar 401). In this case genes are the proper focus 
of Taylor's teleologically based environmental theory. 
Teleology has proven difficult to define and even more difficult to successfully 
apply. Can Taylor's ethic based on teleological interests that do not require having a mind 
or mental desire, logically exclude machines? "Insofar as we can speak of plants, other life 
forms, whole species, or ecosystems as having... a good or well-being, it... seems that we 
can speak of machines having interests in the same sense" (Kaufman 60). Machines 
maintain themselves in "homeostatic equilibrium; " one can refer to a "running engine's 
well being" (Kaufman 59-61). 
Determinism provides grounds for considering the machine-like qualities of 
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organisms. Consciousness alone cannot prevent living beings from being categorized as 
machines if we adopt a deterministic philosophy. 
But clear distinctions exist between organic entities and machines. An organic 
entity is the product of natural selection and participates in a struggle for existence, neither 
of which is true for machines. When a living entity dies, the parts disintegrate, whereas the 
parts of machines do not. The telos of a machine is extrinsic, "imposed by the mind and 
hand of man, " whereas the telos of living entities is intrinsic, theological explanations aside 
(Rollin 40). Living organisms are "the only problem solving complexes in the universe, " 
as distinct from machines (including computers), which are (at least right now) "merely 
among the means that human organisms use to solve problems" (Williams 16). These 
distinctions seem to place living organisms in a separate category with regard to teleology. 
Taylor bases his theory on teleology. But teleology remains ill-defined and 
controversial, and carries "numerous and seemingly weighty objections" (Mayr 41). In the 
absence of a clear understanding of teleology, it is difficult to determine the moral 
significance of Taylor's "teleological beings. " 
c. inherent worth: Taylor asserts that entities that have teleology have interests 
that ought to be respected, and that this entails inherent worth in those entities. 
Some philosophers assert that value can only exist in relation to others. "Since 
value is thoroughly relational, goodness for one's self is inseparable from goodness for 
others" (Scoville 117-118). 
"Value is present wherever being confronts being, wherever there is becoming in the midst of plural, 
interdependent, and interacting existences. It is not a function of being as such but of being in 
relation to being. " This statement sounds very much like a description of what goes on in an 
ecosystem. True, ... no warbler eats 
insects so that it may be of value to the falcon to which it falls 
prey. ... 
Yet, viewed objectively within the interrelationships of the ecosystem, it is just here, in the 
relationship of insects, warblers. and falcons, that value occurs. (Scoville, 118). 
One argument for acknowledging inherent value moves from this assertion of 
190 
instrumental value to assert that natural entities must have instrumental value in order to 
avoid an infinite regress. For instance, if a bird eats a worm, then the worm has 
instrumental value, and the bird must have inherent value. If not, an infinite regress begins 
which can only end with some end in itself, such as a divine being (Lee 300). 
Inherent value can also be understood as the capacity to strive to maintain ones 
functioning integrity: 
... mutely enacted values 
"occur every time natural beings succeed in maintaining their functioning 
integrity, achieving "goods" that "are their own. " ... every time a 
bluetit finds an insect (or seed) to 
eat when it is hungry, ... every time a plant grows taller to reach the sunlight, it, too, is generating or 
enacting a value. ... such values existed 
in nature before the arrival of human consciousness and will 
continue to exist even after the disappearance of such consciousness from the world The source and 
locus of recognized-articulated values are indeed humans; the source and locus of mutely enacted 
values are, in addition, other natural non-human beings. (Lee 308) 
While there are several arguments to support inherent value, the existence and 
nature of inherent value are far from clear. Yet this concept is important to his theory. 
2. Theoretical Considerations. 
a. natural: Taylor calls his theory "Respect for Nature. " He restricts the 
application of his environmental ethics to plants and animals that are not cultivated or 
raised, and the lands they occupy, or might be encouraged to occupy (Respect 3). "What 
makes them 'natural' in the sense meant here, " Taylor writes, "is the fact that the biological 
and environmental factors determining the structure of relationships holding among their 
constituent species-populations take place without human intervention" (Respect 4). The 
defining characteristic, for Taylor, is that humans have not intervened in the environment 
and biology that affect the relationships of the entities. Yet he admits, "... doubts might be 
raised as to whether any genuinely natural ecosystems now exist on our planet" (Respect 
4). Taylor's focus on "natural" entities might prove to be purely hypothetical, and 
arbitrary, or even worse-counterproductive and self-contradictory. 
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Taylor's ethical theory seems hypothetical rather than real because humans venture 
into even the most remote environments. Our pollution rides the winds and the tides from 
one vast continent to the next. The greenhouse effect is not limited to areas inhabited by 
humans, but affects the entire earth. Are there any environments, or biological entities free 
of human intervention? Can caribou, deer, moose, wolves, otter, and bald eagles-the 
numbers of each either artificially inflated or deflated according to human desire-be 
considered natural if Taylor is consistent with his definition of wild? Is it reasonable to 
consider maggots, coyotes, robins, pigeons, raccoons, sparrows, and fruit flies dwelling in 
urban areas non-natural? 
Taylor's use of "natural" also seems arbitrary. For instance, when do "exotic" 
entities become part of the natural environment? "Are ring-necked pheasants still exotic in 
South Dakota? Are daylilies? Are humans? " (Russow 12). 
Taylor proposes that what is natural exists free of all human intervention. Thus, as Taylor contends, 
animals produced by factory farming are not natural. ... 
Taylor's view implies, more comprehensively, 
that breeds of dogs and strains of garden vegetables are also not natural. Each has been selectively 
bred for a place in the human community. Should we then brand as unnatural and eliminate as exotic 
everything from cats to carrots?... 
Taylor's view of natural existence remains problematic, however, because it is not ecological. In 
any ecosystem, all life is interventionistic. Imagine the ecologically gentle John Muir standing in a 
Yosemite meadow. His body intervenes between the sun and the summer flowers, casting as shadow. 
When he walks, he intervenes. ... 
The life processes of human beings inevitably come between the 
Earth as it would be without humans and the Earth as it comes to be with humans. (Scherer 360) 
Taylor accepts "human life as an integral part of the natural order of the Earth's 
biosphere" (Respect 101). If Taylor accepts a domesticated John Muir and millions of 
citified humans as an integral part of the "natural" world, how can he maintain philosophic 
consistency yet exclude other "domestic" animals? 
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Taylor's selection of "natural" entities seems not only hypothetical and arbitrary, 
but also counterproductive. Much of what he excludes is critical to environmental ethics. 
Factory farms pollute the environment and upset the ecological balance (Midgley, "A 
Problem" 63), exploit and desecrate vast tracts of land, and release huge quantities of 
chemicals and waste into the environment (Lappe, 15-16,26-27). Given the vast tracts of 
land and astounding numbers of entities involved, and considering the massive effect of 
these huge enterprises on the planet, any viable environmental ethic ought to caution 
against-if not overtly denounce-agribusiness. Excluding farmlands and domestic 
animals is also counterproductive. 
Taylor's definition of natural does not protect lands on which we live or farm. If 
Taylor is to maintain consistency and exclude all entities whose structure of relationships 
have been effected by human intervention, then he must exclude lands on which we have 
established trails or campgrounds, lands on which we snowmobile, hike, kayak, hunt, ski, 
sail-or over which we fly. Indeed, any land we affect and the entities that dwell therein, 
must be excluded from Taylor's protective ethic. Our presence affects a particular 
environment, which infringes on Taylor's qualifications for "natural. " Under Taylor's 
theory, only by our rare and very conspicuous absence can lands be eligible for protection. 
If such lands do exist, Taylor's theory still seems misguided. Let us assume that 
half the globe is pristine, and the other half trashed by conglomerate masses of unsightly 
human civilization: ought environmental ethics to focus exclusively on the untainted half? 
If there were a place on earth free from human intervention, would such a place be the 
proper focus of environmental ethics? 
Environmental ethics stem from our concern about how we affect the environment. 
We have learned that pollution in one mud-puddle will progress into dirt, streams, lakes, 
oceans and back to mud-puddles in the same neighborhood. It is not merely metaphorical 
to say that how one treats the land and water in their backyard affects the lands and waters 
of every other yard, and every other entity. 
Taylor's concept of "natural" is not only untenable, but also seems misguided- 
there is no place that has escaped, or can escape, damage done by human beings. Because 
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no aspect of land or water is isolated, it is unrealistic and counter-productive to limit 
environmental ethics to narrowly defined geographical areas and "wild" inhabitants. 
Taylor's focus on "natural" contradicts his description of an interrelated universe. 
Taylor does an excellent job of describing the interrelated web of Earth's Community of 
Life. This being so, how can he deny the moral importance of any living entity? How can 
a herd of six hundred cattle, or a domesticated olive tree, be logically excluded from an 
ethical system intended to protect an interconnected earth? 
Perhaps Taylor would justify the exclusion of domestic animals as mere derivatives 
of human purposes. Taylor indicates that "the goals of a machine are derivative, whereas 
the goals of a living thing are original. The ends and purposes of machines are built into 
them by their human creators" (P. Taylor, Respect 124). Taylor might argue that, just as 
machines are not teleological entities in their own right, animals bred specifically for 
human entertainment, companionship, food, research, or furs are also not teleological 
entities in their own right. They are like machines-living only for someone else's 
purposes. 
Like computers, rabbits bred for food and kittens raised for scientific research have 
a derivative purpose. The same is true of racehorses, purebred dogs, miniature goats, and 
perhaps even our own children. At least since the time of Descartes, large groups of 
people have excluded domestic animals-if not all animals-from moral consideration 
simply because they were not considered ends in themselves. 
Domestic animals are the creations of man... There is thus something profoundly incoherent (and 
insensitive as well) in the complaint of some animal liberationists that the "natural behavior" of 
chickens and bobby [veal] calves is cruelly frustrated on factory farms. It would make almost as much 
sense to speak of the natural behavior of tables and chairs. (Callicott, "Animal" 330) 
Perhaps on this ground Taylor would exclude domesticated cattle and olive trees. 
There are two reasons why Taylor could not use this argument and maintain 
theoretical consistency. ' First, Taylor himself asserts that there are fundamental 
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distinctions between machines and biological entities: "The goal-oriented operations of 
machines are not inherent to them as the goal-oriented behavior of organisms is inherent to 
them" (Respect 124). Even those animals that exist because of human breeding, and 
whose lives human beings have staked out for a specific "derivative goal, " qualify as 
teleological life forms for Taylor, whereas machines do not. Taylor's definition of the 
equal inherent worth of all teleological beings does not allow him to exclude domestic 
animals and maintain consistency. 
Second, Taylor encourages captive breeding for reintroducing wild, rare animals 
back into the "natural" world (Respect 196-197). 
Captive-bred animals necessarily harm the integrity of any "wild" ecosystem into 
which they are released. Captive-bred animals are not the same as those raised in wild, 
natural settings. 
A species, like any other thing with interests, has an interest in maintaining itself as a coherent, 
integrated, functional ongoing whole with a particular self-identity. This requires more than just 
survival. It is a matter of what survives. Relating to a particular sort of environment is part of the 
self-identity of a species-and pressure from the environment helps a species to maintain its self- 
identity. What does a species profit if it gains survival and loses its soul? (L. Johnson 179-180) 
Animals in captivity cannot be preserved as the same animals they would be if 
raised in a natural environment. Captive-bred animals-no less than domestic "pets, " 
"laboratory, " or "farm" animals-exist due to human contrivance to satisfy a specific 
human goal. Obviously, captive-bred entities bring human intervention with them into any 
ecosystem where they are released. For all these reasons, Taylor's acceptance of captive- 
bred animals into wild ecosystems contradicts his focus on natural" entities-entities 
whose relations are unaffected by human intervention. Captive breeding is inherently 
"unnatural, " and therefore harms the integrity of wild individuals and species. 
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On what grounds could Taylor possibly exclude domestic animals that are raised 
for human ends, and include captive-bred animals in his theory? Clearly both exist because 
of human contrivance. 
Similarly, Taylor cannot maintain theoretical consistency with regard to his focus 
on "natural, " guild" teleological entities and include restitutive justice in his theory.. If one 
is to make restitution in "natural" places, or with "wild" animals, one simultaneously 
destroys what is "natural. " In Taylor' theory, entities and land effected by human 
restitution no longer qualify as "natural, " and are excluded from moral consideration. 
Taylor cannot consistently include those effected by restitutive justice, nor captive-bred 
animals, under the protective canopy of his theory while rejecting other teleological 
entities simply because they have been affected by human intervention. 
In light of Taylor's discussion of the interconnected biocentric outlook, in light of 
the slippery slopes of what constitutes "natural, " consistency requires that all life forms be 
encompassed in Taylor's environmental theory of ethics, especially given that he accepts 
captive bred animals and encourages restitution. Taylor limits the protective abilities of his 
environmental ethic to exclude domestic animals, but Respect for Nature requires 
comprehensive application of his protectionist theory. 
b. diet: Taylor seems uninformed and inconsistent with regard to flesh- 
consumption. He asserts that a vegetarian diet is no better than a meat diet because 
"plants, just like animals, are our equals in inherent worth. " Plants are wronged just as 
surely as animals when we cut off their existence prematurely for consumption (P. Taylor, 
Respect 295). In light of this, Taylor asks, "why should eating plants be ethically more 
desirable than eating animals? " (Respect 293). He concludes, if animals do not suer in 
the process, there is no ethical reason to prefer eating plants to animals. 
Contradicting himself, Taylor acknowledges that the Western flesh-industry 
requires farming much more land than a vegetarian diet. He wisely concludes that "anyone 
who has respect for nature will be on the side of vegetarianism" (Respect 257). In the 
next moment he asserts that it would require more farmland to produce enough vegetables 
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for a completely vegetarian population (Res ect 257). (He bases this latter assertion on 
increased need for vegetables for a vegetarian population. ) 
Taylor seems uninformed on this issue. The flesh-industry in the Western world 
entails extreme suffering for billions of sentient individuals, as well as severe 
environmental degradation (Singer, Animal 92-158). Furthermore, the flesh industry 
contributes to some of our most frightening environmental problems, such as the 
greenhouse effect caused by the release of methane from "livestock, " and the depletion of 
rainforests for cattle-pasture (Ryder, "Painism" 209). Tons of vegetable crops are raised 
to feed millions of farm animals, all of which is unnecessary for a vegetarian diet. "In a 
completely vegetarian human population, people could subsist on about half of the grain 
we now feed "livestock" (Sterba 203). If we were to eat the vegetable crops we currently 
feed "livestock, " much land could be returned to wild habitat, or developed in preference 
to clearing "natural" land. If we did not raise cattle, and produce tons of produce to feed 
cattle, we could avoid much environmental damage. 
Aside from the problems of animal suffering and environmental degradation, 
consistency requires that Taylor advocate eating low on the food chain. His principle of 
minimum wrong, as well as his focus on individuals, indicates that numbers count. Taylor 
instructs people to choose to harm as few beings as possible: 
... the principle of minimum wrong presupposes that each living thing deserves moral consideration. 
Since each has inherent worth, a prima facie wrong is done when any one of them is harmed. It is 
true that a greater wrong is done when a whole species-population or biotic community is harmed 
This is not because the group as such has a greater claim-to-be-respected than the individual, but 
because harming the group necessarily involves harming many individuals. (Res t 286) 
Basic addition yvill lead Taylor to a plant-based diet. By choosing to eat lower on 
the food chain, harm to individual life forms is minimized because animals eat plants 
before we eat them. To eat an animal that has been fed by tons of plants is to multiply 
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harm exponentially. Therefore, Taylor's ethical theory ought to prescribe a fniitarian diet. 
(Fruitarians eat fruits and nuts, rather than plants or animals. ) 
Instead, Taylor assumes "the necessity of humans to consume non-humans as 
food" (Res ect 293). While he qualifies his assertion, writing that it may be possible for 
most people to eat plants rather than animals, he reaffirms that "there are situations where 
subsistence hunting and fishing are necessary for human survival" (Respect 293). 
Taylor offers examples to support this assertion. He points to the hunting 
of whales and seals in the Arctic, of wild goats and sheep in mountainous regions. "In 
these cases, " Taylor concludes (with no further information provided) "it is impossible to 
raise enough domesticated animals to supply food for a culture's populace, and 
geographical conditions preclude dependence on plant life as a source of nutrition" 
(Respect 293). Taylor also writes "culling wild animals for food where environmental 
conditions make it impossible to raise domestic animals or to grow edible plants for human 
survival" (Respect 294). He uses Africa as an example, where the wildebeest and water 
buffalo are hunted down and then eaten. Taylor admits that our use of animals for food- 
under any conditions-constitutes a violation of our "prima facie duty" because we use 
them as a "mere means to our ends" (Respect 294). Regrettably, Taylor indicates, this is 
sometimes necessary. 
Taylor's use of the word, "culling" suggests that some animals are superfluous. 
"Culling" refers to the "regulation or reduction of animal populations (especially surplus 
animals)... " (Norton 330). "Culling" fails to exemplify a belief in the inherent worth of 
each individual. This term implies expendability, superfluousness, and irrelevance, and 
Taylor probably would not refer to "surplus" humans. Taylor's word-choice reveals a lack 
of respect for teleological entities. 
Second, eating other animals-even in the situations outlined-is not consistent 
with Taylor's own requirements for "minimizing wrong. " In the Arctic, and even in high 
mountainous regions in China, Tibet, and Nepal, people import food staples such as sugar 
and flour. Fresh vegetables such as squash grow high in Himalayas. The Inuit (Eskimo) 
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people of Northwestern Alaska drink tea and cow's nursing milk, eat peanut butter and ice 
cream along with seal meat. 
Places inhabited by grazing animals necessarily have vegetation. In places that 
sustain wild vegetation, humans can grow vegetables. Respect for nature would require 
that such individuals grow and consume vegetables rather than hunt or raise domestic 
animals. 
Hunters-even in the most remote camps in Alaska-wear manufactured clothing, 
use modern transport and weapons, and import basic food staples. Consequently, they do 
not need to hunt. Under such conditions, hunting fails to minimize wrong and reveals a 
lack of respect for nature. 
Places almost surely exist where people can neither import basic staples nor grow 
or raise their own food, but these places are significantly less frequent than Taylor 
indicates. The assumption of the necessity of hunting animals in certain places for basic 
needs is common, but in the vast majority of cases "necessity" is misused in this context. 
Sweeping generalizations about mountainous regions, or the Arctic, are insufficient. 
Taylor's acceptance of flesh-eating amongst human beings, and his prioritizing of 
basic human interests over non-basic interests of other teleological entities, constitutes a 
theoretical inconsistency (discussed further in the upcoming section on basic and non-basic 
interest). 
c. ethical rules: Taylor's proposes four ethical rules that hold rash implications, 
seem difficult to implement, are inconsistent with other aspects of his work, and are 
redundant. 
Taylor's first two rules, nonmaleficence and noninterference, are sound in principle 
but hold unsettling implications. Consider Taylor's following statement with regard to 
non-interference: 
This general policy of nonintervention is a matter of disinterested principle. We may want to 
help certain species-populations because we like them or because they are beneficial to us, but the rule 
of noninterference requires that we put aside our personal likes and our human interests with 
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reference to how we treat them. Our respect for nature means that we acknowledge the sufficiency of 
the natural world to sustain its own proper order throughout the whole domain of life. Respect 177) 
Taylor offers examples of natural disasters, where we may wish to interfere, but 
must not: earthquakes, fires caused by lightning, volcanic eruptions, floods, and 
prolonged droughts. He insists that in every such instance we are "duty-bound not to 
intervene" because these events "have always taken their toll in the death of many 
creatures" (Respect 176). Taylor argues that these occurrences are part of what is 
"natural. " 
In one sense to have the attitude of respect toward natural ecosystems, toward wild living things, 
and toward the whole process of evolution is to believe that nothing goes wrong in nature. Even the 
destruction of an entire biotic community or the extinction of a species is not evidence that something 
is amiss. If the causes for such events arose within the system of nature itself, nothing improper has 
happened. (P. Taylor, Res 177) 
Taylor's application of noninterference acknowledges the dynamic aspect of 
nature, where "new species evolve, old species become extinct, and surviving species 
change in abundance or genetic composition" (Lemons 219). The natural world around us 
constantly changes: Varieties of flora and fauna appear and disappear; deserts vanish 
under the sea and oceans dry up, nature is in a constant state of metamorphoses (E. 
Johnson, "Animal" 273). We accept the fact that glacial lakes may become forests and 
that species may move on or die out. Preservation of the status quo is neither necessary 
nor possible. The "long-term viability of ecosystems is not a function of the continued 
existence of any of its physical or biotic features" (Gunn, "Traditional" 149). In any event, 
our efforts are pointless: "Although we may save the elephants from extinction in our 
millennium, in due time they and we shall perish" (Kohak 170). 
As Taylor indicates, to accept the biocentric outlook is to accept the constant 
changes of the natural world, and to recognize human interference as superfluous and 
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undesirable. But human interference does not allow for the full breadth and diversity of 
the natural process. A wildfire in the wilderness will destroy much of what exists, but 
"disasters" are ecologically important (Birch 328). For instance, knobcone pines are 
dependent on fires for the release of seeds (Little 271), and draughts strengthen genetic 
lines because only the strongest survive. A natural "disaster" is only a disaster to those 
who favour the status quo over other possibilities. No informed individual would argue 
that death-even the death of entire species or ecosystems-is not "natural, " perhaps even 
beneficial, overall. 
Taylor's presentation of the rule of noninterference is consistent with his biocentric 
belief-system, but he fails to carry this idea to its logical conclusion. Taylor views "human 
life as an integral part of the natural order of the Earth's biosphere" (Res ect 101). For 
the sake of consistency, Taylor ought to employ the rule of noninterference on human 
populations. Earthquakes, floods, and famines must be allowed to take their toll on 
human life just as surely as they take their toll on all other entities. If Taylor holds that 
natural selection is best for all other populations, he cannot shelter humans from the same 
fate if he wishes to maintain philosophic consistency. 
Surprisingly, there are yet more striking implications to Taylor's assertion. If we 
are included in the biocentric outlook of interconnected beings, as Taylor asserts, and if we 
ought to leave a squid in the mouth of a flounder, as Taylor indicates, then we must also 
accept the natural outcome of human violence. Taylor asserts that it is not only ethically 
acceptable, but morally obligatory, to allow spiders and ducks to exploit and kill one 
another. For the sake of consistency, he ought also to assert that we are ethically bound to 
allow humans to exploit and kill one another-or other creatures-as seems natural to our 
bloodthirsty nature. Such long-standing institutions as slavery and such age-old acts as 
murder, ought to be acknowledged and tolerated as natural human behaviour under the 
rule of noninterference. If humans are inside the interconnected biocentric outlook on 
equal footing, as Taylor indicates, then we ought to be subjected to all the same rules and 
principles as every other creature. 
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It is difficult to accept the logical extreme for Taylor's philosophy. To do so not 
only undermines his environmental ethics, but also negates human rights and the most 
basic notions of ethics in general. 
Taylor's rule of fidelity seems superfluous. "What the Rule of Fidelity absolutely 
forbids is the exploiting of a situation where an animal is deliberately led to be trusting, or 
is made unaware of any danger, as a way to further the nonmoral interests of humans to 
the detriment of the animal" (Respect 184). He offers hunting, trapping, and fishing as 
examples of infidelity because these acts are based on "entrapment and betrayal" (Respect 
180). Traps are set in areas where animals are likely to pass unsuspectingly; lures attract 
animals, especially fish, to an imagined food-source; Hunters habitually sneak up on an 
unsuspecting animals in their natural habitats with intent to kill. Taylor defines these acts 
as human-centered and exploitative, of treating animals as mere means to human ends. 
Are not these actions already forbidden under Taylor's rule of nonmaleficence? All 
things being equal, nonmaleficence forbids harming an entity that has a good of its own, 
unless that entity poses a threat (Respect 172). As Taylor himself notes, "hunting, 
trapping, and fishing involve gross violations of the rules of Nonmaleficence and 
Noninterference" (Respect 183). Taylor's fidelity rule seems superfluous. 
Taylor's fourth rule, restitutive justice (as already discussed) breaches his definition 
of "natural. " Furthermore, it is likely to result in an infinite regress, seems impracticable, 
fails to comply with his presentation of the biocentric outlook, and seems inherently 
biased. In any event, the rule of restitutive justice seems as redundant as the rule of 
fidelity. 
Restitutive justice applies in cases where one of the previous three rules has been 
broken. According to Taylor, even if a rule is broken by morally acceptable actions, 
restitution is due as acknowledgment of the inherent worth of those entities damaged or 
destroyed. Taylor recommends that we "further the good" of organisms we have harmed 
"by making their physical environment more favorable to their continued well-being" 
(Respect 188). Or, if our activities have resulted in the death of organisms, we might 
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promote or protect "the good of the species-population or life community in question" (P. 
Taylor, Respect 188), or clean up polluted habitats (Res ect 190). 
First, any act of restitution must result in an infinite regress. Restitution will 
invariably harm non-target entities. How can we possibly enhance the environment for one 
population without damaging other plants and animals? Acts of restitution will affect 
other teleological beings: a sprouting great hedge nettle, an ever-hopeful vulture, loitering 
bacteria, or an unsuspecting gooey-duck. How can one introduce change, hoping to 
favour a certain species (to which one owes restitution), without harming other plants and 
animals in the process? Restitution necessarily results in an infinite regress, with ever- 
increasing damage done, and ever more restitution owed. 
Second, the rule of restitution conflicts with other aspects of Taylor's theory. 
Taylor asserts that noninterference can be outweighed by rules of fidelity or restitutive 
justice, provided that "great good is brought about and no creature is permanently harmed 
by the permitted interference" (P. Taylor, Respect 197). But according to Taylor, a great 
harm is done any time we interfere in the existence of a "wild" entity because we thereby 
rob that entity of "wild" status. If fidelity and restitutive justice override noninterference, 
as Taylor indicates, humans will destroy the "wild" status of any and all organisms we 
harm. In Taylor's own words, it will not matter if we "improve their strength, promote 
their growth, and increase their chances for a long, healthy life. By destroying their status 
as wild animals or plants, our interference in their lives amounts to an absolute negation of 
their natural freedom" (P. Taylor, Respect 175). If Taylor is to maintain consistency, 
noninterference ought to override restitution. 
Taylor acknowledges that encouraging certain populations might create further 
environmental complications. For instance, he notes that favouring a certain species might 
create an overabundance, in which case it would be essential to interfere again in order to 
remove some of the burgeoning population. Because people are responsible for the initial 
problem, Taylor asserts that we must act to avoid ongoing, further damage to the entire 
ecosystem by correcting damage done (P. Taylor, Respect 194). 
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Taylor's allowance for certain populations also seems contradictory, and raises 
unanswered questions. On what grounds might one who accepts the biocentric outlook 
interfere with the "natural" population balance? When is a population "natural" such that 
no human intervention is admissible? If one does interfere, would that population still 
qualify as "natural, " or would it thereby be exempt from moral consideration? How can an 
organism, or habitat, on which restitution has been done, maintain "natural" status? 
Taylor will need to address these considerations if he is to include population control in his 
rule of restitutive justice. As it stands, restitution, by altering "natural" status, places the 
very targets of restitution outside the scope of Taylor's environmental ethic, which is 
specifically directed toward "natural" teleological entities. 
Third, restitutive justice seems impossible to implement; where it can be 
implemented, it will be biased. Taylor recommends that harmed individuals be healed as a 
matter of restitutive justice. This seems reasonable enough if one is able to doctor a 
wounded entity back to health without destroying its ability to survive in a natural setting. 
Healing is a viable option only for a few select mammals. However, for vast numbers of 
plants and animals, especially smaller organisms, assistance is impossible. How would one 
help a sandworm with internal injuries, or a millipede with broken legs? Restitution seems 
to favour larger mammals we are only able to act on what we perceive and understand- 
which excludes billions of smaller (and less-favoured) entities. 
Finally, it seems unlikely that restitutive justice can be realized by human beings. 
When human interests come into conflict with "the survival or flourishing of nonconscious 
beings... it is extremely doubtful whether such conflicts can in principle admit of rational 
adjudication" (Regan, "Nature" 21). Restitutive justice-if it is to be just-requires an 
uncommon outside-of-self vision. Whereas we have proven to be remarkably selfish, 
overall, when making decisions that effect other species. 
Restitutive justice is not essential to Taylor's theory. Under his moral guidelines, 
maintaining natural preserves and cleaning up polluted areas (acts which Taylor lists under 
restitutive justice) are also an expression of nonmaleficence. Nonmaleficence requires that 
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we avoid harm to creatures that pose no threat, in which case all lands-and life forms 
therein-will be inherently protected; restitutive justice is superfluous. 
3. Humanocentrism. 
An attitude that elevates human interests is the "common enemy" of any 
environmental ethic and of those who seek to protect the natural world ("Nature" 32). 
Taylor describes his theory as a "life-centered theory of environmental ethics that gives 
impartial consideration to every species" (Respect 306). For Taylor, all entities with 
inherent value are equally deserving of moral consideration (P. Taylor, Respect 79). 
Impartiality is a character trait Taylor considers to be an important part of respect for 
nature. Yet Taylor's work fails to exemplify an egalitarian environmental ethic. Taylor is 
generous in what he allows humans at the expense of all other species. 
Taylor reveals humanocentric tendencies in various areas of his work, including his 
discussion of values, basic interests versus nonbasic interests, expansion, elitism, 
competing claims, rotation, the biocentric outlook, and human rights. 
a. valuing humans above other animals: Taylor's work indicates that he accepts 
loss of life for other entities that he most likely would not accept for humans. In place of 
these lost lives he offers "compensation" in the form of habitat or habitat enhancement 
(cleaning up). Taylor attempts to show that other animals do us a favour, and that we can 
return these favours: "Thus we need not bear a burden of eternal guilt because we have 
used them-and will continue to use them-for our own ends. There is a way to make 
amends" (Respect 306). 
According to Taylor, after we have eaten a few hundred chickens in one short 
lifetime, we can "return the favor they do us by doing something for their sake" (Respect 
306). Can we ethically destroy the lives of animals and refer to the forced sacrifice of their 
lives as a favour? Can we kill without need and show respect for nature? Would the same 
be true if the "compensation" were being offered to human beings? 
Taylor makes no indication that one need cease the activity for which reparation is 
made. Protected lands, or a little clean-up, compensate for ongoing exploitation and death 
in Taylor's theory. If human beings were involved, and if "compensation" was necessary, 
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then morality would require that the offending activity cease. Taylor indicated that 
impartiality is a character trait shared by those who respect nature. He also stated that a 
viable ethical theory ought to be structured with the intent that it be applied 
disinterestedly. Taylor's humanocentrism sometimes prevents both. 
In some ways Taylor acknowledges this shortcoming in his theory. He writes, 
Since we are not carrying out perfect fairness, we owe some measures of reparation or compensation 
to wild creatures as their due... recognition of wrongs being done to entities possessing inherent 
worth calls forth the additional obligation to do what we can to make up for these wrongs. In this way 
the idea of fairness will be preserved... Res ct 292) 
A worthy test for any environmental theory is how well "environmental values, 
such as respect for species and lifeless tundra, will be maintained when they come in 
conflict with the value of human lives and qualities of living" (Stone 110). Such conflicts 
force us to acknowledge all that we gain by exploiting other entities, and how little we are 
willing to sacrifice in order to protect the interests of habitat and other species. Our 
decisions reflect values. "[S]ome nations value whales in the ocean; others, on their 
plates" (Stone 110). 
Taylor values additional art museums at the expense of the myriad organisms that 
will be destroyed to construct and maintain these new institutions. He reveals an interest 
in maintaining a particular quality of life for human beings even though this quality of life 
will destroy many other teleological entities. He justifies his preference as a human right; 
we have the right to maintain our integrity as the type of creatures that we are ("Inherent" 
27). If we accept new art museums as fundamental to the types of beings that we are, and 
therefore our due as persons, logical extremes will require that we accept recreational 
vehicles, aerosol, and Styrofoam cups as our human right as the type of beings that we 
are. 
Taylor offers no guidelines as to how we will determine what kind of a being each 
species is, and he fails to discuss which behaviours indicate a fundamental part of who we 
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are, and which might be altered for the sake of the environment. Without these 
qualifications, Taylor's environmental ethic might well be a method by which one could 
justify any and all current human endeavors as appropriate for the type of beings that we 
are. 
b. basic versus non-basic interests: Taylor's tendency to favour human beings 
over other entities results in inconsistencies in the application of his principles of 
proportionality and minimum wrong, and in the way he prioritizes basic and nonbasic 
interests. 
Taylor defines nonbasic interests as interests that promote the good of an entity, 
and basic interests as necessary for an organism to maintain existence as the type of being 
that it is. Taylor's principle of proportionality asserts that it is immoral to sacrifice the 
basic interests of other entities for the sake of nonbasic human interests. Such actions 
show a lack of respect for nature and fail to apply ethics in a disinterested manner (Res ect 
27). Taylor asserts that when there is "a conflict between human values and the good of 
(harmless) wild animals and plants, greater weight is to be given to basic than to nonbasic 
interests, no matter what species, human or other, the competing claims arise from" (P. 
Taylor, Respect 278). He adds: nonbasic human interests that are "intrinsically 
incompatible with the attitude of respect for nature" are immoral because such interests 
deny the inherent worth of wild things (Respect 273-275). 
But Taylor's theory is not egalitarian on four counts. First, Taylor applies his 
egalitarian assessment of prioritizing interests only to human interests that are 
incompatible with respect for nature; Taylor only applies his egalitarian ideal to 
"illegitimate" nonbasic human interests. Taylor's examples demonstrate that any human 
interests (even nonbasic) deemed consistent with respect for nature override the basic 
interests of other entities. 
For instance, Taylor's list of permissible, environmentally destructive human 
enterprises includes: 
1 
ý t f 
Building an art museum or library where natural habitat must be destroyed. 
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Constructing an airport, railroad, harbor, or highway involving the serious disturbance of a 
natural ecosystem. 
Replacing a native forest with a timber plantation. 
Damming a free-flowing river for a hydroelectric power project. 
Landscaping a natural woodland in making a public park. (Respec t 276-7). 
This list reveals Taylor's willingness to destroy non-human life and vital habitat 
(infringing on basic interests), for non-basic human interests such as landscaping a park. 
Taylor's examples indicate that his theory "provides wide-ranging justification for acts by 
humans that harm animals, microorganisms, and plants" (French 49). For Taylor, in "a 
wide range of cases it is proper for humans' `highly valued, ' but nonbasic interests to be 
given greater moral weight than the basic interests of animals and plants" (French 49). 
Taylor's examples fail to comply with his assertion of equal inherent worth of teleological 
entities, and his assertion that nonbasic interests ought not to override basic interests. 
Taylor also asserts that ethics ought to override all non-moral norms. Yet his 
theory allows human interests in art and history to override protection of the basic 
interests of other teleological entities. 
Second, Taylor offers concessions for the interests of "enlightened" human's: 
"Enlightened" humans may pursue ends they regard as important to their way of life, so 
long as there are no "alternative institutions and practices which could be used by the 
community to accomplish the same social ends but which would involve fewer instances of 
wrongdoing to wild living things in natural ecosystems" (P. Taylor, Respect 283). The 
minimum wrong principle merely asks that we minimize the "number of violations of the 
rule of nonmaleficence, " even if there is no way to minimize harm (Respect 282-283). 
One who respects nature might build a highway even though it infringes on the 
basic interests of millions of wild, teleological organisms: those who respect nature, and 
intend to minimize wrongs done to wild creatures, still choose to pursue ends "whose 
value is so great to them that they are unwilling to give them up" (Respect 287). Taylor 
assumes that human developments as wide-ranging as dams and art-museums are part and 
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parcel of "a community's realization of a high level of civilization, " justified by our basic 
interest in maintaining ourselves as the type of beings that we are (Respect 282-283). 
Taylor argues that morally legitimate humans, humans who do not pursue nonbasic human 
interests that are "intrinsically incompatible with the attitude of respect for nature, " have a 
right to fulfil their basic interests because they are rights holders (P. Taylor, Respect 272- 
275). He specifically mentions our human right to freedom and autonomy. 
By asserting that the fulfillment of human rights is a basic interest, and by 
indicating that these exclusive rights permit human beings to perpetuate current behaviours 
(as the type of animals that we are), Taylor effectively blocks the need for humans to make 
any changes or sacrifices. Instead, he opens the door for a justification of any action that 
is currently considered "normal" for our species, backed by our exclusive human right to 
freedom and autonomy. In this respect it seems that Taylor's theory only requires that 
humans intend to minimize harm and demonstrate "respect for nature. " 
Taylor asserts that an attitude of respect for nature is exemplified in one who 
avoids actions that "deny the inherent worth of wild things" (Respect 273-275). 
Developments such as building an art museum or landscaping a public park would 
necessarily destroy many wild entities. It therefore seems that these activities demonstrate 
a lack of respect for nature. Taylor's permissible activities, activities that do not fulfil a 
basic interest, seem to reveal human bias. It is not likely that Taylor allow these same 
developments to infringe on the lives and lands of other human entities. Could we 
bulldoze over an urban community, with all the inhabitants in their homes, for the sake of 
an art museum or park, a timber plantation or highway? Taylor's bias belies his own 
assertion of the equal inherent value of teleological entities. 
Furthermore, Western ethics does not allow for nonbasic interests at the expense 
of basic interests, as Taylor permits for the sake of a new museum. For instance, suppose 
an enlightened group of scientists, with a great interest in examining religions and virgin 
peaks in Nepal, desired to climb Machhapuchhare, but those who live near 
Machhapuchhare believe this peak to be sacred, and object to anyone climbing this sacred 
peak. These enlightened scientists would ignore religious beliefs if they climbed the peak, 
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but their actions would not threaten lives, yet even this comparatively minimal 
infringement is considered immoral by most Westerners. To allow for the destruction of 
other entities for the purpose of landscaping or to construct a museum seems to reveal 
human bias. 
The third reason Taylor seems to fall short of the expectations of his own theory is 
that he fails to make distinctions between different types of rights, and he fails to prioritize 
these rights in a manner that preserves the most fundamental rights over those that are less 
critical. 
Western ethics does not permit one human to fulfil nonbasic interests such as our 
interest in freedom and autonomy to override more fundamental interests, such as our 
interest in staying alive. For example, religious sacrifices that require human deaths are 
morally inadmissible, in spite of an accepted and respected right to religious freedom. 
Contrary to Taylor's list of permissible yet environmentally destructive enterprises, 
Western ethics acknowledges that "enlightened" people that respect nature cannot morally 
do whatever seems of interest to them. The most basic human interest, that of preserving 
one's life, takes precedence over every other interest. Consistency requires that Taylor, if 
he is to assert equal inherent worth of all wild teleological entities, extend this protection 
to all other living entities-or revoke it from human beings: 
We can no more consistently claim that all living beings are equal and yet aggress against the basic 
needs of some living beings whenever doing so serves our own nonbasic or luxury needs than we can 
consistently claim that all humans are equal and yet aggress against the basic needs of some humans 
whenever doing so serves our own nonbasic or luxury needs. (Sterba 199) 
If Taylor is to honour his own assertion of inherent worth and interspecies equality, 
then consistency requires him to extend the protection of basic interests over non-basic 
interests, to other teleological entities. The human right to freedom and autonomy ought 
not to infringe on the basic interests in survival of all other species. As it stands, Taylor's 
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application of basic and nonbasic interests fails to demonstrate an attitude of equal inherent 
worth and of impartial application of ethical theory. 
c. expansion: If Taylor is interested in minimizing harm, population restrictions 
seem a glaring omission in his theory. In the absence of population control, there is no 
ceiling on the damage that might be done to other species as a result of human expansion. 
If we actualize zero population growth, no additional buildings, roads, or harbors 
will be necessary. Taylor's general acceptance of human encroachment into the habitat of 
other species, which would destroy the livelihoods and lives of myriad organisms, seems 
inimical to environmental ethics. Furthermore, if Taylor included population restrictions 
he might be less inclined to offer controversial concessions to human beings at the expense 
of other entities. 
d. elitism: Taylor does not merely favour human beings, he favours certain 
human beings, as revealed in his list of "nonbasic" human interests that are immoral-acts 
that lack respect for nature. 
Slaughtering elephants so the ivory of their tusks can be used to carve items for the tourist trade. 
Killing rhinoceros so that their horns can be used as dagger handles. 
Picking rare wildflowers, such as orchids and cactuses, for one's private collection. 
Capturing tropical birds, for sale as caged pets. 
Trapping and killing reptiles, such as snakes, crocodiles, alligators, and turtles, for their skins 
and shells to be used in making expensive shoes, handbags, and other "fashion" products. 
Hunting and killing rare wild mammals, such as leopards and jaguars, for the luxury fur trade. 
All hunting and fishing which is done as an enjoyable pastime (whether or not the animals killed 
are eaten), when such activities are not necessary to meet the basic interests of humans. This includes 
all sport hunting and recreational fishing. (Respect 274) 
From this list of seven nonbasic interests, only two are conclusively "nonbasic. " 
This list includes livelihoods that may seem ethically questionable to an environmentalist, 
but they are livelihoods all the same-vital for those so employed. Neither the 
211 
superfluousness of the final product, nor harm to the environment, negates the importance 
of the fur or ivory industry to those who earn their food and shelter in these businesses. 
One may prefer the business of building art museums over and above the ivory 
trade, but both are vital to anyone who earns their livelihood in these ways. Strictly 
speaking, neither art museums nor ivory are necessary for human survival, but building an 
art museum might be considered more grievous simply because it creates a new institution. 
Failing to create jobs is less disruptive to the lives of others-less harmful-than thwarting 
extant livelihoods, such as the ivory trade. If Taylor is interested in minimizing the wrongs 
that we do, as he indicates, it is arguable that the ivory trade is less damaging than 
constructing a new art museum-which would kill millions of organisms. Taylor fails to 
explore these possibilities. 
e. competing claims: Taylor's discussion of competing claims indicates that 
harmful or dangerous species ought be controlled or eliminated (Respect 257). Not only is 
a policy of controlling or killing "dangerous" entities environmentally unsound, it is 
impracticable. 
However, if we were to control or destroy every entity that poses a threat to our 
health or survival, we would intrude on nature as never before. A multitude of "wild" 
entities are harmful in some ways, including bears, great cats, canines, mosquitoes, 
bacteria, tobacco, and other people. In fact, if we are to take Taylor's assertion to its 
logical extreme, as the philosophic tradition requires, human beings must be acknowledged 
as "dangerous organisms" according to Taylor's definition. Our activities frequently 
threaten the life and basic health of moral agents (Respect 265). 
Even if we sidestep the problem of dealing impartially with dangerous humans, 
Taylor's assertion regarding "dangerous" organisms remains uncharacteristically anti- 
environmental. Is not the essence of an environmental ethic that we live peacefully with 
other entities-even those entities that threaten our existence? Do not environmental 
ethics illuminate "our obligation of letting beings be, " regardless of which beings we might 
favour or fear? (Zimmerman 127). 
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Most of the time humans have little choice but to tolerate the myriad entities. Even 
when we do have a choice there is seldom reason to kill harmful entities. Only with the 
advent of modern, Western societies has it become commonplace for people to engage in 
massive campaigns to eliminate animals that threatened, or might threaten, our health and 
safety. But environmental ethics have long insisted that we look to older societies to gain 
insights as to how we might live more peacefully on the earth. Many societies live 
peacefully amongst "dangerous" animals, including the Dinka: "I have sat among a dozen 
Dinka men and women sprawled under one of their raised huts of boughs and thatch, and 
watched a tiny poisonous snake in the floor above us, weaving its way as confidently as a 
gecko. The little snake, an insect eater, was accepted; it was not outside the Dinka's 
world" (Darling 118). 
Life as an earthling entails living amidst myriad creatures. Some of these creatures 
are harmful to us. Taylor asserts that an attitude of respect for nature holds the virtues of 
benevolence and sympathy. If we respect nature, we are obliged to accept the whole-all 
the myriad creatures of the biocentric outlook that Taylor acknowledges as "integral" to 
the whole (P. Taylor, Respect 100), preferably with the grace of the Dinka people. 
f. rotation: Taylor's theory of respect for nature offers four methods of 
distributive justice, through which we might transform "situations of rivalry and 
competition into patterns of mutual accommodation and tolerance, " when the basic 
interests of humans and non-humans are in conflict (Respect 297). The last of these 
techniques, rotation, reveals Taylor's humanocentric tendencies through his explanation of 
"sharing, " and examples of what constitutes a basic human interest. 
Taylor's application of rotation is weighted heavily toward the interests of humans. 
He refers to rotation as "taking turns: " "It is only fair" Taylor writes, "that humans and 
non-humans take turns at having access to favorable environments and habitats" (Respect 
301). Through such time allocations humans and other species benefit from land areas at 
different times (Respect 301). 
Taylor offers examples of rotation: 
9 restoring a closed mining site to natural habitat, 
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" vacating an area where scientists have been doing research and collecting 
specimens, 
" removing temporary structures completely when they are no longer needed 
(and restoring a natural setting), 
" tapping an emergency water supply only in times of drought, or 
" legislating claming marshes as off-limits during specified periods of time 
(Respect 302). 
These examples present two difficulties. First, Taylor's use of rotation offers 
humans extensively more than is offered any other species. He refers to rotation as 
"taking turns, " but human beings exclusively take turns with all other species collectively. 
Furthermore, the sharing Taylor outlines only requires that we "share" with other species 
when we no longer need the area or resource. 
If this method of "sharing" were employed amongst grade-school students, one 
student would "share" a toy with others by letting them collectively enjoy the toy, which 
she enjoyed exclusively at other times, only when she did not want to play. Few would 
consider this equitable-few would even refer to such a scheme as "sharing. " 
If each species were allotted the same amount of time as Taylor allows humans, his 
notion of rotation might be legitimately labelled as sharing. Alternatively, he could allot 
each individual-from every species-a certain amount of time 
Second, none of Taylor's examples of human activity qualify as clearly motivated 
by basic interests, as he indicates. One could make an argument that claming is a basic 
interest, or mining, or collecting scientific data, or tapping an emergency water source- 
but each of these would, in most instances, constitute a nonbasic interest. 
It is unlikely that eating clams constitutes a basic need (Refer to previous 
discussion under "diet"). If the eating of clam-bodies is to be accepted as a basic need, 
Taylor ought to provide an appropriate scenario to establish this fact. Otherwise this 
activity does not qualify, and ought to be considered inconsistent with ideals of respect for 
nature by Taylor's own definition. 
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Similarly, neither mining nor collecting scientific data necessarily fulfil basic 
interests; both require specific scenarios. With regard to emergency water sources, one 
would need to be assured that such a source was not being used to water lawns, wash 
cars, or for use in the "beef' industry-which in California alone uses enough water to 
maintain 27 million households (Stone 43). 
Taylor might justify the inclusion of each of these examples as legitimate for the 
type of animals that we are. However, if taken to its logical extreme-as is the task of 
philosophic exploration-one might justify any human activity, including rape and murder, 
a fundamental for the type of animals that we are. The strength of Taylor's principle of 
distributive justice is harmed by special concessions that Taylor allows human beings. 
g. the biocentric outlook: Taylor includes three basic ideas in the biocentric 
outlook: "... the conception of humans as members of the Earth's Community of Life; the 
view of nature as a system of interdependence of which we along with all other living 
things are integral parts; and our awareness of the reality of the lives of individual 
organisms seen as teleological centers of life" (Respect 153). The biocentric outlook is 
exemplary as a protectionist ideal, but Taylor seems to favor people in ways that thwart 
his assertions of interdependence and the equality of all teleological entities. 
Key concepts in Taylor's presentation of the biocentric outlook suggest why he 
fails to realize the ideals entailed in the biocentric outlook. The third element of Taylor's 
biocentric outlook offers one of Taylor's most daring and promising assertions. 
The first two ideas in Taylor's biocentric outlook present human beings as 
members of the "Earth's Community of Life, " dependent for existence on the "biological 
system of nature" (P. Taylor, Respect 44). "The biocentric outlook recognizes a natural 
world where each species (including human beings) is an integral, interdependent 
element, " and the welfare of each living thing is "determined not only by the physical 
conditions of its environment but also by its relations to other living things" (P. Taylor, 
Respect 100). Taylor asserts that people are an equal part of the biological community, 
existing on the same terms as each other living organism (P. Taylor, Respect 99). 
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Taylor offers an environmental vision where humans, and all other entities, are 
equal and dependent members of the earth's biological community, as perhaps best seen 
from outer-space: 
... what strikes the imagination is the marvelous wholeness of the planet and the globe-spanning 
activities that connect and sustain its tenants. There is one great envelope of atmospheric gases, the 
vast body of ocean, the collusive currents of air and water, the broad belts of photosynthesizing 
vegetation, the complex of plants and micro-organisms that unite in pumping various elements in and 
out of the atmosphere, all on vast regional and worldwide scales. From space, everything that 
dominates the attention is unified and interconnected (Stone 33-4) 
Taylor's biocentric asserts that all entities are equal and interconnected. 
According to Taylor's description of an interconnected universe, what comes around will 
eventually go around. We earthlings are all made of the same organic matter, perpetually 
recycled in the same little cup of tea. We cannot gain at the expense of others without 
eventually suffering loss ourselves. In an interconnected universe, "if there is joy or 
sorrow to be had, it does not matter who has it" (Sprigge, "Metaphysics" 138). 
Yet Taylor's words reveal an "us-and-them" attitude that belies an equal 
interconnected existence for all teleological beings. Taylor suggests that we "ask 
ourselves whether the human values being furthered are really worth the extreme cost 
being imposed on wild creatures" (Respect 290). His comment reveals a hidden 
assumption that people are somehow outside the biocentric loop, so that the costs are for 
other creatures, while human beings reap only benefits. 
Many would argue that humans are not equal members of the earth's community 
because we do make life and death decisions with regard to other entities. But we are not 
unique in this role (though we are exceptional in the extent to which we affect other 
creatures). On a much smaller scale, hunters and grazers all make life and death decisions 
that affect other teleological entities based on whether or not they are hungry, and where 
they choose to feed. And of course many humans are incapable of making any decisions 
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for themselves, but we do not consider them to be less than equal. Therefore, consistency 
requires that we accept our equality with these other animals even though our decision can 
have a great affect on them, where as the reverse is seldom true. 
Each species, and each individual, holds a particular place in the biosphere; neither 
moral deliberations, nor our most destructive actions toward other creatures, set us apart. 
Oxygen-producing plants are critical for the continued existence of the planet as we know 
it, yet no one suggests that these plants stand apart simply because other creatures depend 
on this particular species-specific biological activities. 
Or, one might argue that, if all things were interconnected, nothing could survive 
the demise of one species. Dutch Elm disease would wipe out oak, and then all trees, all 
plants, all living entities (Curtin, "Making" 65). But the demise of an elm tree does not 
culminate in the termination of all life, so perhaps all life is not interconnected. 
But this conclusion misrepresents the concept of earthly interconnections. No 
earthling is directly connected to every other living being. The continuation of life as we 
know it depends on distant connections as well as direct connections. Each aspect of 
nature and life on earth does not directly and immediately effect every other aspect. The 
process of growth and decay, consumption and birth, the turning of the seasons and the 
passing of generations, demonstrate both immediate and more distant biological 
interconnection. 
It is possible that the nature of biological interconnections justifies "the need to use 
other species-even to kill other species-for survival... The interconnectedness of 
species in our ecosystem seems not so much to explain the inherent worth of all life as to 
emphasize the way all species can and often do use others as a means and compete for 
scarce resources" (Lombardi 261). Perhaps our biological interconnections are inherently 
selfish (Spitler 257-260). If so, how can we create a viable environmental ethic based on 
the concept of an interdependent earth? 
Perhaps because interspecies relations are fundamentally exploitative, humans have 
a moral obligation to preserve ecosystems. "Because we depend on the biosphere for our 
very lives, we prudently should see to it for our own sake that it continues to function 
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adequately" (L. Johnson 265). When push comes to shove, we all "depend on the healthy 
functioning of the larger, biotic community" (McRipley 13). The earth's "biosphere is not 
just a theme park... but a very necessary thing for human survival" (Midgley, "A Problem" 
63). Interdependence is both reason to respect other entities and reason to accept human 
exploitation-both of which Taylor allowed in his theory. Recognition of self as part of 
the larger whole leads one to realize that the welfare of the natural environment is 
synonymous with one's own welfare (Reitan 414-415). Selfishness may be unavoidable, 
but it need not hamper environmental ethics. Taylor's description of a biocentric outlook, 
entailing an interconnected earth, seems a viable concept. 
Perhaps we cannot escape our tendency to favour humans because people can only 
see the world from our own point of view ("In Defense" 239). Maybe it is "inherently 
impossible" for human beings to apprehend the world in any other terms, since we view 
the world through human values and experiences-through an anthropocentric lens 
(Spitler 256). 
However, Taylor indicates that a non-anthropocentric vision is possible-and 
essential-for one who respects nature. Taylor indicates, in the third element of his 
biocentric outlook, that we must abandon humanocentrism. The third element of Taylor's 
biocentric outlook requires that we have an "awareness of the reality of the lives of 
individual organisms seen as teleological centers of life" (Reject 153). Taylor suggests 
that we apprehend other beings from the reference point of that other being-from that 
entity's shared interest in "survival, health, and well-being" (Respect 124). In this way we 
can gain "the most complete realization, cognitively and imaginatively, of what it is to be 
that particular individual" (Respect 128). The biocentric outlook invites us to rediscover 
"the sheer mystery of other beings and the worlds they inhabit" (Linzey, After 130), to "let 
the reality of another's life enter the world of our own consciousness" (Respect 128). 
Taylor writes that humans have a "deep kinship with all other living things... 
being, like them, integral parts of one great whole that encompasses the natural order of 
life on our planet" (Respect 154). This kinship makes it possible for us to envisage the 
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world from the eyes of other entities, and to see these others as morally considerable 
(Clark, "Animals" 122). 
In our present ethic, our behaviour towards other living entities is often accepted 
or rejected based on our own interests. Currently, "our view of animals is not only 
anthropocentric, but so very limited as to be gastrocentric" (Linzey, After 122). Our 
attitude reveals "... a failure in empathy... which constitutes an irrational blindness to the 
fact of the basic sameness of suffering in whatever species of animal it occurs; an 
irrationality incompatible with clear thought" and with empathic understanding (Linzey, 
"Animal" 95). 
The world around us does not consist of "resources" available for personal gain. 
Economics have proven a substandard guide of what we ought to do; "externalities" (harm 
to the environment, other people, other nations, and other species) "are not figured into 
economic equations. For instance, the `value' of noncommercial species, are not captured 
by markets" (Stone 150): 
What went uncalculated in court were all those features of nature that the market did not put a price 
on: the non-commercial waterfowl, the spiders and reeds... In fact, even commercially valuable fish 
and animals might go unaccounted for on the view that until someone had brought them under 
control, "captured them, " they were no one's property; and until they had become some owner's 
property, there was no one with legal standing to complain about their fate. (Stone 177) 
Many entities suffer while only a few human beings profit (Stone 28). Our current 
ethic represents a "... moral backwardness in the treatment of animals" that might best be 
"explained by the extreme difficulty human beings experience in apprehending animals as 
they are in themselves, independently of their relations to this or that concern of human 
beings" (McGinn 95). Taylor's assertion of an empathic vision acknowledges that the 
"worth of every creature does not lie in whether it is naturally pleasing to human species, 
whether it is beautiful (to us) or whether it serves or sustains our life and happiness" 
(Linzey, After 99). 
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Taylor's environmental ethic calls people to fully apprehend other creatures for 
what they are: conscious centers of their own existence-just like ourselves. Nature is a 
vital part of who we are; "human thought is in fact intertwined with nature" (Raglon 38). 
Taylor's notion of an empathic vision allows us to acknowledge other animals as the 
subject in a world in which we are merely objects. By visualizing the world from their 
eyes, we might glimpse "another version, in some respects very different, in others very 
much the same" as our own existence, and we might be able to respond to other creatures 
as "centres of consciousness with a life-world as real to them... as the life-world 
immediately inhabited by ourselves... " (Sprigge, "Metaphysics" 116,127). 
Empathy is a "form of knowledge" that can "supply a cognitive backing for 
acceptance of certain moral imperatives" (Sprigge, "Metaphysics" 3). Taylor invites 
people into the senses and minds of other entities, so that they might "reveal their value; " 
simultaneously we might have a chance to discover that value (Birch 328). Empathy 
allows us to see that we ought to treat other entities as ends in themselves, and foster an 
interest in meaningful encounters with these myriad fellow earthlings (Linzey, After 12). 
Change will happen only when 
the community, as a whole, has developed feelings towards animals which will simply make it 
impossible to staff slaughter houses. I question whether there is a psychological compatibility 
between a full grasp of the fact that an animal is the centre of a phenomenal world as vibrantly real to 
him or her as yours is to you and a readiness to have him or her slaughtered for your food, Still less to 
do the slaughtering oneself. (Sprigge, "Metaphysics" 126) 
In the absence of knowledge, understanding, and empathy for others, humans too 
easily overlook their suffering. If we become accustomed to seeing others mistreated, we 
often lose our empathy, the, capacity to know other entities as they are, and our willingness 
to protect their interests (Sprigge, "Metaphysics" 112,134). Our self-centered, self- 
serving approach to other living beings and the land, prevents us from knowing the myriad 
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earthlings as anything more than biological facts or economic potential (Linzey, After 11) 
rather than part of a community to which we all belong (Clark, "Animals" 24). 
Yet it must be acknowledged that knowing another creature from its own 
perspective is not the norm in Western scholarship. It is simply not academic to 
apprehend other entities from their perspective, or to foster a fellowship between creatures 
that is not merely biological. Western academics have long held that "only economic or 
scientific arguments should be allowed in public discourse. Appeals to morality, religion 
and spirituality have no place and are seen as embarrassing or even worse as 
`inappropriate"' (Jamieson, "Moral" 9). The same can be said of empathy and intuition. 
Taylor cannot maintain consistency if he advocates empathic, intuitive connections with 
other beings, while denouncing intuition as a method of ethical inquiry. 
However, moral philosophy has often moved outside of traditional scholarly 
models. An "imaginative perception" is essential to ethics when assessing non-human 
animals (Ebenreck 5,12). Imaginative perception is also necessary for apprehending other 
people as feeling, thinking entities much like ourselves. An empathic approach may seem 
scientifically suspect, but "there are metaphysical truths which are as relevant in reaching 
[moral] decisions... as are any scientific truths" (Sprigge, "Metaphysics" 135). 
Metaphysics reveals "the layering of reality, " where what we see is only one of many 
layers, "others being the abstract, possible, perhaps even spiritual... " (Mathews 11). 
Perhaps Taylor's intuitive approach is more appropriate than the more typical detached 
rationality because we are like them in many ways that cannot be observed or measured 
(Telfer 76-77). Empathy may not offer a quotient that science can weigh on a scale to the 
nearest tenth, but empathy is critical to morality. Our inability to measure and standardize 
this quotient does not prevent empathy from directing human morality. In order to realize 
Taylor's expansive ethic of respect for nature we must move beyond concrete, assumed 
"truths" based on the apparent (empirical). 
Though Taylor's presentation seems humanocentric, the biocentric outlook is 
sound. He indicates that we are equal members of an interdependent world, that if we 
begin from the standpoint of human reality when dealing with other entities we miss the 
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important point that there is "something about animal reality which makes certain human 
behavior towards it wrong" (Sprigge, "Metaphysics" 103). Similarly, to know people 
merely by observing behaviour or brain processes is to miss that essential something which 
is at our core-"something we can never hope to observe" but which we can only come to 
understand "by way of the empathic imagination. When we do so, we come to know the 
kind of truths about [an]other person which evokes the sense of moral obligations" 
(Sprigge, "Metaphysics" 115). If we are to respect nature, as Taylor indicates, we must 
move beyond our pragmatic, empirical approach to other entities (Polk 183,185). 
h. hummi rights: Humanocentric tendencies lie at the root of most of Taylor's 
inconsistencies; his understanding of human rights forms the core of his tendency to favour 
human beings. Taylor's exclusive allowance for human rights seems problematic on three 
counts: in two distinct ways he lacks clarity, and he is inconsistent. 
Taylor rejects non-human animal rights because he believes that his environmental 
ethic accomplishes everything that rights would accomplish, without the use of this 
complicated and controversial concept: 
I hold that, although it is not conceptually confused or logically absurd to ascribe moral rights in an 
extended sense to animals and plants, there are good reasons for not doing so. Everything which 
people hope to achieve by such an extension of the concept of rights can equally be accomplished by 
means of the ideas of respect for nature and the inherent worth of living things, along with the 
structure of thought that supports and makes intelligible a person's taking the attitude of respect and 
regarding living things as possessing inherent worth. es et 225-226) 
Here Taylor holds with philosophic norms by choosing the simplest, most 
straightforward theory-many philosophers agree that ascribing rights unnecessarily 
complicates a theory (Goodpaster, "On Being" 311). Yet three aspects of Taylor's 
rejection of rights for non-humans concerns me. 
First, he mentions but never explains how human rights that exclude non-humans 
can logically include insane and severely retarded humans. He extols the benefits of 
maintaining the integrity of the traditional idea of human rights-based on certain mental 
capacities-and he admits that such a conception excludes certain humans, all plants and 
(most likely) all animals (Res ect 225). Taylor explicitly rejects modified versions of 
human rights that would include these other beings. Although he fails to clarify his 
position, it seems that Taylor excepts the exclusion of certain human beings from bearing 
moral rights, along with other animals. 
Second, Taylor asserts that an entity with rights must be a member of a community 
of moral agents (Respect 246). This leads me to wonder what the status of domestic 
animals might be. Domestic animals seem to qualify as members of our communities, and 
therefore might be protected by the same rights that protect humans: 
Some non-human animals are members, though not citizens, of our immediate society, and have 
rights in law to our care and protection. They pay for these rights by the advantages we gain from 
them, and should certainly in natural justice be paid far more. Some advantages we cannot seek from 
them without violating their rights as members of our society. (Clark, "Rights" 185) 
Domestic animals raise the possibility that Taylor's environmental ethic could 
rightly be extended only to "wild" entities, while all domestic animals (and possibly 
vegetation) would be protected by moral rights. If domestic animals and plants were 
protected by an extended circle of rights that apply to all those living in human societies, 
all such animals and plants would be protected because they are controlled and 
manipulated by human beings. This conclusion would seem unavoidable if Taylor includes 
human moral patients under the protective blanket of human rights. 
The third and most important difficulty with Taylor's assertion of exclusively 
human moral rights is his assumption that moral rights for non-human entities are 
superfluous if people accept the biocentric outlook, hold an attitude of respect for nature, 
and follow the rules of conduct proper to such an attitude. In contrast, Taylor asserts that 
human rights are ours "by nature, not by convention" (Respect 241). "[A]ny being who is 
a person qualifies as a rights-holder just in virtue of her or his personhood, " and these 
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rights are inalienable (Res ect 241). Even though Taylor notes that there are "many 
thoughtful people who believe we have the right to die" (Respect 242), he maintains that 
rights he beyond human contrivance and imagination. "A totalitarian power can deny us 
what we are entitled to, but it cannot take away our entitlement; we still have a legitimate 
claim to what we are being deprived of (Respect 241). Taylor defines rights as a 
metaphysical reality beyond all human contrivance. 
If human rights are ours in such a fundamental and enduring sense, why would 
such a foundational life-protecting essence only belong to one living species, when the 
core principle of all such rights is the right to life? Most philosophers agree that this type 
of distinction between humans and all other animals-that of being bearers of rights-is 
difficult to defend. (The end of chapter one includes these viewpoints. ) 
Taylor indicates that moral agents have certain obligations with regard to moral 
subjects. Taylor makes a distinction between entities that have no moral culpability or 
obligations, and the moral culpability and the obligations of moral agents toward such 
entities. Some individuals lack moral consciousness and have no duties to fulfil, but "it 
does not follow that there are none to be fulfilled toward them" (Kushner 153). Human 
infants and mental incompetents stand with non-human animals in this category. "Holding 
of rights is not important, what matters is that we fulfill our duties toward these beings 
even though they cannot be holders of rights" (Kushner 153). 
Taylor argues that laws regulating moral obligations (and attitudes and outlooks 
behind such laws) are sufficient to protect the interests of non-human animals. If Taylor is 
right, given our tendency to be humanocentric, our pervasive attitudes of respect for the 
lives of persons, and the extensive legal system supporting respect for persons, why do we 
need human rights? Taylor offers no explanation. 
Taylor's position is inconsistent. He rejects duties as a replacement for human 
rights. He insists that rights are not "derived from or... equivalent to assertions about 
duties" because in such a case "the question of whether moral agents respect the rights of 
others becomes identical with the question of whether they live up to their duties" 
("Inherent" 24). Rights, he insists are more than this. 
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This contradiction is highlighted by Taylor's overt comparison of human ethics 
with environmental ethics. He asserts that 
" the biocentric outlook is analogous with the human understanding that all other 
humans are fundamentally like oneself, 
" the attitude of respect for nature is analogous to the societal attitude of respect 
for persons; 
" and the basic rules, such as nonmaleficence and noninterference, are analogous 
with fundamental human laws such as laws against murder. 
Given Taylor's direct parallels, how can he logically assert that his environmental 
ethic can supplant animal and plant rights, while denying their efficacy as a replacement for 
human rights? 
Taylor's theory demonstrates that respect for nature is not a replacement for moral 
rights. Taylor begins chapter six: "In this final chapter I consider the moral dilemmas that 
arise when human rights and values conflict with the good of non-humans" (Respect 256). 
Can the simple "good" of all other entities compete fairly with the multitude of 
comprehensive "rights and values" Taylor allows human animals? 
Taylor's theory indicates that it cannot. 
There is bound to be "tension between claiming that all living beings have equal 
inherent worth and only granting rights to humans" (Lombardi 257). Indeed, most of the 
difficulties of internal conflict in Taylor's theory stem from his tendency to favour human 
beings, most prominently displayed in his affirmation of human rights and concurrent 
dismissal of animal rights. Taylor "cannot bring himself to completely renounce... special 
respect for persons and sometimes speaks of `both systems of ethics'-respect for persons 
and respect for nature-as if he were juggling two independent principles" (Callicott, 
"Case" 107). 
Taylor's acceptance of rights exclusively for Homo Sapiens harms the internal 
consistency and protectionist qualities of his theory. His humanocentric bias-his 
commitment to human rights and human privilege-blinds him to inconsistencies in his 
theory. Most flagrantly, Taylor offers an environmental ethic to protect "wild" entities, 
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inclusive of the most civilized and "unnatural" of humans, yet excluding billions of 
domestic "pets, " "laboratory" animals, and "food" animals that live truncated, and often 
painful, lives. Taylor's theory allows masses of teleological entities to live and die as 
profits for exploitative industries that degrade the land with a multitude of chemicals and 
tons of waste; Taylor protects these industries, rather than the lives of the individuals, by 
allowing people to maintain their integrity as the type of beings that we are-in this case, 
exploitative. 
Taylor fails to fulfil his own standards for an ethical system; his humanocentric 
tendencies prevent him from applying his environmental principles disinterestedly. 
i. Justification: Though Taylor admits that his theory is difficult to realize, he 
asserts that his ideas, based on "equal inherent worth of every living thing, " demonstrate 
that "biotic egalitarianism... does not reduce to absurdity" but can be fruitfully 
implemented (Respect 306). Taylor's work favours humans in ways that sometimes lead 
him to philosophic inconsistencies, but perhaps these special human privileges are intended 
to make his theory more palatable: 
Taylor... guarantee[s] that we human beings... can go on living the lives to which we have grown 
accustomed. He tries to make things come out right=so that we can eat vegetables, build wooden 
houses, and generally get on with our human projects... -by means of an elaborate set of hedges 
enabling us consumptively to use our fellow entities within the limits of his extremely broad 
egalitarian theory. (Callicott "Case" 108) 
Taylor's tries to offer a more palatable theory by granting people more freedom 
and power. Taylor asserts that respect for nature, based on "equal inherent worth of every 
living thing, " demonstrates that "biotic egalitarianism... does not reduce to absurdity" but 
can be fruitfully implemented (Respect 306). There is value in presenting a moral theory 
that is appealing and applicable, one that seems to offer realistic answers to current 
problems. 
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Yet Taylor's human-centered sacrifices have proven inadequate. At least one of 
Taylor's readers concluded that "the clearest and most decisive refutation of the principle 
of respect for life is that one cannot live according to it, nor is there any indication in 
nature that we were intended to" (Goodpaster, "On Being" 324). Taylor's theory provides 
an example of a far-reaching protectionist theory with considerable concession to human 
beings, yet even with Taylor's rather extensive sacrifices to humankind, it is unlikely that 
very many people would be willing to enact Taylor's theory of Respect for Nature in daily 
life (Spitler 256). 
Protectionist ethics ought not to bend to the preferences of the masses. People 
have too often treasured the freedom of human expansion, flourishing civilization, and 
increased profit at the expense of other living entities-even at the expense of less 
powerful human beings. In the United States, in the mid-eighteen hundreds, settlers were 
free to hunt Native Americans for sport and profit; those who brought in the head of a 
Native American were paid bounty-money by the federal government ("Ishi"). In the 
southern United States slave owners were free to profit economically from slaves whom 
they could sell or kill at their whim. Our interest in freedom and personal gain have 
sometimes had an appalling effect on other individuals-human and non-human. Power 
and freedom are much sought-after, but they are often not worth the price paid (Feinberg, 
Social 7). 
All human beings are now protected in the United States, but no other species is 
protected. For instance, land developers in the United States continue to profit personally 
while black bear, white-tailed deer, crested caracara, aplodontia, rainbow trout, pocket 
mice, carrion beetles, and millions of other organisms are harmed. On balance, the myriad 
creatures suffer, while a handful of human beings prosper by maintaining a limited ethic, 
where lives can be traded in for personal profit (Nash 213). Just as moral theory was 
brought to bear on those who exploit Africans and natives for profit, if consistency 
requires that we do so, ethics must be brought to bear on those who profit from the lives 
of animals or their habitat. Catering to self-interest does not do justice to moral 
philosophy; ethics ought to be impartial and consistent. 
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Conclusion 
Taylor's theory is both broader than most protectionist theories (including plants) 
and narrower (excluding animals and plants that are not "natural" or "wild"). It is not 
surprising, given the peculiarities of those included and excluded from his theory, that his 
work entails theoretical problems and inconsistencies. His biggest difficulty seems to be 
his tendency to make exceptions in his theory for the sake of human interests. None the 
less, Taylor's Respect for Nature offer a pragmatic and very interesting protectionist ethic. 
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V. APPLIED PROTECTIONISM 
In the introduction I clarified my dissertation as a work dedicated to addressing the 
moral inconsistency surrounding our treatment of non-human animals, when compared 
with our treatment of human animals. I noted that my methods were based on 
consistency, involved idealism, worked across disciplines, and were rooted in applied 
philosophy. All of these elements come to the fore in this chapter. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. Section A explores consistency across 
religious traditions in response to Andrew Linzey's work. Linzey addresses the current 
moral inconsistency in Western ethics through the Hebrew Bible and New Testament. He 
finds that the dominant religion of Western countries instructs against the cruelty that has 
resulted from a moral discrepancy in the West, a moral discrepancy that maintains a 
different moral standard for human beings as opposed to all other animals. 
Section A moves between the schools of philosophy and theology to highlight the 
consistent protectionist qualities of faith traditions. While these are often ideal rather than 
actual practices, I present the moral ideal philosophers and theologians seek, as indicated 
in the introduction. 
Section A of this chapter presents a spiritual protectionist ethic without 
emphasizing any single religious tradition, and without regard to the actual practices of 
peoples of each faith. My intent is to demonstrate a consistent tendency toward 
protectionist ethics that runs through sacred writings and oral wisdom of spiritual 
traditions. Those who are not Christian, or in fact have no religious affiliation, are. less apt 
to discount the importance of an ethical vision that extends beyond Western faiths, to 
emerge in text and myth across many centuries and civilizations. 
Section B is an exploration of applied philosophy, whereby consistency and 
impartiality are fundamental. Through the use of these basic philosophical tools, I seek an 
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ideal expression of current Western morality between people, by applying this ethic in all 
cases that are similar in morally relevant ways to all entities that have interests. Once I 
have established a theory based on this ideal ethic, I apply it to contemporary ethical issues 
and lifeboat scenarios, using casuistry, and always with a primary focus on consistency and 
impartiality. 
Section B presents and applies a theory based on accepted contemporary Western 
morality that determines actions amongst human beings. In most instances, this ethic 
places supreme value on human life. In the absence of any morally relevant distinction 
between all human beings and all other life forms, this section explores a consistent, 
impartial application of current Western ethics that extends moral considerability to all life 
forms. 
This is not a presentation of my person theory, nor is it offered with the 
expectation that anyone can or should employ such an ethical system. Section B is a study 
in consistent application of moral theory, an examination of current Western morality with 
regard to human life as opposed to other living entities, and the flagrant discrepancy that 
lies between the two. 
A. Consistency in the Spiritual Vision. 
If one is inclined to respect spiritual wisdom, whether or not one is religious, the 
consistency of ethical teachings across traditions and down through the ages carries 
tremendous weight. Religious teachings offer protectionist outlooks in a multitude of 
faiths, and have done so for at least half-a-dozen millennia across the continents. 
1. Vedic/Hindu Tradition. 
The Hindu religious tradition emerged from the Vedic tradition, which appeared in 
India around 1500 BCE. 
Roughly five thousand years ago, Indian beliefs were rooted in nature; most deities 
were personified powers of nature (Wolpert 32-34). Dawn, storms, vegetation, and fire 
were honoured as divine in ancient hymns (Embree, Hindu 9-20). By the time Socrates 
was born the people of India had a thousand years of spiritual wisdom accumulated, 
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including the Upanishads, one of the most important philosophical, sacred works of 
Hinduism. 
The Upanishads contain such protectionist concepts as "oneness" ("Chandogya" 
Upanishad). The Upanishads teach that all things are no different than the One that lies 
behind all (Zaehner 7). No element of earth is distinct from any other-each human shares 
the essence of every other earthly element as well as the essence of Brahman, which is 
behind and within ourselves and all that we see on earth (Embree, Sources 30). "This 
Great Being... dwells in the heart of all creatures as their innermost Self. ... 
His hands and 
feet are everywhere; his eyes and mouths are everywhere. His ears are everywhere. He 
pervades everything in the universe" ("Svetasvatara" Upanishad): 
O Brahman Supreme! 
Formless art thou, and yet... 
Thou bringest forth many forms... 
Thou art the fire, 
Thou art the sun, 
Thou art the air... 
Thou art Brahman Supreme: 
... Thou art the dark butterfly, 
Thou art the green parrot with red eyes, 
Thou art the thunder cloud, the seasons, the seas. ("Svetasvatara" Upanishad) 
In India, the inner essence of each living being is personally related to every other 
being, which leaves no room for cruelty or exploitation. 
Evidence from the earliest known Indian civilization indicates that animals had 
religious significance (Embree, Sources, 4). Recent excavations unearthed images of bulls, 
unicorns, tigers, and other animals (Wolpert 17). 
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Animals play important roles in ancient sacred literature. Some animal characters 
are noble and heroic, others are lowly and evil just like the human characters. Hindu 
mythology teaches that animals and humans were once closer, and could communicate on 
equal terms. Evidence of this appears in the famous epic, the Ramayana, where monkeys 
help the hero, Rama, an incarnation of an important deity (Basham 80-81). 
Animals can also be divinities; Hindu religious texts are filled with stories of 
divinities as animals (Embree, Hindu 210-211). Gods in Hindu literature are reincarnated 
in non-human animal form, or as a mix of human and non-human animal. Vishnu, one of 
the most popular Hindu deities, is depicted as a fish, tortoise, boar, and man-lion 
(Danielou 165). 
Hindu deities are associated with a particular non-human animal. For instance, 
Shiva rides on his trusty bull, Nandi, the giver of life, associated with the lofty principles of 
justice and virtue (Danielou 220). Ganesha keeps company with a rat that controls all that 
is hidden inside, including the soul or atman (Danielou 296). Vishnu is associated with the 
garuda, a mythical bird (half vulture, half man) that represents the magical sounds of the 
sacred scripture, and transports people from one world to another (Danielou 160). 
The Indian philosophy of reincarnation perpetuates and strengthens our link with 
every other living entity. Any given animal, at some point in the incalculable depths of 
time, was reincarnated as our mother, brother, or best friend. Consequently, Hindus have 
been a largely vegetarian society for many centuries. "The wanton killing of animals is 
little better than murder, and meat eating is little better than cannibalism" (Basham 58). 
Indian philosophy teaches that reincarnation, and the condition of one's next life, is 
based on karma, which is determined by one's actions (Embree, Hindu 62-65). The "pain 
a human being causes other living beings... will have to be suffered by that human being 
later, either in this life or in a later rebirth" (Jacobsen 289). For Hindus all beings are "in 
moral relationship to human beings. We are defined morally by our conduct toward 
nature" (Curtin, "Making" 71). Those hoping for a relatively pain-free future existence 
must avoid even the accidental killing of other entities (Basham 59). No human being can 
discount the needs of other creatures, our fate is determined by how we behave toward 
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these myriad "others. " 
The Hindu woridview leads naturally to the teaching of ahimsa, an injunction of 
"non-injury toward all living beings" (Jacobsen 287). In the Hindu tradition, the common 
Christian precept to `Love thy neighbour as thyself, ' is enhanced so that "every living 
being is thy neighbor' (Kushner 148). 
Early Western visitors in India were perplexed and sometimes frustrated by the 
expansive Indian ethic, especially ahimsa. Westerners marveled at how religious 
philosophy regulated Hindu behaviour towards nature (Jacobsen 288). One visitor noted: 
Pesticides spell killing,... small and perhaps invisible insects... This killing is anathema [for 
Hindus]... By nature, the [Indian] agriculturist is generous, wanting to bestow on others what he 
reaps out of Mother Earth. He [sic] does not think that he alone should enjoy the fruits of his labor... 
to kill those unseen and unknown lives ... 
is foreign to his nature... It takes some time for [them] ... to 
get acclimatized to the very conception of killing tiny helpless and unarmed creatures. (Curtin 
"Making" 71, from Journal of the Indian Pesticide Industry) 
It fascinated visitors that even the lives of insects-insects that reduce crop yield- 
mattered. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Hindu ideology is the gentle reverence for 
cattle-a creature Westerners have long disparaged as stupid and expendable. Cattle are 
treated with respect in India. Cows symbolize munificence because of their life-sustaining 
milk. One Vedic hymn, written sometime before 1000 BCE in honour of cows, identifies 
the cow with the entire universe (Embree, Hindu 39-40). 
Vedic nature-deities have left an indelible mark on the Hindu tradition-nature 
remains sacred. Indian sacred literature regards the "earth [as] a fitting symbol for the 
deepest of religious impulses" (Embree, Hindu 45), and spiritual seekers retreat to the 
wilderness to gain spiritual wisdom (Marshall 25). One class of books is called the `forest 
books, " and holds important religious wisdom accumulated during spiritual retreats into 
the wilderness (Embree, Sources 29). 
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Pilgrimages to mountains and rivers remain a common practice in India (Eck 65). 
Rivers are especially important in the Hindu tradition because they are viewed as 
passageways, or thirta, to the divine (Eck 64). "In India today... pilgrimage is as popular 
and important as a religious and cultural phenomenon as it was in the height of the Middle 
ages in Europe. The organization of pilgrim tours is a thriving business... " (Eck 64). 
Pilgrimages to rivers and mountains are just one manifestation of Hindu religious respect 
for the natural world. 
2. Buddhism. 
Buddhism emerged on the outskirts of the Hindu world in the sixth century BCE, 
during the Upanishadic Era. As a result, Buddhist philosophy is closely related in 
fundamental ideas and values to the Upanishadic Hindu tradition (Embree, Hindu 132). 
Buddhism inherited key concepts from the dominant Hindu tradition, such as 
reincarnation, ahimsa, and oneness. The words of the Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh, 
reveal these fundamental Indian concepts: "I am one with the wonderful pattern of life 
which radiates out in all directions. ... 
I am the frog swimming in the pond and I am also 
the snake who needs the body of the frog to nourish its own body. ... I am the 
forest 
which is being cut down. I am the rivers and air which are being polluted" (Allendorf 43- 
44). Thich Nhat Hanh writes of the interconnectedness of all life, and encourages people 
to apply this to their daily lives. 
"A human being is an animal, a part of nature. But we single ourselves out from the rest of 
nature. We classify other animals and living beings as nature, as if we ourselves are not part of 
it. Then we pose the question, `How should I deal with Nature? ' We should deal with nature 
the way we deal with ourselves! ... 
Harming nature is harming ourselves, and vice versa. " 
(Hanh 41) 
Buddhism also absorbed the tendency to associate wild places with spiritual 
wealth. Buddhists wishing to gain spiritual wisdom usually lived simple lives far from 
population centers. The famous Buddhist philosopher Nagasena instructed King 
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Menandros: 
Trees do not show disdain, and they demand no toilsome wooing; 
Fain would I now consort with them as my companions. 
Fain would I dwell in a deserted sanctuary, beneath a tree, or in a cave... 
Fain would I dwell in spacious regions owned by no one. 
And there, a homeless wanderer, follow my own mind. (Conze 102) 
Buddhism inherited the Vedic/Hindu religious respect for nature but Buddhism 
also developed its own nature-friendly philosophy. "Codependent arising, " a key concept 
in Buddhist philosophy, teaches radical interdependence. "Codependent arising" asserts 
that no individual or action can be separated from any other individual or action (Robinson 
23-29). Buddhist radical interdependence does not allow for independent being, action, 
word, or thought because all things influence one another. Therefore, because each thing 
is important to every other thing, all things are one another in their very essence. In the 
words of a contemporary Thai Buddhist monk: "The entire cosmos is a cooperative. The 
sun, the moon and the stars live together as a cooperative. The same is true for humans 
and animals, trees and the Earth. ... the world 
is a mutual, interdependent, cooperative 
enterprise" (Swearer 5). Without the sun we could not live as we currently live. Neither 
could we live as we now live if a small flea is knocked from the side of a kitten in 
Malaysia. All is changed by the slightest occurrence; the ripple effect of each event is 
unending and all-encompassing, no matter how small the event, because all things are 
interconnected. 
When Buddhism traveled to China, it combined with Taoism to form one of the 
most nature-friendly extant religions. (These religious traditions are covered in the next 
section on Taoism. This section only discusses relevant Chinese schools of Buddhism. ) 
Hua-yen, a Chinese school of Buddhism founded around 600 AD, carried "codependent 
arising" to its logical extreme. In the Hua-yen worldview all things are reflected in all 
other things, as in an infinitely regressing mirror that encompasses the entire universe in 
i 
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"simultaneous mutual identity and mutual intercausality" (Cook 214). Nothing is 
independent in this "vast web of interdependencies in which if one strand is disturbed, the 
whole web is shaken" (Cook 213). Cruelty and exploitation are counterproductive if one 
believes that harming one entity harms all that exists, including oneself. 
Also in China, the influential T'ien T'ai school of Buddhism taught that all things 
are contained in one moment and one moment contains all things. This combination of 
one-point and universal culminated in the teachings of `Buddha-Nature" (deBary 156- 
157). `Buddha-Nature" is the inherent perfection of each thing as it naturally is. All 
things have `Buddha-Nature, " and to acknowledge this quality in all things is to realize 
that all things are perfect in their essence. The spiritual seeker comes to understand that 
all things have inherent value, and that one can learn from every aspect of the physical 
world. 
When Chinese Buddhism traveled to Japan the protectionist propensity of 
"Buddha-Nature" reached a peak. The great Japanese Buddhist philosopher Dogen 
(1200-1253) taught that the splendors of nature hold the essence of enlightenment (Curtin, 
"Dogen" 198), and that spiritual ideas themselves are "the entire universe, mountains and 
rivers, and the great wide earth, plants and trees" (Swearer 15). 
Buddhist philosophers simultaneously elevated nature and effaced the individual 
Buddhist practitioner. The philosophy inherited from the Hindu tradition-reincarnation, 
oneness, interdependence, and the inevitability of constant change between birth and 
death-led philosophers to conclude that there really is no independent "self' (Robinson 
38). Buddhist philosophers taught that human existence as individuals is a mirage. We 
are only matter in human form, soon to be disbanded and reformed according to our 
actions in past lives. "It is not just that `we are all in it' together. We all arc, it, rising and 
falling as one living body" (Cook 229). The Buddhist tradition elevated the entire physical 
world through the teachings of inherent "Buddha-Nature, " while simultaneously deflating 
human pride by asserting that there is no individual self. 
Hindu ahimsa is reflected in Buddhist metta (lovingkindness) and karuna 
(compassion). The Buddha's teachings with regard to ethical conduct are "built on the 
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vast conception of universal love and compassion for all living beings" (Rahula 46). 
Compassion is a "feeling that suffers all the agonies and torments" of every sentient 
creature, and an understanding that harm done to others is harm done to oneself (Kushner 
148f). The Buddha instructed followers to exhibit "an unlimited self-giving compassion 
flowing freely toward all creatures that live" (Bunt 46). Compassion is "one of the 
indispensable conditions for deliverance" (Kushner 148f); the Dali Lama has often stated 
that lovingkindness is his religion (Gyatso 8). The Buddhist Sutta-Nipata includes the 
following, often translated as the hymn of love: 
... may all 
be blessed with peace always; 
all creatures weak or strong, 
all creatures great and small; 
creatures unseen or seen 
dwelling afar or near, 
born or awaiting birth, 
-may all be blessed with peace! 
... as with 
her own life 
a mother shields from hurt 
her own, her only, child, - 
let all-embracing thoughts 
for all that lives be thine, 
-an all-embracing love 
for all the universe... (Burn 46-47) 
Buddhists are expected to apply ethical philosophy to everyday life. According to 
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sacred teachings, a Buddhist ought to live mindfully-with an awareness of the likely 
effects of each and every action. Adherents are to "abstain from destroying life, " including 
livelihoods that entail killing animals (Rahula 47). The first, and most fundamental of the 
precepts is "to refrain from killing living beings, meaning all sorts of animals" (Robinson 
77). A Buddhist injunction states that, "meat-eating in any form or manner and in any 
circumstances is prohibited, unconditionally and once and for all" (deBary 91-92). 
Bodhisattvas, compassionate spiritual beings of the Mahayana Buddhist tradition, 
strive to save all creatures (deBary 81-82). The Bodhisattva "is committed to the eternal 
weal of all living beings, and will not rest until he has led them all to the goal. On attaining 
enlightenment, he does not leave the world behind and enter Nirvana... but devot[es] his 
compassionate skill to the aid of others. He shares and bears the burden of their 
sufferings, in loving union" (Burtt 130). Mahayana Buddhists vow to return to the earth, 
rather than disappear into nirvana, until every individual of every species is saved from the 
suffering of rebirth (deBary 81). 
... a 
Bodhisattva should think in this manner: `As many beings as there are in the universe of beings, 
comprehended under the term "beings"-egg-born, born from a womb, moisture-born, or 
miraculously born; with or without form; with perception, without perception, or with neither 
perception nor no-perception-as far as any conceivable form of beings is conceived: all these I must 
lead to Nirvana. (Conze 164) 
The Buddhist Jataka is filled with animal tales. Jataka stories tell of the Buddha's 
past incarnations, featuring non-human animals of every kind, and sometimes humans. In 
this menagerie of stories, the Buddha appears in such diverse forms as a deer, a parrot, a 
dog, a rabbit, a lion, a quail, a monkey, a horse-and many more (Khan). Each animal, 
whether human or otherwise, exhibits "compassionate and often heroic self-giving" 
(Martin 97). Each character represents a future life of the Buddha, and demonstrates self- 
sacrificing generosity "for the benefit of all living beings" (Martin 98). 
Jataka tales remind us that the Buddha has been in many, many animal forms, and 
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that each living entity is capable of respect and compassion toward other living beings. 
For a practicing Buddhist, no creature lies outside the Buddhist spiritual path (Martin 99). 
The Jataka reveals "the essence of the Buddhist attitude brought to life-the attitude of 
universal compassion... flowing from the knowledge of inner oneness" (Martin 98). 
Those who read the stories of the Jataka are offered a deeper, closer connection with other 
life forms, a "sense, that animals have their own lives, their own karma, tests, purposes, and 
aspirations. And, äs often brief and painful as their lives may be, they are also graced with 
a purity and a clatlty which we can only humbly respect, and perhaps even occasionally 
envy" (Martin 100). 
, 5. 
Was not the Buddha a hare? a quail? a monkey, a lion, a deer or ox? Who is to say that the dog 
guarding our porch or the cat twining around our legs is not a Bodhisattva...? Entering the market 
one sees live rabbits and chickens and turkeys for sale. And one wonders, "Why are they here? " and 
is torn. "Should I buy them all? How can I save them? " For in the Jatakas one has seen that their 
inner life is the same as our own. One seeks to save them all, and they too, looking out at us with 
black or with golden shining eyes, yearn only to liberate us. (Martin 100). 
One tale of the early lives of the Buddha reveals him as the Bodhisattva prince, 
Mahasattva. Prince Mahasattva finds a hungry tigress that is too starved to hunt for her 
offspring. She and her little ones are on the edge of death, and the Bodhisattva comments, 
"Holy men are born of pity and compassion. " Prince Mahasattva offers his own body that 
the tigress and her young might live (Conze 24-26). The importance of compassion is 
emphasized because readers know that Prince Mahasattva is eventually reincarnated (due 
to good karma) as Sidhartha Gotama-the Buddha. Buddhist teachings encourage 
aspirants to follow the compassionate path of the Buddha. 
3. Taoism. 
Although people from China and Japan are frequently criticized for their actions 
with regard to non-human animals, the Chinese spiritual traditions are rich with 
protectionist teachings, especially the Taoist and Buddhist traditions, the Philosophy of 
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Change, and Yin Yang Philosophy. This section discusses the Taoist tradition. 
The Taoist tradition teaches wu wei, often translated as non-striving, acting 
without acting, or "nonaction. " Wu wei instructs that we live "in accordance with nature" 
(Po-Keung, "Taoism" 334). Any work that humans do should not go against the grain of 
nature, but should be harmonious with nature (Marshall 19). Lao Tzu wrote, "Tao 
invariably takes no action, and yet there is nothing left undone" (Tao #37). The Taoist 
master Lao Tzu wrote: "... the sage desires to have no desire. / He does not value rare 
treasures. / He learns to be unlearned, and returns to what the multitude has missed 
(Tao). / Thus he supports all things in their natural state but does not take any action" 
(Tao #64). 
In Taoist philosophy the natural state is the ideal state, and adherents are 
discouraged from striving or grasping at material wealth and encouraged to live gently on 
the earth. 
Nature says few words. 
For the same reason a whirlwind does not last a whole morning, 
Nor does a rainstorm last a whole day. 
What causes them? It is Heaven and Earth (Nature). If even Heaven and Earth cannot make 
them last long, 
How much less can man? ao #23) 
Taoist sacred writings discourage meddling with nature or other animals. In the 
Tao-te Ching, Lao Tzu wrote that "Racing and hunting cause one's mind to be mad" 
(#12), and that "Fish should not be taken away from the water" (#36). The great Taoist 
mystic, Chuang Tzu, wrote: 
"What do you mean by Nature and what do you mean by man? " 
The spirit of the North Sea replied, "A horse or a cow has four feet. That is Nature. Put a halter 
around the horse's head and put a string through the cow's nose, that is man. Therefore it is said, 
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"Do not let man destroy Nature. " (Chan 207) 
Technological developments are not value-free in Taoist spiritual writings. 
Technology may appear to be time-saving, but it can create artificial desires that ultimately 
block far more important advances, such as one's spiritual progress (Marshall 18). 
Consequently, Lao Tzu taught that "A small country has fewer people. Though there are 
machines that can work ten to a hundred times faster than man, they are not needed" 
(Tao). Instead, Taoist writings encourage people to live in small communities and work 
the land gently. Letting nature be natural, and living simply, are the highest Taoist ideals: 
" Manifest plainness, / Embrace simplicity, / Reduce selfishness, / Have few desires" (Tao 
#19). 
In ancient China it was believed that imbalance, particularly human domination and 
rigid hierarchy, were the cause of natural disasters. They reached this conclusion by 
extrapolating. Because the excessive wealth of a few contributed to the misery of the 
masses it was assumed that other undesirable effects from human greed might also be 
expected, even in the natural world (Marshall 20). Because the Taoists did not see human 
beings and their actions as separate from the rest of the world, they believed that human 
greed and cruelty could bring on natural disasters. 
Taoist philosophy represents all things as part of one great fluctuating whole. 
Taoists are encouraged to strive for tranquillity and harmony, to regard nature, and what is 
natural, as ideal: 
Attain complete vacuity, 
Maintain steadfast quietude. 
All things come into being, 
And I see thereby their return... 
This return to its root means tranquillity... 
To return to destiny is called the eternal (Tao). 
... Being one with Nature 
he is in accord with Tao. Tao #16) 
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As in the Buddhist teachings, constant change is accepted as fundamental to 
existence. The perpetual transformations of nature bind each individual to all other things 
(Chan 177). The Taoist mystic, Chuang Tzu, wrote, "The universe and I exist together, 
and all things and I are one" (Chan 186), and "Although the universe is vast, its 
transformation is uniform. Although the myriad things are many their order is one" (Chan 
204). 
Chuang Tzu's importance in Taoist philosophy is second only to that of Lao Tzu. 
His vision of interconnetedness and unity were not limited to humans, or even to other 
animals. He views the human body as bits and pieces of everything else. He understood 
death and decay as a mixing of matter. He writes his philosophy in a story about a friend 
on his deathbed receiving a visitor: 
'Go away' he said, `Don't disturb the transformation that is about to take place. ' Then, leaning 
against the door, he continued, `Great is the Creator! What will he make of you now? Where will he 
take you? Will he make you into a rat's liver? Will he make you into an insect's leg? ' (Chan 197) 
Chuang Tzu taught that, "Left to their own devises, human beings and animals 
would form harmonious natural communities" (Mair, Wandering 80). He instructed that 
training an animal is inherently harmful and cruel; human interference in the lives of horses 
turns happy equines into "brigands" (Mair, Wandering 82). Even when we imagine that 
we improve the lives of other animals, Chuang Tzu asserted that interference is harmful. 
"The marsh pheasant has to take ten steps before it finds something to pick at and has to 
take a hundred steps before it gets a drink. But the pheasant would prefer not to be raised 
in a cage where, though you treat it like a king, its spirit would not thrive" (Mair, 
Wandering 27). If we were to leave other animals alone, as we ought to, we would live in 
a golden age of "ultimate integrity: " 
In such an age there would be no paths and tunnels through the mountains, no boats or bridges to 
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cross the swamps. The myriad things would live in groups, their settlements lined up next to each 
other. Birds and beasts would form groups, the grasses and tress would thrive. Thus birds and beasts 
could be tamed but still wander about; one could climb up to the nests of magpies and peep in without 
disturbing them. 
In a world of ultimate integrity, men would dwell together with the birds and beasts. They 
would come together in tribes with the myriad things. (Mair, Wandering 81) 
Taoism found commonality in Buddhism. Chinese Buddhism developed an 
extraordinarily nature-friendly religious philosophy. As in India, Chinese spiritual 
practitioners (Buddhist and Taoist) commonly lived far from civilization (Thompson 81, 
107). In both countries, spiritually advanced humans often lived close to nature: "From 
my favorite place in the Chung-nan Mountains, / The chanting of monks emerges into the 
dark sky. / Groves of trees stand out clearly in the somber solitude, / Thin mist floats in 
the desolate void" (Mair, Columbia 241). 
In Chinese Buddhism, spiritual wisdom became associated with those who lived 
close to nature. For many Chinese Buddhists and Taoists, nature is understood not only as 
the appropriate place to seek spiritual growth and enlightenment, but also as a medium 
through which the highest spiritual truths might be learned. In the following Chinese 
Buddhist poem aspects of nature create a metaphor for the spiritual path: 
I climb up the Way to Cold Mountain, 
But the Cold Mountain road is endless: 
Long valleys of boulders stacked stone upon stone. 
Broad streams thick with dense undergrowth. 
The mosses are slippery, though there's been no rain; 
Pines cry out, but it's not the wind. 
Who can get beyond worldly attachments 
And sit with me among the white clouds? (Sommer 167) 
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4. Islam. 
The Islam is a sister religion to the Judeo-Christian tradition. "Islam accepts, and 
incorporates into itself, all antecedent prophets of Abrahamic lineage, up to and including 
Jesus and Mary" (Stoddart 34). Therefore, much of what Linzey asserts regarding 
Christianity is also true of Islam. 
Islamic sacred writings allow for human exploitation of nature and other animals, 
but as with the Christian tradition, there are many nature and animal-friendly messages to 
be found. 
Islam inherited the Judeo-Christian hierarchy wherein a benevolent, all-powerful 
creator rules, with people placed "in dominion on the earth... " (Qur'an 7: 10). "Man" is 
placed at the top of the hierarchy but people are given incumbent responsibilities: "Man, 
because of his theomorphic makeup, [is] ecologically dominant, but [is] an instrument of 
Allah's Will to whom everything belongs" (Zaid 46-47). "Muslims are fond of declaring 
that `humankind has no rights, only duties. ' ... the only proper relationship 
between people 
and God is that of slaves to master" (Denny 8). 
Yet all of creation is worthy of our care. The universe is "the personal creation of 
God. Since his work is faultless, it is considered perfect" (Marshall 128). As in 
Christianity, all that exists has come from, and belongs exclusively to, the Divine; it is here 
only by the power of Allah. The Earth and each living thing upon the earth, is Allah's. 
Allah is the "Lord of All creatures" (Qur'an 69: 28-52). The earth reveals God's 
tenderness and mercy toward all of creation: "There are signs, too-for those with a mind 
to understand-in the alternation of night and day, and in the gracious rain God sends 
from heaven to renew the face of the parched earth, and in the veering of the winds" 
(Qur'an 45: 1-6). If God tends every parched prairie, who are we to despoil the earth? 
The Almighty beseeches his followers to demonstrate patience and mercy (Qur'an 90: 18- 
19); "Allah desires no injustice to His creatures" (Qur'an 3: 105-110). 
Nature yields precious knowledge of Allah. The Hadith* ("tradition"), the most 
authoritative Muslim teaching after the Qur'an, records the life and words of the prophet 
with intent to perpetuate his way of life (Smith 403). The Hadith qudsi states: "I was a 
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Hidden Treasure, and I wished to be known, so I created the world" (Stoddart 80). 
Creation is a window through which we might glimpse Allah. "The forms and the 
creatures have a purpose" because they make Allah known to us (Mathnawi IV, 3028). 
"Surely in the heavens and the earth there are signs for the faithful; in your own creation, 
and in the beasts that are scattered far and near, signs for true believers... signs for men of 
understanding" (Qur'an 45: 1-8). All of nature is a vision of Divine splendor, and it is the 
duty of the faithful to protect and tend Allah's munificence. "Whichever way you turn 
there is the face of Allah" (Qur'an 2: 115). 
Tending Allah's creation is an act of religious devotion and earthly self-sacrifice 
that bears sweet fruit. When a Muslim "absents himself from the world for God, God 
makes himself present in the world for man" (Schuon 57). By tending the world for Allah 
people come to see the world as part of the Divine, and they find "something of God" in 
the natural world (Schuon 57). Hearts that are open to Allah will find the divine in the leaf 
of every aspen and the song of every katydid. 
People are but earthly attendants of the Divine Creation. As a result, there is a 
tendency to belittle human beings in the Qur'an-in light of Allah and the totality of 
creation humans are insignificant (Schuon 21). We are part of God's bountiful creation; 
we are creatures like all other animals. Two-legged humans were formed alongside other 
animals. "Allah created every beast from water. Some creep upon their bellies, others 
walk on two legs, and others on four. Each created entity was purposefully designed and 
brought to life by Allah. The Qur'an acknowledges our commonality with living entities 
that Allah created: "All the beasts that roam the earth and all the birds that wing their 
flight are communities like your own... " (Qur'an 6: 37-42). We are part of the earthly 
diversity that Allah intended: "Men, beasts, and cattle have their different colors" (Qur'an 
35: 27-30). 
Like most faiths, Islam teaches that the gains of this world are paltry in comparison 
with those that lie ahead. "Worldly goods are but a temptation" (Qur'an 8: 25-31). 
'Worldly cleverness and accomplishments and wealth endanger a man's spiritual life" 
(Whinfield 228). Faithful Muslims are to tend rather than exploit, to assist rather than 
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dominate. 
While there are passages in the sacred writings of Islam that condone flesh-eating, 
others parallel the Hebrew Bible, calling for a vegan diet: 
We have spread out the earth and set upon it immovable mountains. We have planted it with 
every seasonable fruit, thus providing sustenance for man and beast. We hold the store of every 
blessing and send it down in appropriate measure. We let loose the fertilizing winds and bring down 
water from the sky for you to drink. its stores are beyond your reach. (Qur'an 15: 9-32) 
Vegan bounty was provided for all of creation. Allah "laid the earth for all living 
creatures, with its fruits its palm-trees and their fruiting dates, the grain in the blade and 
herbs of fragrance" (Qur'an 55: 1-17). 
As in the Christian scriptures, we are not the only part of creation that adores the 
Almighty. Each object "casts its shadow right and left, prostrating itself' before Allah; to 
Allah "bow all the creatures of the heavens and the earth" (Qur'an 16: 48-56). Though we 
may not see the devotion of the smallest mouse-tailed bat, the silent cottongrass, or the 
most obstreperous wolverine, the Qur'an indicates that every part of creation stands in 
praise of Allah. "The sun and the moon and the stars, the mountains and the trees, the 
beasts, and countless men-all prostrate themselves before Him" (Qur'an 22: 18). "The 
seven heavens and the earth and all that is therein praise Him, and there is not a thing but 
hymneth His praise; but ye understand not their praise" (Qur'an, "Children of Israel" 44). 
Nothing on earth is detached from the Divine: "All in the heavens and the earth gives 
praise to God" (Qur'an 61: 1). 
This "song of praise" carried out by all the earth "binds the whole of creation to 
the Creator" (Stoddart 62). Allah receives each entity's praise, and is aware of each 
entity's folly and hardship: "Do you not see how Allah is praised by those in heaven and 
earth? The very birds praise Him as they wing their flight. He notes the prayers and 
praises of all His creatures, and has knowledge of all their actions" (Qur'an 24: 36-43). 
As in the Christian tradition, all creatures join humankind in the judgment and 
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resurrection. "There is none in the heavens or on earth but shall return to Him in utter 
submission. He has kept strict count of all His creatures, and one by one they shall 
approach Him on the Day of Resurrection" (Qur'an 19: 88-98). Allah is aware of every 
tumblebug and our actions toward every tumblebug: "He observes all things" (Qur'an 
67: 16-24). For Allah has created each entity, and "They shall all be gathered before their 
Lord" (Qur'an 6: 37-42). All that we do is known and considered by Allah; we will be held 
accountable. "To Allah belongs the kingdom of the heavens and the earth. To Him shall 
all things return" (Qur'an 24: 36-43). 
Allah is righteous, compassionate, and has created the earth for "just purposes" 
(Denny 8). "Allah controls the destiny of every living entity, " and attends to the needs of 
the entire earthly multitude (Qur'an 11: 56). "Countless are the beasts that cannot fend for 
themselves. Allah provides for them, as He provides for you. He alone hears all and 
knows all" (Qur'an 29: 56-62). Allah cares for the myriad creatures, and draws them back 
at the end of their time on earth: "To Him shall all things return" (Qur'an 3: 105-110). 
The Qur'an refer to Allah as the "merciful lord of mercy" (Qur'an 59: 22). 
Yea, all the fish in the seas, 
And all feathered fowl in the air above. 
All elephants, wolves, and lions of the forest, 
All dragons and snakes, and even little ants, 
Yea, even air, water, earth, and fire, 
Draw their sustenance from Him... (Whinfield 188) 
Damaging the earth is disrespectful and disobedient toward Allah. "To Him 
belongs all that is, in the heavens and in the earth, each and all subservient to His will. He 
it is who initiates creation and continually renews it... " (Qur'an 30: 26-27). Allah saved a 
pair of every species from the great flood (Qur'an 11: 38-40), and we are called upon to 
tend, protect, and save creatures that have been driven to the brink of extinction. Allah 
beseeches, 'Do not defile the good earth, hallowed as it has been" (Qur'an 7: 55-56). 
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The mystical tradition of Islam (the Sufi tradition) "permeates everything Islamic- 
philosophy, Qur'an commentary, economic life, and popular institutions" (Cragg, House 
64). The Sufi tradition is an expression of Islamic spirituality and not a separate or 
divergent religion (Stoddart 61). Islamic mysticism holds a wealth of protectionist 
teachings. 
Mystics in all faiths tend to believe that the devout can communicate directly with 
the divine-can personally experience the divine (Rippin 25). This is partly due to the 
mystical sense of the "`oneness of essence' between the creature and the creator" 
(Stoddart 71). "The central doctrine of Sufism is... the `oneness of being; " Sufis accept 
no duality (Stoddart 43-44). 
Because Sufi's see all that exists as a unity, they experience Allah within the world. 
The world is not of a different principle from the Divine; the essential principle of the earth 
is that of the Almighty (Stoddart 49). In Sufi teachings, what we see and experience on 
earth is not lowly and base-it is part of the Divine essence. The earth is precious because 
it is inseparable from the Absolute (Stoddart 42). In the Sufi worldview there is no gulf 
between Allah and human beings, between human beings and the rest of creation, or 
between Allah and the world. 
The Sufi tradition, based on the Qur'an, acknowledges creation as a treasure that 
holds Allah in every nook and cranny. Mir, a Sufi poet in India, wrote: "Rose and mirror 
and sun and moon-what are they? / Wherever we looked, there was always Thy face" 
(Schimmel 289). Sufis find in the world "a revelation of God... his beauty and wisdom are 
revealed in creation" (Marshall 135). For Islamic mystics, "The whole creation is one 
great mirror, or a large number of mirrors, reflecting God's overwhelming beauty" 
(Schimmel 382). 
Dhu'n-Nun, an Egyptian mystic, wrote of oneness between God and all of 
creation: 
Oh God, I never hearken to the voices of the beasts or the rustle of the trees, the splashing of the 
waters or the song of the birds, the whistling of the wind or the rumble of the thunder, but I sense in 
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them a testimony to Thy Unity, and a proof of Thy incomparability, that Thou art the All-Prevailing, 
and All-Knowing, the All-True. (Schimmel 46). 
Jalal al-Din Rumi (1207-1273), perhaps the most famous Sufi poet, indicated that 
all had come from Allah, and all would return to Allah, as stated in the Qur'an. This 
knowledge, combined with his sense of ultimate unity, gave Rumi a strong sense of the 
interconnectedness of all life and the connection of all life with Allah: 
I died a mineral and became a plant. 
I died a plant and rose an animal. 
I died an animal and I was a man... 
To Him we shall return. 
Mystical traditions tend to turn spiritual energies inward. The Hadith qudsi 
("tradition") states that "The heart of man is the throne of God" (Stoddart 19,81). It is 
through the heart that Allah touches the human soul; not with our brain do we come to 
know Allah, but through the heart (Stoddart 46-5 1). The Qur'an warns of unbelievers: "It 
is not their eyes that are blind, but their hearts" (22: 46). Rumi understood the religious life 
as moving from the human heart toward Allah. He longed to be close to God, and in his 
search for the divine he lived a life of love, discipline, and self-sacrificing service 
(Mathnawi III, 3435). 
Rumi was an ascetic whose simple lifestyle and earthly service stemmed from his 
love for Allah. His actions were informed by belief in the oneness of all: `Bread-giver, 
bread-taker, bread. / The categories dissolve / into One water" (Mathnawi VI , 
73). 
Whatever Rumi saw, whomever he helped-be it a katydid or a calico clam-it was an 
expression of love for Allah. In the mystic's eye we are all part of Allah, and Allah is part 
of all that exists. Who, knowing this, would harm even the smallest entity? 
The Sufi tradition acknowledged the preeminence of love in a life devoted to Allah. 
Ibn `Arabi wrote: 
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My heart has opened unto every form: it is a pasture for gazelles, a cloister for Christian monks, 
a temple for idols, the Ka'ba of the pilgrim, the tables of the Torah and the book of the Qur'an. I 
practice the religion of Love. (Stoddart 51) 
In the Islamic tradition, a good heart is critical to salvation. The Hadith 
("traditions") offer the examples of a woman who "vas damned because she allowed her 
cat to die of hunger, " while a prostitute "vas saved because she gave a drink of water to a 
dog" (Schuon 9). It is ineffective to follow the fundamentals of Islam meticulously while 
harboring a cruel heart that leads to cruel deeds. Conversely, no matter how far one might 
have fallen from the straight path, Hadith teach that one with a heart filled with 
compassion and tenderness is apt to be spared (Schuon 9). 
The Islamic tradition ought to be applied by Muslims in day to day life: "knowing 
the truth without doing it is vanity. In fact, the truth cannot be merely known, in the sense 
of being brought into mental awareness; it must be fully `known' through realization in 
action" (Denny 12). Generosity and self-sacrifice are virtues in the Qur'an, and social 
ethics are critical (Cragg, Islam 114): believers are expected to tend the poor and needy. 
Those who limit their attentive hand to human beings fail to acknowledge the extent of 
their role as servants to Allah and all that has been created. Sa'di, wrote: 
His Angels order Man and Bird and Beast, 
The Fish, the Flies, the largest and the least; 
So plenteous is His bounty that the Ant 
Finds meat... 
Goodness and gills diffusing, feeding these, 
Because He is creation's Lord, and sees 
All living things... Book 21) 
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"Sharia" is the term for the body of writings referred to as Islamic law. Islamic law 
"constitutes the ideal social blueprint for the `good society"' (Esposito 75). Shari'a comes 
from an Arabic word that means "way, " as in direction to a certain location (such as the 
"way" to the beach). The Shari'a is "God's ordaining of the right way for his faithful 
creatures" (Denny 8). The word "Islam" literally means to "surrender to God's law" in 
day-to-day life (Esposito 69). Muslims are expected to behave in a way that demonstrates 
submission to Allah and respect for all that the Divine has created. 
Islam offers a wealth of scripture and religious exemplars that clear a path for 
protectionists. While Islamic texts offer divergent teachings, as well as practices, few 
Muslims would argue that Allah desires exploitative or cruel behaviour. Sacred writings 
indicate that Allah's mercy and compassion encompass all of creation, and that the role of 
practicing Muslims is one of self-sacrificing submission and service to Allah. 
5. Indigenous Traditions. 
Peoples of ancient times generally thought it obvious that the whole world was to 
be admired, in and of itself (Clark, "Animals" 124). Respect for the natural world was 
common amongst ancient societies that depended directly on the surrounding environment 
for survival. In such communities sustainable lifestyles, complete with protectionist 
philosophies, were often built into cultural belief and practice (Kwiatkowska 268,271). 
Moral codes that entail respect for nature were central to the worldviews of most of these 
ancient cultures. Their moral codes guided everyday life (VanStone 122). 
Most hunter-gatherer societies lived in close contact with nature and with other 
species. It was natural for such peoples to struggle with the harm they brought other 
animals when hunting for food and clothing (Serpell 29). Feelings of respect and regret 
were commonly expressed in myths and rituals. 
For traditional subsistence hunters and gatherers "the division between subject and 
object, between landscape and people, [did] not exist" (Kwiatkowska 276). They tended 
to view their relationship with the natural world as one of kinship (McLuhan 56,99). 
Such peoples most often viewed themselves as just one part of an ongoing sacred life that 
included the entire cosmos. They often believed they were connected to all that was 
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around them, and they felt "consciously responsible for the continuity and balance of the 
cosmos, " which they sometimes promoted through rituals (Kwiatkowska 271). 
Many indigenous traditions offered nature-friendly spiritual visions. The Koyukon 
of interior Alaska and Canada provide a representative concrete example. Indigenous 
cultures of North America have changed dramatically, so traditional attitudes and practices 
are discussed in the past tense. 
The Koyukon, like most Native Americans, believed that animals, plants, and the 
natural world were "endowed with spirits and with spiritually based power" (R. Nelson 
228). "Each animal knows way more than you do... the old people... told us never to 
bother anything unless we really needed it" (225). Traditional cultures in North America 
were respectful toward the animals because they believed that other animals "possess 
consciousness, will, and other capacities... superior to those of humans" (Harrod 159). 
They considered animals sacred and powerful-quite capable of preventing a hunter from 
having success (R. Nelson 23 1). Consequently, these powerful entities were treated with 
respect. 
North American natives did not see any division between other-animal and human- 
animal spheres (Erdoes 389). They assumed that other animals shared "human" qualities 
and that a social and spiritual relationship existed between people and non-human animals 
(Gill, Native American Traditions 121). How the Koyukon interacted with nature was 
critical because they believed that humans and other natural entities shared a constant 
spiritual interchange that profoundly affect[ed] human behavior" (R. Nelson 229). As a 
consequence, traditional hunters upheld "a code of moral and social etiquette" that 
encompassed all creatures (R. Nelson 228). 
I do not wish to perpetuate the myth that indigenous peoples are moral exemplars 
of human interaction with the natural world. This is not the case, and never was. For 
instance, for the sake of good luck, or to prevent bad luck, the Koyukon sought and killed 
rare animals (R. Nelson 28,112-113). Native religious traditions, like other religious 
traditions, offer a wealth of protectionist ideals-but these traditions are imperfect, and 
even if they weren't, religions are no better than the individuals who enact-or fail to 
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enact-spiritual teachings. 
European settlers quickly transformed many indigenous peoples. For a price, 
natives of Southeast Alaska hunted otter to oblivion. Today the Inuit of Canada's Arctic 
use high-powered guns, fast-moving boats, steel traps, and snowmobiles to expedite 
hunting and trapping; Menominee Indians of Wisconsin engage in modern forestry for 
economic gain, as do the natives of Southeast Alaska-with disastrous ecological 
consequences (Buege 83). Presently, the Makah of Northwestern Washington State chase 
and kill whales with the aid of U. S. government funded helicopters. Before the advent of 
Caucasians, Natives were able to maintain the ecological balance partly because of their 
small populations and dearth of technology. Today's American natives enjoy some of the 
best medical care in the world, and their populations have grown accordingly. 
Furthermore, they would now be at a loss without gasoline-powered transport and the best 
in U. S. weaponry, with which to kill the animals they hunt. 
Like each of the previously discussed religious traditions, ancient and indigenous 
religious traditions and their adherents can be faulted for philosophies and practices that 
exploit and damage non-human entities and the environment. But like the other faiths 
presented, traditional spiritual beliefs offer a wealth of protectionist teachings for those 
who might care to notice. 
Summary 
Kant wrote that "the difference between the moral Christian and the moral non- 
Christian is that the former believes in a God... while the latter does not" (Gunn, 
"Traditional" 152-3). As Kant indicated, moral ideals such as compassion, simple living, 
and self-sacrifice are older and more pervasive than any particular faith-tradition; scripture 
and mythology advise compassionate attentive interaction with those that are at our 
mercy-not just toward human beings, but in our interactions with other living entities, 
and with nature as a whole. 
B. Consistency and Impartiality in Applied Protectionist Ethics. 
I have noted elements of partiality and inconsistency in each of the four theories I 
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have presented and examined. For the rest of this chapter I present a protectionist theory, 
the Minimize Harm Maxim, based on impartiality and consistency. 
Established Western ethical standards generally protect human life, even at 
tremendous cost. In search of a truly impartial and consistent application of this high 
standard, this section develops a theory based on this ideal standard for protecting life. 
This section does not contain my personal theory, but an exploration of the consistent 
application of current Western ethics by extending ethics amongst human beings to all 
other entities that have not been proven to be different in morally relevant ways. 
Therefore, if this theory seems extreme, it is only because our standards for 
protecting human life might be considered extreme. If it seems idealistic, it is only because 
we seek to protect human life idealistically. If it seems outrageous, it is only because we 
are not accustomed to treating other life forms with the same ethic we desire for human 
life forms. Though it may seem extreme, idealistic, or outrageous, in the absence of any 
morally relevant distinction between all human beings and all other animals, the Minimize 
Harm Maxim extends current accepted ethics between people to include all creatures that 
are similar in morally relevant ways. 
Toward this end, I offer three premises, followed by an ethical maxim and a 
handful of sub-points. Finally, I apply these premises and maxims in both real and 
hypothetical cases. 
MINIMIZE HARM MAXIM 
1. Premise One: All living entities are morally considerable. 
a. living entities and conatus: Living entities have conatus. Conatus is a drive to 
maintain one's own integrity or unity (Rollin 39), "an effort or striving" to maintain 
existence (Webster's). Conatus is fundamental to the "biological nature" of living beings 
(McGinn 81-99). Conatus is absent in all that lacks life. 
Without the tendency to persist, to resist genetic oblivion, living entities would not 
continue to exist. Without conatus living entities would be likely to starve or fall prey to 
other entities. Any being without a basic will to survive will not stay alive very long in a 
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world where only the most fit survive. Because of conatus, entities seek food, propagate, 
and move away from predators. 
Feedback systems are evidence of conatus: 
When anything starts to go wrong, some sensory device perceives the trouble and sends a message... 
that acts to set things right. If sunshine strikes your skin cells, with possible overheating or damage 
from the ultraviolet component, heat receptors may notify your brain, which then stimulates muscles 
to act in ways that cause you to walk to a shady tree. The skin cells themselves can perceive the 
problem and respond by making the pigment melanin, another way of putting vulnerable cells in the 
shade. If blood sugar drops to a functionally deficient level, it is perceived and corrective measures 
are taken by the conversion of glycogen or fat reserves into sugar, or perhaps just by eating. 
(Williams 120) 
The idea of conatus is thus applicable to body parts, such as skin or a spleen. A 
morally considerable living entity as a whole is morally preeminent over body parts 
(discussed in the last section of this chapter), but the Minimize Harm Maxim protects body 
parts. 
b. morally considerable: Subjects-of-a-life are morally considerable in Regan's 
theory. In Singer's theory sentient beings are morally considerable. In Linzey's theory all 
of creation is morally considerable out of duty to the Divine. Natural teleological entities 
are morally considerable in Taylor's theory. The Minimize Harm Maxim asserts that all 
entities with conatus are morally considerable, and ought to be taken into account when 
determining actions that might affect that living entity. 
In the Minimize Harm Maxim, moral considerability is granted to all living entities 
because they have conatus-an interest in survival-that can be harmed or thwarted. 
Inasmuch as every living entity seeks to survive, if we are to protect this tendency in 
human beings, we ought to respect this tendency in all entities. 
Modern Western ethics protects the human urge to preserve our existence as 
persons" (P. Taylor, "Inherent" 25). Thus Western ethics recognizes human beings as 
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morally considerable. Both civil law and human morality reflect personal human interest in 
continuation-in resisting harm and avoiding death. For the sake of consistency and 
impartiality, as outlined in the introduction, the Minimize Harm Maxim offers moral 
considerability impartially and equally to all living entities, and assures that each entity 
with conatus is allowed to exist in its own right, along with all others. 
c. conatus and Spinoza: Conatus is "the force in every animate creature toward 
the preservation of its existence" (Webster's). In Spinoza's writing, conatus is virtue, 
which is power, which is understanding; the knowledge of God is the greatest 
understanding one can have (Spinoza XXV). 
In Spinoza's great work, Ethics, conatus defines living individuals (Scruton 457). 
"Everything in so far as it is in itself endeavors to persist in its own being, " and such 
endeavoring "is nothing else than the actual essence of that thing" (Spinoza III, vi and 
vii). 
Spinoza's metaphysical ideas about individuals and matter have strong implications 
for his ethics (Scruton 451). Spinoza reasoned that God, being omnipotent, omniscient, 
and omnipresent, must be everything: "Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be 
conceived without God" (Spinoza I, xv). God is indwelling in all things, and each entity 
acts according to the will of God. "... all things are determined by the necessity of divine 
nature for existing and working in a certain way (Spinoza I, xxix). If God is everything, 
then nothing is separate from God, and there can be no world outside of God. Spinoza 
concluded that all of nature-all that exists-must be God (Spinoza V): God and the 
universe are one and the same. 
Spinoza was interested in philosophy as a way of life (Baird 105). He concluded 
that "God is all, " and believed we ought to live accordingly: "do only those things which 
love and morality advise" (Spinoza II , 
iv a). Because he asserted that we share in divine 
nature, he believed that we should "act only from God's command" (Spinoza II, iv a). 
Spinoza asserted that the motivating power behind all of our actions is self- 
preservation-conatus. "The very essence of a human being is desire, that is, a striving by 
which a man tries to preserve his existence... " (Spinoza IV). Furthermore, the highest 
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virtue is conatus-to endeavor (Spinoza IV, xxii). "The more each one seeks what is 
useful to him, that is, the more he endeavors and can preserve his being, the more he is 
endowed with virtue" (Spinoza IV, xx). He reaches this conclusion because: "No one can 
desire to be blessed, to act well, or live well, who at the same time does not desire to... 
exist" (Spinoza IV, xxi). For Spinoza, striving for existence is the foundation of virtue, 
and to "act absolutely according to virtue is nothing else in us than to act under the 
guidance of reason, to live so, and to preserve one's being (these three have the same 
meaning) on the basis of seeking what is useful to oneself' (Spinoza IV. xxiv). 
Every living entity, according to Spinoza, is perpetually engaged in the endeavor to 
persist in its being, to maintain the actualization of its own essence, which is God. 
Because this urge is synonymous with the divine, each entity that has conatus finds 
happiness dependent on the level of success in preserving its existence. Our behaviour is 
guided by conatus, by God, and this impulse for self-preservation leads human beings to 
understanding, the highest form of which is the knowledge of God (Spinoza IV, xxviii, 
Schacht 93). Spinoza viewed God as the root source and ultimate means of salvation and 
self-preservation. Ultimately, conatus-the endeavor to persist shared by all living 
entities-is nothing more nor less than the power of God (Shahan 131). 
Knowing that God is behind our endeavor to survive, and knowing that God is 
present in all other beings in a similar way, has an influence on what we ought to do. In 
Spinoza's writing, conatus is a natural, virtuous, pathway to happiness, power, 
understanding, and the knowledge of God (Spinoza IV). 
d. conatus as opposed to teleology--avoiding epistemological problems: In the 
most basic sense, conatus is the essence of teleology, the "drive, force, or urge possessed 
by a thing which is directed towards the preservation of its own being" (Runes 61). 
Animals, unlike stones, maintain themselves: they avoid injury, resist threats, and restore 
themselves when damaged (Scruton 47). In this sense teleology is synonymous with 
conatus. But teleology implies additional concepts such as "design, " "purpose, " "will, " 
and "final cause" (Webster's). An examination of "will, " demonstrates why "conatus" is 
preferable to "teleology. " 
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Ethical theories almost all include an element of "will" as an important criterion. 
Albert Schweitzer, known for holding an all-encompassing ethic of reverence for life, 
based his moral code on "will to live. " Critics noted that "will" is "a conscious mental 
activity, and thus unlikely to occur in plants, micro-organisms, and other life forms that 
evidently lack the neurophysiological equipment to engage in conscious mental activity" 
(Warren 34-5). By this definition plants have no will, yet Schweitzer included all of 
nature-even snowflakes-in his moral universe. 
Why did Schweitzer include "will"? Why is a mental function considered relevant 
to moral consideration? 
Conatus removes all mental aspects from moral considerability. Conatus does not 
require mental awareness of any kind. Philosophers (or biologists) who attempt to 
determine mental capacities, or to ascertain specific mental states, run the risk of choosing 
attributes that are more human-like, or more highly valued by humans, but which are not 
morally relevant (as noted in the four theories previously examined). 
J. S. Mill epitomizes the pitfalls of such an endeavor (as discussed in Chapter 
One): "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied" (18). As noted, it 
is epistemologically problematic to determine the mental, emotional, or psychological 
abilities or conditions of pigs, barracudas, whirligig beetles, or our fellow human beings. 
Any such assessment is likely to be biased as we have only our own mental state from 
which to assess those of all other entities (A. Taylor 257). Mill's generalities and 
assumptions do not seem to hold any philosophical strength. (The fact that this statement 
has been quoted and re-quoted merely stands as evidence of our tendency to believe that 
human existence is somehow more valuable, and therefore more justified, than any other 
form of life. ) For the sake of consistency, mental state ought not to be a factor for moral 
considerability, as it is not a factor with regard to the moral considerability of human 
beings. In any case, mental assessments of other entities entail epistemological problems 
and human bias. 
When moral considerability rests on teleology, mental state (such as "will" or 
"desire") becomes relevant. Those who base moral considerability on teleology often 
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argue that it is wrong to "kill a being that has a very powerful desire to go on living" 
(Frey, "Autonomy" 51). Yet it remains unclear how we might apprehend such "desire" in 
other entities. 
The epistemological problems entailed in determining the mental states and 
capacities of other entities, indicates that and other mental states, ought not to be a 
factor for moral considerability: 
My inclination is to purge all biological discussion of mentalist interpretation, If I should propose 
that a mosquito turns upwind whenever it detects increased carbon dioxide so that it can find a 
breathing animal to feed on, I am talking about its adaptive programming, not about its understanding 
or thinking. Likewise, when I propose that Suleiman the Bloodthirsty, a Moroccan potentate some 
centuries back, amassed a large harem in order to maximize his genetic representation in future 
generations, I would not be implying that this is what he consciously wished. I would be talking 
about the adaptive programming that was precisely organized for this effect. (Williams 72) 
Adaptive programming is evidence of conatus-striving to persist-a fundamental 
attribute of all living entities. 
Most protectionist philosophers include mental desire in their ethical theories. 
Peter Singer writes: "Apart from individuals whose lives are so miserable that they do not 
wish to continue living, the only individuals likely to have no preferences for continued life 
will be those incapable of having such preferences because they are not self-conscious and 
hence are incapable of conceiving of their own life as either continuing or coming to an 
end" ("Animal" 9). Singer assumes that mental preference for continued existence is 
morally relevant ("Animal" 254): the "obviously relevant issue is whether non-human 
animals have the same interest in continued life as normal humans... " ("Animal" 6). 
Singer refers to mental interest. 
In Singer's view certain life forms (such as those that have no grey matter) cannot 
be assumed to have a preference for (or interest in) existence, and they are therefore not 
morally considerable. But all living entities have a conatus-based interest in living. The 
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problems entailed in Singer's position on the importance of "will" comes to the fore if the 
word "conscious" is added and if his use of the mental term, "preference" is replaced with 
a term that admits of conatus, "biological interest: " "Apart from individuals whose lives 
are so miserable that they do not [consciously] wish to continue living, the only individuals 
likely to have no [biological interest in] continued life will be those incapable of having 
[conscious] preferences... " ("Animal" 9). These additions reveal the ambiguous nature of 
Singer's assertion. This highlighting of biological interest as opposed to conscious 
preference reveals the importance of distinguishing between the two. Every living entity 
has a biological interest in persistence. The mental state of a boll weevil, chinchilla, or my 
neighbour, is indeterminate. But both science and common sense indicate that living 
entities function in order to avoid oblivion and maintain genetic identity over time-they 
all have conatus, a biological interest in survival. 
The work of Singer (and many others) ignores the fact that living beings would 
cease to exist if they did not strive to persist. Biologically speaking, all living entities have 
a "will" to persist, without this "will" they would not survive. In the words of the marine 
biologist George Liles: "the cells and organs that make life possible had better be well 
designed, because the job of living is formidable" (Williams 72-3). If we did not function 
explicitly to persist, we would cease to exist as living entities. Even with conatus, many 
living entities-entire species-are unable to survive. 
The inherent uncertainty involved in apprehending `will" in other living entities is 
reason enough to avoid teleology, and all that this term implies. Conatus is a more 
fundamental and identifiable aspect of living entities, and therefore a more philosophically 
sound basis for moral considerability. 
e. interests: Recall Regan's clarification of two distinctive types of "interest, " 
active and passive, such that the good of an entity can either be consciously sought or a 
passive reality of their biological existence. He talks about one being interested in, versus 
something being in one's interest ("Nature" 22). This distinction is clear when viewed in 
the context of children, who often are interested in things that are not in their interest. 
Most philosophers (including Regan and Singer) include consciousness in their assessment 
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of moral considerability. When based on conatus, Protectionism requires no conscious 
interest in persistence, and no mental assessment. 
Conatus is present in all living beings because persistence is always in such a 
being's interest. Conatus, as a basic criterion for moral consideration, is a biological 
interest. Conatus entails something being in one's good. Plants have conatus. They have 
an interest in sun and water-to have sun and water is in their interest (Goodpaster, "On 
Being" 319). Biological needs are fundamental for the survival of a tree, and are distinct 
from any mental state ascribed to trees by people: "The interests at stake are clearly those 
of the living things themselves, not simply those of the owners or users or other human 
persons involved" ("On Being" 319). Both a snapdragon and a human being have a 
good-their interests-that can be realized or thwarted. Conatus does not require a 
conscious interest in persistence. 
A theory based on conatus avoids the impossibility of assessing where 
consciousness (or pain) begins and ends, what mental (or physical) realities are 
experienced (or not experienced) in other beings, and where certain lines ought to be 
drawn in light of these epistemologically problematic details. Conatus, as the sole criterion 
for moral considerability, skirts the issue of "rights" and prevents one entity from being 
traded off against another for the possible greater advantages gained by the majority-or 
by the more powerful. The only factor of relevance in the Minimize Harm Maxim is 
whether or not an entity has conatus. Entities with conatus are not compared or weighed 
off one against another. All entities with conatus are equally deserving of moral 
considerability. 
Consistency and casuistry require like treatment of individuals with morally 
relevant similarities (Feinberg, Social 100). Conatus reaches the most basic similarity 
shared by all living entities, and it highlights the most basic sense of what it is to have an 
interest-to have something be in one's good. Just as a weeping willow is dependent on 
sun and water, all living entities have basic interests that allow them to persist as entities in 
their own particular way-they all have conatus. Conatus, then, is a criterion for moral 
considerability that includes all living entities because all such entities have an interest in 
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survival whether or not people think that they can feel, whether or not human beings 
believe they can think, and whether or not they are considered capable of reasoning. 
f. impartiality and moral relevance of conatus: Ethicists have persistently 
focused moral considerability on certain individuals and the interests of those individuals. 
Only the particulars of which individuals have varied, depending on which individual made 
and defended the ethical principles, and the breadth of their moral vision. 
Only in recent centuries have the interests of "others" (such as women and African 
Americans in the United States) been acknowledged and protected as a matter of justice. 
In Western societies the scope of ethical protection has been almost exclusively human, 
and it has often been narrow and sectarian even amongst Homo Sapiens. However, the 
trend has been to expand our ethical vision: 
... this aspiration toward the universal 
is the chief feature of the moral history of mankind. It is not 
that modern man is kinder, fairer, or more dutiful than his primitive forebears; in fact, man for man, 
he may be less kind, less fair, and less dutiful. It is, instead, that whatever his moral proclivities, they 
now encompass a larger number of people. The Apache warrior may have been far more loyal to his 
family and caring of his offspring than a contemporary professor of philosophy, but where the Apache 
would kill without remorse a warrior from another tribe, the philosopher would feel obliged not only 
to spare the life of a sociologist but to go to great lengths to ensure that the latter was given equal 
opportunity and personal liberty. (J. Wilson 194) 
We have demonstrated our ability to recognize and honour similar interests 
amongst a diversity of human beings. Protectionist philosophy is at the cutting edge of 
this outward ethical expansion. 
Some protectionists advocate an inverted approach to moral considerability 
whereby all beings are granted initial, unquestioned moral considerability (Birch 318). 
Any quest for moral considerability "will always serve to exclude beings from 
consideration, " and may be innately undesirable (Hayward 56). Our quest for criteria by 
which to include and simultaneously exclude individuals and species seems 
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counterproductive to the expansion of moral theory. Our past indicates that we "are 
subject to thresholds of moral sensitivity just as we are subject to thresholds of cognitive 
or perceptual sensitivity; " beyond such thresholds we are "morally blind" and suffer 
"disintegrative consequences analogous to `information overload' in a computer" 
(Goodpaster, "On Being" 313). Perhaps moral considerabdity ought to be expanded 
radically in order to carry us beyond this threshold along our path to an ever-expanded 
ethical vision. "The lesson of history is that we must open up the question of moral 
considerability and keep it open, not close it off again by instituting practices based on the 
latest, and no doubt mistaken, `final' criterion" (Birch 321). 
Refocusing philosophical protectionism on conatus avoids human bias that has, in 
the past, tended to exclude individuals that were not recognized as morally considerable, 
such as "slaves" and women. Conatus as a base requirement for moral considerability 
offers all living beings moral protection, and provides another step outward in Western 
ethical theory and practice. Protectionists hold moral aspirations to acknowledge the 
universal protection that is due to all living entities as a matter of impartiality and 
consistency, if we are to persist in protecting the lives of all human beings. 
While the outer edges of conatus may be just as difficult to define and delineate as 
those for subject-of-a-life, or sentience, an ethic based on conatus is vastly more inclusive, 
and far less partial. The distant edges of conatus may be obscure, but those entities that 
clearly qualify are greatly augmented, while those that occupy the grey zones are far 
removed from pressing current ethical dilemmas which involve elephants and horses, cattle 
and pigs, mice and guinea pigs. Conatus extends moral consideration to all living entities 
with which we consciously interact; all entities about which we specifically make moral 
decisions. 
How far might conatus carry this outward ethical expansion? Even protozoa have 
interests, e. g. things that are conducive to their well being (VanDeVeer, "Interspecific" 
67). We cannot know what it is to be a microbe, but there are certain things that are, and 
are not, in their interest. They have conatus, the urge to persist, and biological needs that 
must be fulfilled if they are to survive as the type of beings that they are. 
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Basing protection on conatus eliminates partial assessments of which entities ought 
to be protected. Most of us have never seen a protozoa, but these one-celled organisms 
are morally considerable under the Minimize Harm Maxim. Conatus grants moral 
considerability to living entities whether or not we know them personally, whether or not 
they seem insignificant, beautiful or noble, alien or detrimental-or even which life-forms 
are harmful to human enterprises. All of these, along with power, consciousness, and 
sentience are mere derivatives of "the more basic right of a being to pursue its own good" 
(Regan, "Exploring" 82). 
An entity with conatus, whether protozoa or human being, is morally considerable 
under the Minimize Harm Maxim, and must be taken into account when making decisions 
that impact these entities. There is no basis on which to assume that the conatus of one 
individual, or one species, is weaker, more valiant, or in some way more important than in 
other beings. In the Minimize Harm Maxim the interests of all that have something that is 
in their interest count morally, human or non-human. Plants, bacteria, and all primates are 
equally morally considerable. 
The Minimize Harm Maxim is an ideal ethic that aspires to be consistent and 
impartial, and therefore carries current Western ethics with regard to human life to its 
logical extreme. As a matter of philosophic consistency, the Minimize Harm Maxim 
asserts that if human life ought to be protected then every life ought to be protected. All 
life ought to be protected regardless of mental state, central nervous system, subject-of-a- 
life status, or species because living entities have conatus, an interest in persisting as the 
type of entity that each is. In the absence of a morally relevant distinction between all 
people and every other animas, all living entities ought to be morally considerable. 
2. Premise Two: To persist as a living entity necessarily entails harm. 
"The process of life and evolution are such that without the destruction of life there 
can be no life" (Lee 305). Ungulates tread on fungi; carnivores chew on ungulates. 
Organisms live on and within our bodies and the bodies of those we harm. All life forms 
will eventually "be eaten or otherwise consumed by animals: by predators, ... 
by microbes 
or by auto-digestion" (Webster 81). Everything eats and is eaten. Life is sustained by the 
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ecological process of "mutual predation" (diZerega 28). 
Differing interests are not always compatible. Individuals compete with individuals... While there is 
symbiosis in nature, live and let live, interaction for mutual benefit there are also conflicts of interest. 
Nature may not entirely be red in tooth and claw, but certainly we cannot wish away the fact that, in 
many forms, blood is shed. Fortunately, we are not called upon to police the biosphere. (L. Johnson 
244) 
There is a great deal of harm we cannot avoid. It may seem regrettable, but "not 
even in principle could we prevent all injuries... We cannot prevent injuries even to 
ourselves, let alone throughout the biosphere, but we can strike and maintain balances" (L. 
Johnson 244-245). When one must harm to satisfy basic interests, such actions are not 
morally reprehensible. 
Basic interests are essential to the maintenance of life. Food is a basic interest 
because we cannot persist individually without food. There are very few basic interests: 
food, water, air, our immediate safety, and (depending on the climate and species) clothing 
and shelter. 
Just because bloodshed is an unavoidable aspect of life on earth does not indicate 
that we may as well kill and be killed with wild abandon (Luke 41). Morality does not 
seek what is common, but what we ought to do. Ethics require us to speak the truth, 
though being completely honest in all situations seems impossible. Similarly, though it 
seems to be impossible to maintain all entities in all situations, we are called upon to strive 
to preserve and protect life. 
Ultimately, all that now lives will die; all that exists will perish. The life of a may 
fly just a few hours of flight-is not a cause to give up, but a reason to contemplate the 
value of a few hours of life. The Minimize Harm Maxim does not enjoin the prevention of 
all harm because this is not possible; it only asks that we minimize harm. 
3. Premise Three: Any hierarchy of moral considerability is indefensible. 
a. innate human bias: For as long as history has been recorded, philosophers 
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have grappled with their place in the world of living beings. Western philosophers have 
most often proposed a hierarchy; the one who proposes the hierarchy usually places 
themselves, or their kind, at the pinnacle. Our assessments of other organisms have been 
based on personal preference and vested interests, and a narrow human vision of what life 
entails. 
... such ranking 
inevitably leads us to value most that which is either most useful to us 
(economically or aesthetically) or most like us. To give more or greater rights to porpoises over 
sharks and kittens over cockroaches because the former exhibit a greater "richness or experience" is to 
beg the question. Whose standards are the correct ones? The shark and the cockroach appear 
perfectly content with their respective (depth of) life experiences. Certainly their experience has 
served them well enough in terms of evolutionary survival. What we understand by "rich experience" 
it turns out, is experience that most closely resembles the kind enjoyed by [normal adult] human 
beings. (Thiele 176) 
Hierarchies have also been set amongst human beings. In the Western world there 
has generally been a hierarchy of human beings, with men over women and slaves on the 
lowest tier of humanity. In the United States Native Americans were once considered 
"less than fully human" (Orlans 3). Western morality and behaviour have often reflected 
an attitude of European superiority, and from this core prejudice we built hierarchies that 
delineated moral considerability amongst human beings. 
In current Western ethics there is no legitimate hierarchy of moral considerability 
among human beings. Yet we persist in applying a hierarchy that places Homo Sapiens 
above all other species. 
"Any judgment we make about the subjective value of human life relative to the 
subjective value of non-human life is likely to be profoundly biased" (A. Taylor 257). 
Western scholars have engaged in much philosophical speculation to delineate exactly 
what makes us different from all other animals. Our "philosophic" assertions seem rather 
like our superstition that a four-leaf clover is luckier than a three-leaf clover, or luckier 
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than a sand lily. Myths regarding our place in nature have become accepted "truths. " We 
claimed that human beings were closer to God, had souls and rationality, used tools and 
language... and in any case, we were the ones making and defending the rules for moral 
considerability. 
More recent scholarship has challenged these older assumptions. Mary Midgley 
writes: 
The general point is that other animals clearly lead a much more structured, less chaotic life than 
people have been accustomed to think, and are therefore, in certain definite ways, much less different 
from men than we have supposed. .. 
Jour assumed differences were] built up on a supposed contrast 
between man and animals which was formed by seeing animals not as they were, but as projections of 
our own fears and desires. We have thought of the wolf always as he appears to the shepherd at the 
moment of seizing a lamb from the fold. But this is like judging the shepherd by the impression he 
makes on the lamb at the moment when he finally decides to turn it into lamb chops. east 25) 
Maybe a four-leaf clover brings good luck, maybe the wolf is as conniving as Little 
Red Riding Hood would have us believe, and maybe Homo Sapiens is more God-like than 
all other animals, but empirical evidence does not support any of these assertions. Our 
esteemed place amongst the myriad creatures seems little more than oft-repeated myth. 
Yet these myths have prevented us from accepting moral kinship with other animals. 
Our history of self-assessment in relation to other living entities reveals our 
creaturely limitations; we seem patently unable to fairly assess characteristics that are 
radically different from our own. As a result, we have "put a fictitious gulf between 
ourselves and other animals, to the great detriment of the latter" (Singer, "Animal" 3). 
"Our limited ability to relate to other entities has informed our stilted value system on 
which we have built laws and standard practices; " other creatures can rightly and 
reasonably be judged only "in terms of their ability to carry out the way of life appropriate 
for that animal" (Gunn, "Traditional" 151). 
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Even if we can show that some animals have a more complex physiological organization than others, 
we haven't, I think, hit on any really justified sense for `lower' and `higher', especially since we 
increasingly find out that some of the apparently similar animals may be extremely complex in the 
organizations of their ecological relationships or, as in the case of some of the insects, their social 
relationships. (Brophy 67) 
Human beings have tended to value and reward attributes that we perceive to be 
specifically human. But every creature is miraculous in its own right. Consider the 
puffin's ability to negotiate-unaided by devices-on the water, in the air, on land, and 
under water. The puffin has a remarkable bill, can land on tiny ledges on vertical cliffs, 
tirelessly feeds young chicks, remains loyal to one mate unto death, catches fish without 
mechanized help, and survives in the most inclement weather without artificial clothing. 
Puffins even manage to settle inter-puffin disputes without harm or death. Are the 
characteristics for which we have long praised and privileged ourselves any more 
remarkable or morally relevant than those of the puffin? 
... humans have distinctive traits that members of other species lack such as rationality and moral 
agency. ... the members of non-human species also have distinctive traits that humans lack, such as 
the homing ability of pigeons, the speed of the cheetah, and the ruminative ability of sheep and cattle. 
... there 
is no point in claiming that the distinctive traits that humans have are more valuable than 
the distinctive traits that members of other species possess because there is no non-question-begging 
standpoint from which to justify that claim. (Sterba 193) 
The Minimize Harm Maxim acknowledges the epistemological difficulties of 
assessing traits across species, and our tendency to be biased. Due to the ethical 
importance of impartiality, epistemological difficulties, and in light of a long history of 
human bias, the Minimize Harm Maxim permits no hierarchy with regard to the moral 
considerability of living entities. 
b. empirical evidenice: Modern scholarship indicates that we are no more or less 
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unique or marvelous than any other species. In The Origin of Species Darwin wrote: 
... 
like the other animals, man is subject to slight variations from individual to individual (no two 
people are exactly alike), and these variations are heritable. Man also reproduces in greater numbers 
than can survive... Any species with an extended range will tend to diversify; individualized, 
geographically separated varieties will appear. This happens with man: Africans, Eskimos, and 
Japanese are, to the biologist's trained eye, distinct varietal forms. Moreover, as biologists had always 
known, it is easy to fit man into the great classificatory scheme: he is a primate, a mammal, and so 
on. Once these classifications are seen as related to lines of evolutionary descent, it is clear that man 
also belongs to a particular line of descent. (Rachels, "Darwin" 100) 
Darwin's work pushed us to see that we are closely related to other animals: we 
share an estimated 99% of a chimpanzee's genetic composition (Orlans 98); our "blood 
and DNA put us closer to the chimpanzee than horses are to donkeys" (Ryder Animal 
331). 
the genetic code is in fact literally identical in all animals, plants and bacteria that have ever been 
looked at. All earthly living things are certainly descended from a single ancestor. ... From a 
molecular point of view, all animals are pretty close relatives of one another and even of plants. You 
have to go to bacteria to find our distant cousins, and even then the genetic code itself is identical to 
ours. (R. Dawkins 12) 
In the last analysis we are merely another herd of animals, with close relatives in 
the rest of the animal world, and with our own tendencies, advantages, and shortcomings. 
Our genetic code carries not only "impressive cleverness, " but also remarkable 
"stupidities; " human beings are the product of natural selection, not rational planning 
(Williams136). 
At last, the life sciences have yielded a fuller wisdom. We are natural creatures. The oxygen we 
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breathe is a gift of the plant kingdom, just as the carbon dioxide we exhale is their nourishment. Our 
food is digested by symbiotic microorganisms without which we would starve. The DNA code that 
defines us is composed of the same four molecular letters that define all life. The salinity of our blood 
is the same as that of the sea from which we came... Nature gave birth to us. Nature sustains us. 
Nature is us. (Partridge 11) 
In light of such evidence, we cannot help but see our "comparative insignificance, " 
we are just one species amongst many (Hill 219). Today, not so very long after the days 
of Darwin, few deny our biological proximity with the rest of the natural menagerie. 
Indeed, it would be difficult to deny such abundant empirical evidence. Whatever we wish 
to call ourselves, however we wish to classify ourselves, we are part of a great glob of 
striving conatus, part of a mass of entities that swarm the earth seeking to persist. Such a 
realization indicates that it is time to "discard speciesism along with all our other delusions 
of grandeur, and accept our natural place in the universe" (Ryder, Animal 334). 
Giving up our sense of our own unique status is very important to morality because 
it undermines the long held view that we "are fundamentally different and deserve unique 
or sole moral consideration" (Orlans 16). Yet "Darwinism, despite establishing the now 
almost universally held belief in the physical kinship of men and animals; did not cause 
most people to take the logical next step of admitting moral kinship" (Ryder, Animal 331). 
Why? 
We have denigrated other animals for centuries. Our inclination to see living things 
within a hierarchical order, and to place ourselves at the top of this hierarchy, has helped 
to prevent us from accepting our rightful place in the animal world. With the advent of 
Darwinsim, our negative perception of "animals" has caused some problems for our self- 
perception-the way we perceive beasts has become the way we perceive ourselves 
(Rodman 18). It has been difficult for us to accept our "lowly" place amongst the cattle 
and sheep, competing for food around the global manger. Yet "it does not follow, merely 
because we are descended from apes, that we ought to think less of ourselves, that our 
lives are less important" (Rachels, "Darwin" 99). But in fact there is little reason to look 
down on other animals. They have many traits that we admire. "They have social 
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instincts, enjoy companions, are sympathetic with the plight of those to whom they are 
close, help their fellows, knowingly risk their lives, grieve in the loss of life, are gratified 
by others' approval of their behavior" (Orlans 14). If we could shed our human bias we 
might recognize that understanding our place in nature need not involve a lowering of self. 
It is time that we see "animal" not as derogatory but as `us. ' . 
We are animals, just one 
species amongst millions. 
c. consistency and impartiality: Given empirical evidence that we are just one 
remarkable species amongst many, on what logical grounds can we conclude that only 
human life is innately morally considerable? It is difficult to justify our extensive regard 
for human life when balanced with a remarkable disregard for the lives of other species. 
Extreme regard for human life is evidenced in our respect for "jellyfish babies. " In 
the Pacific Islands, where nuclear testing has caused birth defects, women have given birth 
to "jellyfish babies. " In our current ethical system, "jellyfish babies" are morally 
considerable simply because they are born of a human being. Yet descriptions of these 
"children" belie all definitions of what most of us understand to be human: "These babies 
are born like jellyfish. They have no eyes. They have no heads. They have no arms. 
They have no legs. They are not shaped like human beings at all. But they are being born 
on the labor table. The most colorful, ugly things you have ever seen. Some of them have 
hairs on them. And they breathe" (Keju-Johnson 37). 
Under current notions of moral considerability, these "jellyfish" are offered every 
opportunity to live, while healthy adults from other species are considered expendable. On 
what morally relevant grounds do we take the life of a chimp while protecting the life of a 
"jellyfish baby? " An ethic that protects the life of a "jellyfish baby" and allows for the 
slaughtering lambs is the epitome of inconsistency. What morally relevant criterion offers 
moral considerability to these living blobs, but not to turkey vultures or petunias? Is there 
any point at which a deformed entity-born of woman-is not morally considerable? 
This perplexing case raises another question with regard to partiality, consistency, 
and evolution. Currently it is permissible to experiment on non-human primates. At some 
point in history, an "ape" gave birth to a "human being. " If we could identify this historic 
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moment of transition, and the primates involved, our current ethical standards would deny 
the life of the parent (an "ape") moral considerability, while the offspring (a "human") 
would have complete and full moral status. This means that the mother could be freely 
exploited as "an animal" for science, while the "human" children would be entitled to 
experiment on their own parents! 
From embryology to ecosystems our current knowledge indicates that we are not 
separate or distinct from the rest of life. Nor are our particular attributes superior to the 
attributes held by other species. The uncertain evolutionary transition of primates from 
one species to another, and the perplexing case of "jellyfish babies, " highlights 
inconsistency and partiality in our hierarchy of moral considerability. Because impartiality 
and consistency are basic philosophic principles, they ought to be upheld, and hierarchies 
of moral considerability rejected. 
d. the moral ideal: Regan, Singer, and Taylor each demonstrated that species is 
not a morally relevant criterion. "Moral rules are species-neutral: the same rules that 
govern our treatment of humans should also govern our treatment of non-humans" 
(Rachels, Created 208). Any moral theory that makes distinctions based purely on species 
is untenable. "Anyone who wants to be rational and honest [ought to] recognize an equal 
obligation to consider the effects of his activity and inactivity upon the welfare of members 
of other species as those upon his own" (Sprigge, "Metaphysics" 124). 
This is not to suggest that there is no hierarchy within human social structures or 
legal systems, or that such a hierarchy is inherently immoral. Human societies are rife with 
hierarchies based on considerations such as finance, employment, and appearance, none of 
which are morally relevant criteria. Hierarchies abound, but the Western moral ideal, the 
ideal on which we tend to build our constitutions and our legal systems, permits no 
hierarchy of human beings with regard to moral considerability. Theoretically, the life 
and welfare of each human being is as morally considerable as any other. 
Practically speaking, we have not yet achieved our ideal. Evidence indicates that 
rich people who commit crimes are less apt to be arrested, and less apt to go to prison, 
than comparatively poorer people. Our practices do not always live up to our moral 
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ideals, but moral philosophy is concerned with what ought to be, not with what is. It is 
the duty of moral philosophers to develop ethical theories based on human ideals. "One of 
our most fundamental obligations (a sine qua non of ethicality) is discovering our 
obligations" (Birch 322). 
As a society we hold the ideal that all human beings, regardless of finances, 
employment, or appearances are equally morally considerable. There is no morally 
acceptable hierarchy for human life. 
Due to the absence of any morally relevant distinction between humans and all 
other animals, the rejection of a hierarchy of moral considerability for humans ought to be 
extended to other living entities. If life is to be protected, then consistency and impartiality 
require that all life be protected. The Minimize Harm Maxim asserts that all living entities 
are equally morally considerable. This is not to say that all creatures ought to be treated 
the same as humans, any more than a sick budgie ought to be treated the same as a 
starving budgie. The interests of each living entity must be considered equally along with 
the interests of each other entity. Conatus as the foundation of moral considerability 
eliminates hierarchy; all living entities are equally morally considerable. 
From this humble base emerges an ethical maxim theoretically expansive enough to 
protect all living entities. 
4. MAXIM: Minimize Harm. 
I propose the extremely simple ethical maxim "harm less rather than more, " or 
Minimize Harm. This maxim is informed by a handful of sub-points, presented in 
descending order of importance. 
Harm is defined as that which interferes with or frustrates conatus, the force 
toward self-preservation, inherent in every living entity. 
5. Sub-Point One: Maximize Noninterference. 
a. toward other entities: Our moral obligation, long lost but hopefully not beyond 
our grasp, is to "let beings be" (Zimmerman 127-128). If we are to respect other entities 
we must allow them to "function spontaneously" in accord with their own nature (L. 
Johnson 163). Minimizing harm requires that human beings interfere as little as possible in 
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the existence of other entities. 
Noninterference requires that we allow other entities to establish their own 
population balance, and that we allow them to live and die without human interference. 
There are instances in which human beings feel morally obligated to interfere. For 
instance, to prevent starvation, and in the aftermath of natural disasters. 
Many argue that starvation is a more prolonged and painful death than a hunter's 
bullet, but this form of "population control" omits important factors. For instance, one 
ought to consider the terror of the hunted, risk-of-injury in pursuit, risk of wounding with 
a poor shot, damage to smaller entities and the environment in the act of hunting, and the 
mentality fostered by those who hunt and kill other living entities-violent killing harms 
those who engage in violence, and their communities. 
In actuality, hunted animals that are at risk of starvation make up an extremely 
small percentage of "game" animals. Deer constitute about two percent of the animals 
killed by hunters in North American each year. The remaining 98 percent of hunted 
species are far from overpopulated. In fact, in most areas, their numbers have been 
drastically reduced over the last century (Luke 38). For instance, there is certainly not an 
overpopulation of mallards, yet millions of mallards are killed annually by hunters (Orlans 
201). 
Hunting is a self-perpetuating activity. Hunters and trappers who interfere with 
predator populations, may protect some animals from starvation, but in the long run 
hunters cause wildlife starvation and other damage to herds from which they hunt. 
Through bounties on wolf and coyote pelts, through the diligent efforts of farmers against 
cougar and bear, hunters completely removed most "dangerous" predators, including 
wolves, grizzlies, and cougar, from much of the United States, and almost all of Western 
Europe. 
Eliminating or reducing predators to increase "prey" has become a common 
"wildlife management" strategy. The wolf-control program in Alaska current is currently 
reducing the wolf population in order to inflate caribou herds for the sake of caribou 
hunters. It is easy to see the cycle repeating: hunters will soon be able to argue that there 
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is an abundance of caribou, which must be killed to prevent starvation. 
Consequently, this form of "management" is self-perpetuating. Hunters are 
expected to destroy a certain quota of animals, and that number of "excess" caribou, or 
deer, will be purposefully replaced. "Wildlife management" will make sure there is an 
equally excessive crop the following year. 
Hunters are interested not just in the continuation of those species that they enjoy hunting, but also in 
the proliferation of those game species in sufficient numbers to maximize pleasurable hunting 
opportunities. The proliferation of game animals sometimes requires the complete or near 
extermination of natural predators-a case in point being the recent killing of wolves in Alaska to 
generate greater numbers of elk and caribou for human hunters to pursue. (Luke 38) 
Furthermore, hunters harm the herds from which they hunt. Hunters do not select 
sickly, thin, or aging animals that are likely to die over the course of a hard winter; hunters 
kill the healthiest animals they can find (Luke 38-39). As a result hunters reduce the 
genetic strength of herds. 
Hunting, trapping, and fishing are inherently exploitative. Wildlife "management" 
saves entities and habitat to suit human desires and ends, ultimately at the expense of 
numerous species. Because almost no one today hunts out of necessity, those who 
continue to hunt and fish "value their sport with animals more than they respect the lives 
of animals they pursue" (Dionys de Leeuw 373). In light of the biological fact that we do 
not need flesh in our diet, the human desires and ends that are met through hunting and 
fishing must be regarded as entertainment and recreation. 
Hunting is incompatible with the Minimize Harm Maxim. If hunters and "wildlife 
management" are sincerely interested in preventing "overpopulation" they might 
implement birth control serums, administered with guns, that have been successfully used 
on wild animals as diverse as deer and elephants (Dateline). (In her article, "A Problem of 
Concern, " Mary Midgley explains why this option may not be an economically viable 
alternative as yet, but more recent evidence indicates that these economic concerns may 
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already be solved (Dateline). 
The philosophic principles of consistency and impartiality do not permit hunting. 
We do not "cull" the "surplus" populations in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, or North Korea, even 
in cases of mass starvation. Even avid hunters are not likely to suggest that it is more 
humane to shoot starving peoples than leave them alone-or feed them. 
When human beings do not wish to feed people, we simply turn our backs and 
"allow nature to take its course. " Casuistry insists that we handle cases that are similar in 
morally relevant ways in a similar manner. Starvation versus "a quick bullet" -what's 
good for the goose is good for gander. If we are to be consistent and apply our ethical 
commitments impartially, we cannot condone hunting in any form, even under the guise of 
benevolent "population control. " The moral imperative of noninterference admits of our 
ignorance, and of our tendency to be selfish in "managing" other entities. Hunting is just 
one example of our inability to act in ways that truly benefit other species, as evidenced by 
our inconsistency. 
In the interest of setting forth ideals that are the best they can be-utopian-it 
might seem best to maximize benevolent interference. However, this entails 
epistemological problems. We must not only be wary of our motives, but also of our 
assumptions, and of our understanding of the needs of other creatures. We may not be 
able to recognize when other entities are afraid, distressed, or in pain. Other animals have 
different sensitivities to sound, temperature, and odor (Orlans 264). How can we know 
what is offensive or harmful from every other organism's point of view? We cannot be 
sure what is best for each and every entity; noninterference requires that we accept our 
limitations and our fallibility. Attempting to "manage" the lives and habitats of other 
entities is "normally futile, and frequently counterproductive. This is not just because we 
lack wisdom and power, but because introducing qualitative changes into ecosystems will 
generally result in less satisfaction of interests" (L. Johnson 244). Any action we take is 
almost certain to do more harm, overall, than good. "As simple `citizens' of the biosphere, 
we have no claim to the prerogatives of global zookeepers" (Thiele 177). Noninterference 
avoids these epistemological pitfalls by asserting that we must refrain from manipulating 
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and meddling in the lives of other living entities. 
This laissez-faire policy does not carry over to other human beings because we can 
communicate with other people and thereby avoid the epistemological problems entailed in 
"helping" other animals. Generally, it is assumed that human beings are entitled to more 
than mere existence; we are morally obligated to aid the poor, injured, or enfeebled (Gunn, 
"Traditional" 143). Where humans are concerned, because we are generally more similar 
to one another, we can be informed by other people regarding needs and preferences. 
Only with consent can we offer assistance. Our chance of causing harm under the guise of 
"assistance" increases exponentially as we move away from our family, our culture, and 
our species. 
Under the Minimize Harm Maxim humans may interfere only when they are 
directly responsible for acute suffering. For example, on behalf of a snake wounded by a 
shovel. (The importance of intention is discussed in this section, under subpoint three. ) 
Though we may not be able to help a wounded snake-or a dying human being, turning 
one's back on the suffering of others is morally repugnant, even in the face of helplessness. 
Consistency and impartiality require that we hold ourselves to the same standards for a 
snake, as we do for other people. If we choose to interfere for the sake of an entity 
harmed by people, interference ought to take the form of a permanent solution aimed at 
restoring the wild entity to its previous, independent condition and habitat. In all other 
instances the Minimize Harm Maxim requires noninterference. 
b. non-human habitats: For the sake of living entities, all of nature "should be 
treasured and the flourishing of ecosystems promoted" (A. Taylor 252). 
Habitat includes all areas where living entities dwell. Human-made things are part 
of our environment, even refuse dumps, which contain many life forms. If we create a 
park or a garbage dump outside our front door, then our environment is a park, or a 
dump. How we treat our environment, the world around us, affects our planet-and every 
other earthling. 
If we are to maximize non-interference, we must refrain from interfering with the 
habitats of other entities simply because "the conditions necessary for their existence [set] 
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valid claims against us which we are morally bound to fulfill" (P. Taylor, "Inherent" 28). 
Because the welfare of living entities is necessarily dependent on a "supportive 
environment" (A. Taylor 262), we must not harm the world around us. We cannot 
promote the good of manatees or dragonflies by destroying their natural homes (Regan, 
"Animal" 52). Maximizing noninterference requires that we avoid interfering with the 
environment. 
Consequently, we ought not to disrupt the lives of other animals, vegetation, water 
sources, or the earth itself. Animals and plants are dependent on one another for survival. 
Plants need the earth and the earth needs the biosphere, animals, and plants for renewal. 
To destroy habitat harms all living entities that are dependent on that particular place for 
sustenance and survival. The interconnected web of life-so common in the mythology of 
indigenous cultures, and so prominent in eastern religions-is now backed by science, and 
informs the Minimize Harm Maxim. Interconnectedness requires us to refrain from 
altering, destroying, or harming the environment in order to avoid harming other living 
entities. 
Human beings in the West have tended to assume that more biologically complex 
organisms are more morally considerable than biologically simpler organisms. Biological 
inter-dependence reverses this traditional Western hierarchy. Plants are critical for the 
survival of mammals, but the reverse is less often true. Therefore the protection of plant- 
life-of habitat-is central to the survival of larger organisms. For instance, pikas depend 
on local foliage for their sustenance, but pikas are not critical to the lives of the individual 
plants on which the pika depends. Our standard "hierarchy of importance" is reversed 
when we consider "the instrumental value of a population in terms of the health of an 
ecosystem: typically, plant populations have more instrumental value than animal 
populations and animals have more instrumental value than humans" (Hettinger 5). 
Instrumental value is of little importance in the Minimize Harm Maxim, but it 
demonstrates the difficulties of establishing a hierarchy of moral relevance, and reaffirms 
the quest for consistency and impartiality. Any assessment of value is relative and 
therefore lacks philosophical strength. All living entities are equally morally considerable. 
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Therefore we ought to avoid interfering with habitats if we wish to avoid harm to the 
animals that live in those habitats. Even to mindlessly turn over a stone will have an effect 
on organisms in the area-a plant, an insect, or many beings too small for our senses to 
perceive. 
Perhaps this is why Albert Schweitzer included snowflakes within his ethical 
system. He wrote that the ethical person "tears no leaf from its tree, breaks off no flower, 
and is careful not to crush any insect as he walks" (Thiele 177). He has been roundly 
criticized for including insentient organisms, and inanimate objects-a snowflake-under 
his protective ethical umbrella. But Schweitzer was correct-if we are to protect the 
musk ox, then we must protect the muskeg, and if we are to protect the muskeg, then we 
must protect the air, and the water-snowflakes. Schweitzer's ethic acknowledges that a 
fruit bat depends on the insect, which depends on the leaf, which depends on the water, 
which comes from a snowflake. All things are interconnected. If we are to protect the 
bat, or the bird, or the great cats, or ourselves, we must protect the environment. If we 
are to protect the water supply at large, we need to be mindful of how we treat even the'" 
tiniest snowflake that lands in our back yard. To allow other entities to flourish, we ought 
to refrain from meddling with the environment. 
c. non-encroachment: Noninterference carries the moral imperative not to 
encroach further into habitat: not to claim new territory for dams, roads, homes, 
museums, or garbage dumps. If we are to carry the protection of life to its logical 
extreme, we must not interfere with the environments of other entities. There are no 
exceptions. This is made possible by a no-growth, reduce and reuse policy for human 
beings. 
d. no -growth, reduce, reuse: The "flourishing of sentient non-human life on this 
planet requires an end to human population growth" (A. Taylor 264). In thirty years 
projections indicate that human population will have expanded by nearly four billion 
individuals. Correspondingly, demand for food will double and industrial output triple 
(Crisp, "Values" 75). Whether or not these predictions are correct, human populations 
have grown astronomically in the last century, and continue to grow exponentially to the 
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present day. If we are to maximize noninterference, we ought to commit to a no-growth 
policy for human populations. 
The greatest harm a human being can do is to have a child, especially in the 
capitalistic, resource-consuming West. Children in North America use a tremendous 
amount of resources in comparison with children in most other countries, such children in 
Fiji or Indonesia. Lifestyle choices, especially in the West, have done great damage to the 
environment (Stone 241). From abundant school supplies to extensive medical care, from 
well-packaged foods to highly mobile lifestyles, Americans, both children and adults, are 
mega-consumers, as are people in most of the Western world. In every country humans 
take a heavy toll on the environment, but humans in the Western world are probably the 
most environmentally destructive of all animals. Another aspect of reducing consumption 
is reuse and recycling. In order to minimize noninterference, human beings ought to 
commit to a no-growth population policy with extensive reuse and recycling programs. 
"The ethic of unlimited economic growth no longer seems viable given the finite 
nature of the resource base and especially the limits of the biosphere to support further 
expansion of human activity" (Gowdy 55). In the Minimize Harm Maxim, it is a moral 
imperative to minimize consumption. Not only our population, but our "cancerous growth 
of material production and consumption... [are] fast degrading or obliterating the natural 
habitats of wildlife species, multiplying the numbers of enslaved factory animals, and 
having increasingly deleterious effects on the quality of human life" (A. Taylor 264). If we 
persist at our current rate of consumption, the continued degradation and destruction of 
the environment will necessarily follow (Strong 100). The ongoing ecological degradation 
is the result of "a conflict between our moralities (and religions) and our visible and 
immediate economic interests" (Jamieson, "Moral" 9). The protection of other entities 
"can be secured only if human beings exercise restraint and reduce the demands... " 
(Vischer 31). 
For many people conatus entails bearing children. If we choose to breed, we ought 
to limit our reproduction to replacement numbers-one child per person-in order to 
minimize harm and maximize noninterference. We are not expected to disappear off the 
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face of the earth (though this might well bring about the greatest good to the greatest 
number of living entities). The Minimize Harm Maxim indicates that people ought to 
minimize harm: stop population growth, reduce the area we populate, reuse and recycle, 
and reduce the amount of resources that we consume. 
e. harm low on the food chain: The Minimize Harm Maxim requires that, because 
we must take the lives of other entities to fulfil our basic needs, we ought to take the lives 
of those lowest on the food chain. By killing low on the food chain, harm is kept to a 
minimum. 
Human beings ought to raise plants for consumption rather than animals. Animals 
must kill other animals, or other plants, in order to survive. Plants survive via 
photosynthesis, and do not harm other living entities. For this reason one ought to raise 
only vegetable crops, organisms that exist low down on the food chain, in order to 
minimize harm. 
6. Sub-Point Two: We may use other life forms only with consent. Into the 
nineteenth century non-human animals were tried in court for behaviour that human beings 
determined to be "wrong. " They were sentenced and sometimes excommunicated or 
executed according to human religion, human law, and human judgment (Evans). 
Today we recognize that because other animals do not use human language they 
are not legitimate fodder for our gallows. Also due to this communication gap, other 
animals cannot dissent, or consent, to "use" in science, or in the food, clothing, or 
entertainment industries. 
Under the Minimize Hann Maxim, except for basic needs where direct survival 
necessitates, we may only use other living entities for our purposes if "it brings greater 
advantages to the same individual, or [if] that individual gives consent" (Ryder, Animal 
326). Consent for exploitation may only be given verbally, by one who is proficient with 
human language. Except for our immediate and direct survival, we cannot morally justify 
the "intentional infliction of pain, " death, or other kinds of suffering, `without the 
consent... of the proposed victim" ("Narveson, "Animal" 165). 
This is consistent with current Western human ethics, which dictate that we are 
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generally free to be with those who choose to be with us. For instance, we risk 
harassment or stalking charges if we persist in the presence of those who do not choose 
our company. In contrast, with consent we may use others for certain types of research, 
child-rearing purposes, labour, finances, or artistic productions. Consent is critical. 
Because of the epistemological problems of understanding between species, we 
may not use other animals för any of our purposes. Under our current ethical system, 
forced servitude is illegal. For the sake of consistency and impartiality, this same standard 
must be extended to all that might fall prey to forced servitude. 
7. Sub-Point Three: Intentions Matter. We have all heard the adage that good 
intentions are not good enough. For practical purposes this may be true. However, 
intentions are very important where moral matters are concerned, even if they do not 
always bring about the best possible outcome. 
Intentions are the ultimate, personal guide for assessing the morality of our own 
acts. If Jex's very old great aunt drowns while she is bathing her in a large bathtub, Jex is 
not guilty of murder. She may be guilty of negligence, but not murder. Intentions do not 
necessarily affect outcomes: my great, great aunt is dead either way. But intentions do 
affect moral assessment. If Jex throws her aunt in a tub and intentionally drowns her, Jex 
is guilty of murder. As with this case, intentions are oftentimes the only difference 
between murder and accidental death, between stealing and borrowing, between cruelty 
and ignorance. 
Morality does not insist that people never die, or that we never kill others, only 
that we never purposely kill other human beings without due cause. For the sake of 
consistency, this ethic ought to be extended to all living entities. 
Even when good intentions result in bad effects, our ethical and legal system 
indicates that motivation is important in assessing guilt and assigning punishment. 
Sometimes we make mistakes-even in the tending of beloved children and companion 
a"irnals-and we are not morally culpable for the bad effects of such actions if we have 
good intentions and are not negligent. Some "crimes" become the best possible action if 
one has good intentions. For instance, if Maggie lives in a society that punishes theft with 
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death and offers no aid to the poor and needy, and if Maggie has no wealth of her own, 
she might be considered a moral exemplar if she steals to feed the needy. It would be 
unlikely that Maggie's intentions toward the ones harmed (the wealthy), were benevolent, 
though she does them no bodily harm. Yet her act would most likely be considered noble 
because it involves self-sacrifice for the needy-good intentions. The thief is more 
concerned about aiding the needy than she is about property rights, or her own safety. 
Because her intent is to preserve fife, her intentions are good. Intentions are critical for 
assessing the morality of certain acts. 
One who lives by the Minimize Harm Maxim will have benevolent intentions. 
Intending to be compassionate and gentle results in a benevolent life, with very different 
actions and results from one who lives a life guided by indifference or self-interest. 
Intentions may not make a difference in how one behaves-one might steal, or kill, or 
lie-but intentions have a tremendous effect on the overall life that one lives. An 
individual who sincerely intends to be gentle and benevolent toward all will generally be 
gentle and benevolent. Intentions direct behaviour. We cannot control results, only 
methods (Horsburgh, Non-Violence 42). 
Because harm cannot be avoided, harm is not in itself morally reprehensible. 
Intentions are critical in assessing which harms are immoral. For instance, harm that 
results from one's attempt to survive is morally acceptable. However, the same harm 
brought about without need is immoral. It is not the act itself-but one's intentions 
toward the entity that has been harmed-which ultimately determines the moral status of a 
deed. 
In the Minimize Harm Maxim, if one turns over a stone and crushes a pollywog out 
of ignorance, one is not morally culpable. But if one turns over a stone in order to crush a 
pollywog, that individual is morally culpable. Similarly, if one plants a pea-vine to harvest 
peas, and in the process steps on a spider, that person is not immoral. However, if one 
sees a spider and purposefully extinguishes its life, one is guilty because the harm was 
intentional and unnecessary, and under such conditions one is guilty under the Minimize 
Harm Maxim. Yet again, if one kills a small child by accident (not through negligence), 
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one is not immoral-a tragic act, yes; reprehensible, no. However, if one purposefully 
kills another small child via the same error, ignorance has become negligence, and the deed 
is morally reprehensible. If one fails to guard against repeating a moral error in the future, 
then one becomes morally culpable. Intentions determine moral culpability. 
Though intentions are critical, they entail epistemological difficulties. One cannot 
definitively know the intentions of another individual, and intentions are sometimes 
obscure even to the one who acts. Still, as is consistent with current Western ethics, 
intentions matter. 
Morality is, ultimately, a very personal endeavor. When an act is done specifically 
to cause harm, it is immoral and ought to be judged differently from an act that has a 
benevolent intent, but brings about the same harm. The acting agent will know best what 
has motivated an action. Though intentions cannot be definitively known or quantified by 
a jury, we acknowledge the importance of intentions in our ethical system and legal code 
under such terms as manslaughter (unintentional, reckless killing) and murder (intentional 
slaying). 
Intentions are critical because the Minimize Harm Maxim does not measure greater 
or lesser harm-needs and intentions of the one acting determine whether or not an act is 
immoral. It is morally acceptable to cause harm in order to satisfy basic needs. Neither is 
one morally culpable if they harm with good intentions, out of ignorance. Consistent with 
current Western ethics, all lives are equally protected. Due to the epistemological 
problems of comparing harms across species, the Minimize Harm Maxim does not 
compare suffering. In the Minimize Harm Maxim only the morality or immorality of one's 
act is relevant, and the Minimize Harm Maxim looks to the one who acts, not to the 
consequences, in order to assess morality. 
8. Sub-Point Four: Self-defense is Morally Permissible. Because living entails 
harm, there is a need for each living entity to defend itself from other living entities. Each 
living entity strives to persist, and may therefore harm any other living entity that poses a 
direct physical threat. Bacteria, humans, and polar bears can all pose direct threats to 
humans, and we are not morally culpable if we choose to defend ourselves, even if we 
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harm these other entities. 
a. minimize conflict: Self-defense is morally permissible but actions ought to be 
taken to minimize conflicts, and self-defense actions ought to be in proportion to the 
threat. 
The Minimize Harm Maxim requires moral agents to minimize the need for self- 
defense. For instance, if Molly lives in a society without laws or law enforcement, and she 
depends on pumpkins for survival, she is not wrong to frighten, threaten, or even harm 
another person to defend her food-source-even if she foolishly plants her produce in an 
unprotected place. Self-defense is acceptable if my subsistence, and therefore my 
existence is threatened. However, if Molly chooses to plant her pumpkins in an 
unprotected place, knowing that planting her crop in a different location would avoid 
confrontation, she is morally culpable for harming entities that come to feed on her 
pumpkins. One ought to avoid the need for self-defense, when possible. 
Similarly, if we know that intensive planting of crops is apt to cause "infestations, " 
then we ought to avoid planting intensive crops, rather than kill insects or rodents that 
come to feed on our crops. 
Most "pests" might easily be avoided rather than eliminated. To minimize 
conflicts, with annoying or dangerous insects, we ought to wear long sleeves and use 
window-screens. In order to minimize conflict with "pest" mammals, we ought to avoid 
farming methods that attract these organisms. The Minimize Harm Maxim requires that 
we change our behaviour, when possible, to avoid harmful conflicts. 
Minimizing harm in such instances is neither novel nor difficult. Indigenous 
cultures tended to avoided conflict in this manner, rather than destroying competitors or 
threats: "While the Europeans killed wildlife in number and without mercy, the Bantu built 
a structure that attempted to minimize association between humans and wildlife... " 
(Burnett 157). Just as we take precautions to avoid conflicts with detrimental humans, by 
locking doors and restricting our movement in dangerous areas or at dangerous times, we 
ought to avoid conflicts with other entities that we consider problematic or dangerous. 
The minimize harm ethic expects people to "do all that they reasonably can to keep such 
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conflicts from arising in the first place. Just as in human ethics, many severe conflicts of 
interest can be avoided simply by doing what is morally required early on" (Sterba 201). 
The availability of law enforcement alters moral assessments. For instance, in 
Western law we are not allowed to harm someone who steals our pumpkins for two 
reasons: our lives are not directly in danger, and there are legal means to cope with such 
problems. If you steal your neighbour's source of sustenance, you pose only an indirect 
threat, and in our current ethical and legal systems your neighbour may not harm you. We 
may only harm another individual if that person poses a direct threat to our immediate 
physical safety, i. e. if we feel our own lives are in imminent danger. Thus, a human life 
can only be taken if another human life is threatened. 
For citizens of Western countries, there is "no consideration short of the defense of 
one's own life [which] would justify taking the lives of others" (Narveson, "Animal" 165). 
But for "enemy" soldiers, law enforcement people on death row, and those with unwanted 
pregnancies, Western ethics are less clear about the value of human life. Soldiers can be 
killed in war, criminals can be executed, and fetuses can be killed before birth. Such 
killings are permissible based on assumed threats to the well-being or safety of other 
human beings. Such killings indicate that current Western ethics do not protect all human 
life in every situation. 
b. a parallel theory: There is no parallel legal mechanism that maintains such a 
high moral standard for protecting life between species. While our current ethical system 
is designed to protect human life in almost every instance, current human legal systems 
allow individuals to harm members of other species for a host of reasons. In fact, there are 
very few instances in which other animals may not be killed, except where such killing 
harms the interests of a human being. For example, killing another person's goat is legally 
considered destruction of their property. Endangered species legislation provides another 
example. These laws protect the lives of other animals, but they are written from the point 
of view of the ultimate benefit to humanity-we have a selfish interest in biological 
diversity. In the absence of morally relevant differences, consistency requires that we 
apply human ethical standards for protecting life for its own sake to all living entities. 
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The Minimize Harm Maxim offers a more consistent and impartial interspecies 
morality, one that parallels human ethics. Minimizing harm requires that we exist in ways 
that minimize conflicts with other beings. Only when we have considered the behaviours 
of other animals, proactively protected our lives and livelihoods, and only when we are 
directly, physically threatened by another being, is self-defense a legitimate reason to harm 
another entity. This requirement is consistent with accepted Western human ethics 
between moral agents and moral patients. 
c. relative proportion: In the Minimize Harm Maxim the occasional annoying fly 
that finds its way in despite screens, ought to be brushed away or put outside rather than 
swatted. An annoying fly does not deserve capital punishment any more than an annoying 
human. However, a mosquito buzzing around one's ears in an area known to have 
malaria, might be considered a direct, immediate threat to one's life, thereby earning a 
death-sentence. Similarly, a mouse in one's kitchen might not be considered ideal, but it is 
unlikely to be life threatening. Other animals that we do not prefer to live with ought to be 
relocated before numbers pose a health issue, and before conflicts arise. 
The Minimize Harm Maxim asks humans to deal with other "pests" the same way 
we deal with human "pests. " Consistency and impartiality require that we respect the lives 
of other creatures inasmuch as we respect human life. Therefore "pests" of all species 
ought to be dealt with similarly, most often through relocation rather than death. 
9. Minimize Harm Maxim Restated. 
It is possible to diminish the Minimize Harm Maxim to two complementary rules: 
minimize harm; maximize noninterference. As long as all sub-points are included this 
optional presentation seems acceptable. However, no utilitarian scale of meamirement 
applies. Harm is not weighed or compared between individuals or across species. 
In the Minimize Harm Maxim, first and foremost one ought to minimize harm. By 
way of carrying this out, one ought to maximize noninterference. There is no assessment 
of harms, but rather a personal assessment of intention. A harm is always regrettable, 
whether to a gnat or a pig, whether from losing a limb or from starvation. It is always 
immoral to harm a living entity purposefully and unnecessarily. It is only acceptable to 
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bring about harm when that harm has been minimized, and when such a harm is necessary 
for survival. 
C. Applications. 
This section applies the Minimize Harm Maxim to five ongoing protectionist issues 
and two hypothetical scenarios. 
1. Ongoing Protectionist Issues. 
a. zoos and circuses: Non human animals are used in zoos and circuses, on 
television, and in local fairs, for the entertainment and "education" of human beings. 
Circus trainers replace normal species behaviour with unnatural acts. These 
modifications are made for the entertainment of human beings-because people find such 
acts interesting and entertaining. Distortion of natural modes, and imposing unusual 
behaviour for amusement, is unethical between people. For the sake of philosophical 
consistency, circuses ought to be acknowledged as unethical. 
The Minimize Harm Maxim asserts noninterference, which requires that each living 
entity be left to its biological behaviours, unless we must harm such an organism in self- 
defense or to fulfil a primary need. Confining, restricting, and training other entities to 
perform bizarre acts, violate the Minimize Harm Maxim. 
Given that zoos and circuses exist, what ought we to do? 
Many caged animals have lost their ability to survive in the wilds. Non-human 
animals confined for human purposes ought to be re-habituated and returned to the wilds 
when possible. Those unlikely to survive in the wilds ought to be allowed to live out their 
lives in spacious, private quarters, in conditions that are as natural as possible. In such 
instances, good intentions require that these captive animals exist for their own sake, and 
not for the entertainment or "education" of others. 
Any form of confinement of non-human living entities is inconsistent with human 
ethics. Capturing, imprisoning, and training non-human animals-under any human 
justification-fails to maximize noninterference, fails to minimize harm, and is therefore 
indefensible. We are not entitled to assume, across species and without consent, that 
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confinement is preferable to other alternatives. This includes activities such as captive 
breeding and caging "problem" wildlife. 
While one might argue that such actions are well intended, a closer look reveals 
that this is not currently the case. Captive breeding fails to show good intent for the 
individuals involved. Captive breeding stems from human interest in maintaining genetic 
diversity amongst species. We do not act for the individual at hand, or even on behalf of 
the species we strive to save. It is for our future that we maintain biodiversity. 
Meanwhile, for those captured and caged, much is lost. 
Consistency and impartiality require that our ethics deal with other animals as we 
deal with our own kind, in the absence of morally relevant distinctions. Many humans 
would rather die than be captured or controlled by others. The likely terror of finding 
oneself suddenly in a cell, the fear, frustration and boredom of confinement, uncertainty 
regarding one's captors, and loss of freedom and autonomy are a dreadful thought to most 
of us-more so if our captors happen to be a completely different species, alien to our 
understanding and experience. Caged non-human animals exhibit behaviours that suggest 
that they feel similarly about being captured and detained, confined and controlled. 
Even if we do not discern displeasure, given the epistemological problems of 
understanding what other animals think or feel, consistency and impartiality require that 
we treat all living entities as we treat human life. It is not morally permissible to cage, 
chain, or otherwise detain people for the purpose of entertainment or education. Nor do 
we engage in "captive breeding" to preserve "endangered" races. The last purebred Maori 
(indigenous to New Zealand) died recently; there was no systematic effort to continue this 
particular breed of human. It is considered immoral to control and manipulate the lives of 
other human individuals in such a manner. (An ethic that maximizes noninterference and 
minimizes harm would have assured the continuance of the Maori. ) 
In contrast, we do cage problem people. However, caging "problem" humans is 
not comparable for three reasons. First, caged humans are morally culpable. They are 
presumed to have willfully breached the ethical and legal systems relevant to, and 
understood by, their species. Such humans are morally accountable to human ethics; other 
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species are not, and should not be imprisoned with regard to an ethical and legal code of 
which they have no understanding, and which they played no part in establishing. 
Second, "problem humans" undergo a rigorous procedure to determine the need 
for detainment. Non-human animals do not, and cannot, undertake such a procedure due 
to communication barriers. 
Third, we cannot legally exploit imprisoned human beings. Prisoners are never 
forced to learn and perform "tricks" and they are not perpetually used as entertainment for 
others. 
Consistency and impartiality require that we extend ethical standards that protect 
human life to protect other living entities, due to an absence of any morally relevant 
distinction between all human beings and all other animals. Consequently, the Minimize 
Harm Maxim does not permit captive breeding or caging "problem" non-human animals. 
Noninterference requires that we refrain from manipulating other species except out of 
necessity to satisfy basic needs, or with good intentions toward the living entity that is 
manipulated. 
Where "problem" animals are concerned, the Minimize Harm Maxim indicates that 
we must do all that we can to avoid dangerous encounters, but if such encounters occur, 
we may harm an entity that poses a direct threat to our safety. Although we ought not to 
catch and detain such animals, capture-and-release reveals good intentions toward those 
caught, and is preferable, where applicable. 
In the Minimize Harm Maxim zoos and circuses are fundamentally unethical 
because they are built and maintained for the benefit of human beings at the expense of 
other animals. Other animals are incapable of offering verbal consent to human beings for 
such usage. These institutions do not constitute an act of self-defense, nor do they reveal 
good intentions. They cannot be justified as fulfilling a basic interest. Zoos and circuses 
fail to minimize harm or maximize noninterference. Consequently, for the sake of 
impartial and consistent application of human ethical standards across species, zoos and 
circuses ought to be shut down, and those who work in such facilities otherwise employed. 
b. clothing: The need to cover our bodies entails harm that fulfills a basic interest. 
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In the Minimize Harm Maxim, harming other entities is morally permissible in order to 
satisfy a basic interest, therefore acquiring clothing is a permissible harm 
Killing low on the food chain harms less than killing higher on the food chain. 
Consequently, the Minimize Harm Maxim indicates that clothing ought to be acquired low 
on the food chain. Mammals are higher on the 
food chain than plants; consequently, their 
death entails more harm. Under the Minimize 
Harm Maxim, plant or mineral sources 
ought to be used for clothing whenever possible. 
There are extreme instances in which using the body parts of other animals might 
be morally permissible. For instance, in the absence of alternative choices, if one is likely 
to freeze to death, one might kill another animal in order to make warm clothing. 
However, the Minimize Harm Maxim requires consistency and impartiality across species: 
the same individual must also be permitted to harm another human being for this purpose. 
Now let us assume that this same individual, at risk of freezing to death, has 
received a shipment of ammunition for a semi-automatic rifle specifically so that she and 
her community might kill other creatures, including neighboring peoples, in order to 
acquire clothing for the winter. Using modern weapons, and access to ammunition, 
demonstrates availability of clothing sources that are lower on the food chain. If a hunter 
is able to receive supplies from afar, then she ought to receive cotton and Polarguard, flour 
and potatoes-or starters for planting hemp and potatoes-rather than weapons. 
Weapons perpetuate a lifestyle that fails to minimize harm. Anyone importing or buying 
modern, manufactured munitions ought to import clothing and food-staples rather than 
guns and ammunition. 
In the past certain hunter-gatherers could not have survived without wearing parts 
of other animals. Times have changed. "Hunter-gatherers" who import flour and coffee 
on Monday and shoot ducks and rabbits on Tuesday fail to minimize harm. "[I]t is 
disingenuous to point to such human communities" and claim that those who "live close to 
the land" can kill and still "show respect for animals" (A. Taylor 254). Those who destroy 
living entities unnecessarily fail to demonstrate respect for life. If vegetable products such 
as cotton or hemp can be imported along with flour and coffee, there is no need to harm 
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other animals, and the hunter fails to minimize harm. 
The Minimize Harm Maxim does not permit wearing the body parts of other 
creatures except in life-threatening situations where no plant sources can be employed. 
The Minimize Harm Maxim asserts that one ought to harm as low on the food chain as 
possible, in order to minimize harm and maximize noninterference. This application of 
current Western ethics maintains the important standard of impartiality. 
c. diet: Living entities must eat to persist. Human beings have the same right to 
persist as other organisms. However, what we choose to eat is morally relevant. 
Under the Minimize Harm Maxim, we ought to kill low on the food chain in order 
to minimize harm; one ought to eat only fruit. Second best would be the diet of a 
fruitarian, followed by that of a vegan. A vegetarian food choice results in considerably 
more harm, but not as much as a carnivore that eats flesh, dairy, and eggs. 
Those who eat only fruits cause the least harm. When we eat fruit such as peaches, 
berries, tomatoes, grapes, or bananas, we do not harm the seeds; the seeds remain viable. 
Eating fruit thus need not cause any harm to the plant, and may actually be beneficial to 
the spreading of its seeds. For this reason fruits are the ethically preferred food source. 
Fruitarians, who eat only fruit and nuts, do not kill plants or animals. Eating nuts 
interferes with the reproduction of plants because potential plants are destroyed when the 
nut (seed) is eaten. 
A vegan eats no animal products. However, the reproductive conatus of plants is 
harmed when one eats peas or beans, while other plants are completely uprooted, such as 
carrots and potatoes. Vegan's harm at the very bottom of the food chain, harming only 
plant life. 
If one is a vegetarian, one destroys many more plants and contributes to the 
suffering of non-human animals. 
One might think that subsisting on the nursing-milk of cattle brings about less harm 
than subsisting on dairy products because nothing needs to die directly for the 
consumption of nursing-milk: neither cow nor calf are necessarily harmed. In the 
Western world, animals that produce dairy products are harmed through the process of 
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repeated impregnation, the removal of their young, slaughter of male calves, and the 
extracting of nursing milk for human purposes. Like humans, cows do not lactate unless 
they are with young. Only after being impregnated, and after giving birth, will a cow 
produce milk. If the calves are kept alive, they (like their parents) proceed to destroy many 
smaller entities in the process of survival. Male dairy calves are most often subjected to 
the horrors of the veal industry, which allows them a truncated and much-diminished 
existence. Veal calves, along with battery hens, are among the most neglected and abused 
agribusiness victims. 
Egg laying birds, such as hens and turkeys, destroy other animals such as insects, 
worms, and snakes. If they are fed processed corn or wheat, the ill-effects of agribusiness 
adds additional harm. 
If one chooses to eat animals one brings about the most harm. By killing entities 
that eat other life forms (usually plants), rather than directly eating entities that live by 
photosynthesis, one increases exponentially the amount of harm in the world. Not only 
does one harm the animal whose flesh is eaten, but also the many plants necessary to 
sustain these animals, and the many smaller animals that live within and on that species. 
Grazing animals (both dairy and flesh industry) rarely kill vegetation-but they do 
interfere with the conatus of large quantities of vegetable matter. (Note that this only 
holds for natural grazers. ) Herbivores also destroy the lives of many smaller animals 
simply by moving around and chewing on vegetation. Animals that are not natural 
grazers-those fed processed grains and grasses-consume tremendous quantities of 
vegetation that has been raised and destroyed solely for this purpose. Agribusiness grain 
products are an inefficient method of producing food, and they are extremely harmful to 
the environment. Harm to the environment is also greatly increased if one chooses to eat 
flesh from the supermarket: 
... 90 percent of the protein, 99 percent of the carbohydrate, and 100 percent of the 
fiber value of grain 
is wasted by cycling it through livestock, and currently 64 percent of the U. S. grain crop is fed to 
livestock. Thus, by adopting a more vegetarian diet, people ... could significantly reduce the amount 
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of farmland that has to be kept in production to feed the human population. This change. in turn, 
could have beneficial effects on the whole biotic community by eliminating the amount of soil erosion 
and environmental pollutants that are a result of the raising of livestock. For example, it has been 
estimated that 85 percent of the U. S. topsoil lost from cropland, pasture, range land, and forest land 
is directly associated with raising livestock. (Sterba 202-203) 
Most notably, those who eat flesh truncate the lives of these other animals. Many 
animals raised under the difficult conditions of modern agribusiness are harmed greatly 
during their short existence. Consider the case of broiler hens: 
This must constitute, in both magnitude and severity, the single most severe, systematic example of 
man's inhumanity to another sentient animal. ... these animals are 
in chronic pain for one third of 
their short, six-week lives, only 10% are able to walk normally, up to 6% die during rearing, 4% have 
chronic arthritis, 3% break their bones, and 2 million of them die during transport each year. In 1994 
some 7 billion of these animals were in the United States, 4 billion in Europe, and 719 million in the 
United Kingdom. (Orlans 255) 
Current Western agribusiness techniques cause tremendous harm, not just to chickens, 
but to all species that are produced for human consumption: 
... 
factory farms "reduce" the animals made to live in then. For one thing, the very confinement of the 
animals makes their natural development impossible. Confinement also usually pushes the animals 
past the point at which their social instincts can offer them emotional and social equilibrium. Caged 
chickens are cut off from any social relations whatsoever, while others, raised 100,000 to a giant shed, 
are "debeaked" (have their beaks cut off) so that they can't peck each other to death in their fury and 
confusion. All "stock" are bred for maximum weight gain. Pigs are often so bloated that they cannot 
even copulate... artificial insemination is coning into vogue. There are already chickens who gain 
weight so fast that they cannot walk, and deformities and unexplained deaths abound. Research 
veterinarians argue that chickens already "have been bred to grow so fast that they are on the verge of 
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structural collapse" -while genetic engineers speak with enthusiasm about soon breeding chickens 
that have no heads at all. (Weston 119-120, quote from Wise, Veterinary 91) 
If cattle and chickens are allowed freedom and their natural longevity (which is not 
the case for free-range hens or cattle), and if we maximize noninterference in their lives, 
and minimize harm, it is still morally preferable to eat only fruit, to be afruitarian , or to 
be a vegan. Consuming any animal products represents a failure to eat low on the food 
chain, and thereby fails to minimize harm. 
When we choose what we eat, we make an ethical choice. "Unlike us... animals 
cannot survive without killing other creatures [for food]" (Telfer 78). Human beings can. 
There is no nutritional need for humans to eat any animal products such as dairy, flesh, or 
eggs. In fact, doing so increases harm not only to those consumed, but also to the 
consumer, since the consumption of animal products is linked to serious health problems, 
such as heart disease and cancer. 
Minimizing harm also indicates that food ought to be organically produced so that 
the destructive methods of agribusiness, including the harms of pesticides, herbicides, 
overt cruelty, transport, and waste disposal are eliminated. Organic, local farming 
minimizes harm and is consistent with the Minimize Harm Maxim. 
Some argue that traditional diets ought to be maintained in order to preserve 
cultural heritage, offer continuity and meaning, and prevent peoples from becoming 
dependent on outside sources for warmth and sustenance. Hunting is considered a 
traditional activity. There are three important factors to be considered regarding this 
viewpoint: 
" what constitutes "traditional" 
" resolution of conflicts between tradition and more fundamental ethical 
commitments 
" notions of independence 
"Traditional" is defined as an act or idea that has been handed down from the past; 
a "long established or inherited way of thinking or acting" (Webster's). Tradition entails 
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actions that are a "continuing pattern" of customary methods (Webster's). This definition 
indicates that if one breaks continuity, the tradition is broken. It also indicates that the act 
is not important in and of itself-methods are important. 
Today's hunters use modern methods. Oftentimes there is very little vestige of 
older practices. Most "traditional" hunters cannot be distinguished from other modern-day 
hunters. Yet the definition of traditional indicates that if traditional methods have not been 
continuously maintained, an activity is not traditional. Neither can people return to 
traditional methods because, by definition, these activities must be a "continuing pattern. " 
Tradition refers to customary methods that have been maintained continuously over an 
extended period of time. Hunting with modern weapons under modern conditions does 
not, and cannot, qualify as traditional. 
Second, when tradition conflicts with more fundamental ethics, current Western 
ethics has set a precedent for upholding ethics at the expense of tradition. For instance, 
when tradition threatens human life, the tradition is systematically destroyed; headhunting 
and slavery are apt examples. When one's tradition is headhunting, rather than deer 
hunting, we make haste to ban cultural heritage. Consistency and impartiality require that 
we extend our preference for preserving life, over preserving tradition, to all living entities. 
Our reaction to slavery and headhunting indicates that today's "traditional" hunters must 
be acknowledged as yesterday's bad habits. Persistence of culture, though important, is 
not as important as preserving the fundamental health and welfare of individuals. As a 
matter of consistency in applied ethics, the Minimize Harm Maxim is as decisive about 
protecting all living entities as human ethics are about protecting human life. 
Finally, there is the issue of dependence. "Traditional" advocates often argue that 
they do not wish to be dependent on other people for their sustenance. If "traditional" 
hunters use manufactured weapons, or import ammunition, sugar, or coffee not only do 
they not qualify as "traditional, " but they do not qualify as "independent. " If any products 
are imported, isolation and "independence" are fictional. The Minimize Harm Maxim 
indicates that one who minimizes harm will not depend on merchants who sell weapons 
rather than merchants who sell vegetables and rice. In either case they are dependent, but 
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only in the latter instance do they minimize harm. 
What of the harm that gardening entails? Do not gardeners grow vegetation and then 
destroy it? Do they not maim and kill hundreds of small creatures in the process? Yes. 
Two points must be recalled: 
" to persist as a biological entity entails harm 
" intentions matter 
We cannot maintain our existence without causing harm. The Minimize Harm 
Maxim asks only that we minimize harm. Ideally, this would mean that one would subsist 
only on fruit. 
Intentions matter. The intent of gardening is not to maim and kill, but to sustain 
life with a minimum of harm. To be consistent with the Minimize Harm Maxim, each 
move a gardener makes ought to be toward the production of food, and any harm caused 
ought to be either unavoidable or incidental. Vegetable gardeners who follow the 
Minimize Harm Maxim are morally obliged to minimize harm: they ought to avoid 
running over snakes, hacking worms in two, using pesticides, squishing insects, or 
destroying slugs and mice that share food-sources. 
d. science: Science has brought many wonderful things to our world, from Velcro 
to computers, from medicine to astronomy. However, science has also brought many 
more questionable things into our world, such as pesticides and cloning, Styrofoam and 
nuclear weapons. 
Science has often been divorced from morality. From a polluted and 
overpopulated planet to a generation of children that have grown up under the threat of 
nuclear disaster, we have suffered the consequences of science divorced from morality- 
and sometimes devoid of common sense. This does not disavow the good that science has 
brought to our world, of the good intentions of many. scientists, but it does require us to 
reconsider some of what science can offer, particularly those things that science offers at 
the expense of life itself. 
Scientific experimentation on living entities of any kind is not a basic need; it is not 
necessary for the survival of the experimenter. Nor is any one experiment necessary for 
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the survival of any particular individual. There are many instances where experimentation 
has led to the saving of lives, but this is not the same as experimentation being directly and 
surely necessary to a living entity. Some experiments have proven essential to the lives of 
particular individuals after the fact, but this is not a predictable outcome-no single 
experiment is done because it is necessary to and will surely save a certain life. 
The nature of experimentation entails uncertain outcomes. Benefits are 
hypothetical. Furthermore, much experimentation does nothing to help anyone, except 
perhaps the rare researcher who gains the personal benefit of publishing her work. But 
publishing does not constitute a basic need. Although benefits are hypothetical, the 
"subjects" of an experiment are always harmed because they are exploited, without 
consent, for someone else's possible gain. 
Good intentions do not legitimize experimentation. While an experimenter's final 
intent may be admirable, their short-term intentions are deplorable: scientists who 
experiment on animals frustrate, infect with diseases, remove vital body parts, and inject 
alien substances into subjects that cannot offer consent. Such acts fail to show good 
intentions. While harm is not the ultimate intent of scientific research, those who 
experiment on animals harm "laboratory" animals purposefully and directly. Such acts do 
not constitute good intentions. Nor do they minimize harm. 
How then are we to preserve ourselves against disease? It is permissible for a 
living entity to fight directly against disease in self-defense, but not to exploit others 
toward this end. This is consistent with current Western human ethics. If people allowed 
the exploitation of other human entities to secure personal survival, then an individual with 
liver cancer might capture a healthy organ from a neighbour in order to replace their own 
cancerous liver. Under the Minimize Harm Maxim we are not helpless in the face of 
disease. It is morally permissible, because it satisfies a basic interest and is an act of self- 
defense, to fight to persist against such living entities as bacteria, invading cells, or viruses. 
Self-defense is morally permissible when faced with a direct threat to our immediate 
survival. 
Consistent with current Western ethics, the Minimize Harm Maxim does not allow 
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one to exploit innocent third parties in order to achieve personal ends. Neither are 
scientists morally justified in exploiting other life forms in hopes of finding cures for those 
that have, or might come to have, biological shortcomings, cancerous cells, or harmful 
viruses. Noninterference requires that we allow other entities to exist as they are, and 
forbids the use of other living entities for our own hypothetically beneficial ends. If we are 
ethically committed to maintaining consistency and minimizing harm, mice, rabbits, 
monkeys, and dogs ought not to be traded off against the hopes of those who are 
unhealthy or dying. 
However, this does not preclude all experimentation with living entities. Under the 
Minimize Harm Maxim no life form may be sacrificed for the benefit of another, without 
verbal consent. Those who offer verbal consent may be used for experimentation. People 
who are ill and wish to be used to test drugs, those who might be able to save a loved-one 
by risking an unknown operation, and those who might save someone much younger by 
giving their body to science may do so. Due to communication barriers, verbal consent 
effectively eliminates all human exploitation of other animals for science. Only with the 
consent of the "used" entity may science exploit one being for the benefit of another. The 
Minimize Harm Maxim indicates that the ethical individual ought to inflict suffering only 
for the advantage of the individual that is caused to suffer, or with consent. 
Neither does this preclude all use of non-human animals. Animals that have died 
naturally, or that have been euthanized for their own sake-because they were painfully, 
terminally ill, for instance-may be used for the purposes of science, as they are today 
(Zinko 7). 
This is consistent with human ethics. Human ethics indicate that it is immoral to 
exploit healthy entities in an attempt to save one's own life. No matter how talented, 
powerful, artistic, or influential an individual is, it is immoral for them to exploit other 
people (without consent) in hopes of regaining their health. It is also consistent with 
applied human ethics because we use dead human beings for the purpose of science. The 
Minimize Harm Maxim maintains an impartial and consistent ethic to protect all living 
entities. 
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The Minimize Harm Maxim offers an ethical ideal. Each living entity desires to 
persist, but human ethics prevent the powerful from exploiting the weak. Our laws and 
values indicate that to kill others in the hope of saving oneself is unethical, unless one acts 
in self-defense. The Minimize Harm Maxim extends this commonly accepted ethic to all 
entities. One might be willing to kill a mouse, or a million mice, or the very last mouse on 
earth, to save a loved one. But such exploitation is hardly commendable. Desperate 
sentiments are not a sound basis on which to build an ethical code. Ethics offer an ideal, 
not a defense of our most base tendencies. 
More precisely, our powerful instinct to live is exactly why we need to have ethical 
codes-to protect the weak from the powerful. Current Western ethics generally asserts 
that might does not make right. The Minimize Harm Maxim, based on consistency and 
impartiality, insists that this is just as important between species as it is amongst our own 
kind. Under a maxim that requires us to minimize harm, human illness remains our 
problem; we may not destroy or harm other beings in our efforts to secure health and 
longevity. Experimentation on non-human living entities, entities that cannot give verbal 
consent, is never justified under the Minimize Harm Maxim. 
e. non-human animal companions: "Pets" entail multiple ethical dilemmas: What 
are non-human companion animals to be fed? Where can they roam where no other 
creature will be disturbed? How might we deal with the prodigious amount of waste 
produced by our animal companions? What are we to do with the great quantities of 
homeless "pets" that we allow to breed each year? How can we protect them from 
negligent or cruel "owners"? 
Exaggerated numbers of "domestic" animals increase harm to other living entities. 
Roughly 70 million small animals are killed by domestic cats every year (Wilkins 75). 
Petfoods line the coffers of those who own and operate slaughterhouses and other 
enterprises that exploit living entities for profit. "Companion animals" are also vulnerable 
to human abuse. "Pets may be subjected to deliberate cruelty, but also, and perhaps more 
commonly, may become victims of mere indifference and neglect" (Benton 71). For all of 
these reasons, "companion animals" increase harm. 
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Because "pets" interfere with our ability to minimize harm, breeding companion 
non-human animals is incompatible with the Minimize Harm Maxim. Therefore, we ought 
to tend the "pets" that already exist by keeping them contained (so that they do not prey 
on other animals), by feeding them a vegan diet, and by sterilizing each one. Under the 
Minimize Harm Maxim "pets" ought to be phased out through sterilization. 
2. Lifeboat Scenarios. 
Protectionist theories have frequently been criticized for leading to "outrageous" 
conclusions when applied to "lifeboat" scenarios. Most theories, when they are applied to 
outlandish situations, tend to induce outrageous conclusions. Yet there is philosophic 
value in examining hypothetical scenarios (as discussed in the introduction). Therefore, in 
this section the Minimize Harm Maxim is applied to a typically unlikely lifeboat scenario in 
order to test the buoyancy of the Minimize Harm Maxim. The goal is to determine, 
ideally, what might transpire in a certain hypothetical situation. 
Let us suppose, as Regan did, that there are four humans and a non-human animal 
in a lifeboat. The boat can only float with four entities aboard. 
The Minimize Harm Maxim indicates that, ideally, those humans on board who are 
able to converse with one another would consider how to minimize harm. Ideally, all on 
board would have good intentions (i. e. they would intend to minimize harm) and one entity 
would willingly die for the sake of the other four. Perhaps they would choose to allow the 
oldest, the terminally ill, or the sickly to die. Another consideration might be numbers 
saved. If one member were pregnant it would then constitute a greater harm to throw her 
overboard. If this were the case, and if the non-human happened to be a potter wasp 
tending a multitude of larvae, then throwing the potter wasp into the sea would fail to 
minimize harm. 
In an ethic where species, consciousness, talent, intelligence, and sentience are 
irrelevant to the wrongness of causing harm-, as is the case among humans in our 
culture-we must search long and hard for morally relevant criterion by which to make 
such a decision. Age, health, and pregnancy are the most obvious candidates for making a 
morally relevant distinction in such a lifeboat scenario. In the Minimize Harm Maxim the 
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destruction of each and every entity is an equal harm. Ultimately, in the Minimize Harm 
Maxim, it does not matter which entity goes overboard. 
In the Minimize Harm Maxim, ideal ethical behaviour minimizes harm. The harm 
of exterminating any one of the five entities is equal no matter who goes overboard. 
Amongst human beings who share a language, they ought to discuss which decision would 
entail the least harm. 
The Minimize Harm Maxim stands in a long line of philosophic theories that are 
utopian. While idealistic theories often seem extreme and unlikely, the Minimize Harm 
Maxim stands as a model of what we ought to do if we are to be consistent and impartial, 
in the absence of a morally relevant distinction between people and other animals, and if 
we are to persist in our current ethic with regard to human beings. The Minimize Harm 
Maxim upholds ideals that Western ethics strongly supports, such as protecting the health 
and safety of the weak and poor from the powerful and rich. The Minimize Harm Maxim 
allows each living entity an improved chance of fulfilling vital interests that might 
otherwise be lost if we did not strive to minimize harm. 
3. Organs versus Organisms. 
How might we apply the Minimize Harm Maxim to systems within systems? Does 
my left lung have an equal claim to persist in relation to my entirety? Does a species count 
for more than the individual? 
Minimizing harm requires that we harm less rather than more. To avoid harm is to 
avoid frustrating or thwarting the conatus of living entities-the interest that each living 
entity has in biological persistence. To spare a spleen at the expense of an entire body- 
liver, spleen, heart, scales, etc. -is counter productive. Similarly, one ought not to spare a 
cell within a spleen at the expense of the spleen. To destroy the whole for the sake of one 
part fails to minimize harm. 
The spleen is dependent on a specific body, and the body equally dependent on the 
spleen; each is mutually and exclusively dependent on the other. To destroy the spleen is 
to harm the dependent body, and all other organs. To save the spleen, at the expense of 
the many other organs in the body, fails to minimize harm. One ought not to save an 
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internal organ at the expense of a living entity. 
This is not true in the case of individuals and ecosystems. Animals are generally 
not individually integral to any one ecological system. Nor is a specific ecosystem 
necessarily mandatory for the survival of a particular entity. An animal might travel over 
several mountain ranges during its lifetime, or (as in the case of adventuresome 
stowaways), to different continents. Individuals and ecosystems are more flexible in their 
association. Unlike internal organs, no particular individual need be destroyed along with 
an ecosystem, and no ecosystem is significantly affected by the loss of an individual. 
Therefore, individuals and ecosystems are not analogous to body parts and bodies. 
If we are to minimize harm, we ought not to sacrifice organisms for the sake of 
organs, nor ought we to sacrifice living entities for the sake of ecosystems. Such a 
conclusion is consistent with human ethical theory and practice, which maintains human 
beings at the expense of human organs, and at the expense of ecosystems. 
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VI. REVIEW AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In the course of this dissertation I indicated methods and intent, explored the work 
of four prominent philosophers, and presented an idealistic protectionist theory based on 
consistency and impartiality. This final chapter summarizes the fundamental concepts 
explored and developed in the course of my dissertation, and suggests directions for future 
protectionist scholarship. 
1. Overview. 
a. a conspicuous problem: In the West, both civil law and human morality 
protect human conatus, the urge "to preserve our existence as persons" (P. Taylor, 
"Inherent" 25). Western countries tend to protect human life-each human being is 
maintained even at tremendous expense to the rest of society. In contrast, the lives of 
other animals remain almost completely unprotected (Orlans 17). 
At one time only certain human beings were morally considerable, even in Western 
nations. Current Western morality recognizes that there is no morally legitimate reason to 
deny moral considerability to any human being (though there are instances in which moral 
considerability fails to protect human life, such as the case of "enemy soldiers, " or 
criminals condemned to die). Although moral philosophers have been unable to establish 
any morally relevant criteria for denying basic protection to other species, Western 
countries continue to deny all other species even the most fundamental moral protection. 
The contrast between morality with regard to human life and morality with regard to all 
other life forms is conspicuous. It is because of this inconsistency that most informed 
people will acknowledge discomfort with current practices, and it is because of this 
inconsistency that protectionism is an "idea that is easy to ridicule but hard to refute" 
(Ryder, Animal 332). "Current legal consensus seems to be that nearly any human interest 
can in principle qualify as an acceptable justification for animal use... Whether there is a 
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moral consensus in society to this effect is more doubtful" (Orlans 317). 
b. a cooperative enterprise: It is the task of moral philosophers to either sort out 
this inconsistency in moral theory and practice, or justify it. Moral philosophers continue 
to explore more consistent ethical theories. The works of Regan, Singer, Linzey, and 
Taylor contribute to this ongoing effort. 
Protectionist philosophy benefits from this diversity of theory: "What is needed 
most is more cooperative work, and less competitive philosophizing" (Regan, "Animal" 
61). A variety of philosophical theories offer an enhanced possibility for solving this 
ongoing moral dilemma. 
A diversity of theories is also better suited to the diverse population of Western 
countries. For instance, Linzey's theory will be irrelevant to an atheist, but is apt to be 
interesting, and compelling, for a concerned Christian. Alternatively, if an individual feels 
strongly about human rights, they are apt to find moral concordance in Regan's work. 
Each theory helps individuals to recognize and acknowledge the current inconsistency, as 
well as offering possible solutions. 
c. the Minimize Harm Maxim: The Minimize Harm Maxim is a protectionist 
theory that will appeal to a more general audience than most other applied protectionist 
theories. This theory is apt to find moral resonance with someone who is interested in 
philosophical consistency. 
Let us imagine an individual who does not accept the notion of human rights, does 
not care about minimizing suffering, and who is not moved by religious teachings; what is 
the most fundamental common ground one might reach with such an individual? The 
answer seems to be conatus: this person is alive, and almost surely wishes to remain alive. 
If one accepts that they have conatus that they wish to protect, and that human 
beings in general have conatus that ought to be protected (as we all generally assume), 
then moral consistency requires that they extend this protection to all entities that have 
conatus. In the absence of any morally relevant distinction between all human beings and 
all other animals, the Minimize Harm Maxim asserts that ethics ought to protect all life 
forms if any life forms are protected, barring any morally relevant distinction. If one 
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wishes to assert that only they, or only human beings, have an interest in persisting, the 
burden of proof is theirs. 
Summary: 
" Western moral standards and practice are inconsistent and partial with regard 
to the value of human life as opposed to the value of all other life forms. 
" Therefore a diversity of protectionist theories is beneficial to the ongoing 
search for a more consistent ethic with regard to non-human animals. 
" The Minimize Harm Maxim is part of this ongoing effort in protectionist moral 
philosophy. 
2. Philosophical Standards and the Minimize Harm Maxim. 
a. ethical theories: Current Western ethics is inconsistent with regard to moral 
considerability of human life and moral considerability of all other life forms. It is the task 
of moral philosophers to reexamine established ethics and offer sound moral alternatives. 
Human actions affect the land, other living entities, and every human being. There 
is a link between moral behaviour and a smooth-running, satisfied society (Horsburgh, 
Political 47). Human ethics are extremely important to the larger world. 
Moral philosophy presents maxims and theories that guide moral behavior. The 
practical application of philosophy, determining what one ought to do in a given situation, 
is the task of applied philosophy. One philosophical tool in this endeavor is casuistry, 
examining situations on a case-by-case basis, and consistently applying ethical standards in 
diverse situations that have morally relevant similarities. 
Another philosophical tool is the use of utopian visions, ideals that can guide us 
through real-life situations. The role of moral philosophy is to establish "claims on our 
consideration or respect which we acknowledge as in some sense ideally determinative... " 
(Goodpaster, "On Being" 313). Western ethics entails many ideals that are not only 
difficult, but perhaps also impossible to realize. Even a saint must at times be lustful, 
disingenuous, or gluttonous; it seems impossible to avoid all forms of dishonesty at all 
times. Yet self-control and honesty remain ethical ideals. 
Conversely, making concessions for human ethical shortcomings is not a legitimate 
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concern of, or acceptable practice for, moral philosophers. Stringent expectations, and the 
need for sacrifice, do not alter or diminish the value of moral ideals. Ethics distinguishes 
ideals from actuality, preferable behaviour from common behaviour. An ethic limited by 
what an individual can reasonably be expected to achieve is a degradation of ethical 
theory. Morality is about what one (night to do, not about what one does. Human 
actions may fall short of the ideal, but the task of moral philosophy is to present ideals. 
Therefore, moral philosophers ought not to justify the way individuals prefer to 
live, even powerful, influential individuals. "What is right will not always be apparent, and 
the temptation will always exist to rationalize as necessary what we desire or find 
convenient" (A. Taylor 262). Down through history powerful people have often enjoyed 
a multitude of freedoms at the expense of others. 
... suppose that we had quite different rules, and that more people were free to hit others in the nose, 
and correspondingly fewer were free to enjoy the full beauty and utility of their own unbloodied 
proboscises. Woul¢ this new arrangement have a greater or smaller "amount" of freedom in it, on 
balance? 
... there would 
be not "less" freedom but freedom of a morally inferior kind. (Feinberg, 
Social 24) 
For centuries humans have been freely swinging their fists, while other species 
have suffered bruised and broken lives. 
A "major role of morality... should be to enjoin the protection of the vulnerable 
from the powerful" (Miller 333); establishing moral codes that respect and protect the 
comparatively weak from the strong is one of the definitive duties of moral philosophy. 
The weak and silent have interests; therefore the powerful ought to sacrifice for the 
protection of the less powerful (Feinberg, Social 25). Few would condone a moral theory 
that allowed the strongest and most powerful what they prefer at the expense of the weak, 
the silent, or the poor (Feinberg, Social 23). 
But current Western ethics is inconsistent: weak and vulnerable non-human 
animals are not protected from powerful, exploitative human beings. "... Respect is an 
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antidote to expediency and ignorance. When respected, no being ever counts for nothing. 
Without respect for others, the powerful see everyone and everything as either servants 
and resources or as real or potential obstacles to exercising their power" (diZerega 37). 
Moral philosophers have thus far failed to establish a consistent ethic that protects the 
many vulnerable non-human animals from the powerful, prosperous human species. 
b. examining the Minimize Harm Maxim: The Minimize Harm Maxim, an 
idealistic moral theory based on consistency and impartiality, strives to actualize moral 
ideals through applied philosophy. The Minimize Harm Maxim protects all of the poor, 
weak, and helpless. 
The Minimize Harm Maxim does not make concessions for privileged or powerful 
minorities (human beings as opposed to all other living entities); this is consistent with 
norms for moral philosophy. Moral theories ought not to be limited by the abilities of 
human beings; moral theories indicate how one ought to live. Therefore, also consistent 
with established practices in moral philosophy, the Minimize Harm Maxim offers an ideal. 
The ease or difficulty of enacting a moral theory does not add to or detract from 
the moral strength of a theory. In the absence of a morally relevant distinction between all 
people and all other animals, the Minimize Harm Maxim indicates what one ought to do in 
order to maintain consistency, and act impartially. The Minimize Harm Maxim carries 
current ethical standards with regard to human life to their logical conclusion-not to 
suggest what one might prefer to do, nor what it is "reasonable" to expect, but in order to 
indicate what one ought to do if every human life is morally considerable. 
c. comparison: The Minimize Harm Maxim maintains a number of important 
philosophical strengths in relation to other protectionist theories: 
" It maintains consistency and impartiality. 
" It avoids the dubious metaphysical concept of moral rights. 
" It avoids the epistemological difficulties of assessing consciousness across 
species. 
" It avoids the epistemological difficulties of determining and comparing 
sentience or subject-of-a-life across species. 
Jub 
" It does not depend on the epistemologically perplexing task of comparing 
pleasure, pain, harm suffered, opportunities for satisfaction, or pain across 
species. 
But there are also problems entailed in the Minimize Harm Maxim. First, the 
Minimize Harm Maxim is based on current Western ethics with regard to human life. But 
Western morality is not consistent with regard to minimizing harm to human beings. War, 
capitol punishment, and abortion are all examples of practices that reveal a lack of respect 
for human life. 
The Minimize Harm Maxim, and each of the protectionist theories included in this 
dissertation, extends Western ethics with regard to human life outward to include other 
life forms. If Western ethics do not value of human life, as assumed, then the basis for the 
Minimize Harm Maxim, and most protectionist theories, must be reexamined. 
Second, one might argue that human ethics do not generally allow people to kill 
one another even in dire situations. Consequently, one ought not to kill other animals, 
period. Permitting the killing of other animals in extreme situations is therefore 
inconsistent with Western ethics. 
However, human ethics also disallow eating other humans that are already dead, 
under any circumstances. It is likely that the taboo against eating other humans is 
specifically a narrow, intraspecies ethic, generally upheld throughout the animal kingdom. 
If so, this moral imperative holds little sway over an interspecies ethic regarding moral 
considerability of all life forms. 
Third, in the event that one has to kill another animal (say for the sake of warm 
clothing when there are no other alternatives), it is unclear whether one ought to choose 
to kill herbivores or carnivores. Herbivores eat low on the food chain, and therefore do 
not cause as much harm. In contrast, carnivores eat higher on the food chain. 
Consequently, to kill a carnivore, rather than a herbivore, is to minimize the harm that 
remains in the world. 
However, if one must continue this method of subsistence over a prolonged period 
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of time, killing herbivores would seem preferable. Because animal populations replace 
missing members, replacing carnivores would be more harmful than replacing herbivores, 
based on the fact that the young eat more than mature animals. 
Another perplexing question arises with regard to whether or not one ought to 
choose to kill a healthy or an unhealthy deer, when presented with the choice. If one kills 
the healthy deer one avoids the additional harm of killing parasites that are likely to have 
infested a less healthy animal. However, if one kills the unhealthy animal, one avoids 
contributing to long-term harm to the larger herd. Perhaps a long-range vision seems 
more appropriate: kill the sickly deer, do more harm initially, but avoid long-term harm of 
destroying the healthiest members of a herd. 
Finally, the most likely objection to the Minimize Harm Maxim is that such a 
theory requires tremendous sacrifice because the entire natural world is morally 
considerable. 
What is convenient, or what one might prefer, is not the concern of moral 
philosophy. Ethical theories such as the Minimize Harm Maxim indicate what one ought 
to do for the sake of consistency (if one is to persist with current ethical standards 
regarding human life, in the absence of any morally relevant distinctions between all 
human life and all other life forms). 
3. Reexamining Current Western Ethics. 
Protectionist philosophy is based on the following: 
" Current Western ethics generally places supreme value on human life. 
" Philosophers have established no morally relevant distinction between all 
human beings and all other living entities. 
" Consistency and impartiality are cornerstones of Western philosophical theory 
and applied philosophy. 
Until now I have argued as follows: 
" if one can find no morally relevant distinction between all people and all other 
animals, and 
" if one accepts morality regarding human life, 
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" then consistency and impartiality require an extenuation of the moral sphere to 
include all living entities. 
However, this is not the only option available; there are at least three options: 
" Change current Western ethics so that all living entities are morally 
considerable. 
" Establish morally relevant criteria that differentiate some or all human beings 
from some or all other non-human living entities. 
" Change current Western ethics with regard to human life. 
Through the viewpoints of other scholars, as well as in the Minimize Harm Maxim, 
this dissertation has explored the first option thoroughly. The second option has also been 
explored. This option would almost surely result in the loss of moral considerability for 
some human beings. More importantly, this option is plagued by the epistemological 
difficulties of assessing living entities across species. The third option remains unexplored. 
a. reconsidering the value of human life: 
So you are not like a washing machine or a car and are not defined by the material present at this 
moment. You are a complex system of activities that makes temporary use of various kinds of matter, 
but that matter is not you. You, and all other organisms, are continuous systems of material flux, of 
matter moving in, playing a role, and moving out. You are more like a candle flame or a whirlpool 
than like a washing machine. (Williams 118-119) 
What is the value of human life? Many ancient religious teachings, and modern 
sciences, indicate that human beings are more akin to the mayfly than to the divine. If one 
were to alter current ethical standards with regard to the value of human life, one might be 
able to establish a more consistent ethic that treads a more moderate path-and maintain 
consistency. 
In light of the flagrant inconsistency in Western ethics between regard for human 
life, and regard for all other life forms, it seems reasonable to reevaluate both in search of 
a more moderate and consistent ethic. Protectionists have focused almost exclusively on 
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extending current ethics for human life to other living entities. Perhaps we ought to 
reexamine Western ethics with regard to the value of human life. 
Western ethics have supported the maintenance of medical patients that have been 
brain-dead for years, elderly who would prefer to wither away in peace, and terminally ill 
patients who are suffering and wish to die. Western morality generally encourages the 
maintenance of human life, even at great cost to the community and against the will of the 
endangered individual, except in carefully defined circumstances (such as that of 
dangerous criminals, "enemy soldiers, " or unborn fetuses). Peter Singer remarked in a 
recent interview that humans have, for two thousand years, "enshrined the sanctity of 
human life, no matter how compromised" (Specter 46). In his view it is inevitable that 
such a human-centered view should eventually be exposed as fraudulent, and denounced, 
"just as the day had to come when Copernicus proved that the earth is not at the center of 
the universe" (Specter 46). 
That time has come. In the absence of any morally relevant distinction between a 
lifeless and brain-dead human being and protozoa, consistency requires that we extend 
moral considerability to protozoa. It is because of extreme protection of all human life 
that philosophic consistency leads us to such radical ethics as the Minimize Harm Maxim. 
However, as with the second option, this option threatens to remove moral protection to 
some human beings in some situations. 
b. continuing the trend-moving ethics outward: Given the extent of the ethical 
discrepancy involved, expanding current notions of "moral considerability" to include 
other life forms seems inevitable. Even if we exclude certain human being, and even if we 
fail to protect human beings in certain situations, consistency is apt to require that we 
extend the circle of moral considerability. 
It is the task of moral theories to perpetually knock on established ethical 
boundaries, to push morality to a higher standard. Westerners have extended ethics 
outward from self, to family, to community, and to the entirety of the human species 
(Norton 173); we are now called upon to extend moral considerability to other species. 
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Only a lingering and unprincipled prejudice can now underlie the exclusion of animals from the 
kingdom of ends. Principled moral equality cannot stop with the human race. Thus, animal 
liberation presents itself not as a deviant blip in moral theory, but as a compelling outcome of a long 
Western moral tradition as it has become progressively refined through the demands of consistency, 
through redefinition of what in human experience we value and want morally protected, and through 
developing empirical knowledge regarding similarities and continuities between the human and other 
species. Such is the case for the animals. (Miller 322) 
While it remains unclear whether or not every human being ought to be morally 
considerable, it is clear that consistency requires the extension of moral considerability 
beyond the human circle. 
c. human limitations: How far are human beings able to extend the circle of 
moral considerability? 
Some philosophers assert that human beings are meant to be selfish: "... is it not 
natural for us to be anthropocentric, given that wolves typically conduct themselves in a 
lupucentric manner, eagles generally behave aquicentrically, and bees are fervent 
apicetrists? " (Thiele 178). Perhaps partiality is not only to be expected, but also accepted. 
"In making judgments about the moral status of living things, we are not (or should not 
be) seeking to estimate their value from the viewpoint of the gods, or that of the universe. 
We are not gods but human beings, reasoning about how we ought to think and act. Our 
moral theories can only be based upon what we know and what we care about, or ought 
to care about" (Warren 43). If this is the case, then it is unreasonable to expect animals 
such as human beings to establish a more inclusive ethical vision. 
Accepting the human tendency to be selfish seems misguided for three reasons. 
First, the history of moral philosophy does not support this assertion. Self-centered 
partiality has been the successful target of ethical theory for centuries. The abolition of 
slavery in the United States required southerners "to give up their biggest economic 
investment" ("Underground"). Cotton-sown, grown, and picked by slaves-was the 
most important export-more important than all other exports combined 
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("Underground"). Today few would argue that the economic base of the south, or the 
personal economic interests of those involved, were more important than protecting the 
basic interests of individuals. 
Second, if Western morality accepts that human beings are fundamentally selfish, 
and abandons protectionist ethics as a consequence, the repercussions will be far-reaching. 
In the absence of a morally relevant distinction between all human beings and all other 
animals, with an affirmation of human selfishness, individuals would be entitled to be 
selfish with one another. We could not only exploit a spotted sandpiper and a kinkajou, 
but also other human beings. 
Third, any vision that abandons an ongoing quest for a more expansive, 
compassionate ethic runs contrary to the general understanding of what it is to be a human 
being. People tend to identify bees with an extremely complex social order, whales with 
gentleness and intelligence, and eagles with beautiful flight and keen eyesight. Western 
culture has long held that human beings are the quintessential rational animal, as well as 
the uniquely moral animal. If people accept that they are fundamentally selfish and 
incapable of maintaining a consistent ethic of respect for life, then we will need to 
reexamine the human animal. How can individuals be praised for attributes they are 
unwilling, or unable, to employ? 
4. An Ongoing Endeavor. 
I have proposed and defended an ethic that moves beyond rights and animals, 
beyond vertebrates and sentience, and beyond assumed levels of consciousness, to include 
all living entities. The concept of such an expansive ethic is not new: ancient religious 
beliefs, born before the advent of human history, uphold ethics that protect all life forms, 
and view human beings as just one of many remarkable life forms. This attitude is 
supported by modern science, and philosophers are beginning to suggest that nothing 
ought to be excluded from moral considerability: 
... 
it is ethically wrong to suppose that we need and ought to establish a criterion of moral 
considerability... persevere in our unethical Western imperial venture. That is, putting any criterion 
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into practice is an act of domination, an arbitrary act of power and violence to the beings that are 
thereby rendered Other (i. e., constructed as objects of domination and control). 
The assumption that we can and ought to establish a criterion of considerability should therefore 
be abandoned. Once it is, however, we come to the perhaps startling (and to those who are captivated 
by this assumption, seemingly bizarre) realization that everything must be given moral consideration. 
(Birch 318) 
In light of a comparatively stringent Western ethic with regard to human life, and 
in light of the conspicuous absence of any morally relevant distinction between all humans 
and every other living entity, the conclusion is inescapable: all living entities ought to be 
acknowledged as morally considerable. 
If ethical theories are to have practical relevance, those committed to a more 
consistent ethic ought to change activities and choices to reflect their commitment. Such 
individuals are also called upon to seek legal backing in order to force change in a morally 
negligent world. "The law must be made to recognize... that non-humans have claims to 
life, freedom and the pursuit of happiness just as we do; and among the liberties that 
individual non-humans should be able to enjoy is the freedom from exploitation by 
humankind" (Ryder, Animal 332). 
There is growing evidence that a handful of human beings are ready to rise to this 
moral challenge. One of the most well known lawsuits amongst protectionists was "on 
behalf of a small rare fish, the snail darter, [which] derailed construction of a $100 million 
dam" on the Little Tennessee River (Stone 178). Such a legal case would have been 
unthinkable fifty years ago. Somewhere in the last half-century the snail darter, and at 
least one ecosystem, became a serious moral consideration, even if only to satisfy human 
ends. 
Socrates taught that "the unexamined life is not worth living. " Today the Socratic 
injunction to "Know thyself' entails 
recognizing that one is a single life form among many and that one inhabits an environment that is 
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complex beyond our current understanding and easily perturbed. It also means recognizing that one 
is part of a global community that has existed for centuries and will, one hopes, exist for many more 
and that the capacity for an aesthetic appreciation of the majesty, complexity and wonder of the 
natural world is part of what makes us who we are. (Russow 12) 
Current Western ethics is not only inadequate because it is inconsistent, but also 
because it disregards our biological affiliation with other animals; reveals a lack of 
appreciation for the majesty, complexity, and wonder of life; and demonstrates a lack of 
understanding of the fleeting nature of our personal existence on this planet. 
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